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**SCOPING STUDY ON MINE ACTION AND
SMALL ARMS CONTROL
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
ARMED VIOLENCE AND POVERTY REDUCTION**

Report by UNIDIR

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Scoping study on mine action and small arms control within the framework of armed violence and poverty reduction¹

1. Introduction

Small arms and light weapons (SALW), landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are tools of armed violence—violent conflict, terrorism and crime.² They have devastating impacts on the lives and livelihoods³ of civilians around the world, with negative consequences for human security⁴, poverty reduction and economic growth.⁵ Not only do they kill and injure people but also create less visible costs that impede sustainable development such as psychological trauma, forced displacement, reduced economic activity, loss of investment, and disruption of health and education services.⁶ They are not the causes of underdevelopment and poverty but they present obstacles to overcoming these problems and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—see table 1 on the following page.

Box 1: Definitions

Landmines: anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.

Explosive remnants of war: unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance⁷: explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use and used in armed conflict but has failed to explode as intended.

Abandoned explosive ordnance⁸: explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it.

Small arms and light weapons: revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines, sub-machine-guns; assault rifles; light machine-guns; heavy machine-guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of less than 100mm calibre. Related ammunition and explosives are considered part of SALW.

The impact of SALW and mines on development and poverty reduction are increasingly recognised and acknowledged at the global level. The UN Secretary-General's report, *In Larger Freedom*, highlighted these links saying, "the accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to be a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development" and that mines and ERW "hold back entire communities from working their way out of poverty".⁹ The World Summit in September 2005 explicitly made security-development connections and this was further strengthened by the subsequent adoption of a resolution on the negative humanitarian and development impact of SALW by the United Nations General Assembly.¹⁰ The recent Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, states, "Armed violence destroys lives and livelihoods, breeds insecurity, fear and terror, and has a profoundly negative impact on human development."¹¹

Table 1: The impact of armed violence on the Millennium Development Goals¹²

MDGs	Armed conflict and armed criminal violence
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	<p>Armed violence can inhibit economic activity, compromise livelihoods, and force people to relocate to places where food supplies may be low</p> <p>Widespread armed violence can exacerbate the effects of famine and hunger by inhibiting coordinated responses in affected areas</p>
Achieve universal primary education	<p>Armed violence in the context of conflict often results in the destruction of educational infrastructure, including schools</p> <p>The presence of mines and ERW may prevent children and teachers from accessing schools</p> <p>Student-age children may be forced to forgo education for roles in armed violence, including as child soldiers</p> <p>The availability of teachers may be reduced due to increased levels of armed violence</p> <p>Diversion of state revenues from social expenditure to military spending will reduce education opportunities</p>
Promote gender equality and empower women	<p>Widespread armed violence can disempower men and women, who are often coerced to adopt violent roles against their will</p> <p>Women are often victims of sexual abuse in situations of armed violence</p> <p>Armed violence can perpetuate gender imbalances in societies that carry over into post-conflict life</p>
Reduce child mortality	<p>Child mortality rates due to disease and malnutrition can increase in situations of widespread armed violence, as can the number of deaths from indiscriminate killing of children</p> <p>Young children often fare poorly when they experience the loss of one or more of their parents due to armed violence</p> <p>Infant mortality tends to increase in situations of armed violence, as pregnant women's access to prenatal care is severely restricted</p>
Improve maternal health	<p>Maternal mortality can increase in situations of widespread armed violence as women's access to medical attention is restricted</p>
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	<p>Mortality from a wide range of preventable diseases often increases during armed violence, as health infrastructures deteriorate and people's access to medical services is reduced</p> <p>Increased sexual violence and prostitution provide fertile ground for spreading malaria and HIV/AIDS</p> <p>Refugee flows out of zones of armed violence can contribute to increased levels of disease</p> <p>Most deaths in situations of armed conflict are due to disease or malnutrition</p>
Ensure environmental sustainability	<p>Widespread exploitation of natural resources is often a precipitating or exacerbating feature of widespread armed violence</p> <p>Mines and ERW can have negative environmental effects</p>


There has also been a strong initiative within the mine action community to mainstream mine action into development, reflected in the 2004 Nairobi Action Plan, which has led to the establishment of a Mine Action and Development Contact Group to enhance the capacity of States Parties to integrate mine action and development.¹³ Nevertheless, there could more concrete and coordinated actions to include mine action and SALW control in development programming. A number of entry points are identified in this report, with a particular emphasis on security system reform (SSR) based on the proposal to include armed violence and poverty reduction in the OECD-DAC CPDC network's Security System Reform 2007-2008 work stream.¹⁴ SSR is designed to link security and development agendas at policy and programming levels; mines and SALW also span these security and development concerns and there is scope for them to be better represented in SSR policy and programming as well as in broader development efforts.

Mine action and SALW control have been treated as two separate sectors since their inception due to political decisions and positions, as well as mine action being framed as a humanitarian issue and SALW being seen as a security issue. SALW control is also a more complex issue than mine action, for example sensitivities around legal gun ownership have to be taken into consideration, with a wider group of stakeholders and more variables involved. The mine action community is very well established and structured in terms of activities and actors involved (perhaps to its detriment in terms of integration with other sectors), in a way that SALW control is not.¹⁵ Yet there is evidence that linkages between mine action and SALW control exist, some of which have been explored and others where possibilities remain. However, there are also distinct characteristics that mean a uniform approach to addressing these problems is not possible across the range of activities involved in mine action and SALW control.

Table 2: Mine action and SALW control¹⁶

Mine action	SALW control
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mine risk education (including ERW); • Humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and UXO survey, mapping, marking and clearance; • Stockpile destruction: • Survivor assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; and • Advocacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stockpile management and security • Weapons collection and disposal including destruction • Marking, tracing and record-keeping • SALW awareness • SALW survey • Cross border controls • Legislative and regulatory reform systems (including on civilian possession, official use and misuse/inappropriate use of firearms) • Export, import and transfer controls including brokering controls • Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration • Advocacy • (Survivor assistance)

For the purposes of this report, the linkages have been divided up into three categories: joint programmes (where elements of mine action and SALW control could be integrated), coordinated programmes (where mine action and SALW control would benefit from improved coordination and cooperation between the sectors) and separate programmes (where no links exist or it would be detrimental to combine efforts).

Diagram 1: Linkages between mine action and SALW control

This scoping study was commissioned by UNDP on behalf of the Governments of Canada and the United Kingdom. The aim of this report is to examine the linkages between mine action and SALW control within the context of armed violence and poverty reduction. The findings of the report will feed into the initiative to include SALW control and mine action in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) work stream on SSR within its Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC) Network during 2007-2008.

This report first looks at the impact of SALW and mines on human security, poverty reduction and economic growth. It then examines the existing and potential linkages between mine action and SALW control, also identifying distinct activity areas. The following section examines ways to integrate mine action and SALW control into development planning with a focus on SSR. The report ends with conclusions and recommendations for further research. The report is based primarily on secondary research of existing literature. An additional research component—a consultation process with affected states, donors, international agencies and non-governmental organisations—was also conducted with mixed results.¹⁷

2. How mines and SALW undermine human security, poverty reduction and economic growth in developing countries emerging from, or at risk of, violent conflict.

The most obvious impact that mines and SALW have is that they kill, injure and intimidate people resulting in individuals, families and communities living in fear and insecurity. Although insufficient data is available on the impact of SALW and mines on the health of individuals, it is known from that hundreds of thousands of people are killed by small arms, millions more injured, and between 15,000 and 20,000 are killed and injured by mines each year.¹⁸ If people survive a mine or SALW incident, they and their families often suffer from disability and psychological trauma. There is also evidence to show that victims of violence are at an increased risk of committing violence against others.¹⁹ Yet, despite this suffering, it is the knock-on effects on human security, poverty reduction and economic growth that impede efforts to achieve sustainable development and that are the focus of this section (see table 3). It is often these indirect effects that go unnoticed or are too difficult to extrapolate from other interrelated factors even though they are “more insidious and potentially of greater concern”.²⁰

Mines and SALW have a long-term impact on human security resulting from the real or perceived threat of violence. Mines, especially ERW, are a persistent threat and source of

insecurity—they can take years, even decades, to clear and some will never be totally eliminated. There is also the possibility that abandoned explosive ordnance and ammunition (as well as mines and UXO), which may have been stolen from insecure government stockpiles, will be used or re-used as the explosive component of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)—a serious problem today in Iraq. SALW can circulate for many years and be used in a number of different conflicts, for example, AK-47s and M-16s used during the Vietnam War were also used in Nicaragua and El Salvador more than 30 years later.²¹ The availability and misuse of SALW by individuals, armed groups and the state is a considerable source of insecurity and can also facilitate “cycles of violence” whereby the resulting insecurity can then increase the proliferation and use of SALW, particularly as civilians feel the need to protect themselves. Although SALW control can remove the threat of these weapons by improving the reality and perceptions of security, there may be a danger that the threat of violence persists if demand factors that cause insecurity, such as historical, social and economic contexts, are not addressed.²²

Table 3: Direct and indirect effects of armed violence on development²³

Direct	
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Death and injury • Psychological trauma
Indirect	
Deterioration of access to (and availability of) social services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Denial of access for children and teachers to schools • Increased mortality from a wide range of preventable diseases (particularly child mortality rates) and maternal deaths due to deterioration of health infrastructure, lack of access to potable water, suspension or withdrawal of humanitarian supplies and services, and people’s access to medical services is reduced • Psychological trauma as a result of widespread presence or use of mines and SALW, even if not directly affected • Reduced spending on education, health and other services as funds diverted to defence and security
Inhibited economic activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Denial of access to land, natural resources and facilities • Denial of use of infrastructure networks (roads, railways, air & sea ports, electricity, telecommunications, etc.) • Increased transport costs • Livelihoods and food security undermined • Negative impact on internal investment and production • Capital flight
Reduction in government revenue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interrupted tax collection services • Lower domestic savings • Reduced foreign direct investment • Tourism negatively affected
Social capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased numbers of child soldiers • Increased membership of armed gangs • Increased criminality • Increased armed sexual violence • Militarisation of society, including the use of private security companies
Forced displacement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased numbers of refugees and IDPs • Increased armed violence at refugee/IDP camp
Suspension or withdrawal of development assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability to deliver aid due to presence or use of mines and SALW • Threats to security of aid workers (which leads to increased security costs)

The human security of humanitarian and development workers is also threatened by armed violence—murder, kidnapping, rape, sexual assault, assault, armed robbery, harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, attacks on convoys, the presence of mines and UXO in areas of work, the existence of unrecorded mines on access routes, bomb threats, and so on.²⁴ The militarisation of refugee/internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps has also increased the risk of armed violence against aid personnel. Not only does this have a direct impact on individuals, it can also significantly hamper the delivery of aid and increase the cost of security. Aid agencies may be forced to drastically reduce their programmes or withdraw altogether. This insecurity may also deter the allocation of funding by donors for development programmes.

The real or perceived threat from SALW, as well as mines, can force people to leave their homes and become refugees or IDPs as well as inhibiting their return. This destroys families and communities and disrupts normal economic activities.²⁵ Camps themselves become militarised because of overcrowding and extreme deprivation, causing armed violence and further insecurity. Rural-urban displacement, of which armed violence is a contributor, often results in rural people not finding sustainable or suitable livelihoods in urban areas, resulting in impoverishment.²⁶

The number of mine and SALW casualties that need treatment can add a considerable burden to often already over-stretched healthcare systems. Healthcare facilities and schools may have to close, temporarily or permanently, or may be destroyed by mines and SALW, denying people access to these services. Mortality rates increase from non-violent causes, particularly with regard to maternal health and child mortality rates, and immunization campaigns are disrupted.²⁷ The heavy financial burden of conflict also means that government spending on social services decreases in order to increase expenditure on defence and security, including arms purchases.

The denial of access to land and natural resources inhibits economic activity, destroys livelihoods and creates food insecurity. The destruction and deterioration of physical infrastructure such as roads, ports and factories as well as electricity and telecommunications can also have a significant impact on informal and formal economic activity by disrupting trade and employment, and increasing transport costs.²⁸ For example, transport routes thought to be contaminated by mines can remain unused for considerable amounts of time even if it is only one mine or in fact no mines at all that prevent access. According to the HALO Trust, the presence of a single anti-vehicle mine on a road linking two district capitals in Mozambique (Milange and Morrumbala) cut them off from the rest of the world for over ten years.²⁹ Investment and production can also be negatively affected. Armed violence results in decreases in local and foreign investment and a decline in tourism. Government revenue is also reduced due to interrupted tax collection services and lower domestic savings.³⁰

Armed violence can have a negative impact on the social structure of society with respect to gender relations, family and community cohesion and customary institutions.³¹ Indicators of this include the number of child soldiers, membership of armed gangs, levels of armed sexual violence and general criminality.³²

Mine action, SALW control and development

There is growing evidence of the links between mine action and development and how mine action needs to take the wider context into consideration when planning and implementing programmes. Growing acknowledgement of this is reflected in integrated mine action programmes that are developed in consultation with development actors to ensure the objectives of the programmes also contribute to broader development goals, for example in Cambodia and Afghanistan. A variety of impact assessments have been developed to look at the socio-economic impact of mines as well as mine action programmes, including Landmine

Impact Surveys (LIS), community studies and cost-benefit analysis.³³ This has shifted the focus of measurement away from activities and outputs towards socio-economic outcomes and impact.³⁴ Economic analysis has tended to focus on the impact of mines on economic growth rather than on poverty reduction. However, “the available evidence...indicates that people are often adversely impacted by landmines and ERW, to the extent that households of mine victims are caught in ‘poverty traps’”.³⁵ For example, areas most severely affected by mines also tend to be among the poorest, daily economic activities are affected by the presence of mines, and households with a mine survivor are 40 percent more likely to report difficulty in providing food for the family.³⁶

Removing mines does not necessarily eliminate their negative impacts on development. Apart from the survivors who will still have their disabilities, land that has been cleared may not be used productively. People may be too impoverished to purchase seeds, agricultural implements, livestock, and so on, to bring land back into production.³⁷ There may be land ownership or rights of access disputes that result in people not wanting to invest in freed land.

The link between SALW control and development is increasingly being recognised. Bradford University’s Armed Violence Prevention Initiative (AVPI), the Small Arms Survey, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and others have examined the impact of SALW on development. Greater awareness of the impact of SALW on development has, in turn, led to initiatives in other forums such as the United Nations General Assembly and the OECD to tackle the issue of SALW within the development context.³⁸ However, the Small Arms Survey stated, “A developmental approach to small arms is still in its infancy”.³⁹ The Small Arms Survey has since conducted the first detailed economic study in Colombia and Brazil.⁴⁰ More economic analysis is needed as this information is “an essential component in the design, monitoring, and evaluation of violence prevention and reduction initiatives...[that] highlights how every gunshot wound has implications that go far beyond victim and perpetrator, and thus helps justify investment in gun violence prevention and reduction”.⁴¹

It is also extremely difficult to establish a global estimate of the economic burden of violence, much less gun violence, because of the disparate nature of existing data.⁴² There is under-reporting of incidents, insufficient institutional capacity to create and maintain a data collection system, limited financial and human resources, and ignorance of the problem.⁴³ There is a similar problem regarding the lack of available data on mine incidents; records are incomplete, as some incidents are never reported. In addition, records do not always disaggregate the type of ammunition that caused a UXO incident and often the UXO is subsumed within the “mines” category.

3. Linkages between mine action and SALW control

Mine action and SALW control have tended to be two distinct sectors since their inception in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, there have been some efforts by donors, implementing agencies and civil society to link them and these may be further developed in the near future. This section looks at existing and possible linkages between mine action and SALW control. The linkages are divided up into joint programmes (where elements of mine action and SALW control could be integrated), coordinated programmes (where mine action and SALW control would benefit from improved coordination and cooperation between the sectors) and separate programmes (where no links exist or it would be detrimental to combine efforts). Some aspects of mine action and SALW control straddle these categories, as illustrated in Diagram 1 above, because the decision on whether programmes are integrated or coordinated need to be made on a country-by-country basis. Cross-cutting issues such as national legislation, DDR and border controls are dealt with in section 4 as possible entry points into development.

Joint programmes

Survivor assistance

Survivor assistance for the victims of mines is very well developed and this is reflected in the Mine Ban Treaty and the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which both explicitly address the issue.⁴⁴ It is also manifest in the participation of mine action organisations in the evolution of the UN Convention on the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The same is not true of SALW survivors although there is growing awareness amongst the SALW control community of the need for survivor assistance policies and programmes that fully recognise and respond to their needs, including within the Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA).⁴⁵ There are some SALW survivor assistance programmes at the national level such as the Transitions Foundation in Guatemala and the “Disabling Bullet” project in the US.⁴⁶ More remains to be done and much can be learned from the anti-personnel mine and ERW processes where a twin-track approach has been adopted, “mainstreaming disability issues into all levels of society and development, while not losing sight of certain special needs of people with disabilities”.⁴⁷

Although there is very little deliberate programming that addresses the needs of SALW *and* mine survivors, there are programmes that address war-related disabilities and some mine action programmes are broadening out to include SALW survivors and disability more widely. For example, mine action survivor assistance programmes are being integrated into development programmes in Uganda and Zambia and in Senegal, socio-economic reintegration programmes are integrated into the Poverty Reduction Strategy through national development plans.⁴⁸ This is an obvious areas of synergy: “medical personnel training and assistance, record keeping and data storage (injury surveillance); coordinated funding opportunities; community engagement; socio-economic reintegration of victims into communities; employment; rehabilitation”.⁴⁹ For example, mine action data collection and injury surveillance initiatives could be developed or emulated to record SALW victims, eventually being widened to cover all types of disability “to better understand the disability situation and needs in a country”.⁵⁰ But synergy needs to be within the broader context of all people with disabilities, poverty reduction and sustainable development (see section 4).

Joint/coordinated programmes

Risk education and awareness

As a result of the crossover in the definitions of SALW, mines and ERW, there is also natural overlap in SALW awareness and mine risk education (MRE). There are also some common target audiences, similarities in how the messages are delivered, and community-based approaches are encouraged in both sectors. Some MRE programmes have included messages about the dangers of SALW as part of their risk reduction work because they became aware that SALW posed a similar threat to mines during their data collection.⁵¹ For example, messages about SALW were included in an ICRC ERW curriculum in Iraq in 2003. Handicap International developed a joint SALW and mine awareness manual for teachers in Bosnia Herzegovina as well as integrating MRE and SALW awareness into the Federal school curriculum.⁵²

The message of MRE is comparatively simple when compared to the SALW message, which “does not benefit from the clear ‘all mines are bad’ assumption that MRE enjoys”.⁵³ It is generally accepted that mines and ERW are dangerous and need to be reported and MRE aims to promote safer behaviour against the external threat of mines and ERW. However, the

SALW message is more complex as not all SALW are illegal, and local security forces and members of the public own them. The message is more about individuals adjusting their own behaviour in terms of weapons storage and handling.

There is a possibility of mixed messages in countries where MRE and SALW awareness programmes take place, either separately or jointly. On the one hand people are told not to go near or touch explosive ordnance, and on the other hand reduced-risk handling of weapons, ammunition and explosives is encouraged. This can create a conflict between the two messages, complicated by the lack of understanding between the different types of explosive ordnance, that could undermine the work of MRE programmes and even trigger the attempted hand-ins of mines and ERW at weapons collection points. However, SEESAC suggests that greater coordination and cooperation between MRE and SALW awareness programme staff in places affected by both problems will result in the development of improved programmes that hopefully eliminate possibly lethal confusion. It also seems that the SALW control community may benefit from lessons learned from MRE, for example the UNDP Armed Violence Reduction programme in Burundi is interested in learning from its mine action counterparts about their experience of MRE, particularly because both programmes are trying to deal with the problem of grenades in urban areas.⁵⁴

SALW awareness also includes an advocacy element, which is a distinct activity in mine action, adding a different dimension to awareness work that mine action does not include in MRE activities. If SALW awareness programmes were to focus purely on safety within the community, there would be more scope for coordinated and joint programming with MRE (both to learn lessons from each other and also to avoid overlap and confusion). But before that can happen, all actors providing SALW awareness need to agree on the message for the local community (target groups) rather than giving out different messages about the safety and legality of SALW.

It is evident that there is scope to combine efforts in raising awareness of the dangers of mines and SALW amongst the local population and, again, this should fall under a community safety heading, rather than being seen as the integration of SALW control and mine action programmes (see section 4). More research is required, including with affected communities, to fully explore the possibilities in contexts other than the Balkans.

SALW and mine action surveys

It appears that the different threats posed by SALW and mines, and the different survey methods and time lengths mean that this area of possible synergy has not really been pursued. In the Balkans SALW Survey Protocols have been developed which draw heavily on the work of the mine action community in its development of the Technical and Landmine Impact Surveys.⁵⁵ However, this represents a coordinated effort rather than a joint initiative perhaps because it was considered inappropriate to further integrate SALW and mine action surveys. LIS can take up to two years and cost over US\$1 million each; SALW surveys take up to three months and generally cost between US\$30,000-US\$60,000.⁵⁶ It can also be argued that SALW control programmes cannot wait for the results of an integrated survey as it would take too long to get the results, making it difficult or impossible to quickly develop an effective national SALW control strategy. It would also be a very expensive exercise. Emphasis on annual funding from donors means that SALW survey results are needed within a three to five month period if they are to be of any use in supporting strategy development.⁵⁷

Yet, there are links between the threats and socio-economic impact associated with mines and SALW, and greater communication between agencies working on these issues would certainly be beneficial. Particularly at the community level, there may be scope to do joint assessments as individuals affected by SALW and mines may not make the distinction between these two categories in the same way that experts do. As the mine action community

continues to develop its socio-economic impact assessments, these could be further developed to also include the impact of SALW or even to look more generally at the impact of armed violence and its effect on poverty reduction. The Survey Action Centre and Small Arms Survey have already begun to pursue the idea of joint surveys that look at the impact of weapons in the post-conflict environment with a pilot study in Colombia.⁵⁸ These two organisations are currently expanding their approach to data collection, for example by integrating mine action issues into SALW baseline surveys and ensuring that LIS include small arms victimisation and attitudinal questions.⁵⁹ A relatively recent study has taken this even further, looking at how one survey can map all human security threats such as mines, violence (crime, domestic violence) and poverty in post-conflict situations.⁶⁰

Advocacy

Although advocacy remains principally separate, there are opportunities for joint and coordinated efforts in raising awareness of the issues, and the humanitarian and development impacts of mines and SALW. For example, the issue of transfer controls and brokering, and survivor assistance affect both mine action and SALW control constituencies. Just as ERW has been absorbed within the mine action advocacy community, it is likely there will be more joint initiatives in the future on mines and SALW, for example on the global principles for arms transfers and the Arms Trade Treaty. Considerable overlap in membership already exists between the three transnational civil society campaigns (the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)), which might simplify the implementation of joint initiatives.

Coordinated programmes

The gradual recognition and acceptance of what is termed ERW is providing a bridge between SALW control and mine action, allowing for coordinated action or involvement of mine action operators in SALW activities, such as SALW ammunition destruction. And there appears to be further synergy regarding the cost, personnel safety, operational security, safe transport and environmental protection of destruction programmes.⁶¹ However, the suitability of coordinated programming or involvement of mine action operators needs to be evaluated on a country-by-country basis.

Destruction of ammunition and explosives

Ammunition is an obvious area of linkage between SALW control and mine action with both the Programme of Action and CCW Protocol V dealing with ammunition. Ammunition for a variety of conventional weapons is often stored in the same place, including SALW ammunition, mines and items that constitute AXO. Therefore, efforts to address the safety and security of SALW ammunition are also more generally applicable to conventional ammunition types.⁶²

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) note, “In terms of stockpile destruction, APM [anti-personnel mines] are no different to other types of munitions. They all contain fuzing systems and high explosives, so the inherent dangers present during transport, storage, processing and destruction are the same. For this reason, it is recommended that the stockpile destruction of APMs should not be looked at in isolation. The technical factors are the same for the destruction of all types of ammunition, therefore, where appropriate, consideration should be given for the destruction of these different types in parallel to APM; it may prove to be beneficial in some cases. The supporting logistic and support services will remain similar for all ammunition types.”⁶³

This illustrates the linkages between the destruction of mines, ERW and SALW ammunition and that there is scope for coordinated destruction programmes. Increasingly mine clearance agencies are dealing with these abandoned munitions for example in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. However, these programmes tend to be separate, although often in parallel, to their mine action programmes. For example, the HALO Trust has a separate Weapons and Ammunition Destruction programme in Afghanistan that supports the UNDP DDR programme, not the UNDP mine action programme; and, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has a SALW programme in Sudan that destroys items such as SALW ammunition, mortar shells, rockets and SAM surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile launchers.⁶⁴ The NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund (PfP) has also extended its financial support and technical assistance for the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mine to include the destruction of SALW and conventional ammunition.⁶⁵

These projects were not necessarily strategically planned to begin with, rather an *ad hoc* arrangement when the opportunity presented itself, for example when a variety of ammunition and explosives were found at a storage site, or if a country is particularly affected by abandoned caches and dumps that the mine clearance organisations frequently came across so a separate initiative was created.⁶⁶ This was the case with the HALO Trust in Afghanistan, where “the size of the abandoned ammunition problem...demanded a separate capacity”.⁶⁷ However, these organisations now have established SALW programmes. MAG justifies its involvement in SALW, arguing, “To mitigate one problem without the many others is often difficult, and to try can prove to be a costly exercise, not only in financial terms, but also in terms of human security”⁶⁸. The HALO Trust says it has always dealt with SALW and their ammunition in its day-to-day activities.⁶⁹

Arguably, the amount of ammunition that these programmes deal with is only a small percentage in total tonnage terms compared to ammunition stockpile destruction operations conducted under the auspices of SALW control programmes. The mine action response has also appeared quite *ad hoc* to some, having only engaged in a very limited number of cases and even then the response has allegedly been “patchy, expensive and the most appropriate technical methodologies have not always been used”.⁷⁰ It is also valid that a more deliberately integrated approach is difficult because mines are treated differently if found in a minefield (and destroyed *in situ* along with UXO) compared to being found in stockpiles or dumps (where they are usually still unused in boxes and thus treated like any other munition).⁷¹ Nevertheless, there are existing links between mine action and SALW control in this area and scope for them to be further developed through greater collaboration and coordinated programming in places where SALW stockpiles are known to include AXO or there are large numbers of abandoned stockpiles.

Project management

There is scope for integration and cost savings at the project management level in terms of mine action and SALW control coordination but it is likely that the programmes, monitoring and evaluation will remain separate under the catchall heading. There are already examples of mine action and SALW control being brought together under one manager and programme heading but the issues are dealt with separately by different team leaders and programmes are implemented in parallel. This is partly due to the different types of technical expertise required and complications with mixed messages and also related to the different national institutions and coordinating bodies involved in each issue. For example, UNDP in Bosnia Herzegovina has a Human Security Portfolio Manager who manages both mine action and SALW control teams but each issue has a separate Programme Manager and support team. There are similar arrangements in other countries including Albania, Belarus, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of (FYR) Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine.

Separate programmes

Although SALW control programmes in this section should remain distinct from mine action due to clear divisions in technical responsibility, there is a form of overlap existing already as some mine action organisations are involved in these activities but in isolation to their mine action programmes. A common theme amongst the activities in this section is that, even though they are separate, they all contribute to a community safety and security approach to mine action and SALW control, and development more generally. This idea is explored in section 4.

Stockpile management

The security and safety of ammunition stockpiles is not only a SALW issue—it can also be an ERW issue when AXO, a sub-category of ERW, is found and CCW Protocol V includes (voluntary) preventive measures on the manufacture, handling and storage of munitions. Ammunition stockpiles present a real danger to the civilian population living or working near storage facilities, particularly if there is an explosion that causes death and injury as well as a serious ERW problem. In January 2002, for example, a military ammunitions storage facility caught fire in Lagos, Nigeria, setting off explosions that resulted in the death of over 1,000 people.⁷² There is also a risk of loss and diversion of weapons and ammunition if storage sites are not properly managed or secured.

There are already examples of coordination and information sharing between mine action and SALW control sectors, however the actual management of stockpiles remains separate even though it may be a mine action organisation that is responsible for this. For example, in Cambodia the HALO Trust has a contract for SALW safe storage. The Japanese Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC) has a cooperation agreement with the HALO Trust and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) to inform it of SALW they find in clearance efforts, and vice versa so that they can run their SALW management programme effectively.⁷³ Legislation, such as the “Law on the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition” in Cambodia, illustrates a linkage between mine action and SALW control that could lead to the development of national common practices and systems of accountability for the various actors involved in stockpile management, weapons collection and destruction.

SALW collection

SALW collection programmes inevitably collect items other than SALW weapons, such as explosives, detonators, ammunition, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mines. The return of unstable and inherently dangerous ammunition and explosives pose a threat to human life and can also undermine disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes if there are casualties caused by this handling of explosive ordnance. At first glance, it would appear that the best solution would be to prevent this happening. Ideally, collection should be done house-to-house and civilians should not be encouraged to bring weapons and munitions to a collection point thus reducing the risk of potentially unstable explosive material being handled. However, it is unlikely that such an initiative would be successful as it would require giving civilians a lot of technical information in order to distinguish between weapons, ammunition and explosives, it would be costly and time consuming, and it may even alienate local communities and further destabilise the situation if they perceive it to be a “seize and search” type operation.⁷⁴

The most practical and effective solution is to include ammunition technical officers (ATOs) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists in the planning and implementation of SALW collection programmes. If these specialists were brought on site they would be able to assess the risk posed by any potentially explosive item before it is moved and/or destroyed. In

the cases where this has happened, for example in Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia time has been saved, resources used more efficiently and safety improved significantly.

However, this does not mean it is an area of joint programming. Rather, it is an issue where SALW collection can benefit from EOD expertise that may or may not come from within the mine action community as well as from ATOs, who are not commonly part of mine action teams. At present, this remains an area of weakness in both the mine action and SALW communities for which there is no easy answer but the conflict of interest between SALW collection and the problems associated with mines is too serious and dangerous to suggest that these activities could be combined safely.⁷⁵ For example, weapons collection programmes or amnesties may unwittingly encourage people to hand in mines, grenades and other explosive ordnance, especially if there is a financial incentive. The best approach, if a link between mine action and SALW control is to be pursued, may be to make SALW collection part of broader community safety and security initiatives.

SALW weapons destruction

The destruction of SALW weapons is a separate exercise to that of ammunition and explosives, although they can all be under one programme heading. The safe and effective destruction of ammunition and abandoned stockpiles is distinct and technically far more challenging than the destruction of weapons.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, there is already some crossover between SALW control and mine action, with mine clearance organisations being involved in SALW weapons destruction. For example, MAG is destroying weapons in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Landmine Action has a weapons destruction programme in Liberia; and, the HALO Trust has Weapons and Ammunition Disposal programmes in Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia, some of which deal with heavy weapons in addition to SALW weapons. But again, these tend to be separate to their mine action programmes.

Mine and UXO clearance

The destruction of mines and UXO is another separate category. Mine action clearance programmes destroy mines and UXO *in situ* because this is the safest way to deal with this explosive ordnance. SALW control programmes establish logistic disposal systems because they have a much greater tonnage to deal with and this is the most effective method of destruction.

Building a national capacity to deal with residual risk from mines and SALW within the police and/or military is an additional area of synergy when dealing with stockpile management, weapons collection and the destruction of weapons, explosives and ammunition. Resources, facilities and perhaps management structures could also be shared, reducing the costs and making the national capacity to deal with residual mine action and SALW control more financially sustainable.⁷⁷

Donor support for linkages and areas of crossover

Although there appear to be some linkages and overlaps between mine action and SALW control, these are not reflected in many existing programmes today probably partly as a result of donors not encouraging joint approaches or seeking to link mine action and SALW control funding. Some of the obstacles to this may include the governmental structure for dealing with these issues with different ministries being responsible and contact points often being different for the two issues. In Canada, although foreign affairs, development and defence are all involved in mine action and SALW control, there are numerous other ministries that also deal with aspects of SALW control such as the Canada Border Service Agency and Industry

Canada.⁷⁸ National SALW focal points are established under the PoA but often people involved have nothing to do with mine action.

Some governments have integrated their departments on mine action and SALW control, for example, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Security Policy Division is responsible for mine action and SALW.⁷⁹ And there are also inter-ministerial responses to security, peace and development such as the UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, managed by the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Stability Fund in the Netherlands. The US Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Leahy War Victims Fund supports the needs of civilian victims of conflict in war-affected developing countries including those affected indirectly by polio and other preventable diseases.⁸⁰

However, donors do not tend to go much further than recognising that both issues are concerned with human security and thus funding may come from the same stream.⁸¹ Financial assistance tends to be from separate budgets and distinct policies exist. For example, donors fund the HALO Trust's Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Programme from funds separate to those for mine clearance. Separate contracts are agreed and combined projects are not "liked by anyone".⁸² Political concerns may also be linked to this with anti-personnel mines being seen as non-political and SALW political by some states. It may also be because mine action is seen primarily as a humanitarian issue with links to development whereas SALW control is viewed as a security issue that impacts on development and humanitarian issues. Or it may be a result of donors not feeling there is any additional value in further integration of funding.⁸³ The only overlap comes when stockpiles and caches contain SALW, ammunition and mines—this work is of-course acceptable to donors of both SALW and mine clearance programmes. The lack of a joint "weapons" perspective to mine action and SALW control funding means the potential for addressing these issues in terms of their overall impact on health, security, development and other concerns is not fulfilled.

There are also often separate institutional structures in place for mine action and SALW control in affected countries, for example in Bosnia Herzegovina. In the former there is the Demining Commission and the Bosnian Mine Action Centre working on mine action and, separate to them, the National SALW Coordination Board.⁸⁴ This also means that separate national strategies exist—the National Mine Action Strategy and the National Strategy and Action Plan for SALW Control.⁸⁵

4. Entry points into development programming

Efforts to "mainstream" or integrate mine action into development, as previously mentioned, are gaining momentum within the mine action community. There is also a strong development discourse to work on SALW. However, there is still scope for a more comprehensive approach to mines and SALW, or to armed violence generally, that takes broader development concerns into consideration. The Geneva Declaration recognises this with 42 states committing themselves to strengthening their efforts "to integrate armed violence reduction and conflict prevention programmes into national, regional and multilateral development frameworks, institutions and strategies, as well as into humanitarian assistance, emergency, and crisis management initiatives".⁸⁶ The integration of armed violence considerations into mainstream development programming should make the programmes more conflict-sensitive and thus more sustainable by addressing the root causes of violence and poverty.

This section explores possible entry points for mine action and SALW control into development programming, predominantly from a security system reform perspective. Mine action and disarmament activities such as collection, destruction of surplus or illicit weapons and DDR programmes are part of broader SSR initiatives, with links to governance, and law and order issues. They also contribute to other peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and

development initiatives. There are crosscutting themes to the mine action and SALW control entry points—community safety and security; enhancing professionalism in security forces; conflict management and peacebuilding; provision of alternative livelihoods; and, providing opportunities for further SSR activities—that are highlighted below. This is followed by a more detailed examination of some of the entry points.

One key theme of many aspects of mine action and SALW control is the contribution these programmes (stockpile management, weapons collection, weapons and ammunition destruction, mine clearance, MRE and SALW awareness) can make to community safety and security. They have a comparative advantage both from the perspective of community members, who learn how to manage risk and benefit from programmes that reduce insecurity, and from a community-policing angle. Police have a key role to play in enhancing community safety and security, which includes having the ability to deal with residual risks from mines and SALW.⁸⁷ This is a challenge for the existing capacity of many community police forces but initiatives to strengthen their capacity (and that of the military) in this area will also make them more accountable and change the way they are perceived, increasing trust and confidence in them.

Mine action and SALW control programmes can enhance professionalism in security forces through the reform of current practices, for example by providing training in weapons registration and safe storage (which will also improve police/military-community relations), weapons collection and destruction, and how to deal with residual risks from mines. They can also create space for dialogue on other SSR issues or even opportunities to implement other SSR activities as follow-on projects. In Cambodia, as a follow-up to the Weapons for Development programme (WfD), a weapons security programme was established to strengthen the sustainable capacity of local government structures and security authorities on issues related to weapons security by mainstreaming the message of community responsibility for security through these structures.⁸⁸

DDR, weapons reduction, demand reduction and mine clearance programmes can be important elements of efforts to manage conflict (even in so-called “post-conflict” environments) and build peace by removing weapons from circulation, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants (including child soldiers and female combatants) and reducing perceptions of insecurity, for example by training police (and other security forces) in weapons registration and safe storage can improve police-community relations. Symbolic public destruction ceremonies following disarmament or weapons collection programme aid verification and confidence building, thus reducing insecurity. Mine action can help build peace through a variety of means, particularly when programmes are initiated in advance of peace agreements, for example by sharing information and maps on minefield locations, destroying stockpiles and undertaking clearance activities.⁸⁹ Mine action can also form an integral part of peace agreements as in Angola, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Kosovo and Mozambique or be integrated into ceasefire agreements, as in Sri Lanka or the Nuba Mountains of Sudan.⁹⁰ Survivor assistance can also contribute to peacebuilding by helping survivors (combatants and civilians) to reintegrate through skill re-training and support for alternative livelihoods.

However, these programmes cannot happen in isolation. They need to be accompanied by political solutions to armed conflict, reform of the governance and judicial sectors, and sustainable development if they are to be successful. Demand factors—which can often be overlooked in the rush to secure peace—also need to be addressed in order to secure long-term solutions.

Mine action and SALW control can also provide alternative livelihoods through DDR and other reintegration programmes such as micro-credit schemes. These development approaches to mine action and SALW control also have an impact on the reduction of violence. For

example, providing people with alternative livelihoods means that they do not necessarily have to use land that is contaminated by mines or deliberately handle UXO in order to sell as scrap metal.

Stockpile management

Training in safe and secure stockpile management will reduce diversion of legal weapons, ammunition and explosives to illegal use, and enhance codes of conduct. It will also increase the technical proficiency of security forces to carry out core operational functions. In addition, the explosive threat of stockpiles will be reduced, particularly in areas where stockpiles are located near civilian populations, although ideally, the sites would move to safer locations.

SALW collection

SALW collection can address insecurity, livelihood requirements and build confidence in governance as they have in Cambodia as part of a more integrated approach to dealing with the SALW problem there.⁹¹ For example, the WfD programme was combined with a police capacity building project to provide security after people turned in their weapons and to improve police-community relations. Rather than offering a financial incentive in exchange for weapons—an approach that has been largely discredited—appropriate community development projects such as water wells and schools were promised and no personal rewards were given. An internal evaluation of the programme concluded the “WfD programme had evolved...into a weapons collection and public awareness programme that provided a security and stability element as added-value to the work of institutional agencies as well as to the Cambodian government’s own provincial development structures”.⁹²

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

DDR programmes play a significant role in the demilitarisation of society. Mine action and SALW control can both contribute to DDR programmes although the full potential of this has yet to be exploited. It is an area where increased cooperation between the different sectors involved in DRR planning and implementation would be beneficial. The UNDP DDR unit in Sudan illustrates an existing example of this with the Swiss Demining Federation (FSD) being contracted to provide a rapid response EOD team to the DDR programme.⁹³

There is a significant real and potential role for former combatants (and current military forces) in demining (including informal “village demining”), stockpile destruction and other aspects of mine action.⁹⁴ Not only does this create medium- to long-term employment for former combatants and assist them in reintegrating into society, it also helps to build confidence in peace amongst local communities. Former combatants are well suited to mine clearance as they are familiar with handling explosives and used to following orders and set procedures. However, mine action programmes often run in parallel with DDR programmes with little or no coordination.

DDR and development programmes can be mutually reinforcing, however, at present they tend not to be integrated.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, separate programmes to disarm and reintegrate former combatants are being replaced increasingly by programmes that link the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants directly to disarmament by offering a comprehensive assistance package to those who turn in guns.⁹⁶ UNDP and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) pioneered this approach in Congo-Brazzaville in 2000.⁹⁷ This model has also been used for Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, which aims to demobilise over 100,000 ex-combatants and to reintegrate *mujahedin* into civilian life by offering them jobs, including in mine action, and educational opportunities. In Sierra Leone,

destroyed guns were recycled into agricultural tools and were given to former combatants as reintegration assistance.⁹⁸

Risk education and awareness

MRE and SALW awareness can be and are part of broader humanitarian and development activities, particularly in places that are severely affected by mines and SALW. Communities need to learn to manage risk because, for example, it may be impossible to completely remove the threat posed by mines and people need to be able to sustain their families. This is the case in Cambodia where MRE programmes are part of efforts to build local capacity so that “communities themselves act to define appropriate mine action tasks, based on community needs”.⁹⁹

MRE is also often incorporated into the national school curriculum thus making education conflict-sensitive and providing students with the capacity to the manage risk they may encounter on a daily basis. In Bosnia Herzegovina the Ministries of Education provide MRE in schools for children aged seven to 17, often in conjunction with NGOs such as Handicap International and the Bosnian Red Crescent Society.¹⁰⁰ This has increasingly been linked to SALW awareness with the lessons forming part of a risk education/risk reduction programme that also includes road accident prevention. Incorporating SALW awareness into school curricula can also foster a culture of peace.

Survivor assistance

A person with an injury sustained as a result of armed violence belongs to a wider group of people with disabilities.¹⁰¹ As mentioned above, there are already efforts among the mine action and SALW control communities to have survivor assistance programmes integrated into the overall health, justice, education and economic systems of a state as part of efforts to strengthen national healthcare systems, promote sustainable development, and reduce poverty and crime. Nevertheless, more work is needed to fully integrate survivor assistance programmes. Services for survivors of armed violence must ultimately be supported and maintained by the state as part of the national healthcare system.¹⁰² They should not be developed in isolation or in competition with often-limited resources.¹⁰³ The ministry of health should take the lead in coordination with other departments such as justice, interior and social services as well as local government. Other stakeholders also need to be involved in the design and implementation of disability policies and programmes such as healthcare professionals and the survivors themselves. In particular, from a SALW perspective, young men should be targeted, as they constitute the majority of perpetrators and casualties of SALW violence.

In addition, provisions could be made for survivors of armed violence—combatants and civilians—in peace agreements and processes. For example, by including assistance to survivors in post-conflict recovery needs assessments.¹⁰⁴ Employment and income generation programmes should also target survivors of armed violence and their families, including DDR processes, especially in the reintegration component. Survivor assistance could also be included in national development plans as an element of efforts to strengthen and develop national healthcare systems. This would be in addition to its inclusion in national small arms action and mine action strategies.

Border controls and management.

The promotion and implementation of joint border control initiatives as well as the sharing of information on border management can be useful entry points for wider SALW control and security system reform amongst neighbouring countries and within regions. The issue of

mines can be more problematic as it may be the neighbouring country that has laid the mines or used munitions that have become ERW, as is the case in parts of North Africa.¹⁰⁵ Border controls and management may also create links to other programmes on crime, drugs and justice.

SALW demand reduction initiatives

Efforts should be made to incorporate arms-demand reduction into overall frameworks for sustainable development.¹⁰⁶ Demand reduction programmes contribute to SSR—strengthening a feeling of security and increasing the credibility and legitimacy of the security sector—and vice versa, whereby reform of the security sector can have a positive effect on demand reduction, for example through improved community policing.¹⁰⁷ Demand reduction programmes can also contribute to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and improve the well-being of communities. Local communities have important roles to play in these programmes, often being most successful when working in partnership with local and state authorities.

National legislation

Assistance to develop and update national legislation on SALW and mines, for example to incorporate international and regional commitments or on the management of weapons, explosives and ammunition, can strengthen institutional capacity and respect for international humanitarian law. National legislation that regulates the conduct of mine action can be effective in reinforcing coordination and communication between the mine action and development sectors.¹⁰⁸ The same is true of the incorporation of disability rights into national legislation. Development of the capacity to implement and comply with these obligations will contribute to efforts to reform the judicial and penal systems, the police and military forces, improve political and policy dialogue and initiatives (such as national SALW control and mine action coordinating bodies), and strengthen oversight, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (both formal and informal). SALW control and mine action coordination mechanisms can also be useful forums for wider discussions on security system reform.

Stronger regulation of the arms trade worldwide would reduce the impact of weapons, ammunition and explosives on development—at present most regional measures to regulate the arms trade are not legally binding although the proposed global principles for arms transfers recommends internationally legally binding legislation. Arms exporters, particularly to developing countries, need to include sustainable development considerations in their arms-export licensing regimes such as consulting the government department for development as part of the export decision-making process as the Netherlands and the UK do.¹⁰⁹ The Wassenaar Arrangement, the OSCE Document on Small arms and Light Weapons and the EU Code of Conduct all require participating states to take sustainable development needs into account when making decisions on arms exports.

Civil society capacity building

Supporting civil society's (NGOs, media, research institutions, community groups, women's groups etc.) campaigning, policy and research efforts as well as its ability to implement mine action and SALW control will strengthen its important role in the oversight of the security apparatus, at the very least in areas dealing with SALW control and mine action. Strengthening civil society will also develop a pool of alternative expertise for state institutions responsible for the management and oversight of the security apparatus to draw on.¹¹⁰ Similar support for members of the legislative and executive branches of government will increase civilian expertise on security issues and serve to strengthen democratic civilian control.

Capacity building can also enhance their knowledge and tools to enable them to address the roots causes of armed violence and it can create space for debate on mine action, SALW control and broader SSR and development issues. The development of and support for civil society-state partnerships on mine action and SALW control at the local and national levels is also essential for successful programme outcomes.

Mine action and SALW control implementing agencies can be important entry points into development programming with a number of organisations already making the link between mine action and/or SALW control and development, such as UNDP, UNICEF, Handicap International and Norwegian People's Aid. Others include development components in their mine action and SALW control work. It is also necessary to emphasise the importance of incorporating these issues into development agencies' policies and programming as the culture of violence has to be overcome to make development efforts sustainable. Some development organisations such as Oxfam, World Vision and Care International have advocacy programmes on arms and conflict but it is not clear to what extent this knowledge is factored into the design and implementation of programmes in the field.

National development plans and funding

UNDP has highlighted the need to get armed violence integrated into national development frameworks including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF) and Common Country Assessments (CCA).¹¹¹ This will secure political buy-in from the government and ensure sustained focus on the issue, and allocation of resources. It also fosters partnerships with national and international actors and it ensures more transparency and co-ordination between donors. However, this is a challenging task. According to participants at a DFID workshop on tackling poverty by reducing armed violence this is for two reasons: "Firstly, PRSPs and the international finance institutions that develop them use a discourse of economics and politics. To date economic analysis has been missing from SALW research and analysis. Secondly, the PRSP process is heavily supported by the World Bank, which, to date, has not engaged on the issue of arms, citing mandate restrictions."¹¹² The latter has arguably hampered or deterred other agencies from supporting SALW control in development programming. The World Bank has, however, taken mine action on board in terms of it obstructing development.¹¹³ Moreover, in places where there is a significant SALW and/or mine problem and the PRSP process is truly consultative these issues should be flagged.

It may also be difficult for development agencies to fund mine action and SALW control programmes when a state has not cited these issues as priorities in their national development plans. Better understanding amongst states of how SALW and mines affect development, particularly amongst those affected by these forms of armed violence, would go some way to enhancing the likelihood of them being identified as development priorities. Over-emphasis on one issue may also detract from the other. Stakeholders in mine action and SALW control, such as affected communities, NGOs, community police, and local authorities, need to be involved in the development of national development policy frameworks.

Donors also have a key role to play in integrating mine action and SALW control into development planning as they are in a position to insist that these programmes are part of broader development initiatives. For example, mine action donors agreed that survivor assistance should be integrated into poverty reduction strategies and long-term development plans to ensure sustainability and to avoid unnecessary segregation of survivors.¹¹⁴ They can also heavily influence the priority setting of recipient government and how they spend their money.¹¹⁵ The issues of mine action and SALW control can provide a link to defence and development departments as well as foreign affairs within government or the "3-D formula"—diplomacy, development and defence—enabling them to provide a more coherent and integrated response to the problems. Growing acknowledgement among donors of the

links between security and development is reflected in the “securitization” of development programming by core donors such as the UK and Canada.

Mine action donors are starting to take a development approach to this issue and for some donors, mine action tends to be funded principally by the humanitarian part of governments’ development agencies. Not only is this an acknowledgement of the impact mines have on development but also due to the realisation that dedicated mine action funding will probably decrease over the coming years. However, this means that funding is normally only provided in the short-term i.e. for a year or less. This is problematic for long-term programme planning and also deters investment in activities such as “building indigenous capacities, conducting comprehensive surveys of the contamination problem, and ‘luxuries’ such as socio-economic work” which would contribute significantly to a development approach to mine action.¹¹⁶ Although the mine action community is trying to change this approach to mine action funding, there are very few people who can analyse the socio-economic aspects of mine action or know a lot about development.

There are still very few donors funding SALW control via development agencies (often in coordination with defence and foreign affairs) but some core donors do such as Canada (the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)), the European Union (European Development Fund among other budget lines), Germany (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDA)), the UK (Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool managed by DFID), and the US (US Agency for International Development (USAID)).¹¹⁷ The European Commission is also promoting the integration of mine action and SALW control into development programming, which should be fully integrated by 2008.¹¹⁸ Although this is a positive sign, development agency funding for mine action and SALW control still mostly happens in parallel, rather than in a more coordinated manner.

5. Conclusions

SALW and mines not only kill and injure people; they also destroy livelihoods and hamper the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The links between these instruments of war and development are increasingly being acknowledged and efforts are being made to integrate these sectors into development. Nevertheless, there needs to be a more comprehensive and holistic approach to dealing with SALW and mines. Not only should the possible linkages and commonalities be further explored and utilised but also armed violence as a whole should be dealt with more strategically within development programmes. Vital in these processes is involvement of all relevant stakeholders, especially affected communities, in the design and implementation of mine action, SALW control and development programmes on a country-by-country basis. The development sector would benefit from greater communication and cooperation with the mine action and SALW control communities, and vice versa.

This scoping study has attempted to condense a vast amount of literature into a comprehensive document. However, it is apparent that there is still a lot more research required to really understand the possibilities for linkages between mine action and SALW control and exactly how these sectors fit into development programming. Below is a preliminary list of possible areas of further research.

- The mine action and SALW control policies and funding of donors and how these fit into development.
- Survivor assistance within the broader context of public healthcare and whether donors are fully addressing survivors’ needs.

- Lessons learned from existing collaboration and coordination between the mine action and SALW control sectors.
- The economic impact of mines and SALW.
- The comparative advantage mine action and SALW control can bring to development with concrete examples at the micro, meso and macro.
- The evolution of national development plans and ways to improve the inclusion of mine action and SALW control.

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Acronyms

APM	Anti-personnel mine
ATO	Ammunition technical officer
AXO	Abandoned explosive ordnance
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CPDC	Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation Network
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDA	Department for Disarmament Affairs
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive remnants of war

GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PoA	Programme of Action on Small Arms
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern European Clearing House for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security System Reform or Security Sector Reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
WHO	World Health Organisation

Notes

¹ The author would like to thank members of the reference group for their useful comments and support—Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Quaker United Nations Office, Saferworld, SEESAC and Small Arms Survey.

² See Box 1 for definitions of small arms, light weapons, landmines and explosive remnants of war. The term “small arms” will be used hereafter to refer to small arms and light weapons. For the most part, “mines” will refer to both mines and ERW hereafter. There is no agreed definition of armed violence but one working definition defines armed violence as “the intentional use of physical force with arms, anti-personnel mines and explosives, threatened or actual, against another person or a group/community, that results in or has a likelihood to result in injury, death, psychological harm, deprivation, or maldevelopment”. Personal communication with Robert Muggah, Small Arms Survey, 20 August 2006. The focus of armed violence in this report is on violent conflict.

³ “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.” Department for International Development (DFID), *Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets*, DFID, October 2001.

⁴ The term “human security” is used to describe the complex of interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide and the displacement of populations. Its primary goal is the protection of individuals from real or perceived threats of violence. This narrow definition is based on the Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, Canada, *Human Security Report 2005*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. viii and personal communication with Robert Muggah, Small Arms Survey, 20 August 2006.

⁵ Centre for International Cooperation and Security, *The impact of armed violence on poverty and development*, Bradford University, March 2005; Muggah, R. & P. Batchelor, “*Development Held Hostage*”: *Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*, UNDP, April 2002; UNDP Mine Action Team, *Mainstreaming Mine Action into Development: Rationale and Recommendations*, UNDP, December 2004.

⁶ “Sustainable development” is a combination of economic growth and social progress that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Definition in Chanaa, J., D. Hillier, K. Powell, K. Epps & H. Hughes, *Guns or Growth? Assessing the impact of arms sales on sustainable development*, Amnesty International, IANSA, Oxfam published in association with Project Ploughshares and Saferworld, June 2004, p. 9 based on that used in the UN World Commission on Environment and Development, Brundtland Report, *Our Common Future*, 1987.

⁷ See Article 2, Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).

⁸ See Article 2, Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War of the CCW.

⁹ United Nations, *In Larger Freedom*, United Nations, 2005, paragraphs 120 & 121, p. 32.

¹⁰ 2005 World Summit: High Level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly, September 2005. General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation, A/RES/60/68, 6 January 2006.

¹¹ *The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*, adopted at the high-level ministerial summit on armed violence and development, Geneva, 7 June 2006.

¹² Adapted from Batchelor, P. & S. Demetriou, *Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*, UNDP, July 2005; Centre for International Cooperation and Security, *The impact of armed violence on poverty and development*, Bradford University, March 2005; and, UNDP Mine Action Team, *Mainstreaming Mine Action into Development: Rationale and Recommendations*, UNDP, December 2004.

¹³ Adopted at the First Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction (also known as the Mine Ban Treaty).

¹⁴ SSR is also known as security sector reform, justice and security sector reform, and security sector transformation. SSR “seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law”. OECD, “Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice”, *Policy Brief*, OECD, May 2004, p. 1. The overall objective of SSR is “to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy”. OECD, “Security System Reform and Governance”, *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*, OECD, 2005, p. 16.

¹⁵ This is related to the lack of a legally binding instrument on SALW that establishes these structures.

¹⁶ Table created with input from personal communication with Robert Muggah, Small Arms Survey, 20 August 2006, and Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC, 25 August 2006. Also commonly listed under SALW control are national focal points and coordination mechanisms, and assistance and international cooperation in addressing different aspects of the illicit trade as these are identified within the Programme of Action on Small Arms.

¹⁷ The consultation process was conducted using short questionnaires sent by email during late July and August 2006. Unfortunately, it was not possible to include more information from this process because of the timeframe of the project and the timing of the research.

¹⁸ World Health Organisation, *Statement for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, delivered 13 July 2001 by Dr. Etienne Krug; and International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine Free World Executive Summary*, Mines Action Canada, October 2005, p45.

¹⁹ Butchart A., A. Phinney, P. Check, & A. Villaveces, *Preventing violence: a guide to implementing the recommendations of the World report on violence and health*, Department of Injuries and Violence Prevention, World Health Organization, 2004, p. 61. One study found that exposure to SALW violence approximately doubles the probability that an adolescent will perpetrate serious violence over the two subsequent years. Bingenheimer, J. B., R. Brennan & F., Earls, “Firearm exposure and serious violence behavior” in *Science*, Vol. 308, No. 5726, 2005, pp. 323-6.

²⁰ Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2003*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 156.

²¹ Muggah, R. & P. Batchelor, “*Development Held Hostage*”: *Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*, UNDP, April 2002, p. 9.

²² See Atwood, D., A. Glatz & R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, Occasional Paper 18, Small Arms Survey, January 2006 for more information.

²³ Based on Batchelor, P. & S. Demetriou, *Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*, UNDP, July 2005; UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005: International cooperation at a crossroads: Aid, trade and security in an unequal world*, UNDP, 2005; Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2003*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 125; Muggah, R. & P. Batchelor, “*Development Held Hostage*”: *Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*, UNDP, April 2002, pp. 22-36; Muggah, R. & E. Berman, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Small Arms Survey Special

Report No. 1, commissioned by the Reference Group on Small Arms of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, July 2001; and, personal communication with Ted Paterson, GICHD, 24 August 2006. See also Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 191.

²⁴ Buchanan, C. & R. Muggah, *No Relief: Surveying the effects of gun violence on humanitarian and development personnel*, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue & Small Arms Survey, 2005; and, Muggah, R. & E. Berman, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Small Arms Survey Special Report No. 1, commissioned by the Reference Group on Small Arms of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, July 2001.

²⁵ Batchelor, P. & S. Demetriou, *Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*, UNDP, July 2005.

²⁶ Centre for International Cooperation and Security, *The impact of armed violence on poverty and development*, Bradford University, March 2005, p. 83.

²⁷ Batchelor, P. & S. Demetriou, *Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*, UNDP, July 2005, p. 13.

²⁸ Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2003*, Oxford University Press, 2003.

²⁹ Landmine Action & the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, *Alternative anti-personnel mines: The next generations*, Landmine Action & the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, March 2001.

³⁰ Batchelor, P. & S. Demetriou, *Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*, UNDP, July 2005, p. 13.

³¹ Batchelor, P. & S. Demetriou, *Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*, UNDP, July 2005; and, Muggah, R. & P. Batchelor, "*Development Held Hostage*": *Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*, UNDP, April 2002.

³² Although it is recognised that there is a link between the availability of SALW and criminality, there are differing perspectives as to whether SALW increase the likelihood of crimes being committed or actually counter it. Muggah, R. & P. Batchelor, "*Development Held Hostage*": *Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*, UNDP, April 2002, p. 23. It is argued by some that possession of SALW acts a deterrent against crime. Others say that increased availability and ownership of SALW is linked more violent crime.

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³⁵ Harpviken, K. Berg & J. Isaksen, *Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming Mine Action in Development*, PRIO/UNDP, 2004, p. 31.

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³⁷ Personal communication with Ted Paterson, GICHD, 24 August 2006.

³⁸ The General Assembly adopted a resolution addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation, A/RES/60/68, 6 January 2006. The OECD-DAC recognised small arms and mine action as sectors eligible to receive Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in March 2005.

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⁴⁵ Full title is the 2001 *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects.*

⁴⁶ IANSA, “Responding to the needs of survivors of small arms violence”, *IANSA policy recommendations for the RevCon*, IANSA, 2006.

⁴⁷ International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine Free World Executive Summary*, Mines Action Canada, October 2005, p.49.

⁴⁸ International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine Free World Executive Summary*, Mines Action Canada, October 2005, p. 55.

⁴⁹ GICHD, *Identifying Synergies in Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons Control*, GICHD, draft March 2006, p. 9.

⁵⁰ Maes, K. & S. Bailey, “Providing appropriate assistance to the victims of explosive remnants of war” in UNIDIR, *Humanitarian perspectives to small arms and explosive remnants of war*, UNIDIR, 2005, p. 54.

⁵¹ SEESAC, *SASP 2 - SALW Awareness Support Pack*, SEESAC, 2005.

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⁵⁴ Personal communication with Mody Berethe, Conseiller Technique, Armes légères – Réduction Violence Armée, UNDP Burundi, 23 August 2006.

⁵⁵ See Small Arms Survey, *SALW Survey Protocol I: General research guide*, 1st Edition, 2004-01-19, Small Arms Survey, 2004 and other SALW Survey Protocols for more information.

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⁵⁷ Personal communication with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC, 25 August 2006. However, annual funding is also an issue for mine action.

⁵⁸ Referenced in Atwood, D. *Observations on possible synergies between action on small arms and light weapons and explosive remnants of war*, an unpublished background paper for the UNIDIR project “European action on small arms, light weapons and explosive remnants of war”, May 2005, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Personal communication with Robert Muggah, Small Arms Survey, 20 August 2006.

⁶⁰ See Owen, T., *Human Security Mapping: A New Method for Measuring Vulnerability*, (date unknown) and Owen, T. & A. Benini, *Human Security in Cambodia: A Statistical Analysis of Large-Sample Sub-National Vulnerability Data*, a report written for the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2004.

⁶¹ Waszink, C., “Mine action and ‘small arms and light weapons action’”, unpublished working paper.

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⁶⁷ Personal communication with Richard Boulter, Desk Officer, Weapons and Ammunition Disposal, HALO Trust, 2 August 2006.

⁶⁸ Lou McGrath, Director, MAG, presentation to the Mine Action Support Group, Geneva, 7 July 2006.

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- ⁷³ GICHD, *Identifying Synergies in Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons*, GICHD, draft March 2006, p. 59.
- ⁷⁴ Personal communication with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC, 25 August 2006.
- ⁷⁵ Personal communication with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC, 25 August 2006.
- ⁷⁶ Greene, O., S. Holt, & A. Wilkinson, *Ammunition stocks: promoting safe and secure storage and disposal*, Biting the Bullet in association with SEESAC, Briefing 18, February 2005.
- ⁷⁷ Personal communication with Ted Paterson, GICHD, 24 August 2006.
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- ⁷⁹ Personal communication with Marijn van Blom, Policy Advisor SALW, Security Policy Department, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 August 2006.
- ⁸⁰ “Leahy War Victims Fund”, *United States Agency for International Development* accessed at www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/lwvf/ on 28 August 2006.
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- ⁸⁵ Personal communication with Amna Berbic, Project Manager, Small Arms Control in Bosnia Herzegovina, UNDP Bosnia Herzegovina, 2 August 2006.
- ⁸⁶ *The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*, adopted at the high-level ministerial summit on armed violence and development, Geneva, 7 June 2006.
- ⁸⁷ Moyes, R., *Tampering: Deliberate Handling and Use of Live Ordnance in Cambodia*, MAG, Norwegian People’s Aid & Handicap International, 2004.
- ⁸⁸ GICHD, *Identifying Synergies in Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons*, GICHD, draft March 2006, p. 63.
- ⁸⁹ There can also be negative impacts on peacebuilding as a result of mine action so each context needs to be taken into consideration at the planning stage. See Harpviken, K. B. & R. Roberts (eds.), *Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in Support of Peacebuilding*, PRIO Report 2/2004, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004 for more details.
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¹⁰¹ Approximately 10 percent of the world's population—about 600 million people—are affected by disabilities, although it is not known what percentage of that figure is due to SALW and mines according to the UN Statistics Division. See <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/disability>.

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¹⁰⁷ See Atwood, D., A. Glatz & R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, Occasional Paper 18, Small Arms Survey, January 2006, pp. 11-12 for more information.

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