Establishing the Prioritisation System and Adapting it over time

INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

The most important measure of performance for a mine action programme is value for money: the ratio of benefits to costs. The main determinant of whether a mine action programme delivers good value for money is not the quality of its survey and clearance technology, not how hard staff work or how well managers are trained, and not how complete its database is. It is how well priorities are set at all levels. Prioritisation aims to achieve high value for money.

KEY MESSAGES

> Mine action officials need to be aware that the mine action programme will encounter significant changes as their country makes the transition from conflict to development, i.e., the evolving political, social and economic environment, the changing size and importance of international assistance and the waning power of international actors to influence local affairs. Mine action programmes must therefore adapt priorities and allocate resources accordingly.

> It is crucial for mine action resources to be used to support wider strategic management and development processes underway in the country at that point in time.

> A priority-setting system is far more likely to be sustainable if its components are a part of or, at least, fit appropriately within government structures and decision-making processes. For example, key systems for making resource allocation decisions are the annual budget or a long-term, national development plan, which many mine-affected countries have.

> To establish a sound and effective system for setting mine action priorities in a changing national setting, mine action officials should:
  (i) Aim for worthwhile results (focused on how to make a difference)
  (ii) Monitor whether a difference is being made to the wellbeing of people
  (iii) Keep aiming for performance improvements
  (iv) Build stakeholder support
  (v) Promote national ownership

> Mine action officials should always seek to assess the quality of the priority-setting system put in place by focusing on effectiveness, transparency, inclusiveness, consistency etc.

> There is no such thing as an ideal system for prioritisation in mine action. Different mine action programmes need to develop systems that are right for them.
Priority-setting in a national mine action programme requires a number of interlinked processes and decisions that determine:

> What should receive the most resources – known as “allocation” or ‘big P’ prioritisation. Examples include how to divide resources among geographic areas of a country, programme components, and operators.

> Taking into consideration how the resources have been allocated, what should be done first? This is known as ‘small p’ prioritisation. Examples include determining which demining tasks should be done first.

The basic objective of this series of Briefs is to assist mine action programmes in achieving greater value for money, by designing and implementing sound priority-setting systems. These systems should coordinate the many inter-related decisions logically, and should consider both costs and benefits.

The principal audiences for this Brief are national officials and senior managers of large, complex mine action programmes, and those who provide advice to such programmes. Managers in charge of smaller programmes will find the principles outlined in the Brief to be relevant, but some of the topics may be more detailed than they require.
This third Brief in the series discusses:

> Establishing a prioritisation system in a new programme
> Adapting prioritisation over time, as needs and capabilities evolve
> Aligning the mine action prioritisation system with national planning and budgeting
> Assessing the quality of a national mine action prioritisation system

Other Briefs in the initial release in the series are:

> Brief 1: Introduction to the series; key terms and basic concepts; common challenges
> Brief 2: The need for a national priority-setting system; components of national priority-setting systems; what such systems should accomplish and how responsibilities and authorities should be defined
> Brief 4: More detailed examination of values, decision criteria and indicators

Additional Briefs are planned for the future to cover:

> Overview of cost-effective approaches to prioritisation; examples of cost/benefit analysis and multi-criteria analysis in mine action
> Information management to support prioritisation
> Participatory approaches to understand local preferences
> Prioritisation in survey and clearance operations
> Quality Management, monitoring, evaluation and prioritisation
> Putting it all together

**INTRODUCTION**

Priorities are set to determine which actions, from a set of alternatives, will receive the most resources, or will be done first. The basic aim is to achieve the greatest value for money or, more formally, to maximise the ratio of benefits to costs. Obviously, this requires information on both costs and potential benefits. Typical problems encountered include:

1. Insecurity in some areas of the country
2. Information problems:
   > **Fog of war** problems, such as:
     > Poor or incomplete records on the locations of battles, artillery or aerial bombing strikes, stockpile explosions, etc
     > Poor data on the ‘dud’ rates for various munitions when used in different environments
     > Poor or incomplete records on civilian casualties
     > Insecurity, which makes certain areas inaccessible.
   > **‘Fog of peace’ problems in the post-conflict period, such as:**
     > Poor or incomplete records on civilian casualties
     > Incomplete knowledge of population movements (returning refugees/IDPs)
     > Incomplete knowledge of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction plans and operations
     > Incomplete understanding of community needs in conflict-affected areas
     > The breakdown of public service delivery and government ‘reach’ into conflict-affected areas.
3. Coordination problems, due to (for example):

- ‘Inside the programme’ coordination issues, such as:
  - Multiple operators with somewhat different mandates involved in mine action
  - Lack of capacity in the national organisation mandated to coordinate mine action
  - Lack of a common strategy
  - Poor exchange of information among operators.

- Links between the mine action programme and other organisations such as:
  - Core budget and planning units in the national government
  - Sector ministries and sub-national governments
  - International donors
  - Local and international development non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

- Lack of consensus on what types of tasks should be accorded priority

This last problem may be a symptom of the various coordination problems listed above it, but it generally reflects honest differences in underlying values as well, so different actors prioritise different criteria.³

ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES IN A NEW PROGRAMME

A lack of agreement over the relative weights accorded to different criteria may not be a significant problem when mine/ERW contamination is limited and adequate resources are quickly allocated to the problem.

In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, an emergency response mine action programme is normally organised on a ‘campaign basis.’⁴ Decisions are made in a top-down fashion using command and control management for efficient clearance. There is little advantage in devising an elaborate system for priority-setting, as priority is automatically given to areas where there are obvious risks to people and to the delivery of essential humanitarian supplies.⁵ The entire problem will most probably be quickly resolved, so little is lost if the ‘ideal’ priorities are not determined. In addition, ‘bottom-up’ data, such as the preferences of those in affected communities, the likely use to be made of the land, and the plans of humanitarian NGOs are often difficult to obtain, or unreliable, due to ‘fog of peace’.

Problems stemming from extensive contamination, however, cannot be resolved in the short or even medium term. A campaign model of programme management is not effective for the medium or long term, because the complexity of ‘normal life’ overwhelms centralised decision-making. Normal life leads to more and more bottom-up demands for assistance to address mine/ERW hazards that constrain an increasing variety of activities.

Mine action programmes that start on a campaign basis during the post-conflict emergency have to adapt once the crisis has passed. The system for setting priorities must also evolve, often a number of times. As accidents fall, casualties become a less reliable indicator for setting priorities. The pattern of future accidents is increasingly determined by the pattern of current reconstruction and development projects, plus the expansion of the ‘economic footprint’ of communities as people return and growth resumes. More generally, the mine/ERW burden stems increasingly from ‘opportunity costs’ – people, communities, firms, and government agencies foregoing opportunities to use land or invest in assets because of explosives contamination.

Over time, therefore, it is natural for the priority-setting system to evolve, with the relative weight accorded to the different criteria changing. In some cases, extensive contamination may cause many different problems, so it is better to break the clearance programme into components, each with a distinct method of setting priorities. For example, part of the clearance assets might be allocated to supporting infrastructure reconstruction.⁶ Other assets could be used to respond to ‘bottom-up’ priorities identified by communities, and still others to large tasks that have little current impact on people, but must be done eventually, such as contamination from exploded ammunition stores, or battlefield contamination in remote areas. Demand for mine action services also emerges from private investors seeking to open mines, build hydro-electric dams under a public/private partnership arrangement, etc.

The following section provides a broad overview of how mine action programmes, and their prioritisation systems, evolve over time.
Mine/ERW contamination generally stems from periods of conflict. Over the past three decades, many of these have been internal conflicts creating what have been termed “complex emergencies”. These are situations where the legitimacy of the state is challenged in large parts of the country and may even have collapsed altogether, or where peace reigns for long periods in some parts of a country while conflict persists, or is intermittent, in other areas, and where civilians and their livelihoods are targeted by the warring factions.

Frequently, the warring parties or the United Nations will ask the international community to provide assistance in the form of peacekeeping or broader stabilisation missions. Where such efforts appear to be successful or where major countries consider their national interests to be at stake, the peace-keeping phase will lead to a major reconstruction effort. This will be financed by donor countries, the World Bank and regional development banks.

Although in many cases, traditional development work such as new or private investments in infrastructure and public services never stops entirely, the government and the major donors focus initially on stabilisation, and subsequently on the reconstruction programme. With the restoration of key infrastructure (roads, railways, ports, electrical utilities, water systems, and so on) and basic public services (education, health, policing, etc), increasing attention shifts to more traditional development programmes.

Therefore, we can define up to four main stages in a country’s recovery:

(i) Conflict
(ii) Post-conflict stabilisation (including peace-keeping/building)
(iii) Reconstruction
(iv) Traditional development

The transition from conflict to development may not be smooth. Sometimes, conflicts resume, halting the transition. Some countries suffer from simmering conflict for prolonged periods, perhaps becoming a forgotten emergency, receiving little attention from the international community. The transition from conflict to development is uncertain and prone to reversals, and may progress at various rates in different parts of the country. The start and end points of the different phases are not clear-cut either but rather, will overlap.

The details of any one country’s transition is not the focus of our attention here, but rather the dynamics of such transitions in general, and the implications for those managing mine action programmes, who must allocate resources to the current priorities. What we want to focus on in particular are:

- The country’s social, political, and economic environment evolves over time, and quite rapidly in some aspects
- How the size and relative importance of the different types of international assistance, such as humanitarian, peace-building/immediate post-conflict, reconstruction, and development will evolve over time
- The international “actors” present in the country, and how their primary objectives and relative powers to influence local affairs will change over time.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR MINE ACTION PRIORITIES**

The principal outputs of mine action, such as safe land and facilities, making people aware of the dangers, fitting amputees with prosthetics etc, are not ends in themselves, but rather, a means to an end. Mine action is (or should be) at the service of the mine-affected country and its citizens. At any point in time, its focus should be on having most of its resources support the most strategically important efforts underway in the country at that time.

Mine action priorities, and the programme’s allocation of resources should also change as the emphasis shifts from humanitarian assistance to stabilisation, to reconstruction, and finally to development. These are typically relative shifts that occur over time rather than abrupt changes. Therefore, there may be periods when the mine action programme works on as many as four programmes at once: humanitarian, stabilisation, reconstruction, and development.

When separated in this way, the pattern of mine action expenditures over time might appear as depicted in Figure 1 overleaf.

Two additional types of changes will occur, which are also vital to the performance of a country’s mine...
action programme. First, the programme’s capacities grow with new assets, training, the introduction of better management systems, and experience. Some of the likely developments over time for a mine action programme are listed at the bottom of the programme stages graph.

Figure 1 | The mine action programme life cycle

What’s being done in humanitarian mine action?

- Entry of international organisations and assets
- Development of basic capacities
- Support for refugees and humanitarian operations
- Rapid build-up of operations
- Creation of national programme
- Develop high-level capacities
- Local adaptation of techniques and technologies
- Many tasks supporting reconstruction projects
Mine action for development (MAD)

> Progressive transfer of responsibility to national authorities and reduction of international staff levels
> Start and build-up of local funding
> Integration with development planning mechanisms

Assisted development

Development

TIME

> Full indigenisation of management
> Winding down of international funding
> Mine action fully demand-led by sectoral, area, and community planners
Secondly, mine action planners and managers acquire additional data over time. This allows them (in theory at least) to make better projections of likely future developments which could affect their programme, and to make more informed decisions. Some of the important data categories in a mine action programme are those concerning:

- Hazards - locations, numbers and types of devices, what community assets the hazards are blocking, etc
- Livelihoods - how individuals, households, and communities survive and prosper (this requires socio-economic data)
- National governance – the machinery of government and the allocations of authority among government ministries and levels (national, provincial, etc)
- International aid and government financing – the key actors and their principal objectives at national, regional, and community levels.

In general terms, mine action officials should expect three broad trends:

1. Increasing levels of national ownership over the mine action programme. This implies an increase in the authority of the national government relative to the group of donors in setting priorities for the country’s progress.

2. Increasing input from different sectoral agencies (government departments, state-owned enterprises, etc) as planners in the various sectors (agriculture, transportation, education, etc) begin to deal with the problems created by contamination for their sector’s development plans.

3. Increasing input from different levels of government as capacities of provincial and local governments are rebuilt following the conflict, gradually assume their responsibilities, and extend their ‘reach’ to smaller and more remote communities.

Some of the main implications for mine action planners and managers are summarised in the following two tables.

Table 1 | Programming in a changing context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>Dominant</th>
<th>Declining priorities</th>
<th>Increasing priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Humanitarian (although may temporarily increase in the initial months following peace)</td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruct</td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Security</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 | Key challenges for mine action programming in a changing context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need/type of programming</th>
<th>Key actors</th>
<th>Likely degree of coordination</th>
<th>Key challenge for mine action planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Humanitarian             | > UN agencies  
                          > International NGOs  
                          > Red Cross            | Low                         | Dealing with many agencies that may disagree on priorities and strategy, in a chaotic, rapidly changing, and poorly understood environment. |
| Security                 | > Foreign and/or domestic militaries | High                        | 1. Avoid military priorities dominating humanitarian and development needs.  
                            2. Security of staff if internal security has not been established.  
                            3. Getting cooperation and data from militaries. |
| Reconstruction           | > World Bank and perhaps other agency in the Multilateral Trust Fund  
                          > Major donors with large projects | Fairly high                   | 1. Large scale demining tasks under tight deadlines in support of major infrastructure projects.  
                            2. Ensuring funds for demining are included in budgets for reconstruction projects. |
| Development              | > Government  
                          > World bank and regional development banks  
                          > Lead donors for sectors | > Fairly high if government is both committed to citizen welfare and capable but not committed   
                          > Low if government is capable but not committed  
                          > Medium otherwise | 1. Coordinating with many local and provincial governments on task priorities.  
                            2. With committed government: coordinating with ministries of finance and planning to ensure the government gives adequate priority to mine action.  
                            3. With uncommitted government: coordination with donors when overall donor coordination mechanism is lacking. |
This is a stylised picture describing general situations and likely trends. The specific circumstances of individual countries will lead to variations however, sometimes substantially so. Regardless, mine action officials need to be aware that there will very significant changes facing the programme as a country makes the transition from conflict to development. The priorities of key international organisations operating in the country and influencing its development will change, as will the principal needs of the country’s citizens and the role and capability of the government. These changes may not be smooth or predictable, and there may be reversals, but there will undoubtedly be changes that significantly affect the current mine action priorities.

It is important that mine action managers, while developing strategic plans in post-conflict countries remember that their principal challenges and partners will be different in five years. In developing plans and priorities, mine action officials need to anticipate likely changes, and determine the steps the programme should take to meet tomorrow’s challenges. Similarly, in giving support, mine action programmes must make different resource allocations and adopt different priorities.

ALIGNING WITH GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES FOR SUSTAINABILITY

As is the case with other programme planning and management functions, sustainability of the priority-setting system is far more likely if its components are a part of or, at least, fit appropriately within government structures and decision-making processes, for three reasons:

1. The legality of priority-setting decisions hinges on having the right level of government and the correct departments involved in and endorsing the decision.

2. Non-mine action government agencies that have not been involved in a decision will often refuse to implement or even acknowledge decisions made by mine action authorities unless these decisions are made through appropriate government channels.\(^{10}\)

3. Public resources, including funding for mine action, are allocated, according to the structure of governmental authorities and responsibilities.

The key system for making resource allocation decisions is the annual budget. In addition, many mine-affected countries formulate long term development plans (eg a socio-economic development plan; poverty reduction strategy) and medium-term public sector investment programmes, which document development priorities and programmes.

When priority-setting systems do not fit well within the government’s own priority-setting processes, the result is confusion and delays in the emergence of national ownership. Conversely, a properly designed priority-setting system fits the government’s budget calendar. The following table provides an example of a mine action annual plans and priorities process for the coming government financial year (FY\(^3\)).
### Table 3 | Calendar for an annual operational planning and priorities process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY1 - 6 months</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; NMAA and MAC meet donors plus national planning and budgeting officials to agree basic financing parameters for coming year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; NMAA and MAC issue policy guidelines and indicative financing envelopes for the coming year to provincial authorities and operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>&gt; Provincial mine action plans and priorities committees initiate operational planning with operators and government departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; MAC initiates consultations with planning units of ministries that are involved in risk education and victim assistance or whose work programmes may be affected by contamination (to identify national priorities and agree financing for these)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1 - 4 months</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; Mid-year review of current year (F0) implementation and identification of issues to be addressed in FY1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>&gt; Draft provincial mine action plans submitted to national authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; MAC compiles national priorities and provincial mine action plans to identify gaps and overlaps/conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; MAC issues requests for modifications to provincial authorities and national ministries to address gaps and overlaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>&gt; Provincial mine action plans and priorities committees work with operators and government departments to modify plans and priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1 - 2 months</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>&gt; Modified provincial mine action plans submitted to national authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; MAC compiles national and provincial plans and priorities into draft national mine action plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; MAC submits national mine action plan to NMAA for approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; NMAA approves plan &amp; distributes to cabinet, government planning units, provincial authorities, donors and operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1 0 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Start of financial year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1 1-12 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Implementation of FY1 plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1 8 months</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; Mid-year review of implementation process and identification of issues for FY2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1 13-18 months</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>&gt; Evaluation of FY1 implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note that the recommended process starts six months before the beginning of the financial year, and in some cases, it may need to begin even earlier to give operators and provincial authorities time to complete their detailed planning and budgeting. In addition, the review and evaluation process lasts for at least six months after the end of the financial year. The entire planning/implementation/evaluation process lasts two years or more.

The timing and sequencing of decisions need to be structured. This need is clearest in the case of operational priorities, which determine how funds will be invested and where assets will be assigned, and to what purposes, for the coming year. The process takes time, especially as the number of stakeholders grows.

Each of the programme components must first prepare draft plans, highlighting their proposed operational priorities, and these plans then need to be reviewed collectively to ensure they fit into a sensible national programme. There may be need for an iterative (ie back and forth) process to modify component plans. Revised plans may need to be reassessed, to ensure they incorporate a sound set of priorities for the overall programme. The operational priorities for the coming year should be confirmed in time for donors to consider these in their funding agreements and for the government budget.

The Appendix contains an illustration of the annual planning and priorities process proposed for Cambodia in 2003 (Annual planning cycle for updating the five-year mine action plan in Cambodia).11

**ESTABLISHING A QUALITY PRIORITISATION SYSTEM**

**Basic principles**

It often takes time to develop a sound system for setting mine action priorities. The following principles help lead in the right direction:

1. **Aim for worthwhile results.** There may be some benefit from demining any suspected areas to reduce risk and to progress towards treaty obligations. However, it is more valuable to demine those areas that make the greatest difference to the wellbeing of people. Focus on how to make a difference and set priorities accordingly.

2. **Monitor whether you are making a difference to the wellbeing of people.** Good monitoring is the best tool for learning. Countries, communities, and even households are complicated, and surprises can always arise which prevent you from achieving what you expected. Many of these surprises will be outside your control, and it is natural that honest mistakes occur from time to time. But every mistake creates an opportunity to learn: for example, are there ways of determining when certain types of problems are likely to occur, so we can avoid them? Are there inexpensive ways of eliminating the problem before it arises? These lessons can be built into the priority-setting system, strengthening it – and the programme’s performance in terms of value for money – over time.

3. **Keep aiming for performance improvements.** It is impossible to perform at a constant level year after year. You and your organisation will either perform better or worse, in terms of delivering value for money, year on year. If you do not aim to improve performance every year, and set your priorities accordingly, it is very easy for performance to decline, perhaps jeopardising financial support for the programme.

4. **Build stakeholder support.** There are many types of people and organisations with a ‘stake’ in a country’s mine action programme, and its future will depend largely on whether it has most of these stakeholders’ support. This support increases when stakeholders understand why certain tasks receive priority over others, particularly if they believe prioritisation is done fairly, and if the priority-setting system reflects their views about what is valuable.

5. **Promote national ownership.** The foundation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is the principle of national ownership. It often is difficult to promote national ownership, particularly when countries have been torn apart by conflict, but it is a worthwhile goal in itself to strive for, and it is a requirement for transition and the sustainability of the programme.

**Assessing the quality of a national priority-setting system**

The following criteria can be used to assess the quality of a priority-setting system.
### Table 4 | Criteria for assessing the quality of a priority-setting system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The system for setting priorities helps decision-makers choose those alternatives which are most likely to promote the objectives of the programme and, more fundamentally, the development of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-effectiveness</td>
<td>The benefits stemming from the collection and analysis of the data required for prioritisation should outweigh the costs of collecting and analysing that data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>The criteria and processes used to assess alternatives are known to and understood by the stakeholders, and there is regular reporting on the decisions made, demonstrating there is no ‘hidden agenda’ influencing decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>Decision-makers obtain and consider the preferences expressed by affected citizens and communities (self-determination), and those of other stakeholders (eg the national government and representatives from sector ministries, state or provincial governments, district/local governments, local and international NGOs operating in contaminated areas and donors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>Ideally, the entire mine/ERW problem should be considered when setting priorities (eg all tasks in an area when tasking; all provinces in the country when determining allocations of assets among provinces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>Prioritisation takes into account the preferences expressed by women, girls, boys and men from the affected communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Different decision-makers will make the same decision when facing the same alternatives, thus promoting fair and equal treatment for all citizens and communities affected by mine/ERW contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>The priority-setting system is ‘institutionalised’ (ie incorporated into the country’s authority structures) so it will continue as ‘normal business’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>Mine action prioritisation utilises the government’s established systems and ways of doing business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Mine action priorities are aligned with the country’s broader priorities (development, reconstruction, peacebuilding, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>The country’s international treaty obligations are given weight within the priority-setting system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other criteria may also be useful when there are special issues relating, for example, the implementation of a peace agreement. Normally, trade-offs are required - for example, we might be able to improve the effectiveness of our decisions by using very sophisticated techniques of analysis. However, this requires more and better quality data (therefore higher costs) and may lead to a system that stakeholders do not understand; reducing transparency. As a result, there is no such thing as an ideal system for prioritisation.

Different mine action programmes and, sometimes, individual implementing organisations need to develop systems that are right for them in a specific country at a particular time.

Appendix | Annual planning cycle for updating the five-year mine action plan in Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province, NGOs &amp; Operators</th>
<th>CMAA &amp; Donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operators: preparation of the work plan for the next year</td>
<td>Provinces with NGOs: selection of clearance for the next year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Technical Coordination Team'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultative Group (art. 21 Sub Decree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation between provincial authorities, NGOs and operators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of national priorities in the draft of 'PMAP' and in the work plan of each operator</td>
<td>Decision on national priorities: draft of the main lines of the forthcoming FYMAP by CMAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces - Draft of 'PMAP'</td>
<td>Discussion and approval of all 'PMAP' and Operators work plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator - Draft of work plan</td>
<td>Mine Action Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In each relevant province, approval by the Governor of the 'PMAP' for the next year</td>
<td>Updating of the Plan by CMAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NEW FIVE YEAR MINE ACTION PLAN (FYMAP)
ENDNOTES


2 Fog of War is a term used first used by the military analyst Carl von Clausewitz to describe uncertainty in military operations. The quotation from the English translation is “The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently — like the effect of a fog or moonlight — gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance.” Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, 1832.

3 Issue Brief 4 deals with values, criteria and indicators in greater detail.

4 The distinguishing feature of a ‘campaign model’ of management is that all units, which might normally form part of different departments or organisations, are put temporarily under a single command for effective command and control until a clear objective is achieved. Such an approach is often adopted in the wake of a natural disaster or to make a ‘big push’ to achieve a clear objective in a limited time frame (e.g., annual vaccination campaigns in countries where the public health system has broken down).

5 Where the UN has been given an operational mandate in support of a UN-authorised Peacekeeping Mission, priority will also be given to road verification and clearance to allow mobility of the peacekeeping forces. In practice, road verification and clearance is also essential for humanitarian operations, so this is a common priority. Where peacekeeping forces set priorities that are not shared by humanitarian actors, these are done by engineering units in the peacekeeping forces or by commercial operators paid for under the peacekeeping operations budget, which does not divert assets away from humanitarian demining priorities.

6 Critical infrastructure (e.g., national trunk roads) is normally restored in a ‘big push’ post-conflict reconstruction programme, but reconstruction of tertiary roads, clinics in remote communities, etc may take a decade or more in poor countries that have experienced large-scale conflicts (e.g., Mozambique, Cambodia). Infrastructure often represents a particular problem for demining programmes because (i) it is targeted by combatants and (ii) because it is normally far less costly to reconstruct than to construct replacement infrastructure.

7 This discussion is based on Chapter 3 of A Guide to Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action Planning and Management, GICHD and UNDP, 2004.

8 Some have talked about the need to see the move from conflict to development as a “contiguity” rather than a continuum. See, for example, Swiss Red Cross (2010) Concept on LRRD: Linking Relief, Reconstruction and Development. Available from http://www.redcross.ch/data/info/pubs/pdf/redcross_495_en.pdf.

9 The diagram at the end of Brief 2 in this series (The Architecture of Mine Action: Actors, Arenas, and Linkages) provides a tool for illustrating and analysing such trends. See also see Paterson, Larder, Rebelo and Tibana, A Review of Ten Years of Mine Action in Mozambique, GICHD, 2005 for an example of such analysis.

10 This can be true even for countries where national mine action legislation grants the NMAA authority for making all mine action decisions: government agencies not involved in mine action often assume the mine action legislation applies only to mine action organisations.

11 The proposal was sensible but never implemented, perhaps because: (i) CMAA did not engage the operators in preparing the Five Year Plan and (ii) CMAA did not have the capacity to manage the annual review and operations planning exercise.


PRIORITY-SETTING IN MINE ACTION: ESTABLISHING THE PRIORITISATION SYSTEM AND ADAPTING IT OVER TIME
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