EVALUATION OF THE UNDP SUDAN MINE ACTION CAPACITY BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Ted Paterson & Vera Bohle | Geneva | February 2008
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) strives for a world free of anti-personnel mines and from the threat of other landmines and explosive remnants of war, and where the suffering and concerns of populations living in affected areas are addressed. The Centre is active in research, provides operational assistance and supports the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.


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PREFACE

The GICHD Evaluation Team would like to express its appreciation to the many individuals from the Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan, UN agencies, and both local and international NGOs who were so generous with their time, information, and advice. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations are based, in large part, on their contributions.

Particular mention should be given to the UNDP-Sudan mine action team – Qadeem Tariq, the Senior Technical Advisor, Khalid Mohamoud Salih Abdin, Senior National Officer in Khartoum, and Pacifico Augustino Ladu, Senior National Officer in Juba – for their excellent support to the mission, and their openness in discussing issues, problems, and alternatives.

DISCLOSURES

1. The GICHID is responsible for enhancing and maintaining the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which is used for information management by the mine action programme in Sudan. The information management function was not assessed in this evaluation and no conflict of interest arose.

2. On 29 April 2006, the GICHID and the Government of National Unity signed a Cooperation Memorandum covering possible cooperation related to training, IMSMA, research, and technical expertise for humanitarian demining. This evaluation was commissioned by UNDP as an independent exercise and represents no conflict with the Cooperation Memorandum.

3. In 2000-01, Ted Paterson, evaluation team leader, served with Qadeem Tariq, Mine Action STA for UNDP, on a team conducting a joint donor evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan. Messrs. Paterson and Tariq were contracted by different donors and have never engaged in joint business or other commercial relationships that could construed a conflict of interest for the current exercise.

4. The time available for the country mission did not allow for a thorough assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of UNDP assistance relating to a number of aspects of its project. The evaluation team focussed on strategic issues and limited its conclusions to those issues for which there was a consensus among informants, or where previous missions to Sudan by team members plus secondary sources provided adequate data for triangulation.
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# ACRONYMS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>Abandoned Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Dangerous Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>HSTF</td>
<td>Human Security Trust Fund</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMATC</td>
<td>International Mine Action Training Centre</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>JIDU</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Demining Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Unit (of SAF and SPLA troops)</td>
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<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Mine Action</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NMAA</td>
<td>National Mine Action Authority</td>
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<td>National Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian Peoples’ Aid</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>OSIL</td>
<td>Operation Save Innocent Lives</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<td>SSDC</td>
<td>Southern Sudan De-mining Commission</td>
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<td>STA</td>
<td>Senior Technical Advisor</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Advisor</td>
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<td>TTF</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>UN-African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNMAO</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Office</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Project Services</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<td>VA</td>
<td>Victim Assistance</td>
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<td>VTF</td>
<td>Voluntary Trust Fund (UNMAS)</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending a 22-year conflict. Contamination from landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) was one of the many post-conflict challenges facing the country. Fear of this contamination inhibited the return of displaced people and constrained the delivery of humanitarian aid and the operations of international peacekeeping forces fielded through the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

Even before the CPA, the warring parties had reached agreements with the UN and international NGOs to initiate mine action operations. Beginning in 2001, a series of initiatives sought to lay the groundwork for a large mine action programme while simultaneously fostering cooperation between the warring parties. The CPA subsequently stated that the UN will assist the Parties’ demining efforts, leading to the creation of a UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) headed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and including UNDP and UNICEF personnel. The UNMAO mandate covers:

- Development of a mine action programme (survey, clearance of priority areas, victim assistance, and mine risk education);
- Clearance of priority roads and sites to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian police components of UNMIS;
- National capacity building support to both the North and the South.

As UNMAO had a mandate to provide demining support to UNMIS peacekeeping forces and to humanitarian operations, the initial focus of UNMAS, as lead agency, was to get operations established. In spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit infrastructure, and the modest level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives contamination, UNMAS and its partners have done an excellent job in establishing mine action operations and coordinating these through UNMAO.

However, the UNMIS Mission Plan also calls for the formulation and implementation of a transition plan to “...pass responsibility for management of the UN Mine Action Office to national authorities...” and to develop “...fully operational national mine action coordination and implementation capacity.”

Accordingly, the UNDP – as the lead agency for support to capacity development in the UN system – fielded a Senior Technical Advisor (STA) for mine action in March 2004 to initiate its project to support the development of mine action capacities in Sudan, focusing initially on the National Policy and Strategic Frameworks. In November 2005, a new UNDP STA formulated the current project (Support to National Mine Action Capacity Development) for the period 2006-07, which sought to assist national authorities establish a “…National Mine Action Legal and Institutional Framework, with all necessary sub structures, capable of planning, co-coordinating, implementing, and monitoring all aspects of mine action in the country, within the framework of International Mine Action Standards.

In early 2007, UNMIS commissioned an evaluation of the Sudan Mine Action Programme which concluded that capacity development was the biggest weakness in the programme. At the request of UNDP-Sudan, the GICHD fielded a two person team from 22 to 30 October 2007 to evaluate the UNDP project, with the principal aim to “…evaluate the performance and overall approach of the project...to take stock of the achievements made, identify major gaps, lessons learned and make recommendations for the future direction for the project. Given the limited time available for the evaluation team, it was agreed with the UNDP country office that the exercise would focus on strategic issues and the way forward. Among the key
conclusions reached by the evaluation team are that:

1. Mine action has made important contributions to broader processes and programmes, including:
   • Peace-building in the lead-up to the CPA and in its aftermath;
   • The return of displaced peoples and the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
   • The restoration of internal security and the expansion of secure areas;
   • The provision of an important point of entry for constructive engagement by the international community in Sudan.

2. Mine action is one of the fields in which the GoNU and GoSS cooperate most effectively with one another, and with the international community.

3. The UNMAO has established an effective programme in a very challenging environment, while international NGOs have also established significant mine action capacities within Sudan. Cooperation among mine action actors is generally good, and has been improving.

4. Both Sudanese governments have made significant moves towards establishing national capacities to coordinate and implement mine action programmes.

5. There is no clear vision of the make-up and workings of the mine action programme in Sudan following the end of the UNMIS mandate in 2011. Accordingly, there is no long term strategic plan that clarifies what type of mine action capacities will be required, and how to build those capacities.

6. The direct operational mandate of UNMAO could complicate the development of national capacities. As well, specific irritants are emerging which, if unaddressed, could further complicate relations between and the of ability of UNMAO and national authorities to formulate a common strategy for mine action.

7. UNDP assistance has helped the Sudanese governments put in place the basic building blocks of a national mine action programme, with (for the most part) a sound institutional and organisational make-up.

8. UNMAO partners have provided significant training for the staffs of the national mine action organs, but these personnel must be given the opportunity to apply what they have learnt.

9. UNDP has not yet focussed sufficient attention on helping Sudanese authorities formulate their own strategic plans based on:
   • a clear assessment of the likely mine action needs following the departure of UNMIS, and
   • clear decisions on the strategy for developing the national capacities that will be required to meet those needs.

10. The UNDP country management team recognises the contributions made by mine action, the continuing need for mine action and for continued UNDP efforts to assist national authorities in developing their capacities.

Concerning the way forward, the core issue is the lack of a common vision of what mine action capabilities Sudanese authorities will require to address the contamination that is likely to remain after the UNMIS mandate ends. Until this is in place, Sudanese authorities will not be in a position to formulate a long-term strategy for their national mine action programme. Such a strategy is needed as a basis for (from Sudanese authorities) a realistic capacity
development plan and (from the UN perspective) a feasible transition plan for the successful transfer of responsibilities to national authorities.

The bulk of the recommendations address the requirements for:

- A realistic long-term needs assessment, to provide the basis for…
- An appropriate long-term strategy for the national mine action programme, which will allow…
- Realistic plans for further development of Sudanese mine action capacities and for transferring responsibilities from the UN to national authorities, and finally…
- Plans by the international mine action organisations (NGOs as well as the UN agencies) for supporting capacity development.

In addition, recommendations are provided for making best use of the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs) and for the establishment of a Southern Sudan Mine Action Centre, distinct from the Southern Sudan De-mining Commission (SSDC).
INTRODUCTION

In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending a conflict that had raged for 22 years. Contamination from landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) was one of the many post-conflict challenges facing the country. Fear of this contamination inhibited the return of displaced people and constrained the delivery of humanitarian aid and the operations of international peacekeeping forces fielded through the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

Even before the CPA, the warring parties had reached agreements with the UN to initiate mine action operations. Shortly after the 2002 Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement, the GoS and SPLM/A signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN Mine Action Service to establish an Emergency Mine Action in Sudan. In 2004, GoS, SPLM, and the UN signed the first versions of the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework. These stated that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country approach”, presaging provisions in the CPA which provided for a “one country, two systems” approach until a 2011 referendum on possible independence in Southern Sudan.

The groundwork laid from 2002 allowed the UN system and international mine action NGOs to respond rapidly once the CPA was signed. The CPA itself states that UNMIS will assist the Parties’ demining efforts, and the UN established a UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) headed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and including UNDP and UNICEF personnel. The UNMAO mandate covers:

- Development of a mine action programme, surveying of potentially contaminated area, clearance of priority areas, victim assistance, and mine risk education.
- Clearance of priority roads and sites to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian police components of the Mission.
- National capacity building support to both the North and the South.

As UNMAO had a mandate to provide demining support to UNMIS peacekeeping forces and to humanitarian operations, the initial focus of UNMAS, as lead agency, was to get its operations up-and-running. In spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit road and communication networks, and the modest level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives contamination, UNMAS has done an excellent job in establishing and coordinating mine action operations. However, the UNMIS Mission Plan also calls for the formulation and implementation of a Transition Plan to pass responsibility for management of the UN Mine Action Office to national authorities... and to develop fully operational national mine action coordination and implementation capacity.

Accordingly, the UNDP – as the lead agency for support to capacity development in the UN system – fielded a Senior Technical Advisor (STA) for mine action in March 2004 to initiate its project to support the development of mine action capacities in Sudan, focussing initially on the National Policy and Strategic Frameworks. In November 2005, a new UNDP STA formulated the current project for the period 2006-07, which sought to assist national authorities establish a National Mine Action Legal and Institutional Framework, with all necessary sub structures.

1 The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is the military arm of the SPLM.
capable of planning, co-coordinating, implementing, and monitoring all aspects of mine action in the country, within the framework of International Mine Action Standards.

In early 2007, UNMIS commissioned an evaluation of the Sudan Mine Action Programme which concluded that capacity development was the biggest weakness in the programme.²

At the request of UNDP-Sudan, the GICHD fielded a two person team³ from 22-30 October 2007 to evaluate the UNDP project, with the principal aim to evaluate the performance and overall approach of the project to take stock of the achievements made, identify major gaps, lessons learned and make recommendations for the future direction for the project.⁴

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation specified 15 objectives. Unfortunately, the evaluation team had only a limited time available to undertake missions to both Khartoum and Juba.⁵ Accordingly, it was agreed with the UNDP Country Office to focus on recommendations for the future direction of the project, including inputs to feed into the preparation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan for 2009-2012.

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information on the conflict, explosives contamination, and the mine action response, as well as a brief discussion on key political and economic developments. Chapter 3 gives the analysis of the UNDP mine action project itself, including relationships with the broader UNDP country programme and the overall mine action programme. Chapter 4 outlines the conclusions drawn, while the final Chapter provides the way forward, including recommendations for UNDP and UNMAO.

Both UNMAO and the mine action unit in UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) provided thoughtful and useful comments on the draft report. These, along with brief responses from the GICHD Evaluation Team, are reproduced in Annexes 4 and 5 respectively, preceded by:

- Annex 1 – Terms of Reference
- Annex 2 – Itinerary & List of People Met
- Annex 3 – Documents Consulted

³ Ted Paterson, Team Leader, and Vera Bohle, mine action evaluation specialist.
⁴ The full ToRs are provided in Appendix 1.
⁵ Vera Bohle and Léonie Barnes (at the time, also a GICHD staff member) had conducted short missions earlier in 2007 as part of an evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Sudan, which provided the team with a foundation on which to build.
BACKGROUND

OVERALL CONTEXT

PEACE AND CONFLICT

Sudan is considered by some analysts as the world’s most fragile state.\(^6\) The country has been wracked by internal conflict since before its independence in 1956. While the principal conflict has been between the national government in Khartoum and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM\(^7\) ) in the South, insurgencies have also occurred in the East and (continuing today) in Darfur. In each of these areas, the central government has pursued a policy of arming splinter groups, resulting in fighting among rebel factions.

Textbox 1 – Sudan as a Fragile State

<table>
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<tr>
<th>In some sense, characterising Sudan as a fragile state seems odd, given the central government in Khartoum has successfully maintained its power and control of resources for twenty years. However, the country is fragile on a number of inter-related dimensions, including:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The lack of broad-based democratic institutions and government legitimacy in both Khartoum and the South</td>
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<td>• Multiple extended conflicts, both against the central government and among rebel factions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Regional insecurity, with conflicts in neighbouring countries spilling into Sudan, further complicating efforts to restore domestic security</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The absence of effective state structures in much of the country</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increased dependence of governments on oil revenues, providing governments with financial resources even in the absence of popular support based on accountability.</td>
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Haslie, Anita and Axel Borchgrevink, 2007, *International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

This is not to deny that important progress has been achieved in recent years. Following the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sponsored peace talks in Kenya from September 2002 to December 2004, the parties (the Government of Sudan and the SPLM) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005.

The CPA states that a power-sharing government consisting of the Government of National Union (GoNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) will rule the country for six years until early 2011. The CPA grants the South a significant amount of autonomy, and provides for a referendum on secession to be held after a six-year Interim Period. During the Interim Period however, the parties agreed to work together ‘to make unity attractive’, and agreements were made on wealth sharing.\(^8\) Final decisions on some thorny issues were deferred: for example, the final North-South boundary has not yet been agreed in the “Three Transitional Areas”.\(^9\)

A peace agreement was also achieved in the East in 2006. However, the conflict in Darfur has

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\(^7\) The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is the military arm of the SPLM.

\(^8\) The GoSS is to receive 50% of the revenues from oil production in the South.

\(^9\) The Three Areas (Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, plus the Abyei area) have a mixed ethnic composition and oil reserves, and the disputed North-South border runs through them.
continued, in spite of the presence of African peacekeepers and a number of internationally sponsored peace conferences.

**INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT**

The CPA also asks for UN involvement to ...support the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement... In response, through its Resolution No. 1590 (23 March 2005), the Security Council authorised the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) – an integrated peacekeeping mission including political and humanitarian components.10

The international community has attempted to engage with Sudan in a coordinated fashion. The World Bank and UN undertook a extensive needs assessment (the Joint Assessment Mission – JAM) over 14 months following the request of the GoS and the SPLM. This led to two broad plans, endorsed by both the GoS and SPLM respectively, and the creation of separate Multi-Donor Trust Funds for the GoNU and GoSS. Unfortunately, implementation of projects financed by these MDTFs has been slow, leading to criticism of the World Bank – the administrator of the trust funds – for imposing overly burdensome requirements for financial control and accountability. As well, a number of important donors have remained outside the MDTF mechanism, with some following parallel strategies that do not adhere to the broad principles set-out in the CPA (e.g. to make unity attractive).

**ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONTAMINATION PROBLEM**

**EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION**

The contamination from landmines and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)11 in Sudan stems from:

- a. World War II – resulting in minefields along the northern borders;
- b. First Civil War (1955-1972);
- c. Second Civil War (1983-2005) – 22 years of fighting between Northern and Southern Sudan. The main combatants were the Government of Sudan (GoS) military and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The bulk of mines in the southern and eastern provinces were laid during this period.
- d. Darfur (2003-) – A civil war in Western Sudan creating a major humanitarian crisis, despite the involvement of African Union peace-keeping troops. So far, there is no evidence of the use of landmines, but there is a growing ERW problem.
- e. Chadian-Sudanese conflict (2005-) – There are also no reports of mine laying, but fighting will lead to ERW contamination.
- f. Fighting among various local militia groups plus inter-ethnic/tribal conflicts have further complicated the picture, as has the ongoing incursion of the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), into the south-western part of Sudan, which has also led to limited landmine and ERW contamination on the Ugandan border.12

The major contamination problem stems from the second civil war, which was a guerrilla conflict with the government holding towns and SPLA controlling the countryside. The GoS used anti-personnel landmines to protect its garrison towns and to interdict the movement of SPLA supplies and forces. On the other side, SPLA used landmines to block government forces in the

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10 The CPA explicitly called for assistance of peace support missions in the area of mine action, and this is reflected in the Security Council Resolution
11 ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO).
12 The Landmine Monitor (2006) reports alleged use along the borders with Chad, Eritrea, Libya and Uganda up to 2004.
towns and to interdict their supply lines by planting anti-vehicle mines on roads. Further, Human Rights Watch reports that the GoS used landmines in its efforts to control the oil fields in southern Sudan.\textsuperscript{13}

Twenty-one of Sudan’s 26 states are thought to have a landmine/ERW problem, with contamination heaviest in the South, where the bulk of the fighting took place in the last North-South civil war. In the North, three main areas have been affected: Southern Kordofan (the Nuba Mountains) and Blue Nile states, plus the Abyei area – the so-called “Three Transitional Areas”.

In the South and in the Three Transitional Areas, landmine/ERW contaminated areas include access routes and connection roads between major towns and villages; bridges and major transport routes to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Kenya; agricultural and grazing land; and areas used for firewood and producing charcoal. Contamination prevents the use of social and economic infrastructure, and impedes socio-economic recovery and development. In addition, the contamination prevents or delays the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their home communities.

The full extent of contamination is not yet determined. By March 2007, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) has registered dangerous areas (DAs) in seven regions (regions such as Darfur, Kordofan and Equatoria have more than one state).\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Table 1 – Dangerous areas by region}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total number of DA</th>
<th>DA cleared</th>
<th>DA awaiting clearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahr El Ghazai</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatoria</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1,168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{IMPACT OF THE CONTAMINATION}

Compared to 2002, the landmine/ERW casualty rate has dropped from over 170 to under 100 in 2006. However, the numbers of recorded victims has actually increased between 2005 and 2006, and may further increase if accidents continue in 2007 at the current rate. As victim statistics cannot be considered comprehensive, it is difficult to determine whether more accidents are occurring, or whether these figures reflect more complete recording.

\textsuperscript{13} Human Rights Watch interviews with witnesses to casualties caused by government-laid land mines, Kenya-Sudan border, August 1999
\textsuperscript{14} All figures from UNMAO IMSMA Monthly Report, March 2007.
The Survey Action Centre (SAC) got involved in Sudan in June 2003, conducting an Advance Survey Mission in Southern Kordofan. By October 2007, Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) had been completed in seven states: Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile, Kassala, Red Sea, Gadaref, Sennar and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (for which results have not yet been published). Based on these partial results, the contamination problem in most of Sudan appears to be slight to modest.

### Table 2 – Summary of LIS Results in Six States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Affected Communities (% of total)</th>
<th>Pop. Affected (% of total)</th>
<th>Recent victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>43 (10.8%)</td>
<td>83,000 + 53,000 refugees/IDPs (?)%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>33 (6.3%)</td>
<td>55,000 (?)%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala, Gadaref, Red Sea, Sennar</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>16 (1.5%)</td>
<td>61,000 + 20,000 refugees/IDPs (1.6%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PROGRESS IN MINE ACTION

Since early 2004, there have been no reports on landmine use in Sudan, which can be considered a great success stemming from the Government’s adoption of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and SPLM’s signing of the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. It also shows the commitment of both the GoS and SPLM/A to live up to these international commitments. Unfortunately, this does not mean that the problem is solved, as there remain conflicts in Sudan.

Of the known 1,905 DAs, over 735 have been verified as safe or cleared since 2002, with 3,238 anti-personnel mines, 1,682 anti-vehicle mines, along with hundreds of thousands of small-arms ammunition rounds and UXO/AXO found. A total of 1,168 DAs are awaiting clearance, of which a slight majority (656) are suspected minefields. So far, clearance efforts indicate that there are not large numbers of mines and the perceived threat is far greater than the actual threat.

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15 The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment is an instrument committing non-state actors to similar obligations to those of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention.

16 The majority of the cleared DAs were unexploded ordnance (UXO) or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) rather than minefields (528 UXO spots, 47 ammunition dumps, 43 confrontation areas and 9 ambush areas, compared to 107 minefields). The clearance of minefields is far more time consuming than UXO or AXO tasks.
By August 2007, more than 18,500 kilometres of supply and access routes have been confirmed safe, with over 1,800 km of roads demined. More than 1.7 million Sudanese have received mine risk education (MRE).

**UN MISSION IN SUDAN**

**UNAMIS & UNMIS**

The basis for the current UN Peace Support Operation was laid in July 2004 with the establishment of the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS). While the Advance Mission’s mandate focussed on the development of peace operations in support of a peace agreement between the Government and the SPLM/A, from the beginning it had to deploy many of its resources to the continuing crisis in Darfur.

Following the signing of the CPA, the international community established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) via Security Council resolution 1590 on 24 March 2005. The Mission mandate is to help the people of Sudan promote national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability, and the protection of all citizens. UNMIS was assigned various tasks to support the implementation of the CPA, including support for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigations of violations; donor liaison; assistance for DDR programmes and in restructuring the police services; promotion of the rule of law and human rights; facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs, and humanitarian assistance by, inter alia, helping to establish the necessary security conditions. Within the mandate, UNMIS is to …assist the parties to the CPA in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination.

A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is mandated to coordinate all activities of the UN system in Sudan, and to mobilize resources and support from the international community. As the peace-building process also concerns militias and foreign armed groups (e.g. Lord’s Resistance Army), which may threaten the peace in Southern Sudan, the Mission has a force protection mandate, which provides the means to protect UN personnel and facilities and to ensure the freedom of movement for UN personnel. The military component of UNMIS is headed by the Force Commander, responsible for the monitoring/verification and Force Protection functions of the Mission.

The Security Council resolution gave UNMIS a seven-year mandate, broken into four phases:

- Phase 1: pre-interim period (6 months – starting with the signing of the CPA on 9 Jan 2005);
- Phase 2: period up to national elections (3½ years – mid-2008);
- Phase 3: period up to the referendum (2½ years – end 2010);
- Phase 4: period following the referendum, pre-exit

The overall goal of UNMIS is to serve to make national unity attractive for Sudan, via a three pillar process:

1. Make peace sustainable;
2. Guarantee human rights of all the people of Sudan;

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17 Demining includes both survey and clearance.
18 Sudan Unified Mission Plan, p. 7, [www.sudanig.org](http://www.sudanig.org)
3. Reduce poverty … and lift the standard of living of the poorest segments of society through good economic governance.

The UNMIS mandate relates primarily to the former North-South conflict, and its operations are mainly in Southern Sudan and the Three Transitional Areas.19

UNAMID

Until now, the peacekeepers in Darfur have been fielded by the African Union although recently a UN peacekeeping force has been approved. On 31 July 2007, the UN Security Council authorised the joint African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID is to begin implementation no later than 31 December 2007 to support its mandate, as follows:

- to support the peace process and the good offices of the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur;
- security
- rule of law, governance, and human rights
- humanitarian assistance

As part of its security mandate, UNAMID is …to provide technical mine-action advice and coordination and demining capacity to support the Darfur Peace Agreement.

EVOLUTION OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

PRIOR TO THE CPA

Acknowledging the problems of landmine contamination, in 1996 the SPLM/A declared a unilateral moratorium on the use of landmines, provided the GoS reciprocated. In 1999, GoS and SPLM/A pledged not to use mines and requested international assistance for the clearance of landmines. SPLM/A invited international NGOs into the areas of their control to begin mine clearance.

In 2001, the Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) was created to initiate cross-line information gathering and to develop plans for mine action.

The 2002 Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement between GoS and SPLM/A established the international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the ceasefire and created an opportunity for safe mine action in Southern Kordofan. In the same year, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the GoS, SPLM, and UNMAS. The ensuing concept plan for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan established national and regional coordination mechanisms in Khartoum, the Nuba Mountains, and Rumbek.

JMC had a civil-military coordination (CIMIC) component to promote peace, and the first mine clearance projects were also launched as peace-building initiatives.20 Deminers were trained from both north and south to work in the same organisation. Both GoS and SPLM/A showed further commitment by accepting mine ban obligations. The SPLM signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001, while GoS ratified the Convention in October 2003 and this entered into force on 1 April 2004.

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19 The forces component of UNMIS lost its mandate in the East once the SPLA withdrew following the 2006 peace agreement.
20 The NGOs Danish Church Aid (DCA) and Landmine Action U.K. (LMA) started operations in the Nuba mountains. LMA worked with SLIRI, while DCA had the national NGO partners JASMAR from the North and OSIL from the South.
The Swiss Federation for Mine Action (FSD) route survey teams began operations in February 2004. In collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNMAS, priority routes for reconstruction were assessed and DAs identified. The firm Mechem, under contract with UNOPS, also began survey and clearance of routes in March 2004.

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which had been working in southern Sudan since 1986, expanded its programme from food security, health care, and other humanitarian/development components to include mine action in 2004, when sustainable peace seemed in sight.

Also in 2004, GOS, SPLM, and the UN signed the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework. These frameworks stated that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country approach” covering the period 2005-2011.

These initiatives allowed a flexible mine action response even prior to the signing of the CPA in early 2005. However, mine action efforts expanded significantly after the signing of the CPA.

MINE ACTION SINCE THE CPA

UNMAO

Chapter VI of the CPA states that UNMIS will assist the Parties’ demining efforts by providing technical advice and coordination. (This also is reflected in UN Security Council Regulation 1590, which established UNMIS.) According to the UNMIS Unified Mission Plan, UNMAS is the coordinator of a common UN mine action program, involving the following agencies:

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), has a dual role to coordinate UNMAO and to plan, coordinate, and monitor demining in support of the UNMIS mandate;
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), providing support to national authorities in building national mine action capacities;
- United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), undertaking MRE;
- World Food Programme (WFP) undertaking clearance of key supply and access routes; and
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing mine risk education to returning refugees and IDP and undertaking clearance of areas required for resettlement of refugees and IDPs.

The Mission Plan states that mine action will focus on three key areas:

1. Development of a mine action programme, surveying of potentially contaminated area, clearance of priority areas, victim assistance, and mine risk education.
2. Clearance of priority roads and sites to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian police components of the Mission. (This includes Juba airport and UNMIS and other UN deployment sites.)
3. National capacity building through support to the national mine action authorities and national NGOs in both the North and the South. This includes the development of national technical standards.

The Mission Plan also calls for the formulation and implementation of a Transition Plan to...
responsibility for management of the UN Mine Action Office to national authorities… and to develop …fully operational national mine action coordination and implementation capacity.

UNMAS has established the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Khartoum, with regional offices in Juba (controlling sub-offices in Wau and Malakal),24 Kadugli (controlling sub-offices in Damazin and Kassala), and Al Fashir (controlling Darfur). This decentralised structure is expensive as it requires many international personnel, but it serves the needs of a large country with little infrastructure.

UNDP ROLE
UNDP is the lead agency within UNMAO for supporting the development of mine action capacities. The UNDP project is managed by a Senior Technical Advisor (STA) based in Khartoum, with a Technical Advisor (TA) in Juba and two national programme officers.

With support from UNDP and UNMAO, the National Mine Action Policy Framework and the National Mine Action Strategic Framework were updated in June 2006 and approved by the Council of Ministers (GoNU) that August.25

UNDP has also assisted with coordination for a variety of training activities,26 principally:

- senior and middle management courses (at James Madison University, Amman, and Nairobi);
- training in humanitarian demining at the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Nairobi for personnel from both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA assigned to the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs – 133 personnel in total), as well as from the local NGO Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL – 17 persons);27
- study tours of other mine action programmes;
- attendance at various international mine action meetings.

The UNDP also encouraged the GoNU and GoSS to include mine action in their budgets for the first time in 2006, and assisted the preparation of GoSS medium-term expenditure plans for mine action through the ‘budget sector working group’ process.28

Future priorities planned by the UNDP include:

- establishment of a legal framework for national NGOs (to facilitate the involvement of national NGOs in mine action),
- additional capacity enhancement for staff of the national authorities,
- stockpile destruction,
- support for the six sub-offices, and
- implementation of a victim assistance project.29

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24 With improvements in road transportation in the South, sub-offices in Yei and Rumbek were closed in July 2007.
25 The original Policy and Strategic Frameworks date from August 2004.
26 For the most part, the organizations providing the various training workshops raised their own funds, so little funding for training has come via the UNDP budget.
27 An additional 140 deminers were undergoing training at IMATC at the time of the evaluation mission, while 20 persons from the initial course are also being trained as team leaders.
28 This appears to be designed both to establish a medium-term expenditure framework for the GoSS and to facilitate aid coordination.
29 Funding for the Victim Assistance project comes from Japan via the Human Security Trust Fund.
UNDP support to MA is provided mainly under the Human Security and Recovery budget line, included in multi-year project (USD 120 million/per year, of which approximately USD 1 million is budgeted for mine action).

NATIONAL ORGANS
The CPA specifies the establishment of Northern and Southern demining authorities that are to coordinate their activities in close cooperation with UNMAO. In the North, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established 24 December 2005 through Presidential Decree No. 299 and officially launched on 07 March 2006. The National Authority comprises:

- The High National Committee for Mine Action
- The General Secretariat
- The National Centre for Mine Action (NMAC) under a Director General
- The Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre

The NMAC is based in the same building as the UNMAO, and reports to the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs who in turn reports to an inter-ministerial committee under the lead of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence.

In the South, the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (NSMAD) was formally established in Juba in 2005. It was also collocated with the UNMAO Regional Office. NSMAD existed in name only, with little capacity to conduct coordination or mine action planning. In June 2006, NSMAD was re-named to Southern Sudan Demining Authority (generally termed the Southern Sudan Demining Commission – SSDC), through the GoSS Presidential Decree No. 45. As well in 2006, the Transport and Demining Steering Committee was established in Southern Sudan to agree mine action priorities. It is chaired by the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator and is said to work effectively.

The institutional and organisational make-up for mine action in the North is excellent, at least on paper. There is a clear separation between the policy and oversight roles of the High Committee, supported by a secretariat, and the policy-implementation responsibilities of the Mine Action Centre. The list of responsibilities set for the different organs are well thought out.

Unfortunately, the institutional and organisational make-up for mine action in the South remains incomplete. Only a five-person demining authority was established by presidential decree. However, the SSDC has engaged approximately 40 staff and opened three sub-offices, and seems intent on assuming many functions that should be discharged by a mine action centre – a body

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30 The State Minister for the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs serves as the General Secretary to the High Committee. Together, the High Committee and its General Secretariat would constitute the ‘national authority’ according to IMAS definitions.

31 Although formally both the Higher Committee and the NMAC are part of the ‘Authority’, it is clear that the Higher Committee (supported by its General Secretariat) is responsible for policy and strategy, and for supervising the work of the NMAC in implementing those policies and strategies. Thus, following IMAS definitions, the Higher Committee is the ‘National Authority’ and the NMAC is a separate ‘National Mine Action Centre’. See IMAS 02.10, Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme.

32 Technically, a mine action centre in the South does not exist; instead, a Southern Sudan Mine Action Commission (SSDC) has been established. This distinction is discussed later in the report.

33 Having been relocated from Nairobi where it had been since its formation in 2002.

34 This comprises representatives from 12 national ministries, from the GoSS, from the armed forces (GoS, SPLA, and JIUs), and from civil society.
distinct from and reporting to an authority. Fortunately, the presidential decree states that the SSDC is to work with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development to prepare draft legislation for mine action in South Sudan. This will allow the shortcomings in the institutional and organisational make-up to be addressed.

OTHER MINE ACTION ACTORS

The main operating partners for mine action remain the international NGOs (often in cooperation with national NGOs) and commercial contractors, along with demining contingents in both the UNMIS Peacekeeping Forces and the local militaries.

Table 3 – Principal demining operators in Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firms</th>
<th>International NGOs</th>
<th>Local NGOs</th>
<th>UNMIS Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armour Group</td>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>FPDO</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECH EM</td>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>JASMAR</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Tech</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>NMMAS</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronco</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>OSIL</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>JIDUs, plus SAF and SPLA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNMAO has not only taken on a coordinating role, but it also administers and supervises contracts\textsuperscript{35} for the tasks identified as priorities by Steering Committees.\textsuperscript{36} In addition, UNMAO coordinates the tasking of the demining assets of the Troop Contributing Countries.

WFP also issues contracts for survey and road clearance.\textsuperscript{37} Coordination between WFP and UNMAO has generally been sound (at least when WFP has a mine action advisor on staff), and criteria for setting priorities for road work are clear: (i) opening access to Uganda and Kenya and (ii) supporting IDP/refugee return through regional centres and then smaller communities.

FUNDING

Mine action in Sudan has been well resourced, particularly since the CPA. Total funding rose to over $40 million in 2005, and perhaps $60 million per year since then. More than half the total funding has come via the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assessed budget, which is used for mine action in support of the UNMIS peacekeeping forces. Significant amounts also have been channelled by donor countries through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action (VTF), which covers other UNMIS priorities (e.g. to support humanitarian assistance). Other international funds have gone to:

- the WFP for demining services in support of its road rehabilitation programme\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{35} Technically, UNOPS issues the contracts on behalf of DPKO/UNMAS.
\textsuperscript{36} The bulk of mine action funding has come from the assessed budget for UNMIS, and covers the UNMIS ‘forces mission’. The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for mine action covers humanitarian priorities of the mission. The Steering Committees comprise representatives of UNMIS, the UN Country Team, and the Sudanese Governments.
\textsuperscript{37} On signing of the CPA, WFP switched all efforts to road repair and reconstruction to reduce costs. Since 2002/3 WFP has reduced the percentage of airlifted food from 80% to under 7%. This demining project is a component of a larger road construction programme, running from 2004 – 2008.
\textsuperscript{38} The WFP road programme appears to have become part of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) mechanism. Under the general arrangements for the MDTF, two-thirds of funding for each project should come from the governments of Sudan, with the remainder covered by the Trust Fund itself. The WFP budget for demining is $12 million.
directly from donors to international NGOs for demining, MRE, and victim assistance
- directly from donors to Cranfield University to run mine action training courses
- directly from donors for training and equipping of the JIDUs

In addition, the UNDP has received EUR 50 million from the European Community for the Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), to be implemented by NGO consortia. Grants totalling EUR 10.7 million have been awarded to two consortia which include international and local mine action NGOs to provide support to the other consortia members that are working in mine-affected communities.

The World Bank administered Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) had budgeted $5 million for demining in support of the Emergency Transport and Rehabilitation Project. These funds have not yet been drawn upon, and there is some question whether they will, in fact, be utilised (this is discussed later in the report).

In addition to these international contributions, both the GoNU and the GoSS have significantly increased their funding to mine action. The governments are paying for the staff in the NMAC and SSDC, and the deployment costs of the JIDUs. Although the evaluation team was not able to obtain precise figures for mine action expenditures to date, the GoSS has budgeted $2.5 million for the SSDC for both 2008 and 2009.

CURRENT PRIORITIES

The programme’s overall objectives as outlined in the Mine Action Strategic Framework, and referred to in the JAM Volume II report (pages 245 ff.) include continued implementation of demining and MRE priorities, plus:

- Completion of the Landmine Impact Survey
- Strengthening and expanding national capacities for victim assistance
- Capacity development, including:
  - Strengthening and expanding the national mine action institutional framework for planning, coordination, and monitoring all activities
  - Strengthening and expanding national capacities for operations (survey; clearance; MRE; victim assistance)
- Developing and implementing a transition plan to transfer responsibilities from UN agencies to national authorities
- Mainstreaming mine action into national recovery & development plans
- Mobilising adequate resources to achieve the strategic goals, and
- Ensuring Sudan meets its Treaty obligations.

In its 2007 Work Plan, UNMAO defines its priorities for mine action as:

HUMANITARIAN PRIORITIES

- Assessment and clearance of priority roads to facilitate mission and humanitarian operations, and the safe movement of population;
- Conduct survey, marking of dangerous areas, and the clearance of minefields and ERW contaminated areas in high impacted communities in support of mission and humanitarian activities;
- Provide targeted MRE to IDPs, refugees and mine/UXO affected communities to reduce the risk from landmines and ERW; and
- providing Landmine Safety briefings to UN and aid agency personnel.
RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

- Development of national mine action institutions and capabilities;
- Strengthen and expand the existing national capacities for physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of mine survivors;
- Destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines.
### Table 4 – Timeline of Mine Action in Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>General context</th>
<th>Mine Action Programme</th>
<th>UNDP/Capacity Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>SPLA moratorium on use of landmines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Dec</td>
<td>GoS signs Ottawa Convention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>GoS &amp; SPLM/A pledge not to use landmines &amp; request international assistance for mine action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>SPLM/A invites INGOs for demining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement GoS/SPLA cooperation</td>
<td>Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) created to initiate cross-line information gathering and to develop plans for mine action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPLM signs Geneva Call Deed of Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep MoU between GoS, SPLM/A, &amp; UNMAS for the Emergency Mine Action Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (SPLM/A) established in Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>SPLM/A signs Geneva Call Deed of Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>GoS ratifies Ottawa Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Nov Cross line operations begun, allowing movement of deminers for humanitarian demining</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP STA arrives in Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>UN deploys UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS),</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMAS initiates limited route verification and clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar Route survey &amp; clearance begins.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional EMAP sub-office established in Rumbek, South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial version of National Mine Action Strategic Framework adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>General context</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme</td>
<td>UNDP/Capacity Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jan Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar Security Council Resolution 1590</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar Sudan Unified Mission Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep New Sudan Mine Action Directorate moves from Nairobi to Juba</td>
<td>New UNDP STA for Mine Action arrives in Khartoum (7 month delay)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct UNDP Support to National Mine Action Capacity Development plan revised</td>
<td>Members of Joint Integrated Units trained on basic demining in IMATC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec GoNU establishes National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) by Presidential Order 34/2005</td>
<td>GoNU establishes National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) by Presidential Decree No. 299/2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Mar Southern Sudan De-mining Authority established by Presidential Decree 45/2000</td>
<td>National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) officially launched</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun GoNU &amp; GoSS include funds for mine action within their budgets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mar UNMAS Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct Evaluation of UNDP Mine Action Project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMAS engages transition planning officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>mid Elections due</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>end Referendum scheduled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>mid UNMIS mandate ends</td>
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</table>
CURRENT ISSUES CONCERNING THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

UNMAO & UNMAS

UNMAO continues to act as the de facto mine action centre for Sudan. Perhaps 80% of all international funding for mine action flows through UNMAS for UNMAO, with about half of the total international funding going for demining support for the peacekeeping forces. UNMAS plays the dominant roles in UNMAO.

Table 5 – Estimated annual funding for mine action in Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of funding</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Approximate amount/yr (% of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessed peacekeeping budget</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>$30 million (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTF &amp; other grants to UNMAO</td>
<td>UNMAS (mainly)</td>
<td>$20 million (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to NGOs</td>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>$10 million (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct grants to WFP</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>$2.5 million (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broadly, UNMAS has two main responsibilities:\(^{39}\)

1. performing the mine action centre functions in support of UNMIS peacekeeping forces and police contingents (covered by the peacekeeping assessed budget), and other UNMIS components (i.e. ‘humanitarian’– covered by the VTF and direct grants from donors);

2. providing support for national mine action authorities (including capacity development).

Experience elsewhere has shown that the effective discharge of such a dual role is difficult.\(^{40}\) Understandably in such situations, staff tend to focus firstly on their direct responsibilities, and only secondly on supporting counterparts in local organisations. This ‘operations bias’ is particularly pronounced in fields such as mine action when the failure to get the work done in the field could result in human casualties and the disruption of essential operations (peacekeeping; humanitarian).

Another common challenge is that the people hired on the basis of their abilities to perform a job may not have the skills and aptitudes needed to train and mentor a counterpart. An additional issue in Sudan is that the scope of UNMAS responsibilities in support of UNMIS has represented a daunting challenge, particularly during the start-up of such a large and geographically dispersed programme in a difficult environment, leaving less time for support to the NMAC and SSDC.

Capacity development also requires more than training. Local counterparts need the opportunity to apply, on-the-job, what they have learnt in workshops and study tours. In Sudan however, UNMAS has direct responsibility for tasks in support of UNMIS, and cannot transfer these responsibilities to local counterparts. As the majority of demining tasks are still in support of UNMIS (or fall to international NGOs or firms working to support WFP, UNHCR, etc.), there have been comparatively few opportunities to put NMAC and SSDC personnel in charge of the task cycle, with UNMAS personnel playing an advisory role.

In situations such as Sudan, where UNMAS has a direct management role, a further complication is that responsibilities for supporting capacity development are split within the UN. UNDP is

\(^{39}\) These are explicitly mandated responsibilities. UNMAO may also support development priorities using the VTF or grants directly from donor countries.

\(^{40}\) See, for example, Eaton et al, 1997, The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities, UN DHA.
designated as the lead UN agency with respect to supporting capacity development, but the bulk of the skilled and experienced personnel who could train, advise, and mentor local counterparts are UNMAS staff. In Sudan, for example, there are only two international mine action TAs for UNDP, compared to perhaps 50 for UNMAS. Thus, while UNDP may be in a position to assist local authorities in defining their capacity development requirements, planning how to develop those capacities, and implementing certain components of the capacity development plan (e.g. training workshops; study tours), the UNDP TAs depend on UNMAS personnel to provide capacity development support on a day-to-day basis.

This dilemma cannot simply be ‘solved’ once and for all – it has to be managed through effective planning and coordination. As yet however, the essential plans and coordination mechanisms are not fully in place. On the one hand, there is no medium- to long-term plan for mine action in Sudan. UNMAO prepares only annual plans, focussed principally on operational priorities for the coming year. The Policy Framework and Strategic Framework adopted by Sudanese authorities is an important achievement, but does not paint a clear picture of the likely contamination problem that Sudanese authorities will have to deal with following the UNMIS mandate. Because of this, the capacities required to deal with this contamination cannot be defined and, as a result, the appropriate strategy for developing these capacities cannot be determined.

As well, there has not been an adequate overall coordination mechanism for mine action in Sudan. On paper, there is a Steering Committee chaired by the DSRSG, but this has not met in over a year. Recently however, the Secretary General of the NMAA convened a meeting of Sudanese mine action authorities and UN agencies to initiate the process of transition planning. From this, the GoNU has agreed to a broader Steering Committee (government/UN/donor) to meet alternatively in Khartoum and Juba.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION ORGANISATIONS
Coordination between UNMAO and demining firms is straightforward as this is covered by commercial contracts. Cooperation between UNMAO and international mine action NGOs also appears to be good. Although the INGOs get much of their funding directly from donors, there are regular meetings in Juba for all mine action organisations (chaired by SSDC and facilitated by UNMAO), and the INGOs attend most of these. The INGOs also report that they obtain task dossiers from UNMAO, and they report regularly on their activities to both UNMAO and SSDC. The NGOs also work closely with government mine action authorities – particularly in the South where most demining operations take place. Most report that their relations with both UNMAO and government mine action authorities are good and have improved over the past year.

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
In the absence of a long-term strategy based on a realistic assessment of the likely contamination the governments will have to address following the departure of UNMIS, Sudanese mine action

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41 UNMAS, 2005, Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy. As well, UNICEF is the lead UN agency with respect to MRE.
42 Formally, they are engaged by UNOPS on behalf of UNMAS.
43 At the time of the mission, it had been endorsed by the GoNU cabinet. The GoSS had concerns about language that seemed to give the NMAA oversight responsibility over the SSDC, but we understand that a clarification had been proposed that satisfied the GoSS.
44 See letters of 29 August and 25 September 2007 from the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs on mine action transition planning.
45 Generally, the NGOs do not simply adopt UNMAO priorities as they are working for specific clients (e.g. DDG for UNHCR) or have adopted a distinct strategy from UNMAO (e.g. NPA focuses on demining for agriculture; MAG focuses on UXO).
officials appear to lack a realistic picture of what their capacity requirements are. In the absence of such a picture, it is natural that they look to UNMAO and international NGOs as models. Thus, Sudanese mine action authorities appear to envisage a large programme with a number of operating partners (JIDUs and perhaps other military units; local NGOs; perhaps other types of organisation) working under the direction of the two MACs (which will also handle quality assurance). Accordingly, the two MACs have hired fairly large number of personnel (perhaps 40 each) and have opened a number of sub-offices (often collocated with UNMAO sub-offices).

This concern was well encapsulated by the evaluation team commissioned recently by UNMAS: The result is that there has been little effective effort to manage the expectations of the national bodies, which seem to be trying to duplicate the current size and structure of the UNMAO.

### JIDUs

The first cohort of the JIDUs received their training in IMAS-compliant mine clearance in 2006. However, the units were never accredited by UNMAO before they began demining operations in advance of reconstruction of the 446 km Babanusa-Wau railway line. This key North-South transportation link is a high priority for both GoNU and GoSS, and $32 million was allocated for its rehabilitation in the MDTF-funded Emergency Transportation and Rehabilitation Project. Accordingly, UNMAS planned to issue a commercial tender for demining in 2006.

However, the GoNU decided that the cost and time estimates from UNMAS were excessive, and agreed with the GoSS to assign the JIDUs to this task. The GoNU procured approximately $1 million in heavy equipment required by the JIDUs, and paid for their deployment. Sudanese authorities report that the task took one month preparation and four months to complete, and cost substantially less than the estimate provided by UNMAS. UNMAO did not quality assure the work, but the GoNU accepted liability.

Following a request for assistance from the governor of Kassala, the JIDUs are now working on the clearance of roads in that state. Again, this assignment was made outside the joint priority-setting mechanisms established by UNMAO and the Sudanese governments. As such, the JIDUs are not tasked by UNMAO and their work is not quality-assured by UNMAS.

The Evaluation Team was advised that the Sudanese governments plans to use the JIDUs to provide demining support for roads to be reconstructed by the Emergency Transport and Rehabilitation Project, funded through the MDTF. Approximately $5 million (all from international donors) had been included in the project budget for demining support but – based on

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46 The SSDC is legally constituted as the ‘authority’, but is referred to as the ‘commission’ and is trying to develop capacities that would normally reside in a mine action centre.
47 Accreditation of a Demining organization requires a review of its Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and of all its equipment – as well as the training received by its personnel – to ensure all these are compliant with IMAS.
48 It planned a general assessment followed by clearance of identified DAs to 15 meters each side of the centre line, plus clearance of all road-rail crossings, railway stations, and rail bridges.
49 Under the MDTF agreements, the governments in Sudan would pay for two-thirds of all MDTF-funded projects. The Babanusa-Wau railway was budgeted at $32 million, but the governments would accrue two-thirds of any cost savings.
50 The JIDUs were supported by military engineers from the SAF and SPLA, who identified where they had planted landmines.
51 The cost figures provided by the GoNU do not include all cost elements, such as depreciation of equipment.
52 It could do this because the reconstruction work was to be done by the state-owned Sudan Railway Corporation.
the experience on the Babanusa-Wau railway – the GoNU has advised the World Bank that all demining would be done by ‘national assets’ (i.e. the JIDUs), with the government providing a certificate that the demining shall be done to international standards.

This approach could lead to serious problems and cause significant delay to the relevant components of the Emergency Transport and Rehabilitation Project. The first problem relates to liability and insurance. Unlike the Babanusa-Wau railway, which is being implemented by the state-owned Sudanese Railway Corporation (allowing the GoNU to absorb all liability) the road reconstruction contracts are to be awarded following World Bank rules for international competitive bidding. These rules require, among other items, that the prime contractors have adequate insurance coverage. In areas where explosives contamination is suspected, international insurance companies will require that demining support is provided by accredited operators in accordance to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). At the present time, the JIDUs are not accredited by a body that is technically capable of accrediting demining operators. If insurance firms are aware of this, it is unlikely they will agree to insure against risks related to explosives contamination. If they are unaware of the situation and provide insurance, it is possible that they would refuse to pay should a problem arise from explosives contamination. It is unclear whether the World Bank would even proceed with a tender in such a situation.

The second problem relates to project management and cost-effectiveness. Based on experience in other countries, best practice is for the tender documents to specify that prospective prime contractors for road/rail reconstruction in mine-affected areas be required to include in their bids an accredited demining operator as a sub-contractor. The winning prime contractor would then manage and accept responsibility for the work of the demining sub-contractor. Thus, should there be a missed device leading to an accident or work stoppage, the prime contractor (and its insurer) bears the responsibility, rather than the government. This often leads to cost savings on the entire reconstruction project, even though the costs of demining may be higher. Experience from other countries shows that work delays caused by missed incidents often cost more than the demining services themselves, so trying to save money on demining services alone (e.g. for Sudan, by using the JIDUs as a government contribution) may be self-defeating.

Textbox 2 – Demining for Road & Rail Reconstruction: lessons from Mozambique

Roads – The National Administration for Roads (ANE) first encountered serious problems with landmine and UXO contamination during its Emergency Road Programme (1994-96). Under intense time pressure, it worked with UNDP and donors to make arrangements for stand-alone demining services – typically mechanical ‘treatment’ followed by survey and clearance – so as not to delay the work of the civil engineering firms selected as prime contractors for each rehabilitation project. This proved extremely unsatisfactory, as many explosive devices were missed, causing the road work to stop, with the ANE bearing the cost of delays.

As a result, ANE has developed a system whereby the prime contractor assumes complete responsibility for demining services. Tender documents make it clear that the bidders must include an accredited sub-contractor for demining. After the award of contract, the prime

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53 The GoNU has the legal right to provide an accreditation certificate, but it is unlikely that international insurance companies would recognise this as being IMAS compliant. Accreditation involves, in the main, assessing that all equipment is IMAS compliant, that all personnel (deminers; medics; etc.) are trained to IMAS standards, and that the organisation’s Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) are IMAS compliant. NMAC personnel have not yet developed the expertise required to conduct such an accreditation exercise, and it is not clear to the evaluation team that the JIDUs have even developed a complete set of SOP.

54 In most countries, the work by the demining operators would also be quality assured by the national MAC, which would still issue clearance certificates.
contractor is not allowed to mobilise the road works crews until the demining sub-contractor produces a certificate from the national mine action authority that the roads, bridges, gravel pits, and other worksites relating to the roads rehabilitation project have been cleared. Subsequently, any missed devices incidents are the responsibility of the prime contractor.

**Railways** – In contrast, the failure to integrate demining into reconstruction proved extremely costly in the case of the Sena railway line – a vital development initiative for Mozambique which, among other things, opens access to the large Moatize coal mine. The World Bank financed ($130 million) a major public-private project in which Mozambique’s state railway corporation (CFM) reconstructed the railway as a prelude to a major investment in rail stock by a consortium of Indian firms that would manage rail operations. Demining had been done by MineTech (1998) and RONCO (2001). When the World Bank conducted its environmental impact studies relating to the upgrading of the Sena line, it advised that clearance would be required to at least 15 metres from the centre line and, ideally, to 25 metres. However, the Bank did not incorporate funds for demining into its loan or the financing plan for the project, leaving this cost to be covered by CFM. CFM sought assistance from the U.S. State Department, which provided funding to Ronco to conduct demining again.

Unfortunately, once the rail reconstruction was completed, an employee of the Indian railway consortium was killed when he stepped on a landmine in a ‘cleared’ area. The Indian rail consortium demanded that the rail line be re-surveyed before resuming its work.

* In some cases, the ANE suspects that roads contractors planted mines themselves in order to justify work stoppages (i.e. they were delayed for other reasons, so created a “missed device incident” to justify a work stoppage and shift the cost of the delay onto ANE).


Apart from the problems that could arise on road reconstruction programmes, which are so vital to Sudan’s development prospects, having the JIDUs work outside of the scope of UNMAO could lead to a number of problems or lost opportunities, including:

- the loss of a single, definitive source of information on landmine and other ERW contamination and demining work;
- greater difficulty for national mine action authorities in establishing and enforcing the principle that all demining in Sudan shall be IMAS-compliant;
- lack of certainty on the part of development agencies and future investors concerning the safety of an area ‘cleared’, but not to IMAS standards;
- The need to demine some areas again at a future date to ensure the work has been done to IMAS-standards;
- the failure to recognise that the JIDUs have the capacity to work to international standards.

**PRIORITY SETTING**

The assignment of the JIDUs to the Babanusa-Wau Railway task is the clearest indication that differences are emerging between the priorities identified by the governments and by UNMAO.\(^55\) Joint priority-setting mechanisms have, in fact, been established in both the North and South,\(^56\) and these meet regularly. The governments compile priorities from the state governors, sector

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\(^55\) All parties recognized that the railway was an important task, but the governments gave priority to cost and speed rather than to IMAS compliance.

\(^56\) In the South, this is the Transport and Demining Steering Committee. The Committee is chaired by the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and comprises UN agencies, UNMIS, the Ministry of Transport and the SSDC.
ministries, etc. while UNMAO focuses on UNMIS priorities (peacekeeping forces, plus UNMIS humanitarian priorities).

There appears to be agreement on the majority of the task priorities, which is not surprising as the opening of major roads is viewed as an essential by both government and UN authorities. However, government authorities – particularly in the South – expressed some frustrations to the evaluation team. From the examples they cited, it appears there are two frustrations:

**Table 6 – Emerging frustrations regarding priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expressed Frustration</th>
<th>Underlying Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some tasks are demined even though these are far down on the SSDC list of priorities</td>
<td>These are tasks required by UNMIS peacekeeping forces. As almost half of all mine action funds are earmarked for demining support of UNMIS peacekeeping forces, these tasks are done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some tasks that the GoSS has indicated as development priorities do not get on the final list of demining priorities (e.g. irrigated agricultural land in Awil and a sugarcane plantation in Maloot)</td>
<td>The GoSS is not in a position to implement the development project in the current year, and UNMAO does not have multi-year plans so these tasks cannot be listed as priorities in future years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some cases, SSDC has approached one of the demining NGOs to undertake a task that the GoSS considers to be a development priority, but which UNMAO is unable to demine.

The problems arising from different priority ‘orderings’ for UNMAO and government authorities appears to be modest at the present time, suggesting (i) that many tasks are common priorities and (ii) that the regular meetings between government authorities and UNMAO are effective in maintaining cordial relations. However, the divergence between UNMIS and national priorities is likely to increase over time:

- as local authorities launch additional development initiatives that do not overlap with UNMIS security or humanitarian mandates; and
- as the most obvious common priorities (primary roads, etc.) are addressed.

**Figure 2 – Diverging priorities?**
UNMAO has effective mechanisms for funding and QA of its priorities (which include the common priorities). However, a solution is not yet in place for funding and QA of those GoNU/GoSS priorities which are not shared by UNMAO.
ANALYSIS OF THE UNDP PROJECT

KEY RELATIONSHIPS

UNDP IN SUDAN

UNDP plays a number of roles (i) within UNMIS, (ii) as a UN agency with long-standing involvement in Sudan (which will continue after the UNMIS mandate ends), and (iii) as the lead among UN agencies with respect to a number of programming areas that are critical in Sudan, such as capacity development, governance, and ‘early recovery’.

Within UNMIS, one of the two Deputy Special Representatives to the Secretary General (DSRSG) combines humanitarian and development functions by uniting the functions of UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative with those of Humanitarian Coordinator. The intent is to coordinate all multilateral aid to Sudan through the DSRSG for Development and Humanitarian Affairs. However, the DSRSG then must manage a huge amount of humanitarian aid while, at the same time, gradually introducing development assistance.

The UNDP also serves as the administrator of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and, as such, must provide financial management and operational services to the Humanitarian Coordinator, other UN agencies, and donors. This has been a significant burden given the amount of humanitarian activity in Sudan and, unsurprisingly, affects the level of administrative support available to smaller programmes, such as the support to capacity development for mine action.

Outside the UNMIS mandate, until last year the legal basis for UNDP work was its Country Cooperation Framework: 2002-2006 (CCF). However, the signing of the CPA, the establishment of UNMIS, and the massive international assistance ($4.5 billion) pledged at the Oslo Donors Conference made it necessary to make substantial revisions to the CCF. This was accomplished by means of a Bridging Programme for 2007-2008, with three broad programme areas:

1. Fostering Democratic Governance and Rule of Law
2. Promote Human Security and Recovery
3. Human Poverty reduction and progress towards the MDGs

Mine action falls under Human Security and Recovery, along with (in the human security ‘cluster’) Security Sector Reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); Community Security; and (under recovery) livelihood restoration; sustainable natural resource management; and capacity building for conflict resolution. Human security is an appropriate cluster for mine action, which has links both to the other human security programmes and to recovery (e.g. the large Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme – RRP – which is managed by UNDP). The senior UNDP personnel responsible for Human Security and Recovery programming appear to be well informed concerning mine action and its importance in Sudan (including its contributions to peace-building in advance of the CPA).

In its role as the lead UN agency in early recovery situations, the UNDP is taking a lead role in the development of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2009-12. This work is well advanced, and is organized around four themes:

- Peace-building;

57 There are also cross-cutting issues: capacity development; gender; environment; HIV/AIDS; and conflict transformation/prevention.
• Governance, rule of law, and capacity building;
• Livelihoods and productive sectors; and
• Basic services.

Mine Action is being addressed under the peace-building theme, along with DDR. This appears reasonable, although some attention will need to be given to ensure that appropriate links are forged with the livelihoods thematic group, as the focus of mine action will shift over time to livelihoods support in remote communities.

UNDP has provided just over $987,000 from its Mine Action Thematic Trust Fund for its mine action project in Sudan. 58

UNMAO, UNDP, AND OTHER UN AGENCIES

In a number of earlier situations where the UN has been called upon to mount a major peacekeeping mission, there have been coordination difficulties among the various UN agencies that play a role in mine action. The UN has attempted to overcome such problems via a UN Inter-Agency Policy (Mine Action and Effective Coordination) and Strategy (United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010). 59 Building on the policy, the UN established an integrated mine action office – UNMAO – as part of UNMIS to bring the three components of the mine action programme in Sudan (Emergency Mine Action, Support to Peacekeeping Operations, and Capacity Building) under one UN coordination body. UNMAO is led by UNMAS and incorporates technical advisors from UNDP and UNICEF. At various times, WFP and UNHCR have engaged mine action advisors to liaise with UNMAO.

UNMAS plays the central role within UNMAO. It fields the UNMAO Director (in Khartoum) and the Deputy Director (based in Juba). 60 The bulk of funding for mine action in Sudan is channelled through UNMAO for support of UNMIS forces (financed by the DPKO assessed budget for peacekeeping) and the UNMIS humanitarian mandate (financed principally by the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action). UNMAO takes the lead in preparing annual mine action plans and in implementing those plans (largely via contracts with demining firms and NGOs). It also provides coordination services 61 with:

• international mine action NGOs for their work that is funded directly by donors or other UN agencies (e.g. UNHCR)
• firms or NGOs providing demining services in support of the WFP road rehabilitation programme
• government mine action organs

UNMAO is also the de facto authority in Sudan with respect to quality management, including the accreditation of operators and quality assurance of demining operations. 62 In addition, UNMAO maintains the mine action information management system.

Both UNDP and UNICEF have technical advisors housed in UNMAO Khartoum responsible for

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58 UNDP Sudan Strategic Framework for the Bridging Programme: 2007-08, p. 17.
59 The Policy outlines common ‘positions’ and the specific roles and responsibilities of the various agencies. The Strategy provides the overall goal and four strategic objectives, together with the activities to achieve these objectives and performance indicators.
60 Technically, UNMAO personnel are contracted by UNOPS on behalf of UNMAO.
61 Principally, these relate to information exchange rather than direction, and seem to work well.
62 For QA, UNMAO focuses on the firms and NGOs that it has contracted (via UNOPS) rather than the international NGOs working with direct funding from bilateral donors, UNHCR, etc.
capacity development and MRE respectively. UNDP also has an international advisor based at the SSDC, who also spends time at UNDP and the UNMAO office in Juba,\(^{63}\) while UNMAS has engaged regional MRE Coordinators for both the North and South, whose work is coordinated by the UNICEF MRE officer.

UNDP has also engaged an advisor for victim assistance,\(^{64}\) who is housed at UNMAO, Khartoum. This work is supported by a grant from the Japanese-funded UN Human Security Trust Fund (which also covers some of the MRE costs).

Neither the WFP or UNHCR have personnel housed within UNMAO to facilitate coordination of mine action support to their respective programmes. Coordination between UNMAO/UNMAS and WFP has apparently been good when the WFP has had a mine action advisor on staff, but problematic at other times (see textbox). Apparently, coordination with UNHCR has been adequate since 2006 when it engaged DDG for MRE, survey, and EOD tasks – essentially, DDG serves as the link between UNHCR and UNMAO.\(^{65}\)

**Textbox 3 – Demining roads in emergencies**

Sudan is an excellent example of the tensions that arise concerning the demining of roads in the immediate post-conflict period. Peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies, as well as residents and returning refugees, need road access as quickly as possible. The standard practice that has evolved since the early 1990s is to engage specialised assets\(^*\) to conduct rapid verification surveys (i.e. to verify whether there is a risk of contamination) and, where necessary, demining of road surfaces – in Sudan’s case, to a width of eight metres. If a danger area (DA) is encountered, it is ‘breeched’ rather than entirely cleared.

However, the rehabilitation/reconstruction of roads and bridges requires demining of much wider areas (typically, 25-35 metres from the centre line) to allow safe access for construction equipment and personnel. As road rehabilitation for bulk delivery of food and other humanitarian aid often begins shortly after the cessation of hostilities, it is important to coordinate all verification and demining work on roads to prevent needless duplication of effort. As well, it is critical that all DAs encountered during the verification/demining of road surfaces be marked and accurately recorded, so these data are available to subsequent road rehabilitation/reconstruction projects.

\* There is no IMAS that explicitly covers the survey and clearance of roads and other infrastructure networks (‘linear’ rather than ‘area’ demining), and there is no agreement on what type of assets and procedures are most suitable in different situations. Typically, various mechanical devices and vehicle-based survey assets are employed, including Remote Explosive Scent Tracing (REST), wide-area detection systems (WADS), etc. These are expensive and require sophisticated quality management and logistical support systems. Because of this, international firms or NGOs are engaged to import the specialised assets and carry-out the work, often with little concern over developing sustainable local capacities as such sophisticated capacities are difficult to develop and may not be required for the long-term.

It is unsurprising that the creation of UNMAO has not fully eliminated tensions among UN agencies involved in mine action, or even among those agencies with personnel working within UNMAO. The various agencies have different mandates, partners/clients, planning horizons, and so on. On paper, there is an inter-agency steering committee chaired by the SRSG\(^{66}\) to resolve

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\(^{63}\) This position was vacant at the time of the evaluation mission.

\(^{64}\) Again, this individual has been contracted via UNOPS.


\(^{66}\) The Director of Mine Action provides Secretariat services, and other members are UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, the Deputy SRSG, the UNMIS Director of Administration, and the Force Commander.
tensions that invariably arise, but this has not met in over a year. However, the government/UN/donor Steering Committee recently convened by the Secretary General of the NMAA to initiate the transition planning process may overcome this deficiency.

UNMAS commissioned an evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Sudan in early 2007. (The report is not in the public domain but a copy of it was made available to the evaluation team on a confidential basis.) The relevant conclusions and recommendations are discussed in the next section.

MINE ACTION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

THE UNDP ROLE

In line with the UN Inter-Agency Policy, UNDP is the lead agency for national capacity building within UNMAO. Its principal goal is to support the development of national mine action capacity to coordinate and implement all mine action related activities to address the humanitarian and development challenges in the Sudan in the long term. To achieve this goal, this project provides management and technical support to the concerned national mine action authorities to enable them to establish an institutional framework (legislation, standards, organs, etc.), with a network of decentralized organizational structures across the country, capable of coordinating, planning, prioritizing, quality manage, monitoring and implementing all aspects of mine action in Sudan in line with international standards.

UNDP also works with NMAA, NMAC, SSDC and other government bodies to include mine action into the broader development agenda. It has also provided support to government authorities and civil society organizations to ensure that landmine survivors are provided with rehabilitation and reintegration services.

Under the overall supervision of the UNDP Sudan Country Director, the project uses the Direct Execution (DEX) modality, managed by the UNDP Senior Technical Advisor for Mine Action within the UNDP Human Security and Recovery Unit. UNDP also has an international Technical Advisor based in Juba and two Senior National Officers, one based in Khartoum and one based in Juba. Under DEX rules, the project management team is responsible for ensuring the application of the UNDP guidelines (programme, finance, and personnel) and related policies. The project team also coordinates activities with the New York based UNDP/BCPR mine action team and with other components of UNMAO.

The line ministry responsible for this project within the GoNU is the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, with most matters handled by the secretariat of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA). Within the GoSS, the Office of Presidential Affairs is the responsible department. The key implementing partners/counterparts of this project are the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC).

UNDP plans for mine action capacity development envisaged the following sequence:

1. Getting the basic legislative framework in place to establish the national organs (i.e. mine action authorities and centres) and policy;
2. Getting the national organs housed, staffed and equipped, and training managers in their basic functions;
3. Supporting the development of operational capacities (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.).

Adapted from UNDP Mine Action Capacity Development Presentation, October 2007.
The principal achievements in the realm of capacity development are:

- Establishment of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and National Mine Action Centre (NMAC, as well as the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC);
- Incorporation of mine action in the GoNU and GoSS budgets;
- Establishment of the head offices of NMAC and SSDC and six field offices, with defined organizational structures, offices, equipment (vehicles, computers, and furniture);
- Training about 45 staff members of NMAC and SSDC in middle management (in Amman, Jordan) and eight senior national staff members in senior management (at James Madison University, USA);
- Two mine action exchange missions (Jordan, Bosnia and Herzegovina) with the participation of two State Ministers to review issues related to legislative and institutional frameworks; planning and prioritization processes; quality assurance; national coordination mechanisms; the ‘tool box’ of mine action assets; donor relations/resources mobilization; and transition from UN management to national management);
- Participation of GoNU and GoSS officials in several official key mine action meetings/workshops including the States Parties Meetings, and Inter-sessional Committees Meetings from 2004-07;
- Training and field deployment of 133 national deminers (JIDUs), plus 17 from OSIL (a local NGO);
- Preparation of a draft Mine Action Law at the level of the GoNU;
- Establishment of a facility to support community level micro-projects for the rehabilitation and socio economic re-integration of landmine victims/survivors (part of a joint UNDP, UNMAS, and UNICEF project financed by the Human Security Trust Fund).

UNDP has also provided technical assistance to the National Authority on Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) in resource mobilisation and in meeting Sudan’s obligations under the Nairobi Action Plan.

Two points should be highlighted. First, the UNDP project team facilitated, but did not finance from its budget, most of the training, study tours, and participation at international mine action events. The UNDP project has had a modest budget, most of which has been spent on the project team (TAs plus two national programme officers) and procurement of vehicles, computers, and furnishings for the NMAC and SSDC offices and sub-offices. Second, the pace of capacity development accelerated after the establishment of the NMAC and SSDC and the adoption of the National Mine Action Strategic Framework in August 2006.

THE UNMAS ROLE

One of the principal responsibilities falling to UNMAO is support to capacity development. UNMAS is the lead agency within UNMAO and so bears some responsibility even though (in line with the UN Inter-Agency Policy) UNDP has the lead role for supporting capacity development.

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68 It is local authorities, organizations, and individuals who develop capacity – agencies such as the UNDP can only support local actors in their capacity development efforts. As such, it is difficult to attribute capacity development outcomes – good or bad – to the supporting agency.

69 This list is derived from the Terms of Reference.

70 Less than $2 million for the period 2004-06. The budget for 2007 was $4.7 million, but only $2.1 million was received or pledged.
The UNMAS evaluation took place in early 2007. It concluded that capacity development was the biggest weakness in the programme and recommended that the UNDP TAs should work within the UNMAO structure and have ‘a reporting line’ to the Director of Mine Action or to the appropriate senior manager within the UNMAO. Subsequently, UNDP-Sudan senior management wrote to express concerns with the UNMAS evaluation, including that:

- senior management of the UNDP Country Office was not officially informed about the evaluation, nor consulted during the exercise;
- the UNMAS evaluation team did not consult with senior officials of the GoNU government;
- the report was not officially shared with senior management of the UNDP Country Office or with senior national mine action authorities for comments/feedback; and
- the report makes recommendations that are not in line with the mandates and policies of individual UN agencies (e.g. having UNDP TAs reporting to the UNMAS Director of Mine Action within UNMAO).

This skirmish appears to be part of a wider controversy within the UN system concerning how best to achieve what some have termed a ‘joined-up approach’ in peacekeeping situations (see textbox).

Textbox 4 – Mine Action: ‘unified’ or ‘integrated’

Following the establishment of UNMIS by Security Council Resolution 1590, the UN prepared the Sudan Unified Mission Plan, which contained the following principles to govern the unified approach of the UN system in Sudan:

1. One shared objective
2. Common assumptions and parameters
3. Responsibility to consult
4. Responsibility to collaborate
5. Responsibility to maximize shared resources
6. Common decision making

(p. 13)

At the same time, the Plan emphasised that ...the actual peace support operation will not physically absorb the agencies, funds, and programmes organized in the UN Country Team (p. 12). This echoes the following statement in the 31 January 2005 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, which led to Security Council Resolution 1590:

This unified approach would not alter the traditional relationship between the mission’s activities and the work of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Such bodies would continue to implement their respective mandates in the Sudan within an overall and agreed framework developed under the leadership of my Special Representative. A clear distinction would be maintained between the coordinating role of the mission and the implementation responsibilities of agencies, funds and programmes. (S/2005/57, p. 10)

Thus, the ‘unified mission’ does not imply a unified command-and-control structure but rather a common approach based on a shared objective, common assumptions (e.g. on needs), and common decision-making.

More recently, the ‘capstone’ document on UN Peacekeeping Operations states that ...integrated planning allows the United Nations system to maximize the impact of its engagement in countries emerging from conflict by ensuring that its activities are guided by a common strategic vision. However, integration does not mean that all United Nations actors on the ground should be physically integrated or subsumed under a single structure. Moreover, while the members of the
UNCT come under the overall authority of the SRSG/HOM, in reality, they are governed by mandates, decisionmaking structures and funding arrangements that are quite distinct from those of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. As a result, integration among the members of the broader United Nations family cannot simply be imposed by edict from above, and can only be achieved through a constant process of dialogue and negotiation between the actors concerned. UN DPKO, Jan 2008, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, p. 43)

A distinction between ‘unified’ and ‘integrated’ also appears to have evolved within the UN system in Sudan. The Evaluation Team has not come across any reference that clarifies the distinction in definitive terms, but – in practice – the distinctions seem to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unified</th>
<th>Integrated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command-and-control</strong></td>
<td>Staff appointed by UN agencies to a unified office still report to line managers within their parent agencies, but coordinate activities within the unified office/programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource mobilization</strong></td>
<td>Resources are mobilized separately by each UN agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong></td>
<td>Each UN agency represented in a unified office reports directly to its donors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DDR programme has been managed as an integrated programme by the Integrated UN DDR Unit. This programme has been criticised for slow progress caused, in part, by disagreements among the participating UN agencies on the appropriate strategy. For example: …tensions emerged between the DPKO and UNDP over the best way forward. The UNMIS DPKO contingent endorsed the conventional top-down approach prescribed by the CPA. UNDP – together with a number of local organisations – advocated for an alternative model that… emphasised local and participatory approaches to defining ‘community security needs’, and supported ‘development’ incentives in exchange for voluntary disarmament. UN policy makers and practitioners admit that, despite their best intentions, very little has been achieved over the past two years… (Robert Muggah, Great expectations: (dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti, Humanitarian Practice Network, www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2878)

Of course, one should not conclude that the difficulties experienced in the DDR effort, which has its own unique challenges, implies that an integrated approach should not be adopted for Mine Action. Indeed, in September 2005, the Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan stated: In addition to general coordination between the UNMIS military component, United Nations agencies and national and local authorities, the United Nations Mine Action Office, in cooperation with UNDP, facilitated dialogue between the two national mine action authorities to ensure continuation of the integrated and unified mine action programme in the Sudan and long-term capacity-building. (S/2005/579, 12 September 2005, p. 14 – emphasis added.) In this context however, the phrase ‘integrated and unified mine action programme’ appears to refer to the ‘one country’ approach agreed for Sudan’s mine action programme as far back as the initial Mine Action Strategic Framework and Policy Framework adopted in 2004.

However, the problems experienced by the UN DDR programme do suggest that an integrated approach does not, by itself, overcome deep-rooted differences between agencies concerning the correct strategy. As well, it is unclear that the mine action programme has fully adhered to the principles outlined in the unified mission plan. The most obvious problem has been the failure to hold regular meetings of the Steering Committee for UN Mine Action, chaired by the DSRSG. This would be the obvious mechanism for implementing ‘common decision-making’.

More generally, a means has to be found to address the underlying tension in strategic approach
between DPKO units (whose mandate stems from the time-bound peacekeeping mission) and agencies such as UNDP, which have long-term development mandates. The obvious means to grapple with these differences in planning horizons is a multi-year plan – one with a duration long enough to incorporate both the developmental objectives (including capacity development) and the shorter-term requirements of the mission. Crafting a multi-year plan is not an easy task, but in the absence of such a plan it is hard to see how either a unified or an integrated programme will achieve short-term requirements while at the same time promoting long-term development.

Concerns over progress have also been expressed by the governments of Sudan. These, however, have been discussed in the context of the ‘transitional plan’ which was specified as a goal in the Mine Action Strategic Framework, to be developed and endorsed by December 2006.

Of course, ‘transition’ and ‘capacity development’ are complementary and, in the case at hand, should be seen as two sides of the same coin – the successful transfer of any responsibility from the UN to national actors is predicated on the capacity of national actors to discharge that responsibility. But at the same time, ‘transition’ and ‘capacity development’ are not precisely the same thing, and it is important to maintain the distinction to avoid confusion. For example:

- there are UNMAO responsibilities that will not be transferred to national authorities – most obviously, mine action support to UNMIS;
- national authorities already have many capacities relating to mine action that UNMAO does not have and cannot transfer, such as:
  - status as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention;
  - ‘organic’ connections with other government departments and levels (states, etc.) to facilitate the incorporation of mine action within development plans;
  - access to the public treasury via annual and supplemental budget processes.

As well, although both ‘transition’ and ‘capacity development’ should be seen as joint responsibilities of UNMAO and the Sudanese governments, UNMAO will be taking the lead role in formulating the transitions plan while responsibility for capacity development planning rests first-and-foremost with the governments.

ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION NGOs IN CAPACITY BUILDING

In addition to the mine action services they provide, international NGOs have played a significant role in supporting the development of local capacities for mine action. As in most mine-affected countries, this is most obvious at the level of individual capacities – hundreds of Sudanese are trained and are working as deminers, medics, team leaders, MRE instructors, etc.

Support from INGOs in the development of capable local organisations has been somewhat less successful. Local NGOs such as JASMAR, FPDO, and OSIL are playing significant roles in MRE, victim assistance, and in conducting the Landmine Impact Survey. But for demining – where the technical and financial demands are far greater – progress has been slower (again, this is consistent with the experience in other mine-affected countries). Regardless, some INGOs seem committed to supporting the capacities of their local NGO partners for demining.

In a number of mine-affected countries (BiH, Cambodia, Ethiopia), NPA has taken the strategic

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72 We have no view on whether this should be the norm. But in the case of Sudan it seems appropriate. UNMAO has responsibilities to support UNMIS that it cannot transfer to national authorities, so will need to plan and manage the transition in such a way to protect its own capacity to discharge those responsibilities.
choice to support the capacities of national mine action centres. NPA has stated its interest in playing a similar role in Sudan – for example, it would be willing to second some of its most experienced local staff to a Southern Sudan MAC once one is created.73

UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN SUPPORTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

The report from the evaluation commissioned by UNMAS in early 2007 concluded that capacity development was the biggest weakness of the mine action programme in Sudan and recommended that the UNDP TAs should have a ‘reporting line’ to the Director of Mine Action in UNMAO. This suggests the UNDP TAs should answer to, and take direction from, the UNMAO Director for at least some of their responsibilities. The report did not, however, specify precisely how responsibilities should be split between UNMAO and the UNDP Country Office.

It is unclear that such a shift in reporting relationships is either necessary or warranted to promote mine action capacity development in Sudan. First, most of the people met on our mission stated that (i) mine action has made much greater progress than other programmes such as DDR, and (ii) progress in capacity development has accelerated since mid-2006, when the NMAC and SSDC were formally established.

More fundamentally, the principal responsibility for capacity development lies with national authorities and not with UN agencies, which can only advise on the capacities required and the strategies for developing these, and then support what Sudanese governments and mine action officials have determined they will do. Thus, the unique role for UNDP assistance should be in advising and supporting Sudanese governments and mine action officials in the development and implementation of their capacity development plans for mine action. In this role, the UNDP has a number of comparative advantages vis-à-vis UNMAS, including:

- long-term relationship – local capacities are needed for the long term challenge of addressing Sudan’s explosives contamination problem. UNDP has a long-term relationship with the governments of Sudan, whereas the UNMAS involvement stems from the UNMIS mandate, which will expire in 2011;
- development mandate – while mine action is in Sudan is now supporting humanitarian and peacekeeping programmes, it will shift to a development focus over time (see textbox). UNDP has a development mandate, whereas UNMAS does not;
- lack of a mandate to support UNMIS operations – there are unavoidable tensions arising between UNMAS (which has a distinct operational mandate from the Security Council) and the Sudanese governments, which want to allocate resources to their own priorities. UNDP does not have a mandate to undertake mine action operations and can focus on advice and support to Sudanese governments in their capacity development efforts;
- good relationship with governments – By all accounts, the UNDP mine action team has established very good relations with both the GoNU and GoSS authorities;
- the ability of the UNDP STA to function in Arabic – this has been important in dealings with the GoNU.

73 NPA does not consider the SSDC to be a MAC and believes – correctly in the view of the Evaluation Team – that a MAC should be distinct from the authority.
74 UNMAS can, of course, provide mine action services in support of development (rather than peacekeeping or humanitarian) activities. However, UNDP’s core mandate is development its mine action activities follow from this. The reverse is true with UNMAS, where the core mandate is mine action.
Textbox 5 – The Mine Action Programme Life Cycle

**Transitions from conflict** – Countries that are successful in recovering from internal conflict go through a number of transitions, from conflict through post-conflict stabilisation (including, in some cases, peacekeeping and internationally-supervised elections), reconstruction on a ‘campaign’ basis and, finally, to traditional development.

This description of the recovery is a stylised one as the transition from conflict to development is uncertain, prone to reversals, and may evolve differently in various parts of the country. But the dynamics of such transitions is significant for mine action programmes. In particular:

- the country’s political and socio-economic environment will evolve, often quite rapidly
- the size and importance of the different international assistance programmes – humanitarian, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and development – will evolve over time and, because of this…
- the international actors present in the country, their primary objectives, and their relative powers to influence the development agenda will also evolve.

**The mine action programme life cycle** – The principal outputs of mine action (safe land; people aware of the dangers posed by landmines; etc.) are simply means to an end. Therefore, mine action should focus most of its resources in support of the most strategically important efforts underway in the country at any point in time. Thus, mine action priorities should shift from a humanitarian focus, through support for internal security/peacekeeping operations, then support to the priority reconstruction programme, and finally alignment with ‘normal’ development priorities. Typically these will be relative shifts over time rather than abrupt changes and there will be periods when mine action is supporting multiple objectives.

When broken down in this manner, the pattern of mine action expenditures over time in a country might appear as depicted below.

![Mine Action Programme Life Cycle Diagram](image-url)
objectives at national, regional, and community levels.

Some of the main implications for mine action managers are summarised in the table below. This aims to describe general trends, but the specific circumstances of individual countries will lead to variances (sometimes substantial) from this picture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need/Type of programming</th>
<th>Key actors</th>
<th>Likely degree of coordination</th>
<th>Typical challenges for mine action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Humanitarian             | • UN agencies  
                           • Red Cross  
                           • INGOs      | Low                           | Dealing with many agencies which may disagree on priorities + strategies in a complex, rapidly changing environment. |
| Internal security        | • UN agencies  
                           • Peace-keeping forces | High                          | • Balancing military, humanitarian, reconstruction priorities  
                           • Security of staff  
                           • Cooperation with militaries |
| Reconstruction           | • World Bank + regional DB  
                           • Major donors (showcase projects) | Fairly high                   | • Large scale demining tasks under tight deadlines in support of major re-construction projects  
                           • Ensuring funds for demining are included in reconstruction projects. |
| Development              | • Government  
                           • World Bank + regional DB  
                           • Lead donors in each sector | High if government committed + capable  
                           Low if government capable but not committed  
                           Medium otherwise | • Coordinating with many local, provincial, + national officials on task priorities  
                           • With committed governments, coordination with key budget + planning units to ensure adequate priority for mine action  
                           • Without committed government, coordination with donors |

**Implications** – When developing their strategic plans, mine action managers need to be aware that their principal challenges and partners may well be different in five years’ time. They need to anticipate what changes are likely and determine what steps they need to take today so the programme is well positioned to meet tomorrow’s priorities.

* Post-conflict reconstruction programmes are often organised on a ‘campaign’ basis to unify command-and-control and to pool resources, rather than through the normal work procedures of donors and the local government.

CONCLUSIONS

Mine action has made important contributions to broader processes and programmes in Sudan, including:

- Peace-building in the lead-up to the CPA and in its aftermath;
- The return of displaced peoples and the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- The restoration of internal security and the expansion of secure areas.

Mine action has been an important point of entry for constructive engagement by the international community in Sudan.

Mine action is one of the fields in which the GoNU and GoSS cooperate most effectively with one another, and with the international community.

In most areas of Sudan, contamination is a modest problem, but the fear of landmines remains a significant constraint to recovery and development efforts.

UNMAO has established an effective programme in a very challenging environment.

International NGOs have also established significant mine action capacities within Sudan.

Cooperation among mine action actors is generally good, and has been improving.

Both Sudanese governments have made significant moves towards establishing national capacities to coordinate and implement mine action programmes.

There is no clear vision of the future make-up and workings of the mine action programme in Sudan (i.e. post-UNMIS).

There is no long term plan in place that clarifies what type of mine action capacities will be required following the departure of UNMIS, and how to build those capacities.

The direct operational mandate of UNMAO could complicate the full development of national capacities for planning, coordination, and quality management.

Specific irritants have emerged which, if unaddressed, could further complicate the relations between UNMAO and the national authorities and their ability to formulate a common vision and long-term strategy.

The fact that the JIDUs are engaging in demining for infrastructure reconstruction without being accredited in a manner compliant with IMAS could have serious repercussions for the major infrastructure projects to be funded by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which would, in turn, seriously delay development in much of the country.

UNDP assistance has helped the Sudanese governments to put in place the basic building blocks of a national mine action programme, with (for the most part) a sound institutional and organisational make-up.

UNMAO partners have provided significant training for the staffs of the national mine action organs, but these personnel must be given the opportunity to apply what they have learned,
particularly in discharging the core functions of mine action centres – quality management
(national standards, accreditation, quality assurance/control); operations planning and
tasking/contracting; information management.

UNDP has not yet focussed sufficient attention on helping Sudanese authorities to formulate their
own strategic plans based on:
  • a clear assessment of the likely mine action needs following the departure of UNMIS,
    and
  • clear decisions on the strategy for developing the national capacities that will be required
to meet those needs.

The UNDP country management team appears to recognise the contributions made by mine
action, the continuing need for mine action in Sudan, and the requirement for continued UNDP
efforts to assist national authorities in developing the capacities needed to plan and manage a
national programme.

There appears to be insufficient attention to the need to involve donors in the process of
formulating a common strategy for mine action in Sudan.
THE WAY FORWARD

THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC PLAN AND PLANNING PROCESS

There is an urgent need for a long-term strategic plan for mine action in Sudan that addresses what will be required after the departure of UNMIS. Such a plan should be developed by the governments with the assistance of UNMAO and, in particular, the UNDP. To be meaningful, such a strategy needs to be endorsed by all main stakeholders (UN agencies; donors; INGOs; national operators) and to be consistent with the transition plan for transferring responsibilities from UNMAO to national authorities and centres.

DEFINING AND AGREEING UPON FUTURE NEEDS

A commonly endorsed strategic plan must be based on a needs assessment that is accepted by all stakeholders. Therefore, the starting point in the planning process is a thorough discussion of the explosives contamination problems that Sudanese authorities are likely to face following the UNMIS mandate. The various survey processes are sufficiently advanced to provide a reasonable assessment of Sudan’s explosives contamination problem. As well, UNMAO has the capacity to prepare a reasonably accurate forecast of the progress that will be achieved in the coming years and, therefore, the contamination that will remain after mid-2011. In broad terms, UNMAO believes it will:

- open all roads for use;
- mitigate contamination in all communities with high- or medium-impacted LIS scores;
- clear 90% of the DAs along roads.

Textbox 6 – Essential features of strategic plans for mine action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential features of strategic plans for mine action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The logic underpinning the plan is how to achieve a desired outcome in the future rather than a forecast of what will be achieved given the current structure and momentum of the programme (although such a forecast will be necessary to assess what changes to the programme will be required to achieve the desired outcome)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In focusing on the future outcome, the plan addresses not only the internal dynamics of the programme, but also on the broader political, social, and economic features that will make the future different than today;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The plan incorporates ‘hard decisions’ – in this case for example, there will be a number of alternative strategies for developing the local capacities to plan and implement the continuing mine action programme, and the strategy should be clear that certain alternatives will be supported, while others are not;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The plan addresses a number of inter-related decisions in an integrated fashion so it is internally consistent – for example, there must be internal consistency among (i) the set of mine action problems/needs, (ii) the planned operational capacities to meet those diverse needs, and (iii) the mechanisms to coordinate and monitor the operators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To provide an adequate basis for a strategic plan, forecasts must be made not only of the extent of the likely contamination that will remain in 2011, but also of:

- its nature (e.g. minefields; scattered landmines; UXO; AXO; etc.);
- location (including whether it is accessible or remote);
• socio-economic impacts (including whether it is a current problem or whether it will become a problem in the future); and
• reconstruction and development programmes that may be constrained by explosives contamination and which, therefore, will require mine action support.

As well, provision must be made for the fact that surveys are dependent largely on information from local residents, and that the contamination picture will remain incomplete in areas where the population has not returned and resumed their livelihoods. In addition, as communities grow and prosper, their economic footprints will expand, which may bring residents into contact with previously unknown contamination hazards. Thus, new reports of contamination hazards will emerge over time, and this needs to be considered when determining future capacity requirements.

AGREEING ON CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS

The needs assessment will then provide a basis for discussions concerning:

• **What capacities?** The types and quantities of assets and skills that will be required to address the different categories of contamination;
• **Capacities for whom?** The types of mine action organisations (military, police, non-uniformed public sector, NGO, commercial) that should house the capacities, and;
• **How to coordinate the capacities?** How those assets will be coordinated and monitored/quality assured.

The current UNMAO ‘business model’ is based on commercial contracting of assets over a specified period, with the assets then being assigned to specific tasks by UNMAO. For this model to be fully effective, independent monitoring is required of both the quality and productivity of the various demining operators. There are alternative business models that may be more appropriate for different types of contamination. For example:

• normally, demining support for major reconstruction of infrastructure networks (roads, power lines, etc.) is best managed by making the prime contractor responsible for the demining (i.e. by sub-contracting an accredited demining operator and assuming responsibility for that operator’s work);
• normally, demining of small tasks in remote locations cannot be monitored effectively by mine action centres (particularly when EOD teams respond to community requests), so is best delivered by accredited government or NGO operators with a public service (rather than a commercial) mandate 75 (the international demining NGOs are already operating on this basis with respect to EOD tasks);
• mine action support for small-scale reconstruction and development work appears to be best managed by having the development NGOs or programmes coordinate the mine action operators (as appears to be the case for the two RRP consortia that incorporate mine action); 76

75 The essential issue is that the funding arrangements should not be based principally on the completion of specific tasks, which strengthens incentives to maximize productivity but also to cut corners, misreport achievements, and conduct unnecessary clearance.
76 A problem that has been experienced with such arrangements in other countries is that the development organisations are risk-averse and may demand clearance of areas that probably do not contain explosive contamination – better, however, to sacrifice some demining efficiency rather than developmental effectiveness.
• mine action in support for commercial projects (oil drilling; oil and gas pipelines; mining; commercial farming; etc.) is best managed by having the investor engage specialised demining firms. These firms should, however, be accredited by national authorities and be required to report on hazards discovered, survey and clearance work completed, etc.

Thus, there are alternative approaches for developing the needed demining capacities (which could be commercial; civilian public sector; defence and/or police forces; local NGOs; international NGOs), and for coordinating the demining organisations (e.g. central tasking with fixed-price contracting, cost-plus contracting, or straightforward grants; community-based planning and priority-setting; rapid response by decentralised operators, etc.). Each alternative has strengths and weaknesses, which need to be assessed relative to the challenges inherent in the different types of demining tasks (e.g. for infrastructure; large minefields; remote, small tasks; etc.). Thus, a core element of the strategic plan will be the identification of what types of capacities should be developed, within which kind of organisations. Implicitly, this means decisions on which capacities/organisations should not be supported.

Textbox 7 – Lessons learnt or dogma: the basic structure of a mine action programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ever since the 1997 report on building indigenous mine action capacities,* the international mine action community has advocated the following basic structure for the key organs of a national mine action programme:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• an inter-ministerial committee to function as the national mine action authority, responsible for broad policy and oversight (reporting through a designated minister to the government as a whole)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• a national mine action centre responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring operations, and for quality management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• independent operators – public service units, firms, NGOs, etc. that are independent of either the authority or the MAC and which provide the actual mine action services (demining, MRE, survivor assistance).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are these recommendations backed by evidence? Not all are. Some of the most effective national mine action programmes in the world have the operational mine action capacities incorporated into the national mine action centre (e.g. EMAO in Ethiopia; YEMAC in Yemen). However, the failure to put in place an effective inter-ministerial committee to function as the national mine action authority and to hold the MAC to account for performance appears to be a recipe for performance problems, even if operators are independent of the MAC (e.g. Angola and Mozambique, where there is no effective national authority for mine action).

** Unfortunately, the Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Sudan has this muddled, conflating the cabinet with the national mine action authority (and calling this a ‘governing council’) and then having a ‘national regulatory authority’ responsible for the typical MAC functions. See especially Annex III.

A MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK

The strategic plan should be formulated by the Sudanese governments with the support of UNMAO partners and in consultation with other key stakeholders (donors, international demining NGOs, etc.), as the Sudanese governments will be seeking the support of these stakeholders in achieving the planned outcomes. At the end of the process, the strategic plan should be endorsed by all stakeholders wishing to remain active in mine action in Sudan. The agreed contributions from, and roles to be played by each stakeholder should be clearly noted.
The last essential element of the strategic planning process is agreement on a monitoring and evaluation (M & E) framework that will:

- monitor progress towards the achievement of planned results;
- monitor the extent to which different stakeholders have delivered on their agreed contributions to the strategic plan (i.e. a mutual accountability framework);
- monitor whether the critical assumptions on which the strategic plan is based are holding true – should it become clear that a critical assumption is untrue, the plan will need to be modified or abandoned.

### PLANS-STRATEGIC, CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSITION

Objective #6 of the Strategic Framework specifies that UNMAO and the NMAA shall jointly develop, endorse, and implement a transitional plan to facilitate the transition of mine action management from the UN to the national mine action authorities. Subsequent to the evaluation mission, UNMAS has engaged an officer responsible for transition planning. Meanwhile, the report from the recent evaluation commissioned by UNMAS recommended that **UNMAS, UNDP** and **UNICEF** need to make a concerted effort to address the issue of capacity building and to develop a joint plan with planned activities, milestones and outputs that is commensurate with the residual mine problem in the country in 2011. (p. 44)

Thus, there are existing recommendations to formulate a ‘transitional plan’ and a ‘capacity building plan’, while we are recommending a ‘strategic plan’ for the national mine action programme. What are the differences?

We see the central need is for the governments of Sudan to put forward a strategic plan – that is, a clear vision of what mine action will look like after the end of the UNMIS mandate, based on a clear assessment of the likely scope and nature of the remaining contamination problem and on strategic decisions concerning what capacities will be required in what types of organisation. This should be done with the advice of UNMAS and other UNMAO partners, but **must not be done by UNMAS/UNMAO** as this would be an abrogation of national responsibility for addressing Sudan’s contamination problem, would inhibit continued growth in national ownership, and would leave it unclear whether Sudanese authorities were truly committed to the ‘hard decisions’ on which any useful strategic plan is based.

Once the strategic decisions are made by Sudanese governments concerning the quantity and types of mine action capacities needed for the long-term in Sudan, along with which organisations will house these various capacities, an adequate framework exists for:

- A proper capacity development plan specifying how and when the needed mine action capacities will be developed in the selected organisations. Once again, the capacity development plan should be formulated by the governments of Sudan and not by the UN agencies within UNMAO as, in the long term, it is the governments that will be responsible for supporting and managing these mine action capacities. However, the

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77 The original schedule was for the transition plan to be completed by December 2006. In August 2007, the Secretary-General of the National Mine Action Committee wrote to UNMAO and UNDP to initiate the transition planning process, which led to a meeting in early October.

78 Needless to say, in the absence of these fundamental strategic decisions, the framework for a capacity development plan can never be entirely adequate.
various UN agencies – and particularly UNMAS – will need to provide support to Sudanese capacity development efforts.\(^{79}\)

Therefore, the ‘joint capacity building plan’ referred to in the report from the UNMAS-commissioned evaluation should be a document from the governments and not from UNMAS, UNDP, and UNICEF: rather, each of these UN agencies should have its plan for supporting Sudanese capacity development efforts.

- Transition planning – the sequenced transfer of UN responsibilities and assets to the appropriate Sudanese organisations.

As the successful transfer of UN responsibilities will depend largely on the capacity of the organisations assuming those responsibilities, the transition plan needs to be tightly linked to both the national capacity development plan and to the capacity development support plans of the various UN agencies.

Therefore, the strategic plan provides the essential framework for both a capacity development plan (which could even be a chapter of the strategic plan) and a transition plan.

**Table 7 – Medium/long-term plans required**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sudanese plans</th>
<th>UNMAO plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Plan provides the framework for (\Rightarrow) and for (\downarrow)</td>
<td>Transition Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Development Plans (GoNU; GoSS) provides the framework for (\Rightarrow) and for (\downarrow)</td>
<td>Capacity Development Support Plans (UNMAS; UNDP; UNICEF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Development Support Plans of International NGOs (NPA etc.), specialised mine action organisations (e.g. Cranfield University), etc.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendation 1** – The UNDP and its UNMAO partners should encourage Sudanese authorities to launch a process to prepare a long-term strategic plan for Sudan’s mine action programme. This plan would be based on a thorough analysis of the likely need for mine action services after the end of the UNMIS mandate, clarify what mine action capabilities will be required, and specify the types of organisations that will deliver the various mine action services.

**Recommendation 2** – UNMAO partners should assist Sudanese authorities in preparing their strategic plan, which should also incorporate input from national and international mine action NGOs, donors, and other stakeholders.

**Recommendation 3** – The UNDP and the UNMAO Transitions Planning Officer should assist Sudanese authorities in formulating their medium-term and annual plans – based on the strategic plan – for developing the mine action capacities the country will require by the end of the UNMIS mandate.\(^{80}\) These plans should be synchronised with the UNMAO Transitions Plan for

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\(^{79}\) NPA has also stated that it would be willing to support capacity development of a MAC in Southern Sudan should one be established (i.e. NPA does not consider the SSDA to be a MAC).

\(^{80}\) The draft IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme – provides excellent advice concerning the roles, responsibilities, and capacity requirements of a mine action programme, including the national organs (i.e. the authority and MAC). Available from [http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm](http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm)
transferring responsibilities to Sudanese authorities, set clear objectives and dates for achieving these, and specify what specific actions or contributions are expected from which agencies (Sudanese, UN, international NGO, etc.).

**ROLE OF UNDP**

At the present time, the chief value-added of the UNDP in mine action would be assisting the Sudanese governments in formulating their strategic and capacity development plans. A key aspect of this would be facilitating the process of consultations with mine action stakeholders – other UN agencies, local and international mine action NGOs, and donors. This contribution would be consistent with the UN Inter-Agency Policy for Mine Action and its mandate within the UNMAO, and with the UNDP comparative advantage vis-à-vis other international mine action organisations present in Sudan.

**Textbox 8 – Capacity development in post-conflict or fragile states**

Mine action practitioners frequently find themselves in situations where the government lacks capacity, commitment, or both. In these situations, it generally is easier and less risky to ‘do the work for them’ (e.g. by using international NGOs or firms to provide demining services) rather than investing in local organisations which may – initially at least – be slower, less accountable, more prone to collapse, etc. And how does one even start when one’s counterparts may not have the capacity to plan how to develop the capacities that will be needed in the long-term? This, in particular, is the situation that UNDP TAs often find themselves in, because the organisation has a mandate focusing on capacity development.

The initial step has to be a plan to get to a capacity development plan – how to assist local authorities in getting to the point where they can formulate their own capacity development plan. This typically requires, at least, designating a national authority which has responsibility for mine action, staffing the authority and/or MAC with a few capable and motivated managers, exposing these personnel to the mine action field and how it functions, and ensuring they are aware of good practices based on experience in other countries.

Implementing such a preliminary plan often is fraught with problems. For example, the legal basis of the new national authority may be seriously flawed, or the individuals appointed to key mine action positions may lack appropriate skills or commitment. In such cases, scarce resources should not be spent on supporting capacities that should not be developed. Thus, preliminary plans should give priority to flexibility – typically it is better wait until essential preconditions are in place rather than rush to spend the budget on schedule.

Preliminary plans should also allow the flexibility to capitalise on unforeseen opportunities. For example, in some countries where the central government has lacked commitment to mine action, governors in highly impacted states have been anxious to work with mine action operators. Support for these state governments has then led governors to champion mine action and to get it on the national development agenda.

Capacity development picks-up pace once the basic structures and a few committed people are in place. This is borne out in the case in Sudan, where progress accelerated after the creation of the NMAC and SSDC, and the adoption of the National Strategic Framework in August 2006.

In addition, the UNDP should continue its efforts to broker support for capacity development from other international mine action agencies present in Sudan. UNMAO/UNMAS will play a critical role, particularly in supporting the core capabilities required by national MACs – operations planning; setting priorities; quality management; and information management. However, other UN agencies (particularly UNICEF for MRE) and the international NGOs
(including NPA, which has already expressed its interest) could also provide valuable support for the development of national capacities in the MACs and local NGOs. Finally, Cranfield University has already established a mine action training programme for Sudan, and raised much of the funding required directly from donors.

Where possible, commitments to provide capacity development support should be reflected in the national capacity development plan, as well as in the medium-term and annual plans of the agencies involved (i.e. as sections outlining their plans for supporting the development of local capacities).

The more success the UNDP has in brokering support for capacity development from other international mine action agencies, the less need for it to raise substantial sums for its own project. Indeed, in some countries, aggressive fundraising by the UNDP has been a point of contention with other mine action agencies, creating a competitive rather than a collaborative environment. The UNDP should build on the collaborative relations that now prevail in Sudan and provide only those capacity development support services that other agencies cannot.

**Recommendation 4** – The UNDP should focus its efforts on assisting Sudanese authorities in formulating their strategic and capacity development plans, including the facilitation of consultations with mine action stakeholders.

**Recommendation 5** – So far as possible, the UNDP should aim to broker capacity development support from other international mine action agencies present in Sudan (UN, Cranfield University, international NGOs, etc.), and finance only those capacity development support services that other agencies cannot provide.

**MAKING BEST USE OF THE JIDUs**

The JIDUs now represent the bulk of the local demining capacity in Sudan. As well, they provide a concrete example of effective collaboration between the GoNU and the GoSS (and between the two armed forces). The Babanusa-Wau railway is an essential link between the North and South, and the work of the JIDUs towards the rehabilitation of that link is precisely the type of initiative that needs to be replicated many times over ‘to make unity attractive’. The JIDUs could also be expanded, absorbing troops from both the SAF and the SPLA and contributing to DDR. More should be done to make best use of the JIDUs within the mine action programme. This, however, should be done in a manner consistent with the UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Policy.

**Textbox 9 – UN Policy on Support to National Militaries Engaged in Mine Action**

The UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action first adopted a policy on the use of militaries in January 1999, as an addendum to its initial UN mine action policy document, *Mine Action and Effective Coordination*, October 1998. This addendum stated that support to national militaries for mine action would be considered on a case-by-case basis, with several caveats (e.g. the overall coordination, control and priority setting of mine action should be the responsibility of civilian authorities). It stated that collaboration with militaries could include tasking, quality control, information sharing and logistical support. No mention was made of training, equipping, and support to capacity development in general.

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81 For example, the UNDP may need to finance short-term experts to facilitate strategic planning or develop mine action legislation.
In the 2005 revision to the UN Mine Action Policy, the policy vis-à-vis local militaries was amended somewhat. For example:

- **In the event that national military forces or armed groups still involved in conflict request assistance in mine action, the United Nations may support such activities, on an exceptional basis... The terms and conditions of such assistance will normally be defined in a Memorandum of Understanding between the parties to the conflict. United Nations support in such circumstances is determined on a case-by-case basis by the Senior United Nations Official in the country concerned, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action.** (par. 33)

- **United Nations cooperation in the field of mine action may, in peacetime, support national mine action programmes that include collaborative arrangements with the national armed forces as long as the overall coordination, control and priority-setting of mine action is the responsibility of national civilian authorities. Such cooperation may include the provision of training, equipment and operating costs, but not the payment of salaries.** (par. 32)

In addition, the policy stipulates that **All mine clearance operations involving the use of national armed forces and/or armed groups conducted with the support of the United Nations in peacetime or in a conflict situation should be undertaken using IMAS, or national standards based on IMAS.** (par. 34)

Thus, in the opinion of the Evaluation Team, UNMAO could collaborate with and support the JIDUs provided that:

1. Civilian authorities are in charge of overall coordination, control and priority-setting of the tasks assigned to the JIDUs;
2. The demining conducted by the JIDUs is compliant with IMAS; and
3. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action endorses a specific plan for collaboration and support.

The first essential step is to accredit the JIDUs to ensure they work in compliance with IMAS. These units could then be assigned to national priorities, jointly endorsed by the GoNU and GoSS through their respective mine action authorities. Staff from the NMAC and SSDC (or better, a separate Southern Sudan MAC, as discussed below), assisted by UNMAO personnel, could then do the quality assurance of the JIDU tasks, providing invaluable on-the-job training opportunities.

**Recommendation 6** – UNMAO should agree a work plan with Sudanese authorities for accrediting the JIDUs, including, if necessary, further capacity development to allow these units to operate in compliance with IMAS.

**Recommendation 7** – UNMAO should agree a work plan with Sudanese authorities for quality assurance of the JIDU tasks by QA officers from NMAC and a Southern Sudan MAC, supported by UNMAO personnel.

**ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOUTHERN SUDAN MAC**

Presidential Decree No. 45/2006 established a Southern Sudan De-mining Authority (generally referred to as the Southern Sudan De-mining Committee). Since it was created, the SSDC has

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82 Additional training, equipment, and advice may be required.
engaged approximately 40 staff and opened a number of sub-offices. It appears that the SSDC intends to assume the responsibilities of a MAC. Experience from other countries demonstrates that most attempts to have the functions of a mine action authority and a MAC integrated into a single organisation have failed.

Fortunately, Presidential Decree No. 45/2006 states that the Authority shall collaborate with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development in the formulation of its Draft Act… The UNDP should, in conjunction with its UNMAO partners and other mine action organisations, urge the SSDC to include in the draft legislation provision for a Southern Sudan MAC as a distinct organisation.

Recommendation 8 – The UNDP should, in conjunction with its UNMAO partners and other mine action organisations, assist the SSDC in drafting mine action legislation that incorporates provisions for a Southern Sudan MAC as a distinct organisation.

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83 The division of responsibilities outlined in decree establishing the National Authority for Mine Action (Decree no. 299/2005) provides a useful model for this part of the draft legislation.
ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE UNDP SUDAN MINE ACTION CAPACITY BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Background:

1. Sudan is considered as one of the countries suffering the most from the Explosives Remnants of War (ERW) contamination problem although the problem lies more in the perception of a threat than a real threat. Most of the access/supply routes and roads are blocked in central, eastern and southern parts of the country. In addition, vast areas of arable land, livestock grazing land, areas required for collecting firewood and producing charcoal and water resources are blocked. Landmine and ERW contamination in Sudan is impacting the post-war recovery phase as it directly affects the return and settlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, the access and implementation of humanitarian and development activities, freedom of movement, and freedom to conduct economic activities and thereby the sustainable livelihoods of affected communities.

2. Current assessments have identified more than 1,920 dangerous/suspected areas of which only 760 have been cleared. As of April 2007, more than 14 million m2 of land have been cleared, 3,221 km of roads verified as safe, and 850 km of those were cleared, 4,164 Anti-Personnel mines, 1,911 Anti-Tank mines, and more than 474,000 ERW destroyed. Under the overall coordination of UNICEF, more than one Million Sudanese civilians have received Mine Risk Education (MRE). The IMSMA database in Sudan has also recorded a total of 2,400 victims. However, there is now nation-wide surveillance system in place to provide timely and accurate information about the casualty rate.

Mine Action in the Sudan:

3. A number of international mine action organizations have been active in the field of mine action in Southern Sudan since early 90s. However, after the signing of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement in 2001, the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) started to cooperate in the area of mine action, which established a unique precedent for cooperation and peace-building even during ongoing conflict. Based on this cooperation, a tri-partite Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed among the GoS, the SPLM and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on 19 September 2002 in Geneva, which provided the framework for mine action activities to be undertaken throughout the Sudan. In addition, the CPA and the UN Security Council Resolution 1590 further enhanced the mandate and role of the UN in the Sudan in the field of mine action.

4. Currently, there are five UN agencies actively engaged in undertaking various mine action activities within the unified framework of the United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in close coordination and cooperation with the concerned national and local authorities. The UN agencies involved in mine action and their respective roles include:

- United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in cooperation with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), conducting humanitarian demining and
providing coordination and technical advice in support of the UNMIS mandate and the CPA.

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), providing support to national authorities in building sustainable local/national mine action capacities,
- United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), undertaking mine risk education projects,
- World Food Programme (WFP) undertaking clearance of key supply and access routes,
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) providing mine risk education returning refugees and IDP and undertaking clearance of areas required for resettlement of refugees and IDPs.

5. In addition, there are several demining companies operating as part of the UN Peace Support Force, several national and international humanitarian organizations and commercial firms, involved in undertaking mine action operations in various parts of the country, with the UN Mine Action Office serving as the coordinating body.

**UNDP’s Role and Mandate in Mine Action in the Sudan:**

6. Within the unified structure of the UN Mine Action Office, UNDP is the lead agency for national capacity building and programme development. The UNDP’s approach to mine action in the Sudan is guided by the provisions of the "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy" as well as the UN inter-agency Mine action Strategy 2006-2010.

7. In order to address the landmine/ERW contamination problem in the Sudan in the long term, the Sudan requires developing national mine action capacity to coordinate, manage and implement all mine action related activities in order to effectively address the humanitarian and development challenges in the Sudan in the long term. To achieve this goal, this project provides necessary management and technical support to the concerned national mine action authorities to enable them to function as coordinating and executing agencies, at the policy, strategic and operational level with limited external assistance and support.

8. The expected/desired outcome of UNDP’s support to mine action in the Sudan is a well established legislative and institutional framework, with a network of decentralized organizational structures across the country, capable to coordinate, plan, prioritize, quality manage, monitor and implement all aspects of mine action in the country as per international standards and norms.

9. UNDP Sudan assisted concerned national authorities within the Government of National Unity (GONU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to establish the required legislative and institutional framework, develop individual and national capabilities, develop policies and national standards and strategic plans; deliver all elements of mine action efficiently and to IMAS; establish comprehensive information management systems necessary for the efficient planning and prioritization of mine action activities and ensure the quality of mine action operations. In addition, UNDP Sudan assists national authorities to prepare for an effective and well planned transition to national management.
10. UNDP works with NMAA, NMAC and SSDC and other concerned government institutions to include mine action into the broader development agenda and to promote mainstreaming of mine action into national and sector development.

11. UNDP provides support and works closely with relevant authorities and civil society organizations to ensure that landmine survivors are provided with rehabilitation and reintegration services and enjoy being full productive members of their communities.

Management Structure/Modality and Partnership:

12. Under the overall supervision of the UNDP Sudan Country Director, this project is being executed under the UNDP’s Direct Execution (DEX) modality and managed by the UNDP Senior Technical Advisor-Mine Action within the “Human Security and Recovery Unit” with an international Technical Advisor based in Juba and two Senior National Officers once based in Khartoum and one based in Juba. In accordance with the UNDP’s rules and regulations for DEX projects, the project management team is responsible for ensuring the application of the UNDP guidelines (programme, finance, and personnel) and related policies for the execution of this project. The project management team also ensures that the project achieves its goals and objectives by supervising all project activities and conducting monitoring and evaluation missions to project sites, and preparing progress, monitoring and evaluation reports/updates to the UNDP CO management and donors. The project team also coordinates its activities with the New York based UNDP/BCPR mine action team and with other components of the UN Mine Action Office.

13. The line ministry for this project at the level of the Government of National Unity (GNU) is the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs through the secretariat of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) while at level of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), it is the Office of the Presidential Affairs. The key implementing partners/counterparts of this project are the at national level, the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) in the North; the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC).

Summary of the Achievements of the Project:

14. Achievements of the technical, advisory and financial assistance of this project to Sudan are summarized below:

   a. Establishment of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC)
   c. Lobbied with the GONU and GOSS who included mine action in their budgets.
   d. Establishment of the head offices NAMC and SSDC and six field offices in terms of development of organization structures, offices space, necessary equipment (vehicles, computers and furniture), and trained about 45 staff members of NMAC and SSDA in middle management in Amman, Jordan. In addition, UNDP trained 8 senior national staff members of NMAC and SSDA outside Sudan in senior management.
e. Organized and partially sponsored two Mine Action Exchange (MAX) missions to Jordan and Bosnia Herzegovina with the participation of two State Ministers. During the missions issues related to legislative and institutional frameworks, planning and prioritization processes, quality assurance, national level coordination mechanisms, tool box of mine action assets, donor relations/resources mobilizations transition from UN management to national management, national ownership and leadership were looked at.

f. Organized and partially sponsoring participation of the officials of the GONU and GOSS in several official key mine action meetings/workshops including the all the States Parties Meeting, and intersessional committees meetings in 2004, 2005, and 2006.

g. Training and field deployment of 133 national deminers

h. Provided technical assistance to development of the first draft of the National Mine Action Laws at the level of the GONU.

i. As part of a joint UNDP, UNMAS, and UNICEF project, mobilized US$ 688,000 for the implementation of community level small projects for the rehabilitation and socio economic re-integration of landmine victims/survivors. Other two components of this project MRE and needs assessment are undertaken by UNICEF and UNMAS respectively.

j. UNDP also provided technical assistance to the National Authority on Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) in resources mobilization and meeting the obligations of the Sudan under the Nairobi Action Plan.

Rationale and Aim of the Evaluation:

15. UNDP regularly conducts internal and external evaluations of its projects and programmes including mine action. Evaluation results, in particular lessons learned, are made available to all partners and other interested parties. Based on its mandate, stipulated in the “United Nations Inter-Agency Policy” UNDP Sudan got engaged in mine action support in early 2004. UNDP Sudan feels that after four years of support, it is timely to conduct an internal evaluation of the project.

16. The aim of this evaluation is to evaluate the performance and overall approach of the project from January 2004 to July 2007 to take stock of the achievements made, identify major gaps, lessons learned and make recommendations for the future direction for the project. The evaluation should take into account, obligations of the Sudan under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, recent political developments in the country, the provisions the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), UN Security Council Resolution # 1590, presidential decrees of the GONU and GOSS on the establishment of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC), development and endorsement of the “National Mine Action Policy Framework” and “National Mine Action Strategic Framework”, the UN Inter Agency Mine Action Policy, the UN Mine Action Strategy for 2006-2011 and other relevant documents including the UNDP Sudan Project Document and the UN Mine Action Annual work Plans for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.

Objectives of the Evaluation:

17. Evaluate the UNDP Sudan mine action project management structure, its coordination and collaboration at various levels within the UNDP Country Office (Both Khartoum and
Juba, with other UNDP units/projects and within the UNDP global management arrangements in relation to small arms and mine action issues.

18. Evaluate the in-country inter-agency (UNMAS, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP) cooperation and coordination mechanisms/arrangements and UNDP’s capacity to deliver against the mine action plan/strategy in Sudan.

19. Evaluate the sustainability of UNDP’s project as well as UNDP’s performance in delivering technical assistance as per its specific role and mandate for mine action in Sudan.

20. Evaluate UNDP’s performance in providing institutional and individual capacity development support.

21. Evaluate mine action authorities abilities to plan, quality manage, coordinate and manage mine action?

22. Evaluate the technical support provided by the project to the National Mine Action Authority (NMMA), NMAC, SSDC, concerned civil society organizations at various levels and in various fields and ascertain their feedback.

23. Evaluate the resource mobilization approach and strategy of the project and utilization of the project resources and future plans.

24. In view of the findings of the evaluation and in light of UNDP’s mandate, provide recommendations on the definition of specific outcomes and activities in the area of mine action that will then feed into the preparation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan for the period of 2009-2012.

25. Evaluate UNDP’s performance in the process of mainstreaming mine action within the wider humanitarian and development community.

26. Evaluate the role and performance of the project in light of UNDP policy on support to landmine Survivors/Victims.

27. Review and comment on the process and progress of the establishment of the legislative and institutional frameworks for mine action at the level of GONU and GOSS in view of the transition of the mine action management from the UN to the national authorities planned for 2011. Identify key capacity building and institutional development gaps and make necessary recommendations for bridging those gaps.

28. Review and comment on the inter-ministerial level coordination and cooperation mechanisms within the GONU and GOSS in regards to mine action and between the NMAC and SSDC.

29. Review and comment on the management structures of the NMAC and SSDC and progress made in establishing various management functions of these authorities such as planning, coordination, quality assurance, monitoring, information management, resource mobilization, and reporting.
30. Review and comment on the possible political and other implications for a sustainable and fully nationally owned managed mine action programme(s).

31. Comment on the gender considerations of the project.

**Timescale:**

32. The Evaluation is planned to take place in late October 2007, depending on the availability of the consultants and other factors. The evaluation is estimated to take a total of three weeks time with half of the time inside Sudan and the other half outside Sudan. A detailed itinerary and workplan shall be developed by the Independent Consultants in coordination with the UNDP Sudan Country Office with the Senior Technical Advisor-Mine Action as the focal point.

**Debriefing and Reporting**

33. The consultant shall debrief the UNDP Sudan management in a meeting through a PowerPoint presentation before his/her departure from Sudan and prepare and submit a detailed final report which shall cover findings, observations, and recommendations to the UNDP Sudan County Office within 10 days of the completion of the evaluation.

**Cost of the Evaluation:**

34. Mine Action Project of UNDP Sudan and the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) will share the cost of the evaluation. UNDP Sudan will cover the cost of airfare, terminal expenses, accommodation and food of the consultants while GICHD will cover the cost of the time of the consultants.

**Mission Composition:**

35. The evaluation will be conducted by two independent consultant provided by GICHD with the following skills and experience:

a) Extensive experience in conducting project’s evaluations

b) Extensive experience in all aspects of institutional and individual capacity building. Specific experience in mine action capacity building would be an asset

c) Extensive experience in the coordination, management and implementation of mine action programmes/projects

d) A good understanding of general development principles and the role and priorities of mine action within a multi-sector post-conflict response

36. The consultants should be self-sufficient in relation to personal medical requirements and funds and be prepared to work in difficult living conditions. It is suggested that the consultant should have personal accident and medical insurance with specific cover for operating in security-sensitive locations such as the Sudan.
### ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY & LIST OF PEOPLE MET

#### Khartoum – Ted Paterson & Vera Bohle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22-Oct</td>
<td>Arrive Khartoum</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-Oct</td>
<td>UNMAO</td>
<td>Qadeem Tariq (initial briefing)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Jerzy Skuratowicz, Country Director</td>
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<td>Omer Ishaq, Head, Human Security &amp; Recovery Unit</td>
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<td>Musa Ibrahim, Programme Officer, Mine Action</td>
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<td>24-Oct</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Khalid Abdin, Senior National Officer for Mine Action in North Sudan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NMAC</td>
<td>Baballah Braima, Deputy Director</td>
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<td>Yousif M. Osman, Victim Assistance Officer</td>
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<td>Dr. Ahmed E. Yousif, Victim Assistance Officer</td>
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<td>Adil A. Hameed, Legal Advisor</td>
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<td>Abd Almonem Ahmed Giha, Technical Advisor</td>
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<td>Abdelazim Elshielch, Training Officer</td>
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<td>UNMAO</td>
<td>Akiko Kobayakawa, Programme Officer</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Alexander O’Riordan, Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP) Manager</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mariam A. AlRahman Ali, Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst RRP</td>
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#### Khartoum – Vera Bohle

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#### Juba – Ted Paterson

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<td>NPA (at UNDP) Kjell Ivan Breili, Operations Manager, Mine Action</td>
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ANNEX 3 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Peace Agreements

Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, 2006
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 9 Jan 2005

Decrees


Mine Action Documents


Government of Sudan and UNDP-Sudan, 2005, Support to National Mine Action Capacity Development Project


National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework, March 2007-12-14


Sudan Mine Action Strategic Framework, August 2004 (adopted by the GoS, SPLM, UNDP, and UNMAS)

The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework, 2006

UNDP Sudan (various years) Mine Action Annual Reports


Other Documents

GICHD, 2007, Mission to Sudan, (country mission report as part of the regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Africa)


UN Country Team, 2007, *UN Development Assistance Framework: Plan of Engagement*


ANNEX 4 – COMMENTS FROM UNMAO ON THE DRAFT REPORT

United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO)
Plot 42, Block 13, Riyadh Area, Khartoum P.O.Box 913, Khartoum, Sudan

The report are a reasonably balanced observation, and the need of the Govt's strategic plan in order to develop a comprehensive transitional plan is paramount (although it does not address the point about why it has not been done and not supported by UNDP after four years). It also did not answer one of the crucial questions in terms of relationships in an Integrated or Unified Mine Action Office – see point six

Some of specific points are:

1. JIDU - a good analysis on JIDU issues. It does not address the point about why UNDP supported such a unit without QA support and a unit that does NOT conform to international standards. The role of the British High Commision can be enhanced, as they are the real driver behind this initiative.
Recommendation 6 talks about UNMAO support to JIDU and this can be done if the Govt is ready to comply with IMAS and necessary funding are provided (either from donors or from the Govt) to UNMAO to hire additional QA. Still some fundamental questions remain though such as are UNMAO supposed to be supporting a military unit.

Comment from Evaluation Team (ET) – We have added a textbox on UN policy vis-à-vis military units and mine action.

2. UNDP comparative advantages (Page 34) - there is no doubt that UNDP has a vital role, but the last 2 points (Good relationship with Govt and Arabic speaking) are very ad-hoc, and limited. It was definitely not the case for South Sudan that UNDP always had a good relationship and Arabic speaking in the south???. As to Arabic speaking, this advantage will be lost once Qadeem leaves so this is not an organizational advantage, and this caused some issues in South Sudan as some of Southerner have issues with Arabic-speaking people. 3rd point can also be debated - UNMAS CAN and have a mandate beyond 1590 with VTF funding, and we are actually implementing MRE and VA which are beyond UNMIS mandate.

Comment from ET – We are aware that SC Resolution 1590 mandate is not restrictive & have added some statements to ensure this is clear. Our point is that the UNMAS mandate obliges support to UNMIS (and this responsibility cannot simply be transferred to national authorities), whereas additional tasks (e.g. demining in support of development) are possible but not obligatory.

3. Recommendations - 1,2 and 3 are making sense, especially the 3rd one that says that UNDP does not need to do an excessive resource mobilization. Recommendation 4 is good, but means that UNDP needs to hire a specialist. Both STA and TA are not a transition or public administration specialist.
Recommendation 5,6 and 7 are good but again there must be an appropriate resource allocation to this. Recommendation 8 is great and again, UNDP needs a long-awaited legal specialist as STA and TA are not legal specialist.

Comment from ET – We agree that the UNDP may need to engage specialists re: strategic planning and planning for capacity development. However, the UNMAO Transitions Planner was not yet in place and we were not in a position to assess whether that individual might handle the bulk of the tasks in conjunction with the UNDP mine action team.

4. UNMAS role -There is a basic misunderstanding that we are only obliged to UNMIS mandate - either Peacekeeping or Humanitarian priorities, but it is not true. VTF funding can be used for development
priorities too within the current UNMAS/UNMAO set up, when donors are willing and priorities are agreed by all stakeholders.

Comment from ET – see comments under point 2

5. The observations and recommendations are fairly reasonable and what UNDP now need is a proper work plan based on Govt strategy with specialists, not project managers. Currently both STA and TA are functioning as project officers managing their own small projects and travels of training, but no "technical" expertise on transitional planning or legislation development. It must also be cautioned that some of the comments, while accurate are somewhat misleading and create the wrong perceptions.

Comment from ET – in addition to comments under point 3, we agree that UNDP should engage some expertise in mine action legislation once the GoSS/SSDC are committed to move on the issue of mine action legislation in Southern Sudan.

6. The report does not answer the vital question, is UNDP MA part of an Integrated or unified UNMAO and what is the relationship with the Director MA Sector (if such a position exist in a country) or is it independent form a UNMAO?. This relationship is not clear in the UN Strategy for MA – the roles of the different agencies etc has been defined but not in terms of an Integrated or Unified mission.

Comment from ET – an important point, and we have added a rather long textbox on the ‘unified’ versus ‘integrated’ question. In our view, UNDP MA is part of a unified UNMAO and, as such, is neither independent from nor subsumed within UNMAO – rather, it is collocated and should strive to operate in accordance with the principles laid-out in the Unified Mission Plan.
ANNEX 5 – COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT FROM UNDP
BCPR

Re: Evaluation of UNDP Sudan Mine Action capacity building and development
project.

Inputs from:  Armed Violence, Mine Action and Small Arms
Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team
BCPR New York and Geneva

1. Long term strategic plan

Transition planning should be part of larger, long term strategic plan, which
encompasses all aspects of transition including capacity building. The transition
marks the process of reaching milestones towards progressively handing over
all elements of mine action to the national government. A capacity building
strategy would build on and address the identified gaps in a national partner’s
capacity and capability to take over responsibly for mine action.

In North and South Sudan the transition plan would prepare the establishment of
a capacity able to address residual contamination – estimated at 20% by
UNMAO – remaining on UNMAO’s departure. The planning for dealing with this
residual contamination would make up the body of the long term strategic plan
implemented from 2011. Although there cannot at this time be precise figures in
terms of planning for the post 2011 status of contamination, extrapolations of
current data from the LIS and technical surveys will allow us to foresee what level
of capacity will be required post UNMAO departure.

It is towards the development of this level of technical capacity and the
administration, management and QA systems to support it, that the transition
plan must focus. Whether or not this requires expansion of capacity in terms of
hardware and well as the human resource focus of capacity building remains to
be seen. It has been noted by BCPR that human resource development – the
“softer” side of capacity building - is in need of a greater attention and focus in
2008. At this point the consolidation of current assets and strategizing towards
their most efficient use in developing a strong capacity which can address
residual contamination post 2011, should be UNDP’s active focus.

In order to develop such a comprehensive strategic document addressing
transition, capacity building and longer term capacity to deal the ERW in Sudan,
support will be required in both north and south Sudan. To this end BCPR and will
be making this part of the terms of reference for Sara and Pontus during the
planned integrated mission to Sudan in April.

2. Role of the GOS in capacity building / recommendation 2
We have a concern with the way that capacity building is presented in this report. The idea that capacity building is the responsibility of the national authorities and that UNDP is one step removed i.e. there to support it and broker relationships from the outside. Part of the responsibility of the Government, under international treaties, is to put in place an effective institutional structure that can regulate/coordinate and manage mine action in the country. It is the responsibility/mandate of UNDP to provide capacity building support to the government to achieve this end should it be called on to do so. The host government of the countries in which UNDP works request the support of UNDP, and basing its mandate on support of the implementation of the UNDAF, create MOUs shaped by the host government itself. This is more of an active role than the somewhat passive one presented in the evaluation report.

Recommendations for encouraging coordination on the part of the government – ways of increasing capacity to do so would have been useful. E.g. page 19 comments on the lack of success in convening the DSRSG.

Comments from Evaluation Team (ET) – We’re not clear what the concern re: “how capacity building is presented” – the emphasis on the fact that it is local people and organisations which develop capacity and that the role of international partners is to support the capacity development efforts of locals is one of the central messages of about a decade’s work by UNDP’s central capacity development unit & others and is reflected in the name of the current UNDP project (Support to National Mine Action Capacity Development). This distinction is also one of the central principals distinguishing ‘new’ capacity development (espoused by UNDP) and ‘old’ capacity building – see, for example, from Supporting Capacity Development: The UNDP Approach (June 2007) Capacity development is a primarily endogenous and domestically driven process and Capacity development efforts must be led and grounded in endogenous efforts if they are to be meaningful and sustainable. UNDP will work closely with the UN development system, and global, regional and national partners, to support CD efforts through the provision of these services. What we are recommending is consistent with the UNDP approach (an approach with which we concur).

Perhaps the concern is that our report advocates a ‘brokering’ more than a ‘resource mobilisation’ role. In our minds, this reflects the current situation in Sudan where UNMAS has so many resources in country which should be playing a significant role in supporting capacity development. As well, one of the principles underpinning the ‘unified’ approach (from Sudan Unified Mission Plan) is “Responsibility to maximize shared resources.” In other countries, UNDP is the lead UN agency and has to shoulder more of the resource mobilisation burden. But we don’t see UNDP’s role as passive – its TAs have to assist Sudanese authorities in defining their long-term requirements, then brokering-in the requisite support that is available (including from the Sudanese budgets, which are significant), and filling gaps where necessary support isn’t available.

Concerning “Recommendations for encouraging coordination on the part of the government”, we noted the State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs has taken the initiative to establish a mine action steering committee, which is a good initiative. As well, the process of strategic planning will encourage coordination on the part of the government, so long as UN agencies, donors, etc. adhere to the precept that the Sudanese governments remain ‘in the driver’s seat.’

3. Capacity building direction
The situation report regarding the current hardware capacity of national bodies in Sudan was useful and was welcomed. However, recommendations which encourage the consolidation of current assets and the development of the softer side of capacity as opposed to hardware would have been useful. BCPR is weary of the current drive to emulate the UNMAO structure. There should be a consolidation of current hardware and a focus on the software. These are issues which have been discussed with our national counterparts in terms of strategic planning for the next 5 years and are ones which are ongoing and valuable in terms of sustainability.

Comments from ET – our view is that Sudanese officials, drawing upon the advice from UN agencies and others, will be capable of determining what is needed re: the “softer side of capacity” as part of a structured process to develop their national strategy. We have also added a note that the draft IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme, contains excellent guidance on the roles, responsibilities, and capacity requirements of national authorities and MACs.

4. Content of capacity building

The evaluation does not give many indications with respect to what kind of capacity building is needed and specifically on what areas should be strengthened, in light of the evaluation of the existing UNDP programme. A stronger evaluation of the UNDP programme would have set the stage for more concrete and directly applicable recommendations in this respect.

Comments from ET – Again, we have also added a note that the draft IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme, contains excellent guidance on the roles, responsibilities, and capacity requirements of national authorities and MACs. As well, our report makes clear that what is most needed for further development of capacities is on-the-job experience at a number of levels (e.g. deminers in JIDUs working to IMAS with QA inspections; personnel in the MACs managing the tasking cycle with guidance from UNMAS TAs; senior officials in strategic planning).

5. JIDUs

We agree with the analysis of the situation, as well as with the recommendations of UNMAO with regards to working towards JIDU accreditation and quality assurance. However, it would be useful if the report would also make specific recommendations to UNDP with respect to (i) how UNDP should engage with the JIDUs and (ii) the entry points through which UNDP can actively support and promote the accreditation and coordination of the JIDUs and support the qualitative improvement of their technical and management capacity.

Comments from ET – the strategic planning process that we have recommended is an ideal ‘entry point’ for engaging with the JIDUs. We have added a textbox on UN policy vis-à-vis the use of local militaries in mine action and our understanding of what these policies imply in the case of the JIDUs.

6. UNDP role in UNMAO / feedback on UNMAS report
Inclusion of material from the UNMAS evaluation of mine action in Sudan was a useful addition. If the evaluation could have addressed in greater depth / followed up the perceived shortcomings of UNDP capacity building presented in the UNMAS report and confirmed, quantified and qualified these it would have been more useful than re-presenting them again in another forum.

Comments from ET – The limited duration of the evaluation mission made it impossible to conduct a detailed assessment of the various capacity development initiatives supported by the UNDP. We believe our report is clear in stating there is little evidence to support a blanket disparagement of capacity development achievements to date (and the report on the evaluation commissioned by UNMAS provides scant evidence to back-up its apparent censure of the capacity development component). We pointed out that CD progress typically is slow until some capable and committed managers are appointed, which really wasn’t the case until mid-2006 after which CD progress accelerated. We also noted that, ‘benchmarked’ against capacity development achievements of other UN programmes in Sudan, all those we interviewed stated that mine action was far ahead. Our principal criticism is that a proper strategic plan is not in place and the process for formulating such a plan should already have begun.

The role and timeframe of UNDP in Sudan in terms of building a sustainable national capacity both in the north and south is one which will extend beyond that of UNMIS. As noted in the UNMAO feedback, UNMAS’ role is not predicated on UNMIS’s mandate. UNDP’s comparative advantage lies in its long term commitment to work with national counterparts and building their capacity to a point where external assistance is no longer required. The role of UNDP in the implementation of the transition plan, whereby national capacities will be able to address contamination independently is one which will be in coordination and cooperation with UNMAS in terms of technical input. Greater cooperation and coordination between the respective elements of UNMAO is the only way that capacity building throughout the transition can be guaranteed.

Recommendations that focus on increased cooperation and matricing of the capacity building roles of the component departments of UNMAO would have been helpful, as institutional arrangements will not allow us to separate lines of reporting out of that of UNDP. Creative ways in which the CTAs in south and north could function more efficiently and effectively in coordination with the UN Mine Action office could also have been included.

Comments from ET – we have added a rather long textbox on the ‘unified’ versus ‘integrated’ controversy. In it we conclude that the six principles presented in the Sudan Unified Mission Plan are reasonable but have not been put fully into practice. As well, once UNMAS, UNDP, and other agencies are working on a common multi-year plan, coordination should be more efficient and effective.