Aid and conflict in Uganda

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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>conflict-sensitive approach</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
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<td>CSOPNU</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTG NARC</td>
<td>Donor Technical Group on Northern Uganda, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>GoU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<td>JLOS</td>
<td>Justice Law and Order Sector</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>KIDDP</td>
<td>Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRRD</td>
<td>linking relief, rehabilitation and development</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MFPED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NFP</td>
<td>National Focal Point</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NIMES</td>
<td>National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy</td>
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<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>NURP I</td>
<td>Northern Uganda Reconstruction project</td>
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<td>NURP II</td>
<td>(phases I and II)</td>
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<td>NUSAF</td>
<td>Northern Uganda Social Action Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PAF</td>
<td>Poverty Action Fund</td>
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<td>PEAP</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Action Plan</td>
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<td>PPA</td>
<td>Participatory Poverty Assessment</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>People’s Redemption Army</td>
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<td>PRDP</td>
<td>National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery and Development</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>PRSC</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Support Credit</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSR</td>
<td>Poverty Status Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>small arms and light weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCD</td>
<td>Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>SWAp</td>
<td>sector-wide approach</td>
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<td>SWG</td>
<td>sector working group</td>
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<td>UJAS</td>
<td>Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Force</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Executive summary

**There is a growing consensus** amongst researchers and policy makers that development and security are closely linked. Poverty and underdevelopment increase the risk of violent conflict and contribute to other forms of armed violence. This is clear in Africa where factors linked with underdevelopment such as weak state capacity, horizontal inequalities, and livelihood and resource pressures, contribute to conflict and insecurity. On the other side of the coin, conflict and armed violence contribute to poverty and undermine development, for instance by destroying livelihoods, causing displacement, and disrupting economic activity and service provision.

Fully integrating issues of conflict and armed violence into development programming is therefore vital. Development can contribute to peace and security by addressing the root causes and motivations for conflict and armed violence; however it can also exacerbate tensions. It is therefore vital that development interventions in all sectors are conflict-sensitive and work to promote peace. Sustainably addressing conflict and armed violence requires a multi-dimensional approach that both ensures that development in all sectors, supports peace and security (e.g. by addressing the social and economic causes of violence) and addresses specific conflict and security-focused issues that impact on the poor (e.g. reform of the security and justice system).

Conflict and armed violence have a strong bearing on development prospects, and vice versa, in Uganda. Since independence in 1962, Uganda has experienced a history of conflict and violent uprisings. Violence, rather than democratic, inclusive processes has been used to assume and often retain power. These conflicts and uprisings have been rooted in deep ethnic divisions and regional inequalities, which continue to lie beneath the surface of the current period of relative stability. Regional divisions and disparities in development between the North and the rest of the country, the continued dominance of the military in public life, the proliferation of small arms linked with the history of conflict, and the difficult political transition to multi-party democracy all contribute to the country’s fragility.

The 20-year rebel insurgency in the North of the country, by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), has been characterised by brutal attacks on civilians, abductions of children, rape and human rights abuses. The conflict has displaced over 1.6 million people, who live in conditions of chronic insecurity and poverty. It has cut off the North from mainstream development leading to some of the highest levels of poverty in the country. Armed cattle rustling and conflicts involving pastoralists in the Karamoja region in the North East have also become increasingly violent. The possession and misuse of small arms is widespread, and tensions are escalating between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and local people over how disarmament and development occur in the region. As well as internal conflicts, Uganda has been affected by
regional conflicts and cross-border insecurity illustrated, for example, by Uganda’s involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

While concern and attention is correctly focussed on resolving the conflict in the North, underlying divisions and sources of insecurity need to be addressed across the country so that violence does not re-emerge along the same regional and ethnic fault lines of the past. Whether or not peace is ultimately sustainable will depend in part upon how socio-economic development occurs across the country (for instance, the extent to which it promotes regional equity) as well as how the GoU addresses security threats (e.g. through military responses or through a preventative approach that prioritises civilian protection and human security).

This paper examines how far issues of conflict and armed violence have been integrated within development frameworks in Uganda. It analyses the nature and impact of conflict and armed violence in Uganda, the development approaches taken by the GoU and donors, and how they address conflict and armed violence, both on paper and in practice. The analysis focuses primarily on the GoU’s own development framework, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). It also assesses donor responses to the PEAP by examining key donor assistance strategies, policy dialogue and programmes. The paper aims to provide a basis for deeper dialogue between the GoU, donors and civil society on how to improve the way that development frameworks address conflict and security in Uganda.

Main findings

On paper, the PEAP provides a reasonable framework for integrating conflict and armed violence issues within development processes in Uganda. Conflict and security issues are recognised as a high priority in the PEAP, with Pillar 3 dedicated to ‘Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management.’ The GoU’s approach to implementing Pillar 3 has been to establish Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management (SCD) as a new sector with a secretariat situated within the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). The GoU also recognises the need to ‘mainstream’ conflict and security components across sectors that do not have a conflict or security focus, such as health and education.

However, there is some way to go before the GoU realises the potential of the PEAP in practice and translates it into any significant impact on the ground. For a number of observers, the GoU’s limited progress in implementing Pillar 3 reflects its lack of political commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict and armed violence, and its tendency to resort to reactive military responses. Some feel that there are fundamental limitations to addressing issues that are essentially ‘political’ through a technical exercise such as the PEAP. In addition, some feel that establishing a separate pillar and sector dedicated to SCD is counter-productive because it reinforces the tendency to treat conflict and armed violence as stand-alone issues, rather than mainstreaming these issues across sectors. Beyond these fundamental concerns, a key constraint to progress is the GoU’s lack of capacity to translate the vision of the PEAP into concrete action. The agreement of the National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery and Development (PRDP) is an important step forward, and has the potential, if implemented, to provide a basis for an integrated approach to peacebuilding in the North.

Donor relations in Uganda are characterised by high levels of harmonisation and alignment with the PEAP framework, with most donors aligning their assistance with...
GoU priorities and processes via sector and general budget support. Donors’ decisions to provide the major part of their assistance via budget support reflects strong confidence in the GoU’s economic and political governance and full support for the PEAP, including Pillar 3. It also shows a belief that they can influence the GoU through policy and political dialogue. While donors are aligning their support behind Pillar 3 of the PEAP through budget support, ongoing concerns relating to the country’s transition to democracy and the GoU’s commitment to resolving the conflict in the North have called into question the basis for this confidence and raised questions about the extent to which donors consider human security issues when they are deciding on whether to offer general budget support. While some donors did make cuts to budget support in relation to events surrounding the 2006 elections, they have not yet been prepared to do so in relation to GoU policy in Northern Uganda. Even with recent progress towards peace in the North, the suitability of the use of budget support as the primary aid modality needs to be monitored and evaluated carefully by donors, particularly from the perspective of its impact on conflict.

Furthermore, despite the inclusion of Pillar 3 in the PEAP, the needs of conflict-affected areas in the North are being addressed largely through separate donor-funded projects and humanitarian assistance rather than through development assistance via budget support. This separation risks undermining the GoU’s role in service provision in the North and reinforcing northerners’ perceptions of neglect by the GoU. It also implies that some donors do not see the conflict in the North as strictly relevant to dialogue around the PEAP, poverty reduction, or the GoU’s performance in relation to these. In the context of budget support, it is vital that the GoU adopt conflict-sensitive approaches in its mainstream development planning mechanisms, including sectoral strategies and plans, and that donors support this through dialogue, capacity-building and monitoring of GoU performance. However, while some donors are linking conflict and development in specific projects, donors are doing little to encourage the integration of conflict and armed violence issues across sectors through dialogue and support linked with sector wide approaches (SWAps). Furthermore, while much attention is focused on the conflict in the North, the potential for conflict and armed violence to escalate or re-emerge in other parts of Uganda, such as the North East and West Nile, is not being adequately addressed because donors and the GoU have not developed a systematic approach to conflict-sensitivity.

However, there is growing donor co-ordination on conflict issues, a clear attempt to link development co-operation with political dialogue via a Governance Matrix, and most donors have integrated conflict issues into political dialogue linked with budget support and monitoring of PEAP results, although more can be done. The development of the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) involving over ten donors is a significant move towards closer co-ordination, harmonisation and alignment with the priorities of the PEAP, including Pillar 3. Donors are also seeking to integrate a conflict and armed violence perspective within new development strategies and programming. This reflects growing recognition of the need to address conflict and armed violence in order to alleviate poverty and to move beyond humanitarian responses to deal with the longer-term needs of populations in conflict-affected areas.

**Recommendations**

The GoU, Ugandan civil society and donors must work together in order to ensure a coherent and integrated approach to addressing conflict and armed violence across the country through support to the PEAP. This paper puts forward the following recommendations:

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3 DFID cut £5 million in budget support in May 2005 (of a total of £40 million for the year) over concerns about the progress of the country’s political transition, particularly in relation to the establishment of a fair basis for a multi-party system. Several donors, including the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Sweden also cut support during the run-up to the elections, over concerns of human rights abuses.

4 For instance, GTZ has a project in West Nile that is linking conflict and water provision.
Donors should:

- Ensure that the GoU’s approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and an analysis of the impact of budget support on conflict dynamics, are placed at the centre of future decisions on budget support to Uganda.

- Ensure that all new internal and bilateral donor assistance strategies address the linkages between conflict, armed violence and development and that they are informed by a conflict analysis.

- Continue to support the GoU’s efforts to implement Pillar 3 of the PEAP by:
  - establishing the SCD sector;
  - mainstreaming actions to address conflict and armed violence across other sectors;
  - pursuing other entry points on initiatives such as ‘equity budgeting’, including engaging with the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and with sector line ministries in addition to support for the OPM; and
  - evaluating the sustainability of technical assistance to the OPM and ensuring capacity-building support strengthens rather than substitutes for its core functions, such as policy development and co-ordination.

- Strengthen joint analysis and monitoring of conflict and armed violence in Uganda among donors and use this to inform donor assistance strategies, dialogue and programming. As a starting point, donors should support a joint conflict analysis to inform dialogue and support via the UJAS.
  - Encourage the integration of conflict and armed violence issues into support linked with SWAps, through research, dialogue and capacity-building support. Donors should, for instance:
    - support participatory conflict assessments and research on how specific sectors (e.g. water, health) can be integrated into conflict and armed violence issues and consider the findings within the Sector Working Groups; and
    - provide staff with training, guidance and incentives (including joint donor training) to enable them to promote conflict-sensitive approaches in their sectors.

The Government of Uganda should:

- Ensure that conflict prevention and peacebuilding are at the heart of GoU poverty reduction strategies, by:
  - implementing Pillar 3 of the PEAP, and ensuring it is adequately resourced; and
  - implementing the National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace Recovery and Development (PRDP) and use this as the basis for an integrated approach to peacebuilding in the North.

- Build capacity within the OPM, MFPED, and sector line ministries to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches to development planning and implementation, both in PEAP review and implementation processes, and in particular sectors, by drawing on the resources and expertise of civil society organisations and donors.

- Strengthen the coherence and division of labour between different government ministries (and departments within these, particularly the OPM) on conflict and security issues.

- Undertake a conflict assessment and research, in partnership with donors and civil society, to inform the PEAP implementation and review processes, and the process of mainstreaming actions to address conflict and armed violence across sectors.

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5 This initiative aims to make operational the commitment of the PEAP to ensuring a more equal distribution of resources to different regions of the country.
Civil society should:

- Monitor progress in implementing Pillar 3 of the PEAP and hold the GoU accountable to its commitments by engaging with ongoing review processes, such as the Poverty Status Report (PSR) and the annual PEAP implementation review.
- Engage in dialogue with donors on the development and review of donor assistance strategies, and how they address conflict and armed violence issues.
- Conduct research and advocacy to demonstrate the links between conflict, armed violence and development in Uganda, and to assess how conflict and armed violence issues have been integrated at a district / local level (e.g. within District Disaster Management Committees) in order to inform planning and policy development.
- Provide practical support to the GoU to address conflict and armed violence in policies, sector strategies and planning through, for example, capacity-building and collaborative research, using multiple entry points including MFPED, OPM, NFP and local government.
Introduction

“Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security.”
Kofi Annan, ‘In Larger Freedom’

The linkages between development and security are increasingly recognised internationally, as is reflected in recent reports such as ‘The UN report of the High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change’ and the ‘Millennium Project Report’. In Uganda the strong link between poverty and insecurity makes it imperative for any development effort to address issues of armed violence and conflict, yet the Government of Uganda (GoU) and donors have some way to go to translate this realisation into concrete action.

This paper seeks to shed light on the extent to which the GoU and donors are aware of the linkages between poverty and insecurity, by examining how far issues of conflict and armed violence have been integrated within development frameworks in Uganda. It primarily considers how these issues have been integrated within the GoU’s own development framework, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which acts as Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); as well as to a lesser extent within donor assistance strategies, policy dialogue and programmes. On the basis of this analysis, the paper then draws out recommendations on how a more integrated, comprehensive approach to conflict and armed violence in Uganda could be encouraged.

It draws on Saferworld’s work in Uganda over the past five years on conflict prevention and small arms control. This has been supplemented by a five-day research visit to Uganda in May 2005, which involved interviews with a number of donors, government officials and civil society representatives, follow-up interviews held in August 2006, as well as a review of relevant policy documents and academic literature.

Structure of the paper

Section two provides an overview of the linkages between development and security, and how these are borne out in international policy statements. Section three analyses the nature and impact of conflict and armed violence in Uganda. Section four provides an overview of the main development frameworks in Uganda, describing the PEAP, as well as donor responses and strategies. Section five goes on to consider how far issues

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6 ‘Integration’ of issues of conflict and armed violence into development frameworks refers to a situation where the linkages between conflict and armed violence and development are explicitly recognised and incorporated in the frameworks and their implementation processes.
7 The term ‘development framework’ is used to describe strategic policy frameworks drawn up by national governments and donors to guide the development process. Development frameworks include national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs); drawn up as part of the World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative; multilateral donor frameworks such as United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF); European Union Country Strategy Papers (CSPs); World Bank Country Assistance Strategies (CAS); and bilateral donor frameworks such as the Department for International Development (DFID) Country Assistance Plans (CAPs).
of conflict and armed violence are recognised and incorporated within the PEAP, examining its development and review as well as the steps the GoU is taking to implement it. Section six then examines how far donors have integrated conflict and armed violence issues within their own policy dialogue, strategies and programmes in Uganda. The final section of the paper provides a number of recommendations for improved action to civil society, the GoU, and donors.
The linkages between development and security

There is a growing consensus amongst researchers and policy makers that development and security are closely linked. This is backed up by statistical evidence of a strong correlation between violent conflict and poverty. For example, a conflict-affected country typically has only one-third the per capita income of a country with similar characteristics but at peace. Furthermore, a country with a per capita income of $500 is about twice as likely to have a major conflict within five years as a country with an income of four times that amount.

Poverty and underdevelopment make countries more vulnerable to violent conflict. Underdevelopment is linked to weak state capacity, causing countries to be less able to manage conflicts peacefully. It undermines the state’s ability for sound and equitable economic and environmental management and is linked to scarcity of resources (e.g. pasture, water) which, particularly in situations where there are sharp horizontal divisions (based e.g. on ethnicity, regions, religion), can increase the likelihood of conflict between groups. It also affects demography and social structures leading to high child to adult ratios which are associated with greater conflict risks.

Poverty and underdevelopment are also linked to an increase in armed violence, even where major conflict is not present. Pressure on resources can undermine livelihoods and push groups and individuals into armed crime, such as cattle rustling, banditry and theft – a common occurrence in the underdeveloped pastoralist areas and poor urban areas of East Africa.

On the other side of the coin, conflict and armed violence increase poverty and undermine development. Conflict destroys physical and human capital, disrupts economic activity and livelihoods, reducing growth, trade and investment. It destroys health and education systems and causes the rapid movement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), deepening poverty and inequality by spreading malnutrition and infectious diseases and reducing educational opportunities. At the same time, conflict

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9 Poorer countries are more likely to have demographic regimes marked by high fertility and high mortality, resulting in high child to adult ratios. These have been linked to increased conflict risks.
encourages high levels of military expenditure, diverting essential resources away from
development and poverty alleviation. High levels of gun violence also obstruct poverty
alleviation, deter investment, restrict food production and distribution and under-
mine livelihoods in both rural and urban areas. There is also a growing recognition
that freedom from fear is central to well-being and that enhancing human security is
important in improving the lives of the poor. This is reflected in the views and
experiences of those living in poverty, who express security of the person and property
as a key issue.

The policies of key multilateral and bilateral donor institutions, including the World
Bank, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and members of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recognise the linkages
between security and development. These links are also borne out in The UN report
of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which introduces a
concept of collective security, involving a broad range of global, regional and national
actors, and recognises development as the indispensable foundation for, and poverty
as one of the key threats to, security.

The UN Millennium Declaration (2000) outlining the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) emphasises peace, security and disarmament as fundamental for
human well-being and eradicating poverty in all its forms. This has been reinforced
by The Millennium Project Report which recommends that any international or
national strategy to achieve the MDGs include a focus on conflict prevention and that
MDG-based poverty reduction strategies include specific investments aimed directly
at enhancing peace and security. Suggested actions include designing conflict-sensitive
strategies, undertaking security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration (DDR), controlling the use and spread of small arms and light
weapons (SALW), rehabilitating war-torn areas and providing support to IDPs and
refugees.

11 Centre for International Cooperation and Security, The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development, Department
12 See for example, World Bank, Voices of the Poor (Oxford University Press, 2000).
13 United Nations, A more secure world, our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change (2005).
14 The ‘Millennium Declaration’ was adopted by 189 Member Nations of the UN on 18 September 2000 and outlines the
signatory countries’ commitment to achieving the MDGs. The MDGs are time-bound and quantified targets for addressing
extreme poverty.
Conflict and armed violence in Uganda

IN UGANDA THE CONFLICT AND SECURITY SITUATION has a strong bearing on development prospects and vice versa. Since independence in 1962, Uganda has experienced a history of conflicts and uprisings where violence has been used to assume and often to retain power. This history of conflict is linked to a British colonial legacy of deep-rooted divisions between the North and South of the country. The policy of focusing production and wealth in the South whilst using the North as a reservoir for military personnel, as well as a period of indirect colonial rule through the Buganda, contributed to ethnic and religious tensions and regional disparities. Successive post-colonial governments have further manipulated ethnic and religious divisions. The most notable was Idi Amin, the Chief of Staff of the Army who overthrew Milton Obote’s post-colonial one party state in 1971. Amin oversaw the murder of thousands of Ugandans and the expulsion of Uganda’s population of 70,000 Asians before being forced from power in 1979 by opposition elements supported by the Tanzanian armed forces.

Following a number of short-lived administrations, the current president, Yoweri Museveni, took power as leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM, later the ‘Movement’) in 1986. He has overseen a period of relative stability and economic growth in Uganda with the economy growing at 6 percent during the 1990s. On achieving power he quickly sought to build legitimacy beyond the NRM’s power base of the South and South West and established a no-party system based on decentralised councils in an effort to overcome some of the ethnic and religious cleavages.

Uganda, however, remains politically and economically fragile. The military plays a dominant role in political life and the country still faces a fairly tense period of political transition towards multi-party democracy, as evidenced by events around the 2006 elections. Regional disparities in economic growth and poverty levels between the North and the rest of the country continue to be a source of division. Ongoing conflicts and high levels of armed violence continue to threaten the North and the North East, and the West remains vulnerable to a resurgence of violence.

The predominant ongoing conflict in Uganda is the 19 year insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, that has affected the Acholi, Lango and Teso regions of the North and parts of the West Nile. This insurgency is rooted in popular Northern grievances against Museveni’s NRM, but has been transformed by the LRA into a violent and brutal conflict that appears to lack a clear political agenda. On closer analysis, the war appears to be “two conflicts in one: a multi-faceted northern rebellion against the NRM government whose root causes have never been fully resolved, and a war with an LRA that does not fit conventional models of political insurgency and is motivated by an Old Testament-style apocalyptic spiritualism.”

The LRA is viewed by some as having become a self-sustaining war machine which terrorises and commits gross human rights abuses against the largely civilian population of Acholi (and to some extent, of Lango and Teso) and thereby spreads hatred of the GoU for their inability to protect the population.

Chronic insecurity and the displacement of a large proportion of the population from their land into internally displaced person (IDP) camps, particularly in the Acholi area, have led to a loss of services and infrastructure and the disruption of livelihoods resulting in widespread poverty. Over 1.6 million people have been displaced into around 200 camps, some by forced relocation by the army. There is a deep mistrust of the NRM government by the Acholi people, many of whom believe that the government is pursuing a policy designed to keep them politically and economically weak by allowing the conflict situation in the North to continue. This is exacerbated by insufficient protection of IDPs, corruption and human rights abuses by UPDF soldiers, and a sense of marginalisation caused by underdevelopment and a lack of government investment in the North.

The conflict has not just been confined to Uganda and has had an important regional dimension: it has been linked with the 21 year civil war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). The LRA historically operated from back-bases in South Sudan and received arms and support from the Government of Sudan, reportedly in retaliation for the GoU’s support to the SPLA/M. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, which requires an end to Sudanese support to the LRA, has shifted this dynamic and placed greater pressure on the LRA. In addition, the newly formed Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has played a central role in bringing the LRA to the negotiating table in peace talks it is mediating in Juba.

Until recently, the GoU’s response to the threat posed by the LRA has been principally military. This situation has sustained and justified its high military expenditure and large national army, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). GoU attempts to stamp out the LRA by force have been unsuccessful, despite a concerted effort under the name of Operation Iron Fist in 2002, which extended into Southern Sudan, leading some observers to believe that the GoU is unlikely to ever defeat the LRA without the active support of the Acholi population. In order to provide security in IDP camps and to bolster the troops, the GoU has also pursued a policy of arming a variety of local defence units and militias, thus increasing the number of arms in circulation. Officially, these units are supposed to function under UPDF command, but the extent of practical control over them is unclear. Although some IDP camp residents have said that the local defence units have increased their security, others are worried about the long-term implications of eventually having to disarm and reintegrate them in an environment with almost no alternative livelihood options.

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At the same time as pursuing a military strategy, the GoU also made some moves toward a peaceful solution. Since 2004, there has been a GoU initiative to negotiate a peace settlement, led by Betty Bigombe, a former Minister responsible for the North. The GoU granted amnesty to the rebels through the Amnesty Act of 2000 and the Amnesty Commission and NGO-supported reception centres have played a key role in the reintegration of former soldiers and abducted children. At the same time, in January 2004, the GoU referred the crimes of the LRA to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued arrest warrants for Kony and four other LRA commanders, disclosed in October 2005. These approaches have yielded fragile and short-term results, with the GoU continuously favouring a military solution.

The peace talks which began on 14 July 2006 between the GoU and the LRA in Juba, mediated by the GoSS, represent the best opportunity in a decade to end the conflict in Northern Uganda. The talks have come about due to a confluence of factors. In the context of reduced support to the LRA from Sudanese elements, the GoSS has placed strong pressure on the LRA, which it views as a potential threat to its authority and to the implementation of the CPA, to engage in peace talks or face military confrontation. In addition, the LRA has also recognised that it will come under pressure from the UN missions in Sudan and DRC (where some LRA forces operate), and as a result of the ICC indictment of the LRA leaders. At the same time, President Museveni has announced a blanket amnesty for the five indicted LRA leaders if they accept peace—a position that is strongly supported by northern leaders and Ugandan civil society organisations who favour justice and reconciliation via traditional systems and the Amnesty Act of 2000 and see ending the war as the first priority. This has been coupled with growing recognition by the GoU that it must address the conflict and chronic poverty and insecurity in the North if it is to restore its international reputation and the confidence of Western donors, which have been seriously damaged by events surrounding the 2006 multi-party elections.

Notwithstanding some disagreements and delays, the peace process appears to have support from both parties. On August 26 2006, the parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement that was renewed in November. Since then, the UPDF has halted operations against the LRA and LRA rebels have begun to gather at assembly points in South Sudan. In addition, the LRA have reportedly agreed to release abducted women and children from captivity. The peace process still faces some challenges, including reluctance by senior LRA commanders to attend talks due to the ICC indictments and difficulties providing assurances that the GoU will be able to circumvent future ICC rulings, as well as lack of support and consensus towards the peace process on the part of the international community due to their prior commitment to future ICC rulings.

The peace process presents an important opportunity to address some of the root causes of Acholi grievances such as social, political and economic marginalisation, and to initiate a process for building trust between different segments of society, including applying restorative justice. Resettlement of IDPs has started in the relatively peaceful Teso and Lango regions of Northern Uganda under a six month plan implemented by the GoU. This, importantly, also includes a plan to replace the army with a civilian police force to provide security. This has been seen as an encouraging sign by international donors who are keen to engage with new initiatives and to realise any peace dividends in the North.

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26 Interview with donor official, August 2006.
Inter-ethnic conflict and armed violence also severely affect development in the Karamoja region in North East Uganda, a predominantly pastoralist area that has been of marginal interest to authorities since the days of colonial rule. Cattle rustling and ethnic clashes are widespread and extend across the borders into Sudan and Kenya. They are linked to a number of factors, including: competition over access to land, water and pasture exacerbated by unpredictable rainfall; low levels of government investment and weak governance structures; the proliferation of vigilante groups of armed youth; the emergence of local businessmen and warlords connected to criminal commercial cattle trading networks; and general economic marginalisation of these areas.\(^{27}\) From the 1970s and 1980s onwards, instability and conflict in Ethiopia, Sudan and other parts of Northern Uganda have exponentially increased the volume of available small arms, causing clashes to become more violent.\(^ {28}\) The ensuing displacement and loss of livelihoods in the region have contributed to rising levels of poverty.

In the past the GoU has made various attempts to disarm the Karimojong but none have been successful, as there seems to have been a failure to understand and effectively address the overall development and security needs of the people.\(^ {29}\) Recent initiatives have tried to address the cross-border nature of the conflict by undertaking a joint GoU/Government of Kenya cross-border mission to consider options for coordinated disarmament interventions in the Karamoja, Turkana and Pokot areas. The government, in wide consultation with stakeholders, has also developed the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) with support from DANIDA. The KIDDP appeared to be a step forward in that it sought to address both issues of insecurity and development in the region. In addition the UNDP developed a preparatory project which would seek to increase human security in the Karamoja region by supporting peacebuilding and recovery. Subsequent phases of the project would prepare for community-based policing and link development projects to voluntary weapons collection (see Box 4). However, the finalisation, launch and implementation of the KIDDP has been delayed and in the meantime the UPDF launched an unrelated, forced disarmament exercise in the Karamoja region known as ‘cordon and search.’ The use of force to disarm communities has contributed to an escalation in conflict between the GoU and local people as well as disagreement with development partners over how disarmament and development should occur in the region. A series of clashes between UPDF and Karimojong warriors in October and November 2006 led to the killing of 16 UPDF soldiers, an attempt to shoot down a UPDF plane, and the bombing of a pastoralist settlement on the border with Kenya by the UPDF. The issue is becoming increasingly divisive with the Ugandan Minister of Defence calling the attack on the UPDF an ‘act of war’ and accusations of human rights abuses by the GoU.\(^ {30}\) The UNDP first postponed the start of its project activities and then suspended support to the Karamoja region in June 2006 in response to the forcible nature of the GoU disarmament exercise, while other development partner support has also been set back or reprogrammed.

The West Nile and Rwenzori regions of Uganda have experienced rebel insurgencies against the GoU and are moving towards post-conflict situations with functioning peace agreements and seemingly effective demobilisation and disarmament programmes. In the West Nile, the Development Conference, which was an agreed component of the peace agreement, finally materialised in 2005, and is structured to deal with both the short-term consolidation of peace and long-term developmental challenges.\(^ {31}\) Other security issues facing Uganda include the external security

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27 Mnukutu, K, Pastoralist conflict and small arms: The Kenya-Uganda border region, (Saferworld, 2003), p 6
28 ibid, p 13.
29 ibid, p 6.
challenge posed by rebel groups based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This led to involvement in the conflict by the UPDF, partly motivated by economic objectives relating to the exploitation of the vast natural resource wealth of the Eastern DRC. Uganda has now withdrawn from the DRC, but maintains a division in the Rwenzori region and occasional rumours of an anti-government rebel group, the People’s Redemption Army (PRA), based in the DRC, continue to surface.32

Organised violent crime is a growing phenomenon, particularly in Kampala, and one that is exacerbated by the large number of SALW in circulation, growing urbanisation and ineffective responses. Anti-crime operations, such as Operation Wembley undertaken in Kampala in 2002, have been criticised for being heavy handed and involving human rights violations by security personnel,33 and appear to have done little to address the problem in the longer term.

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32 Dr. Kizza Besigye and others have faced treason charges for alleged involvement with this group.
Development frameworks in Uganda

**The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)**

The key strategic planning framework for GoU policy and approaches to development and poverty reduction is the PEAP. According to the GoU, the purpose of the PEAP is to “provide an overarching framework to guide public action to eradicate poverty, defined as low incomes, limited human development and powerlessness”\(^3^4\). It is a home-grown document which was first drafted in 1997 prior to the introduction of the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process, and was later adopted as Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) following its first revision in 2000. It was revised again during 2003/4 and the current version runs from 2004/5 to 2007/8.

The development of the current PEAP was managed by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and involved an arguably strong participatory process. It drew on a number of sources which included:

- a 2003 Poverty Status Report (PSR) which assessed progress in implementing the PEAP and outstanding challenges and included the findings of a Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) undertaken in 2002;
- stakeholder workshops involving over one thousand stakeholders from all levels of government, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector;
- Sector PEAP Revision Papers developed by Sector Working Groups (SWGs), focusing on sectors such as agriculture, health, education and social development;
- and a civil society consultative process led by the Uganda NGO Forum and Private Sector Foundation, which put forward various position papers.

The PEAP’s core development priorities are presented under a number of pillars outlined in the following table:
The implementation of the PEAP is tied closely to the national budget process controlled by the MFPED. The PEAP provides the overall framework for the development of Sector Strategies and District Plans which are linked to the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The MTEF links the Sector Strategies to the overall resources available by setting sector budget ceilings and is presented to Cabinet as part of the annual Budget Framework Paper. The MTEF is intended to guide all public expenditure including the use of resources committed by donors.

A Poverty Action Fund (PAF) was set up in 1997 in order to strengthen the pro-poor orientation of the budget. The PAF ensures that priority areas for poverty alleviation, such as primary health care, primary education, water and sanitation, agriculture and rural roads, are protected from budget cuts and receive additional resources from debt relief monies. The PAF is, however, currently being phased out as its weaknesses have outweighed its benefits. It has, for example, led to an increased burden of cuts on non-protected sectors (such as the Justice, Law and Order sector) and has reduced flexibility of local governments to prioritise according to local need.

Progress on implementing the PEAP is measured against output and outcome indicators related to PEAP strategic objectives outlined in the PEAP Results and Policy Matrix (known commonly as the ‘PEAP Matrix’). To strengthen the monitoring process, the GoU has developed a National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES) with a secretariat located in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Monitoring data is collected using censuses and surveys, administrative data, PPAs, beneficiary assessments, and research studies. This data feeds into biennial Poverty Status Reports (PSRs) which review progress and challenges in implementing the PEAP. The 2005 PSR has been completed and contains detailed information relating to the implementation of the PEAP, including Pillar 3. In addition, in 2006 the OPM has commenced an annual PEAP implementation review process, which is intended to feed into an annual progress report against benchmarks and indicators in the PEAP Matrix.

The process of revising the current PEAP (which runs from 2004/5–2007/8) will commence in 2007/08. It will be revised on the basis of information from a PSR 2007 and the annual progress report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Pillars of the PEAP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar 1 – Economic Management</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Boosting economic growth (e.g. by removing bureaucratic barriers to investment, improvement in transport infrastructure) and macro-economic management via actions to reduce the budget deficit</td>
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</table>

Donor relations in Uganda are characterised by high levels of harmonisation of operational policies, procedures, and practices and by alignment with the PEAP framework. There are well-developed co-ordination mechanisms led by the MFPED, and donor assistance strategies and implementation processes are predominantly aligned with GoU priorities and processes via general and sector budget support and
the MTEF. Even those donors that continue to pursue a project approach (e.g. USAID and UNDP) have aligned the majority of their assistance behind programmes and priorities outlined in the PEAP. Annex 1 provides an overview of selected donor assistance strategies, their development and review.

The majority of donors deliver their assistance either through budget support to the GoU’s central budget or to sectoral ministries to support the implementation of Uganda’s SWAps. The purpose of budget support is to support the implementation of the PEAP as the GoU’s strategy for poverty reduction by providing substantial unearmarked financing in a way that increases GoU’s control and reduces the burden of donor co-ordination and liaison on the GoU and its ministries. Nine donors provide general budget support via the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC). They have agreed on a joint policy matrix, known as the ‘PRSC Matrix’, of proposed GoU actions and commitments, which are monitored and linked to disbursements. Uganda is one of the most advanced countries with respect to SWAp development. It has extended SWAps to all sectors, including agriculture, health, HIV/AIDS, water and the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS), which was the first SWAp of its kind. Sector Working Groups, which include officials from line ministries, MFPED, donors and civil society representatives, have been set up to review the performance of SWAps.

The Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) for 2005–2009 has been agreed by over ten donors. The UJAS is firmly aligned behind the priorities in the PEAP and focused on results and outcomes. It represents another step towards closer co-ordination, harmonisation and alignment with the PEAP. The UJAS includes a commitment to use the government’s own monitoring and evaluation systems as the basis for assessing PEAP implementation and results. It therefore contains a results matrix that is aligned with the PEAP policy and results matrix. This includes result areas related to all pillars of the PEAP.

In addition, a number of donors have adopted a ‘Governance Matrix’ as the basis for monitoring progress and policy dialogue on a range of political governance issues that extend beyond the purview of the PRSC Matrix and the PEAP Matrix (see Section 6 for further discussion of this). The UJAS recognises the need to discuss with the government expanding the PEAP Matrix to reflect a broader governance and human rights agenda, and states that some donors will continue to use the Governance Matrix in the interim.

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36 A SWAp is a way of engaging in development co-operation in which government and donor funds are used to support a single, comprehensive programme and expenditure framework for an entire sector. General budget support is a method of financing a country’s budget in which funds are transferred directly to the recipient country’s treasury and are managed in accordance with the recipient’s budgetary procedures. Sector budget support is used to refer to cases in which dialogue between donors and recipient governments is focused on policy and budget priorities within a particular sector, usually within the framework of SWAps.

37 African Development Bank, UK DFID, European Commission (EC), Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, World Bank.

38 African Development Bank, Austria, Denmark, EC, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK DFID, World Bank.
Integrating conflict and armed violence issues in the PEAP and PEAP implementation

The current version of the PEAP (2004/5–2007/8) explicitly recognises the relationship between conflict, security and development and the contribution of insecurity to rising poverty and inequality. Conflict and security are deemed as issues of national relevance and priority, and the consequences of conflict and regional equity are highlighted as one of the four core challenges of the PEAP. This is reflected in the designation of a whole pillar, Pillar 3, to Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management underlining the importance the GoU attaches to these issues.

Previous versions of the PEAP showed some recognition of the links between conflict and development. However, the introduction of Pillar 3 represents a step change in the priority given to issues of conflict and security within mainstream development planning. The 2000 PEAP, for example, noted that “the successful resolution of conflict is a necessary part of poverty eradication”39. However, prior to the development of the current version of the PEAP, the GoU had not sought to embed developmental and humanitarian responses to conflict and armed violence within government structures and processes for development planning and implementation in any meaningful way (for example, by integrating rehabilitation or conflict prevention objectives into sector strategies and the MTEF). It is not possible to attribute the prominence of conflict and security issues within the current PEAP to one single process or actor. The inclusion of these issues was rather the outcome of a convergence of factors which are highlighted in Box 1 overleaf.

Box 1: Factors leading to the inclusion of conflict and armed violence issues within the PEAP

Clear evidence of linkages between security, conflict and poverty
The Poverty Status Report (PSR 2003) highlighted the disproportionate levels of poverty in Northern Uganda. Poverty levels in Northern Uganda were calculated at 66 percent, excluding those in IDP camps (and therefore an underestimation). The PPA (2002), which informed the PSR, revealed that in Northern districts insecurity was viewed as the most prominent cause of poverty. There were however, no formal conflict assessment processes undertaken.

Increasing recognition by the GoU of conflict as a ‘national issue’.
According to some commentators, the GoU and in particular the MFPED, increasingly view conflict, and especially the conflict in the North, as a national issue. This change of perspective has been linked to the influence of reports such as the PSR 2003 which have highlighted the contribution of Northern Uganda to overall rising poverty levels and to the lack of progress in relation to the government’s own poverty reduction commitments and the MDG’s. It is also possibly a response to the ongoing debates in Ugandan civil society over the issue of identity in the national context and the need for national reconciliation.

Development of GoU policy related to conflict-affected areas and other security issues
Alongside the development of the PEAP, the GoU was also developing various policies and strategies towards conflict-affected regions, such as the Disaster Management Policy, the IDP Policy, the Karamoja Strategic Plan, as well as strategies to address other security issues, such as the NAP on small arms. Pillar 3 reflects an attempt to incorporate these policies and strategies into the PEAP under an over-arching framework.

Realisation that the current instruments and approaches are ineffective
There is an ongoing policy discourse in the donor community and within the GoU on the importance of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and the need to move beyond humanitarian responses and deal with the longer term needs of populations in conflict-affected areas. This provides a strong rationale for integrating issues of relief and rehabilitation and disaster management within the overall PEAP. Some conceptions of LRRD are limited however by the tendency to see relief, rehabilitation and development as a linear progression.

The role of civil society
Civil society actors in Uganda were strong advocates for including conflict and armed violence issues in the PEAP and exposed linkages between poverty and conflict, which correlate to the government’s own statistics. Oxfam, the Ugandan NGO Forum, Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU) and Justice Resources were key players in a Sector Working Group on Security, Conflict and Disaster Management which fed into the development of the PEAP. They presented an issues paper which the OPM heavily drew upon in the development of the sector PEAP revision paper.

The role of donors
The Donor Technical Group on Northern Uganda, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict (DTG NARC) was instrumental in pushing the issue of conflict during the PEAP revision process. GTZ in particular played an important role within the OPM in getting buy-in internally within the government.

41 This is reflected in donor policy documentation such as European Commission, Communication Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An Assessment, 2001.
In the past, responses to conflict and armed violence in Uganda have tended to be developed and implemented outside of mainstream GoU development processes through project-based approaches (see Table 2 overleaf for examples). The needs of conflict-affected areas (particularly the IDP camps in the North) have been addressed through the provision of large volumes of humanitarian assistance by donors, UN agencies and international NGOs with a relatively small government contribution, both in material terms (less than 1 percent of overall funding) and in relation to co-ordination efforts. In addition, some rehabilitation programmes have been established in conflict-affected areas. These have been donor funded and have used parallel financing and management structures rather than being channelled through government line ministries and funded out of the overall government budget. Government service provision to conflict-affected areas of the North and North East has been weak, but has begun to improve slowly. This has been due to a number of factors including inflexibility in government financing, which has now been largely resolved, weak government structures, and problems of access and security.

Actions to prevent conflict and armed violence have also been inherent (although this is not always explicit) in the activities of the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS), for example community-based policing activities, as well as in DDR and SALW control activities, such as the work of the Amnesty Commission which oversees DDR related to the Amnesty Act of 2000.

The PEAP can be seen as an attempt to provide the basis for a strategic approach to issues of conflict and armed violence in Uganda. It represents a shift towards a long-term developmental and peacebuilding approach to managing conflict and armed violence. The priority actions of Pillar 3 are outlined in Table 3 overleaf.

Significantly, Pillar 3 of the PEAP displays a commitment in the long term to ‘mainstreaming’ or integrating actions to address conflict and armed violence across sectors and within broader development planning and implementation. Regional equity and the specific problems of Northern Uganda are seen as cross-cutting issues that should be addressed across the different sectors and there is a pledge to increase government expenditure to previously under-funded areas of the North. There is an intention to integrate the activities of existing regional rehabilitation programmes (such as those described in Table 2 overleaf) as well as new actions, including post-conflict planning, within sector strategies and implementation plans (e.g. health, education, JLOS) and budgetary allocations via the MTEF. There is also a commitment to address the financing and implementing issues that have undermined service provision in conflict-affected areas, such as the need for increased flexibility. Encouragingly, the PEAP recognises the important role that civil society plays in addressing armed violence and conflict, including conflict resolution, and promotes the active participation of communities in peacebuilding and disaster management. It also prioritises implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) on Arms Management and Disarmament, a comprehensive strategy which highlights the need to ensure that small arms control measures are integrated with and support wider poverty reduction, peacebuilding and development programmes and strategies.

The PEAP itself was not informed by a conflict analysis and does not explicitly identify the links between the overall development strategy and the root causes of conflict and armed violence in Uganda. Nonetheless, the PEAP includes a range of actions that contribute to prevention of conflict and armed violence and the promotion of human

42 Inflexible government financing, particularly with regard to reallocating funding for different purposes in response to changing needs, meant that District Administrations in conflict-affected areas were often forced to send funding back to the central government. However, a fiscal decentralisation process proposes 10 percent (and in some cases 100 percent) flexibility for the districts to allocate funds across sectors. There are also changes to the allocation formula which would allow more funding to go to the North.

43 For more information on the contribution of DDR and SSR (including community-based policing) to the reduction of armed violence see Bourne, M and Greene, O, Armed violence, governance, security sector reform, and safety security and access to justice, Briefing Paper, CICS, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 2004 and Ginifer, J with Bourne, M and Greene, O, Considering armed violence in the post conflict transition: DDR and small arms and light weapons reduction initiatives, Briefing Paper, CICS, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 2004.
AID AND CONFLICT IN UGANDA

Table 2: Examples of current development and humanitarian responses to conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of response/intervention</th>
<th>Response/intervention</th>
<th>Who is involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid – support to IDPs</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance, particularly to IDPs. The UN's Consolidated appeal for humanitarian aid in 2004 was $127 million. Government spending was $1 million</td>
<td>GoU (OPM), International agencies including: WFP, UNOCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, ECHO, Oxfam, World Vision etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Development, rehabilitation and peacebuilding | Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme II (NURP II) is the second phase of the NURP I. It is composed of a number of sub-programmes including:  
  **Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF):** a World Bank funded ($133 million) programme focused on 18 districts in the North and East. It aims to empower communities to identify, prioritise and plan for needs with funding implemented at a community level. Key areas include improved social services and community initiated infrastructure development, peacebuilding and conflict management.  
  **Acholi Programme:** EU-funded programme (€4 million) supports small scale operations that address development needs of rural communities in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. Focuses on building capacity and accountability of local government structures.  
  **Karamoja Programme:** EU-funded programme (€4.2 million). Supports community identified micro projects at district and sub-county level reflected in district development plans, support to peace initiatives. Various bilateral and NGO interventions. | GoU (OPM), World Bank, EU |
| DDR, disarmament and SALW control           | Amnesty Act and Commission: In 2000, the GoU declared an amnesty in respect of all persons who had been engaged in acts of rebellion. This was through the enactment of the Amnesty Act 2000. The Amnesty Commission implements the act and includes a demobilisation and resettlement team. December 2001 disarmament programme in the Karamoja region.  
  **Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme:** This was developed by the GoU with support from donor partners however its launch and implementation have been delayed. At the same time, the UPDF has re-initiated forced disarmament in the region.  
  **Establishment of the National Focal Point and development and implementation of the National Action Plan on Arms Management and Disarmament.** | GoU, Ministry of Internal Affairs World Bank, Denmark, Ireland – as part of Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) GoU, UPDF, GoU, CSOs, UNDP, EU, Denmark |
| Security sector reform                      | Defence Review supported by UK government  
  **Police reform under the JLOS strategy**                                                                                           | GoU (Ministry of Defence) UK Government (Conflict Prevention Pool) GoU, Ministry of Internal Affairs        |
Table 3: Priority actions of Pillar 3 of the PEAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security and Defence</th>
<th>Conflict Resolution</th>
<th>Disaster Preparedness and Management and Planning for Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions include to:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political process to end rebel insurgency</strong> – actions include to:</td>
<td><strong>Internal displacement</strong> – actions include to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Gradually replace military actions with dialogue with insurgent groups, whilst honouring the obligation to protect people and property from external aggression</td>
<td>■ Work with CSOs, faith-based groups and traditional leaders in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes</td>
<td>■ Better co-ordinate humanitarian aid provision with the security operations and other service provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Gradually increase the role of the police in the North as security is restored and to regularise the status of vigilante forces</td>
<td>■ Assign responsibility within Government to respond to peace initiatives</td>
<td>■ Enhance the co-ordination role of government at both district level and at a national level via the OPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Implement the recommendations of the Defence Review given adequate resources</td>
<td>■ Strengthen diplomatic ties with neighbouring countries, including participation in regional initiatives for conflict resolution</td>
<td>■ Improve service delivery through tailoring implementation mechanisms and the integration of humanitarian assistance into national plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Consider the development of a regular focus for national discussion on conflict resolution</td>
<td>■ Develop concrete plans to implement the IDP policy in co-operation with key stakeholders including donors and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Planning for the aftermath of disaster and insecurity</strong> – actions to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Develop a Post-Conflict Recovery Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Mainstream post-conflict planning into sectoral strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

broader ‘human security’ approach that is rooted in the security needs of the individual. This emphasis reflects the dominance of the Ministry of Defence in formulating and implementing some security elements of the PEAP. In addition, some observers feel that armed violence and insecurity associated with the proliferation and misuse of small arms is not given the focus or attention it deserves within the PEAP. Although the NAP is mentioned in Pillar 3 of the PEAP, in practice, small arms proliferation and armed violence are treated as problems specific to the Karamoja region and the practice of cattle rustling, rather than as national issues impacting on the security of people throughout the country.

Nonetheless, on paper, the PEAP provides a reasonable framework for integrating conflict and armed violence issues within development processes in Uganda. The next section examines how the GoU is seeking to put the commitments and priorities contained in Pillar 3 of the PEAP into practice.

44 Human Security represents a shift from the traditional state-centred conception of security, to a focus on the security of the individual.

45 Interviews with donor, civil society and government officials.
Putting Pillar 3 of the PEAP into practice and mainstreaming conflict and armed violence issues in practice — opportunities and challenges

The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) regards itself as the institutional home for driving forward the implementation of Pillar 3. In order to undertake this role, it has focused some attention on constituting the Pillar as a ‘sector’ entitled the Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management (SCD) Sector, with structures (including a secretariat), terms of reference, strategic action plans and policies. The objective is to facilitate a more co-ordinated response, to place new and existing policies within an overall strategic framework and to ensure that these are captured within the government budget (at national and district levels) and across other government ministries, sectors and programmes. Importantly, this approach provides a strong opportunity for raising awareness of conflict and armed violence issues across government and for making the reality of the conflict in the North more apparent to government and ministries. It has been inspired by the experience and success of the JLOS in constituting itself as a sector and attracting both government and donor support.

A key challenge associated with establishing the SCD secretariat and constituting SCD as a sector is that the OPM lacks a clear strategic vision of the function of the secretariat and how it should coherently link with and add value to existing co-ordination and implementation structures. For instance, it is not clear how the SCD secretariat should co-ordinate with existing structures related to the IDP policy, and the nascent National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery and Development (PRDP) (see Box 2 opposite). The sector as a whole, and the composition of the sub-sectors, still need to be defined through a participatory process in order to achieve a common understanding amongst the different stakeholders involved. A UNDP technical advisor has been appointed to support this process.

Initial meetings of the SCD Sector Working Group took place in November 2004. These meetings recommended the establishment of three sub-sector working groups:

- **a Security Sector Working Group**, led by the Ministry of Defence,
- **a Disaster Management and Special Poverty Reduction Sector Working Group**, tasked with developing an action plan that integrates relevant policies and plans relating to IDPs, refugees, disaster management, and recovery in northern Uganda, and
- **a Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Sector Working Group**, involved in setting out the process for developing a Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding policy.

However, since November 2004 there has been little substantive progress in taking forward the proposed working groups. Currently, the Security Sector Working Group is the only group that is functioning, which risks creating the perception that Pillar 3 has a narrow security focus. The lack of progress is a reflection of the lack of consensus and of a clear vision to guide the make-up and objectives of the various sub-sectors.

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46 Interview with donor official, August 2006.
47 Interview with donor officials, August 2006.

**IDP Policy**

This is a comprehensive government policy launched in February 2005 which aims to serve as a guide to government institutions, humanitarian organisations and development agencies as they provide assistance and protection to Uganda’s IDPs. The policy aims at promoting integrated and co-ordinated response mechanisms to address the effects of internal displacement, through co-operation between relevant government institutions, development and humanitarian agencies, and other stakeholders. It is a positive step forward in terms of the government taking responsibility for leading and co-ordinating the humanitarian response.

The Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees in the OPM is the lead agency. National and local committees will be established to develop an integrated approach to managing and mitigating the effects of internal displacement (including strengthened reporting and early warning).

**National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace Recovery and Development**

The GoU has developed the National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery and Development (PRDP). It aims to provide an over-arching strategic framework for all interventions in Northern Uganda in the short-, medium-, and long-term, and to provide a basis for consolidating existing programmes and new initiatives (including donor-supported interventions such as NURP II). It has high-level support and is led by an inter-ministerial technical committee under the President. In the long term its implementation will be mainstreamed into the national budget framework and across key sectors. The intention is that it should take the planning processes of the local District Disaster Committees as its starting point, thus promoting a ‘bottom up’ approach to planning.

The PRDP was not based upon a formal conflict analysis process, but it nonetheless reflects a nuanced understanding of the conflict in Northern Uganda, and provides a strong basis for addressing its underlying causes and promoting peace and recovery. The key challenge is ensuring that the PRDP is effectively implemented.

**National Action Plan on Arms Management and Disarmament**

The National Action Plan on Arms Management and Disarmament (NAP) is a comprehensive framework for the GoU’s actions to address both the supply and demand for small arms. The National Focal Point (NFP) on SALW is situated within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and has responsibility for co-ordinating the implementation of the NAP. The NAP was publicly launched in September 2005, and a draft policy on SALW is being developed to inform the review of small arms legislation. Progress has also been made in reviewing stockpiles and weapons destruction, training and capacity-building for civil society and the NFP.

The NFP sees itself as having a role in mainstreaming SALW control and armed violence issues across sectors (such as JLOS) and within the work of the OPM and existing programmes. There remains much awareness-raising, training and familiarisation to be undertaken by the NFP and other stakeholders to integrate the NAP across sectors. It will take time to improve the understanding of the problem and develop workable solutions. More, for example needs to be done to integrate actions called for in the NAP into the work of the JLOS, a large sector with already well-defined areas of work. While there remains an ongoing disparity between the human security approach inherent in the NAP and the more military approaches to disarmament and insecurity, pursued by the GoU in the Karamoja region for example, the NAP represents a consensus on the approach, advanced thinking, and a framework and direction for arms control and disarmament. It remains an important ‘hook’ around which to bring together stakeholders, policy and action over time, with the NFP acting as an internal champion.47
The MFPED’s perspective on Pillar 3 is that it should ultimately be implemented via a process of mainstreaming. Plans and policies related to the pillar, such as the PRDP, would be centrally developed and sectors would extract what they can implement via sector plans through local government structures. In the longer term, this should help to promote a more sustainable and integrated approach to conflict-affected regions and guard against budget support being targeted at new centrally driven ‘extra’ projects. However, given the weaknesses in government service delivery in the North, humanitarian assistance and donor-supported projects such as the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) will continue to be vital to providing basic services to conflict-affected areas. It is important that these interventions seek to support government capacity and structures rather than build parallel structures. The European Commission has been supporting local government capacity in Northern Uganda through its Acholi and Karamoja Programmes, and is planning to continue support to local government in the next funding cycle.

Despite these intentions and the efforts led by the OPM outlined above, the GoU has yet to emphasise and make progress towards a cross-sectoral approach to conflict, and the key ministries have yet to tailor their approaches to conflict-affected areas. Most service delivery in conflict-affected areas remains dominated by humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies and is poorly co-ordinated with the GoU’s sector priorities. Attempts to improve government service delivery in conflict-affected areas by creating more flexibility and increasing the latitude to reallocate funding have faced real challenges. This suggests a lack of coherence, capacity, understanding and political will across government towards addressing the needs of conflict-affected areas.

For a number of observers, the GoU’s limited progress to date in addressing conflict and armed violence within the development process relates to fundamental political issues. Some observers question the GoU’s political commitment to preventative and developmental approaches to addressing conflict and insecurity. There are continued tensions within the GoU between long-term approaches to peacebuilding and human security and short-term military responses, as is reflected in its periodic resort to military solutions to the conflict with the LRA and to disarmament in the Karamoja region. Furthermore, some are concerned that the GoU, civil society and donors will be distracted from long-term conflict prevention and peacebuilding by the shorter-term imperatives of managing the transition to democracy and related political tensions. Some suggest that there are inherent limitations in addressing issues which are essentially ‘political’ and sensitive, such as national reconciliation, through a ‘technical’ project such as the PEAP, and that these issues strongly relate to the governance agenda. While these political challenges persist, the peace process has refocused the attention of donors, civil society and the GoU on the conflict in the North and it presents new opportunities to link development with a conflict prevention, peacebuilding and human security agenda.

Aside from these fundamental issues, a key constraint to progress is the lack of capacity and power of the OPM to drive forward a coherent conflict prevention and security agenda and to gain the buy-in and support of relevant government ministries and actors. The OPM lacks institutional power and a coherent vision as well as the capacity to organise effectively, to draft policy and to advocate across ministries. A clear illustration of this is the OPM’s failure to get support from the 2005/2006 budget for the new SCD sector structures. This relates to a culture of poor communication and co-ordination within the GoU as a whole. Some commentators have gone as far as to say that the lack of capacity within the OPM is related to a more fundamental
issue of a lack of political will and support at the highest levels in the GoU for the implementation of Pillar 3.

The OPM’s limited capacity is also manifested in its reliance on externally funded technical assistance and consultants to undertake activities that should be the core function of the institution. For example, it relied heavily on external support to draft the IDP policy\(^{54}\) and the conflict resolution policy\(^{55}\). Some donors have questioned the sustainability of this form of capacity-building, particularly in relation to fostering institutional buy-in to policy development and implementation.\(^{56}\) In addition, the OPM and other sector ministries lack an understanding of how to implement conflict-sensitive approaches\(^ {57}\) to development. For instance, no conflict assessments have been undertaken to inform policy or programme development related to conflict-affected areas.

Despite these challenges, the PEAP framework presents a number of opportunities for promoting an integrated approach to conflict and armed violence issues. The PEAP framework provides civil society with multiple entry points for engaging with and monitoring the GoU on issues of conflict and armed violence, not only via the OPM but also within specific SWGs (e.g. health, education, JLOS) and the NFP. In addition, the PEAP monitoring and review process, and related consultations, provide an important framework for monitoring the implementation of GoU commitments and building consensus around the implementation process.

It is early days in the process of making Pillar 3 operational and establishing the SCD sector. There is a long way to go before the commitments in Pillar 3 are reflected in the activities of relevant sectors and line ministries within the framework of the MTEF. The experience of the JLOS suggests that developing co-ordinating mechanisms and coherent sector strategies, and articulating issues in order to attract donor support and engagement, takes time. The question still remains how far central co-ordination points, such as the OPM, the SCD secretariat or the NFP, can influence policy and spending across government. Translating the PEAP commitments into practice will require pressure from different angles, including donor and civil society engagement with champions within line ministries, rather than a purely centralised approach. The annual PEAP monitoring and review process, and the forthcoming 2007 PSR, provide a good opportunity to monitor and take stock of progress and key challenges.

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54 The policy was developed with significant input from a technical consultant funded by UNDP, sitting in the OPM.
55 This policy is being developed with support from consultants contracted by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa.
56 Interview with donor officials.
57 A conflict-sensitive approach to development is an approach which involves an understanding of the operational context (including the conflict), and understanding of the interaction between an intervention or policy and that context and the capacity to act on this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive ones. Africa Peace Forum, CECORE, CHA, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding*: A resource pack (2004).
Integrating conflict and armed violence issues within donor frameworks

AN ASSESSMENT OF KEY DONOR ASSISTANCE STRATEGIES (see Annex 2) suggests that donors are beginning to align their support behind Pillar 3 of the PEAP. However, there is a long way to go before they achieve a fully coherent and co-ordinated approach to issues of conflict and armed violence in Uganda. Some of the donor assistance strategies, analysed in the course of this research, were developed prior to the current PEAP and therefore did not reflect the priority it gives to security, conflict resolution and disaster management in Pillar 3. However it now appears that these issues are being given greater consideration as these strategies come up for review. The new UJAS, which co-ordinates the support of over ten donors, represents an important step towards donor harmonisation and alignment with the PEAP, including Pillar 3.

The decision of donors to provide the majority of their assistance via budgetary support reflects strong confidence in the GoU’s economic and political governance and full support for the PEAP, including Pillar 3. It also shows a belief that they can influence the GoU through policy and political dialogue. Donors are aligning their support behind Pillar 3 of the PEAP through budget support. However, ongoing concerns relating to the country’s transition to democracy and the GoU’s commitment to resolving the conflict in the North have called into question the basis for this confidence and raised questions about the extent to which donors consider human security issues when they are deciding on whether to offer general budget support. While some donors did make cuts to budget support in relation to events surrounding the 2006 elections, they have not yet been prepared to do so in relation to GoU policy.

58 The table at Annex 1 provides an overview of the integration of conflict and small arms issues within donor assistance strategies including the EC CSP, the UNDAF, and the UJAS, including: how conflict, armed violence and SALW are addressed in framework documentation and preparatory assessment processes; and an overview of current programmes related to the frameworks which address conflict, armed violence and/or SALW.

59 Strategies reviewed in the course of this research which pre-date the current PEAP include the EC CSP (2002), DFID Interim CAP (2003) and the World Bank CAS (2000). The DFID CAP and World Bank CAS have been replaced by the UJAS. The EC is developing a new CSP, covering 2008–2013.
in Northern Uganda*. There are fears that budget support can reduce the domestic accountability of leaders, help embed incumbent politicians and undermine the opposition. Even with recent progress towards peace in the North, the suitability of the use of budget support as the primary aid modality needs to be monitored and evaluated carefully by donors, particularly from the perspective of its impact on conflict.

Furthermore, despite the inclusion of Pillar 3 in the PEAP, the needs of conflict-affected areas in the North are being addressed largely through separate donor-funded projects and humanitarian assistance rather than through development assistance via budget support (see Table 2 for examples). This separation risks undermining the GoU’s role in service provision in the North and reinforcing northerners’ perceptions of neglect by the GoU. It also implies that some donors do not see the conflict in the North as strictly relevant to dialogue around the PEAP, poverty reduction, or the GoU’s performance in relation to these.

In the context of budget support, it is vital that the GoU adopt conflict-sensitive approaches in its mainstream development planning mechanisms, including sectoral strategies and plans, and that donors support this through dialogue, capacity-building and monitoring of GoU performance. However, while some donors are linking conflict and development in specific projects, donors are doing little to encourage the integration of conflict and armed violence issues across sectors through dialogue and support linked with sector wide approaches (SWAps). For instance, there is little evidence that donors are seeking to engage in dialogue on issues surrounding government service provision to the North via SWAps. Furthermore, while much attention is focused on the conflict in the North, the potential for conflict and armed violence to escalate or re-emerge in other parts of Uganda, such as the North East and West Nile, is not being adequately addressed. This is partly because donors and the GoU have not developed a systematic approach to conflict-sensitivity, and because donor staff are often unaware of how conflict and security issues relate to their sectors. Some donors have made progress in using conflict assessments to inform their assistance strategies and programmes, but there is some way to go before donors develop a joined-up and systematic approach to conflict analysis, and before conflict-sensitive approaches are adopted at the sector level.

The UJAS represents an important step towards a more joined-up approach to conflict issues that is firmly aligned with PEAP priorities and outcomes. Resolving the conflict in Northern Uganda and fostering the region’s social and economic development are identified as a central strategic priority of the UJAS. There is a clear effort to link budget support with a joint assessment framework that includes performance indicators aligned with the PEAP. The performance indicators related to Pillar 3 are: (1) commitment to peace in Northern Uganda and in neighbouring countries and (2) improved security and humanitarian situation in the North. The UJAS partners have also committed to a joint needs assessment in Northern Uganda, which presents an opportunity for a joint analysis of the conflict.

At the political level, there is a clear attempt in the donor and diplomatic community to link political dialogue with the more technical level of engagement (i.e. development co-operation) via the framework of the Governance Matrix which acts as a key monitoring tool. The Governance Matrix reflects commitments made by the GoU in the PEAP under four headings and includes a heading: ‘Security and the protection of

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*DFID cut £5 million in budget support in May 2005 (of a total of £40 million for the year) over concerns about the progress of the country’s political transition, particularly in relation to the establishment of a basis for a multi-party system. Several donors, including the UK, Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Sweden also cut support during the run-up to the elections, over concerns of human rights abuses.

*For instance, GTZ has a project in West Nile that is linking conflict and water provision.

*Interview with donor official.

*DFID has undertaken conflict assessments to inform strategy and programme priorities in the North and West. SIDA has undertaken conflict assessments to inform design of a programme of support to rural electrification, including Pader district in Northern Uganda, and has commissioned a conflict assessment. The EC commissioned a report by the University of York Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit which undertook a desk-based study of the conflict and field-based study of existing initiatives. This report informed their Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme, and the development of part of the CSP for 2008–2013.
persons and their property’ which explicitly addresses issues of conflict and armed violence.

**Box 3: The Governance Matrix**

**Heading 3:** Security and protection of persons and their property

**Objectives:** Conflict resolution and amnesty
- Small arms control and disarmament with a special focus on the Karamoja region (including enhanced capacity of the NFP)
- Disaster management (including implementation of IDP Policy)

Donor technical groups follow the four headings and provide a monthly update to ambassadors on progress against indicators, which informs political dialogue at the diplomatic level.

There are, however, a number of factors which have limited progress in political dialogue between members of the international donor community and the GoU. Events surrounding the first multi-party elections in January 2006, most notably the arrest, detention and trial of the leader of the opposition, Dr. Kizza Besigye, placed considerable strain on the relationship between the international donor community and the NRM. Some international donors expressed concern that the arrest of Besigye was part of a wider campaign to weaken the democratic process and to enable the NRM leadership to retain power.

Despite these challenges, there is evidence that donors are increasingly seeking to engage on conflict and security issues and integrating these issues within new rehabilitation and development programming. This reflects a growing recognition of the importance of addressing conflict and armed violence if development is to be achieved, and of the need to move beyond humanitarian responses to crises to deal with the longer-term needs of populations in conflict-affected areas. There is strong donor co-ordination on conflict issues in the form of the Donor Technical Group on Northern Uganda, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict, currently chaired by UNDP, which aims to foster joint approaches and raises issues at a technical level with the GoU, in particular the OPM. Many individuals within this donor group recognise the importance of mainstreaming actions to address conflict across sectors and where possible try to engage colleagues working across different sectors. There is also some nascent interest in working on conflict issues within other SWGs. Donors have also been increasingly willing to use development funding to address security issues, for example DFID’s support to the Defence Review, which includes assessing non-military responses to security threats, and to the NAP on small arms.

Pillar 3 of the PEAP has provided a strong incentive and justification for donors to engage on conflict and security issues and to integrate these issues within the new development programming specified in Box 4.

It has also led to an emerging national policy framework to which to link programmes, for example through supporting GoU policy and planning capacity (e.g. within the OPM) and providing opportunities for programme-level learning to be reflected nationally. Box 4 provides a description of two new donor programmes which have these characteristics.

Thus, whilst donors are increasingly aware of the importance of addressing conflict and armed violence issues from a development perspective, there is still some way to go before donors in Uganda display a fully coherent and strategic approach to these issues.
Box 4: New donor programming

**EU Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme**

**Goal:** to improve the living conditions, protection of civilians, human rights and access to justice in Northern Uganda as well as to contribute to poverty reduction and good governance; and to promote reconciliation at community, regional and national levels.

**Key objectives:** Strengthened national framework for recovery and reconciliation; IDP self-reliance and coping mechanisms improved; improved local governance in conflict areas (including capacity-building for local governments); improved livelihoods and economic development; strengthened respect for human rights, law and order (including support to community-based policing); national integration of conflict-affected areas through communication and infrastructure, effective promotion of peace and reconciliation.

**Addressing armed violence:** Although the programme does not explicitly address SALW issues within its objectives, it is attuned to a range of issues which are relevant and complementary to SALW control (e.g. community-based policing, support for livelihoods). It has been purposefully designed with the latitude to respond to a variety of needs, including SALW control, through flexible and decentralised programming.

**Elements which link back to the national development framework:** Support to the development of a coherent national framework for recovery in the form of the recovery plan (see box 2) – including technical assistance to OPM and local governments. The eventual objective is that service delivery related to the implementation of the recovery plan will be channelled via the budget in line with sector and district plans.

**Assessment and conflict sensitivity:** The assessment process was informed by a study undertaken by the University of York, Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit which undertook a desk-based study of the conflict and field-based study of existing initiatives. The programme foresees capacity-building and training in conflict prevention, management and resolution, including the design of training manuals and mainstreaming of approaches into all programme activities.


A preparatory assistance project run during 2006, with the aim of preparing the ground for a five-year conflict reduction programme, in line with the UNDP country programme and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

**Goal:** to contribute to the promotion of human security and stability in order to foster the conditions for recovery and development, focussing on the conflict in the North and North East (Karamoja region).

**Key objectives:** Supporting the disarmament and demobilisation of reporters and linking their reintegration to wider community recovery based on the national IDP policy; working to increase human security in the Karamoja region by linking voluntary disarmament to long-term development; supporting the implementation of key components of Uganda’s NAP in line with the priorities set out in the PEAP.

**Elements which link back to the national development framework:** Supporting the implementation of the IDP Policy (see box 2), the NFP to increase its capacity and relevance and the implementation of key components of the NAP.

**Assessment process:** UNDP / Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (BCPR) Mission
THE GOU, UGANDAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND DONORS must work together in order to ensure a coherent and integrated approach to addressing conflict and armed violence across the country through support to the PEAP. This paper puts forward the following recommendations:

Donors should:

■ Ensure that the GoU’s approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and an analysis of the impact of budget support on conflict dynamics, are placed at the centre of future decisions on budget support to Uganda.

■ Ensure that all new internal and bilateral donor assistance strategies address the linkages between conflict, armed violence and development and that they are informed by a conflict analysis.

■ Continue to support the GoU’s efforts to implement Pillar 3 of the PEAP by:
  ■ establishing the SCD sector;
  ■ mainstreaming actions to address conflict and armed violence across other sectors;
  ■ pursuing other entry points on initiatives such as ‘equity budgeting’65, including engaging with the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and with sector line ministries; and
  ■ evaluating the sustainability of technical assistance to the OPM and ensuring capacity-building support strengthens rather than substitutes for its core functions, such as policy development and co-ordination.

■ Strengthen joint analysis and monitoring of conflict and armed violence in Uganda among donors and use this to inform donor assistance strategies, dialogue and programming. As a starting point, donors should support a joint conflict analysis to inform dialogue and support via the UJAS.

  ■ Encourage the integration of conflict and armed violence issues into support linked with SWAps, through research, dialogue and capacity-building support. Donors should for instance:

  ■ support participatory conflict assessments and research on how specific sectors (e.g. water, health) can be integrated into conflict and armed violence issues and consider the findings within the Sector Working Groups; and

  ■ provide staff with training, guidance and incentives (including joint donor training) to enable them to promote conflict-sensitive approaches in their sectors.

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65 This initiative aims to make operational the commitment of the PEAP to ensuring a more equal distribution of resources to different regions of the country.
The Government of Uganda should:

- Ensure that conflict prevention and peacebuilding are at the heart of GoU poverty reduction strategies, by:
  - implementing Pillar 3 of the PEAP, and ensuring it is adequately resourced; and
  - implementing the National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace Recovery and Development (PRDP) and use this as the basis for an integrated approach to peacebuilding in the North.

- Build capacity within the OPM, MFPED, and sector line ministries to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches to development planning and implementation, both in PEAP review and implementation processes and in particular sectors, by drawing on the resources and expertise of civil society organisations and donors.

- Strengthen the coherence and division of labour between different government ministries (and departments within these, particularly the OPM) on conflict and security issues.

- Undertake a conflict assessment and research, in partnership with donors and civil society, to inform PEAP implementation and review processes, and the process of mainstreaming actions to address conflict and armed violence across sectors.

Civil society should:

- Monitor progress in implementing Pillar 3 of the PEAP and hold the GoU accountable to its commitments by engaging with ongoing review processes, such as the Poverty Status Report (PSR) and annual PEAP implementation review.

- Engage in dialogue with donors on the development and review of donor assistance strategies, and how they address conflict and armed violence issues.

- Conduct research and advocacy to demonstrate the links between conflict, armed violence and development in Uganda, and to assess how conflict and armed violence issues have been integrated at a district/local level (e.g. within District Disaster Management Committees) in order to inform planning and policy development.

- Provide practical support to the GoU to address conflict and armed violence in policies, sector strategies and planning through, for example, capacity-building and collaborative research, using multiple entry points including MFPED, OPM, NFP and local government.
### ANNEX 1: Donor development frameworks – development, implementation and review processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework/key document and date</th>
<th>Framework development and assessment process</th>
<th>Mechanisms and processes for implementation of development programmes (key programmes/sectors)</th>
<th>Monitoring and review processes (including development of new strategy)</th>
<th>How it relates to PEAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS)**  
2005–2009  
AfDB, Austria, Denmark, EC, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK DfID, World Bank | The UJAS includes a description of the country context including economic development, poverty and inequality, social development and progress towards MDGs, regional integration, governance, political transition, conflict, civil society.  
The UJAS is a joint response of over 10 donors to the PEAP. Strategy development involved discussions among UJAS partners, and consultations with government, civil society and other development partners. | The UJAS presents a common assessment framework for determining levels of finance to help improve the predictability of aid. UJAS partners will become increasingly selective in their programming and policy dialogue with each concentrating on its comparative advantage.  
The UJAS partners support the implementation of the PEAP in general, but prioritise the following areas judged important to achieving PEAP results:  
- Strengthening the budget process and public sector management  
- Promoting private sector development and economic growth  
- Strengthening governance  
- Improving education and health outcomes  
- Promoting the resolution of the conflict in the north and fostering the social and economic development of the region | Results based monitoring and evaluation framework that is fully consistent with the PEAP matrix, but contains indicators that are specific to UJAS interventions.  
Will rely on government’s own assessment of PEAP results, via the annual PEAP implementation review process.  
Mid-term review process  
Final self-evaluation (2009)  
Annual independent assessment of UJAS partners organisational effectiveness, using indicators agreed in the Paris Declaration on Harmonisation | Structured around PEAP priorities with a focus on budget and sector support, as well as support to private sector and civil society.  
Monitoring and evaluation based on PEAP matrix. |
| **European Commission Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programme (NIP)**  
2002–2007 | The CSP includes an assessment of the political, economic and social situation. No formal assessment processes were undertaken in the development of the strategy.  
Strategy development involved consultation with local representatives of member states, and local civil society consultation based on the existing GoU process via the PEAP.  
EC support is based on PEAP priorities.  
The response strategy reflects:  
- Development priorities of GoU via the PEAP  
- Financial and implementation requirements in sectors  
- Historic relationship between EC and GoU  
- Complementarity between donors | EDF A envelope  
Focal sectors:  
- Macro-economic support and economic reform  
- Transport  
- Rural Development  
Focal sectors are complemented by capacity building for governance and civil society.  
Other activities – non focal sectors:  
- Decentralisation  
- Rule of law and governance (the JLOS SWAp)  
- Human rights  
- Institutional support to non-state actors | Annual Review Process  
Mid term review process (2004)  
Monitoring via PRSC matrix and Governance Matrix  
UJAS partner  
A new CSP for 2008–2013 is currently being developed. | Based on PEAP priorities with a focus on sector and budget support. |
<table>
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<th>Monitoring and review processes (including development of new strategy)</th>
<th>How it relates to PEAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2006–2010 (still in draft format) | Basis for co-ordinated UN assistance to Uganda | EDF B Envelope – unforeseen needs. Following the Medium Term Review the B envelope was reduced and remaining funding kept in reserve to support operations in North. Budget lines:  
- NGO Cofinancing  
- Human rights  
- Gender HIV/AIDS  
- Forestry and environment  
Implementation modalities focus on sector and budget support; Budget support is provided via World Bank PRSC.  
Project funding at a minimum  
Some funding is channelled through the PAF | The five UNDAF working groups will meet regularly and will be the mechanism to implementing and monitoring the UNDAF.  
Monitoring indicators have been set out in results matrices annexed to the UNDAF.  
A joint mid term evaluation by the Government, UN System and other development partners will be conducted at the mid point of the UNDAF period. A joint end of cycle evaluation will also occur. | Areas of co-operation reflect PEAP priorities. |
| Common Country Assessment (CCA) – basis for collaborative programming. UNDAF addresses issues identified during CCA.  
Joint mid-term review in April 2004 agreed planning process for new CCA and UNDAF.  
Thematic working groups were created around the 8 MDGs, were represented by UN agencies and were constituted to draft sections of the CCA.  
CCA drafted in a two month working period led by an international consultant. Consultations with government and civil society took place.  
CCA was finalised at the end of 2004 following a validation workshop.  
UNDAF – strategic priorities were identified during a 3 day retreat and five working groups were tasked to draft results matrices. A joint strategy meeting in Feb 2005 discussed and validated UNDAF and provided guidance for the development of individual agency country plans.  
The four key areas of co-operation reflect the UN system’s comparative advantage in supporting the objectives of the PEAP and the attainment of the MDGs. | 4 areas of co-operation:  
- Reducing poverty and improving human development  
- Good governance, and protection and promotion of human rights  
- Supporting the national AIDS response  
- Accelerating the transition from relief to recovery in conflict-affected areas.  
Co-operation strategy includes dialogue, consultation and collaboration. The UN system will also consider the importance of regional co-operation, particularly in relation to security challenges. A human rights based approach will be central to implementation.  
The UNDAF is reflected in each individual agency’s Country Programme Action Plan.  
Different agencies collaborate around different activities.  
Participation in government and donor co-ordination mechanisms. | |
### ANNEX 2: Donor development frameworks – integration of conflict and armed violence issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>How conflict, armed violence and SALW are addressed in framework documentation and preparatory assessment processes</th>
<th>Current programmes which address conflict, armed violence and/or SALW</th>
<th>Current programmes which are complimentary to addressing the issue of conflict, armed violence and/or SALW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS)**  
AfDB, Austria, Denmark, EC, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK DfID, World Bank | The context section of the UJAS contains a description of the conflict situation in the country, which refers to the conflict in the North, the Karamoja region, the West Nile and instability in neighbouring countries. It stresses the impact of the conflict in the North on development and the protection of civilians and states that the GoU response to these issues has been inadequate. The analysis of poverty and inequality refers to regional disparities. It also contains a discussion of governance issues and of the political transition, but does not refer to issues of justice, law and order, small arms control, and security. | The UJAS contains a joint assessment framework linked with budget support. It includes the following performance indicators relating to Pillar 3:  
- Commitment to peace in northern Uganda and in neighbouring countries  
- Improved security and humanitarian situation in the north  
The UJAS partners will carry out a joint needs assessment in Northern Uganda to determine areas of support in relation to Pillar 3. They commit to support actions related to Pillar 3, including:  
- Support for efforts to resolve the conflict in the North  
- Support for reintegration of IDPs and former rebels, including through the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme and the Amnesty Commission  
- Re-orienting the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund to meet changing needs  
- Dialogue with GoU on security provision, human rights, justice, law and order in conflict affected areas  
- Integrating their assistance within the MTEF and sector strategies where GoU is a lead partner  
- Continued provision of humanitarian assistance (bilaterally)  
- Strengthening government systems for managing disasters, providing services and humanitarian assistance | Support for Pillar 4 – Political governance and human rights. The UJAS includes performance indicators relating to Pillar 4 including:  
- Maintenance of a stable, free and fair political environment  
- Improving record of human rights  
Most UJAS partners will support the JLOS. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>How conflict, armed violence and SALW are addressed in framework documentation and preparatory assessment processes</th>
<th>Current programmes which address conflict, armed violence and/or SALW</th>
<th>Current programmes which are complimentary to addressing the issue of conflict, armed violence and/or SALW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **European Union Country and Regional Strategy Paper, National Indicative Programmes and Mid Term Review** | The CSP contains an assessment of political situation which refers to conflict in Acholiland, ADF activities in SW Uganda and the violence in the Karamoja region, as well as activities of armed forces in Congo. There is no explicit recognition of the problem of proliferation of SALW. The CSP contains an assessment of economic, social and governance developments which does not mention the impact of conflict or insecurity or mention the disparity between the North and South. The Mid term review paper cites the war in North as threatening growth and poverty reduction and contributing to disparity between North and South. Recognises potential instability due to Constitutional review and 2006 elections. Finance from B envelope has been shifted to support new programming in the North (see section 4.4) | Karamoja Programme (2001–2006)  
Objective: improve standard of living of people of the Karamoja region and support the decentralisation policy of GoU  
Interventions include: Community identified micro-projects, capacity building of district personnel, support to peace initiatives  
Implementation modality: via a programme unit KPIU which following closure in 2003 has been re-staffed and according to the EC has become the 'lead development partner on conflict intervention and disarmament in the region'.  
No formal conflict assessment was undertaken to inform the development or implementation of this programme. | EU Microprojects programme, which targets local communities in Northern and Eastern regions, aimed at providing better access to sustainable education, health and water and sanitation services.  
Support to decentralisation and capacity building at district and lower-level local government via budget support.  
Support to JLOS SWAp  
DANIDA-EC human rights programme  
Institutional support to non-state actors |
| **United Nations**  
**UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2006–2010 (still in draft format)**  
**UNDP Country Programme** | UNDAF recognises security and humanitarian situation (including activities of LRA, cattle rustling in Karamoja region and SALW) as a key development challenge. Recognises the important of addressing regional disparities  
Accelerating the transition from relief to recovery in conflict-affected areas is one of the four key areas of co-operation.  
The Common Country Assessment which informed the development of the UNDAF and UNDP country programme document includes an assessment of the security, conflict and humanitarian situation and influenced programme priorities. The assessment consisted of a situation analysis, patterns and trends, a causality analysis looking at immediate causes, intermediate causes and root causes of insecurity and conflict. Progress towards national priorities was assessed and capacity gaps and challenges as related to progress. | UNDPs new country programme (see also box 4) document states that UNDP will concentrate its efforts on:  
Human security, peace building and reconciliation including, support to DDR of LRA ex-combatants.  
Support to GoU and other development partners in Karamoja region by linking voluntary disarmament initiatives with longer term development plans.  
Assistance to GoU to address the proliferation of illicit small arms and land mine contamination.  
Support to Uganda HR Commission, Acholi traditional and religious leaders and civil society organisation in their peacebuilding and reconciliation activities.  
IDPs – support to OPM to implement national IDP policy and development of recovery plan.  
Addressing gender dimensions of conflict. |
ANNEX 3: List of persons interviewed

Donors
Ambassador Sigurd Illing, Head of Delegation, Delegation of the European Commission
Terhi Lehtinen, Second Secretary (Head of Section), Governance and Civil Society, Delegation of the European Commission
Uwe Bergmeier, Programme Officer Governance and Civil Society, Delegation of the European Commission
Warner Ten Kate, First Secretary, Macroeconomist, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Randolph Harris, Deputy Team Leader for Democracy, Governance and Conflict Programmes, USAID
Maria Selin, First secretary, Embassy of Sweden
Anne Lekvall, Political Affairs and Northern Uganda, Embassy of Sweden
Gerald Owachi, Assistant Conflict and Humanitarian Advisor, DFID
John Oloya, Rural Development specialist, World Bank
Auke Lootsma, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
Stig Marker Hansen, Chief of Party, Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI)
Robert Scharf, OPM Advisor and Human Security Programme Manager, UNDP
Frauke Bartels, OPM Advisor, PEAP and Conflict Resolution, GTZ

Government of Uganda
Rosetti Nabbumba Nayenga, Policy Analyst – Poverty, Monitoring and Analysis Unit, MFPED
Richard Nabudere, Coordinator of Uganda National Focal Point on small arms, Ministry of Internal Affairs
Martin Owor, Assistant Commissioner, Disaster Management, Office of the Prime Minister

CSOs
Rose Othieno, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)
Emma Naylor, Country Programme Manager, Oxfam
Cannon Joyce Nima, Head of Consensus Building, Coordinator Interfaith Peace & Action Network on Small Arms (IPANSA), Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)
James Odong, National Peace Building Coordinator, World Vision
ANNEX 4: Bibliography

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COVER PHOTO: Uganda – tending crops in a region devastated by conflict.
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