TOWARDS SECURITY, PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

THE STATE OF PLAY IN SAFE AND SECURE MANAGEMENT OF AMMUNITION
GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The GICHD is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with mine action organisations and other human security organisations. We support the ultimate goals of mine action: saving lives, returning land to productive use and promoting development. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 65 staff members from over 19 different countries. This makes the GICHD a unique and international centre of mine action expertise and knowledge. Our work is made possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 30 governments and organisations.

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TOWARDS SECURITY, PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

THE STATE OF PLAY IN SAFE AND SECURE MANAGEMENT OF AMMUNITION
INTRODUCTION, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
Unplanned explosions of poorly managed munitions sites often result in a high number of people being killed, injured or displaced. Such sites present a global risk with more than half of the countries of the world having experienced incidents since 1979. Following a peak in 2011 with 37 reported incidents, the trend is still high with more than one incident a month in 2017.

The humanitarian impact is most visible in terms of casualties: an average of more than 800 casualties per year, over 35 years (from 1979 to 2013). Such impact tends to be much higher when sites are located in populated areas, as illustrated by the multiple explosions at the Mpila ammunition depots in a heavily populated area of Congo-Brazzaville in 2011, resulting in 300 killed, 2,500 injured and 121,000 made homeless. Further to the human toll, the socio-economic consequences of such explosions can be significant. For the incident in Congo-Brazzaville, they were partially estimated at US$ 672 million. The costs of repairing the damage tend to be far greater than preventive and effective stockpile management procedures. As an example, the Gërdec explosion in Albania in 2008 resulted in estimated socio-economic and clean-up costs of US$ 29 million, whereas preventing the accident may have required less than US$ 6.6 million.
In addition to the humanitarian and socio-economic repercussions, poorly managed ammunition also fuels insecurity. Diversion of ammunition from storage sites, and its onward proliferation, has been a catalyst for armed conflicts in various regions of the world. In the wake of the uprising in Libya, weapons, ammunition and explosives from looted and often-damaged Libyan stockpiles have become key enablers of political instability, security volatility and violence. They have reinforced the military capability of a number of non-State actors, from West Africa to Syria. Also, diverted ammunition and explosives are increasingly used to build improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The latter have become a weapon of choice, especially of non-State actors, in many current conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq or Syria. The harm caused by IEDs largely affects civilians.

These developments have underlined the relevance of safe and secure management of conventional ammunition. In countries failing to identify and dispose of surplus or unsafe stockpiles of ammunition, risks of unplanned explosions and diversion are particularly elevated.

Safe and secure ammunition management should not be comprehended as a ‘silied’ set of technical activities, but rather as part of broader efforts towards peaceful societies and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for instance, as a means to reduce violence, curb illicit arms flows and increase urban safety. It can also derive from and contribute to security sector governance such as at the level of institutions, management processes and the security of ammunition storage sites (see Figure 2).

In addition, ammunition management is a pathway towards sustaining peace, including as part of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). At the same time, measures geared towards preventing diversion and the illicit trafficking of ammunition and explosives are usually part of counter-terrorism strategies. Finally, efforts to safely and securely manage ammunition contribute to implementing arms embargoes, and strengthening compliance with arms control and disarmament instruments.

While countries bear the primary responsibility for improving their management of ammunition, a considerable number of them have been facing challenges to do so effectively. In recent years, much effort has been made to address these challenges with a particular focus on strengthening national management practices. The ammunition issue has been increasingly discussed, gradually creating a more conducive environment for countries to more openly engage. The scale of requests for support – and the number of stakeholders involved – has augmented as a result.
The higher profile of unplanned explosions, recognition of diversion risks and the increasing use of IEDs have elevated ammunition management as a priority. This has also led to recent international normative developments. The adoption by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) in 2011 was a landmark in this regard. It was followed by the establishment of the UN knowledge management platform dedicated to conventional ammunition (UN SaferGuard programme) overseeing IATG roll-out.

It is in this context that Switzerland launched the Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition (SSMA) initiative and held two international meetings in 2015 and 2016. Similarly, the African Union (AU) adopted its regional Ammunition Safety and Security Management initiative in 2017. The same year, the UNGA resolution on ‘problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles
in surplus’ established a multilateral platform for discussions on ammunition, with a group of governmental experts (GGE) to be established by 2020.

This report will address the current state of play on safe and secure management of ammunition by discussing the normative landscape surrounding it, implementation at various levels, as well as key principles and challenges. It will also elaborate on gaps and issues for further consideration. It rests on substantive desk research, complemented by interviews with and/or questionnaire responses from major relevant States and organisations.17
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS AND PROCESSES ON AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
**Normative Frameworks**

**International frameworks**

At the request of the UNGA in 1997, a study assessed how enhanced controls on ammunition and explosives can contribute to ‘preventing and reducing the excessive and destabilising accumulation and proliferation of SALW [small arms and light weapons].’ This brought the topic of ammunition prominently onto the international agenda for the first time. Today, a wide range of instruments exist that deal with ammunition in different ways, often within the context of SALW control (see Table 1).

While the scope of the politically binding 2001 UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (UN PoA) did not explicitly refer to ammunition, some controversy persists in this regard. In fact, the outcome document of the 2016 UN PoA Biennial Meeting of States includes references to risks (e.g. accidental explosions), investigative methods (e.g. ballistics information) or activities (e.g. life-cycle management) that are equally relevant to ammunition as to weapons. The forthcoming UN PoA Third Review Conference is likely to hold a discussion on ammunition.

Other frameworks deal with provisions directly relevant to ammunition. The first legally binding international instrument on small arms control, the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol, places ammunition firmly in its provisions aimed at combatting the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of ammunition. Relevant provisions are also contained in the 2003 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) that encourages States Parties to take generic preventive measures to minimise the occurrence of explosive remnants of war, including through munitions management.

A major addition to the ammunition management framework was added by the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The centerpiece of the treaty, i.e. prohibitions and an export assessment procedure, apply to ammunition. Appropriate measures that could be undertaken to mitigate risks of exported ammunition being used to violate international law can include programmes, agreed between exporting and importing States, to strengthen stockpile management capacities. Stockpile management also features among areas for international cooperation and assistance.

Finally, the UN Security Council provides a further international legal framework under which ammunition management may be addressed (see Box 1).
Lastly, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents the global political framework for the many significant interconnected challenges to sustainable development of our times. Since 2016, countries have worked towards the achievement of the SDGs. The latter represent an important framework for ammunition management and its manifold ramifications. While improving stockpile management is key to curbing illicit arms flows (SDG 16.4), it also helps to prevent unplanned explosions, enabling at-risk countries to better protect civilians (SDG 16.1), increase urban safety (SDG 11.7) and create an environment that is conducive to sustainable development. The SDGs can also serve as a vehicle for strengthening national institutions in charge of stockpile management and promoting their effectiveness, accountability and transparency (SDG 16.6; SDG 16.a). The importance of the SDGs in this context is echoed by the UNGA’s call on States to consider ammunition management as an intrinsic part of their actions for achieving the SDGs.

Regional frameworks

Various regions of the world bear witness to a body of frameworks that address the topic of ammunition in various forms and degrees of implementation (see Table 1). In the Americas, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) has set the benchmark since 1998, serving as a model for the UN Firearms Protocol. The CARICOM region, suffering from a high level of homicides, has adopted a crime and security strategy and declaration on SALW, whereby States are committed to combatting the illicit trade of ammunition or enhancing ammunition management.
### TABLE 1
**SELECTED AMMUNITION-RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS (DETAILED IN ANNEX I)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption</td>
<td>Entry into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (universal adherence)</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW Protocol V</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Firearms Protocol</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN PoA (universal adherence)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Declaration</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM Declaration on SALW</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS Convention (Kinshasa Convention)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Convention</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Protocol</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Protocol</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadi Framework</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFTA</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A particularly high number of frameworks have been developed on the African continent, compared to other regions. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol, adopted in 2001, was the first African regional small arms agreement to become legally binding. It seeks to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials, regulate the import and export of legal small arms, and harmonise national legislation. It served as the basis for the 2004 Nairobi Protocol on the prevention, control and reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.28

Another major instrument on the African continent is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 2006 Convention on SALW, their ammunition and other related materials. ECOWAS member states committed to taking appropriate steps to manage and secure government stocks of weapons and munitions, such as by identifying surplus and obsolete stocks for disposal.29 Furthermore, in 2010, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted a legally binding instrument, most commonly known as the Kinshasa Convention, which establishes measures to control the production, trade and use of small arms. Finally, in the 2012 non-legally binding Khartoum Declaration, States Parties are committed to controlling SALW across the neighbouring countries of Western Sudan, including through physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of State-held SALW and ammunition.

In Europe, the 2003 Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) represents the major political framework applicable to all OSCE participating States to improve stockpile management practice, particularly relating to assessing surplus items and risk, and facilitating international cooperation and assistance. In the European Union (EU), two major frameworks stand out: the EU Council Common Position 944, adopted in 2008, defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, and the 2005 EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, in particular in the Sahel region.

In Asia and the Pacific region, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) created the political Nadi framework (2000) to address the problem of illicit arms trafficking in the region.30 Later in 2003, PIF adopted the Model Weapons Control Bill, which includes standards on safe and secure storage.31 While SALW and ammunition do not seem to have yet been dealt with in regional instruments in Asia, efforts in this regard are currently ongoing (see Box 2).
This patchwork of international and regional frameworks, some of which differ in their definition of ammunition, makes their effective implementation challenging. The Small Arms Survey examined definitions, synergies and contradictions in terms of stockpile management and diversion of SALW and ammunition across the UN PoA, the ATT, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) and several regional African instruments. It revealed a considerable overlap in the nature of stockpile management measures required or recommended and inconsistency with regards to surplus stocks or diversion prevention. More specifically, the ATT primarily deals with diversion prevention during international transfers; the other instruments do so during the life of a weapon. Better understanding on how the instruments link to one another is the pre-condition to enhance the effectiveness of and synergies across their implementation.

**Norms and standards**

The development of norms and standards in recent years is proof of the distinctive nature of ammunition (see Annex II). One major development culminated in the adoption of the IATG under the UN SaferGuard programme in 2011. Using a three-tiered progressive risk reduction approach, these guidelines were developed to assist countries in improving safety, security and efficiency in managing ammunition throughout its life cycle. Based on good practices from around the world, they are a solid foundation for developing national regulations and standard operating procedures (SOPs) regarding ammunition management.

Efforts have been made to ensure that standards in the realm of arms control and disarmament, although distinct in scope, are fully compatible with one another. The IATG, for instance, were developed to complement the 2006 UN Integrated DDR Standards and the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). Complementarities and similarities also exist between the IATG and the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The former are of relevance to

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**BOX 2**

**EFFORTS BY THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TO DEVELOP A LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT**

Since 2015, Cambodia has been leading the efforts of the ASEAN, with the support of the EU, to develop a legally binding instrument to tackle the problems of illicit firearms trafficking. This initiative responds to a recognised need that more should be done to address the security challenges in the region. A possible instrument in the future may include provisions on SALW ammunition, and on stockpile management and security.
mune action organisations for the storage, transport, logistics and disposal of ammunition and provide guidance on explosive ordnance clearance of ammunition storage sites after an explosion. Consequently, once the IATG came into effect, the IMAS were reviewed so as to ensure consistency with these new requirements.36

At the regional level, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW (SEESAC) has, since the early 2000s, contributed to standard-setting in the form of its Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines that comprise standards on ammunition stockpile management or ammunition storage and safety.37 Regional organisations have also codified good practice to help implementation such as the OSCE’s Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition38, generic SOPs for stockpile management and destruction of SALW by the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean or guidelines for the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol by the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Noteworthy also are the manuals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Safety Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives and for Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives that informed the drafting of the IATG.39 With the adoption of the IATG, there is a clear reference point for any subsequent updates of these regional standards and guidelines.
POLITICAL PROCESSES

In parallel to the elaboration of international and regional normative frameworks, norms and standards, several political processes on ammunition management have taken shape within and outside of a UN framework.

The UNGA has dedicated specific attention to ammunition since 1997 when it requested a report on the problem of ammunition and explosives (mandated notably under the agenda item on small arms). In 2004, the Assembly decided to include on its agenda a stand-alone item related to conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, while the open-ended working group to negotiate the ITI also recommended that SALW ammunition be addressed in a comprehensive manner as part of a separate process. Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus have since been addressed by the UNGA periodically. In 2008, a GGE considered further steps to enhance cooperation on the topic, which recommended the development of the IATG and the set-up of a knowledge resource management platform on ammunition technical issues (established later as the UN SaferGuard).

The latest iteration of the biennial resolution adopted by the UNGA in December 2017 represents the culmination of that ammunition-specific process. This resolution establishes open and informal consultations ‘with a view to identifying urgent issues pertaining to the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus on which progress can be made’ that may build a basis for a GGE to be convened for 2020.
Beyond this specific UN General Assembly ammunition-dedicated track, other UN processes consider the effective management of ammunition, mostly in relation to SALW. Since the advent of the UN’s process on small arms, ammunition has come into play and been considered an integral part of SALW. In principle, the UN Security Council treats small arms and ammunition in a comprehensive manner when addressing country-specific and thematic items on its agenda. For example, UN Security Council resolution 2220 (2015) recognises the value of effective PSSM of SALW and ammunition as an important means to prevent the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse of SALW, while also emphasising the need for assistance to develop capacities. Since 2016, ammunition management has also formed part of another UN process pertaining to countering the threat posed by IEDs.

Switzerland launched its SSMA initiative in 2015 outside of a UN context. This initiative materialised in particular in the form of an informal open-ended Group of Interested States in Geneva to discuss the topic regularly, as well as two international meetings in 2015 and 2016. These meetings were a first attempt to stimulate discussions among policy-practitioners and technical experts aimed at exploring ammunition management implementation challenges and identifying responses to address them. The Swiss initiative is appreciated for having boosted attention for and generated political momentum around this long-time neglected issue. This achievement has contributed to the strong mandate for ammunition management-related work called for by the 2017 UNGA resolution on the topic.

Most recently, the AU adopted its Ammunition Safety and Security Management initiative in 2017. In doing so, the AU acknowledges that ‘poorly secured and managed Government arms and ammunition stockpiles remain a main source of armaments for non-state armed groups, terrorist groups and criminals’, and urges Member States to implement PSSM best practices. The initiative supports the practical steps outlined in the AU master roadmap to ‘silence the guns’, while seeking to complement assistance in beneficiary countries. As a first concrete result of this initiative, Guinea-Bissau was supported in 2017, while other countries including Malawi, Zambia, Angola or Mozambique, are considered for 2018 and beyond.
CHALLENGES IN AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT EFFORTS
NATIONAL LEVEL

Immediate prevention measures are essential, not least to demonstrate positive dividends and foster confidence in the process. But focus on short-term interventions on physical security and ammunition and explosive management, or stockpile accounting training has rarely been proven to be sufficient to address the issue and ensure that knowledge and practices are sustained. The two international meetings convened by Switzerland have clearly sharpened the understanding among practitioners of step-by-step and consistent approaches as well as sustainable solutions. Also, there is growing recognition that unplanned explosions and diversion are symptoms of various shortcomings: lack of political awareness, lack of staff capacity, skills and adequate infrastructure, or institutional, governance and oversight issues.

**BOX 3 MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT) PROJECT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Set up in December 2010, the MTT project aims to develop capacity and provide training on weapons and ammunition storage site management, safety and security in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through a train-the-trainer approach.

Led by Switzerland and implemented jointly with Austria and Sweden, the project has delivered sustainable results principally due to its multi-level and holistic approach:

- While the project provides needs-based, tailor-made modular training, it also ensures that knowledge and capacity are incrementally transferred and institutionalised with increasing national responsibility and autonomy;

- The MTT courses address the needs of armed forces personnel working on different aspects of weapons and ammunition life-cycle management, recognising that MTT training should be specific to local dynamics, sensitive to the actual competencies and needs of recipients, and based on an in-country assessment;

- The MTT project strives to ensure coherence between training and equipment so that both aspects are delivered in accordance with international standards;
Although achieving effective and sustainable national ammunition management is a multi-layered and context-specific endeavour, efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Box 3) illustrate some of the following common key ingredients that have emerged over the years:

National awareness and ownership

Many countries remain unaware of the risks associated with the consequences of inadequate ammunition management practices and consider addressing them only in the aftermath of an explosive event. At times, they also refrain from engaging openly, in particular in regions characterised by political tensions. Ammunition is more often perceived as an asset than a potential liability. Awareness can, in certain contexts, be absent due to political, security or simply cultural and language factors.

National ownership is a pre-requisite. Commitment at the top level of government does, however, not necessarily trickle down to those actually doing the job on the ground. On occasion, implementing agencies are asked for support, but once in country, cooperation from local storage holders is not guaranteed.
Likewise, commitment may be found on the ground whilst lacking at the top level, requiring that it be nurtured at all levels.55

Effective ammunition management is driven nationally and takes into account country-specific situations.56 Engaging with countries on ammunition also pre-supposes a high level of trust and confidence. As trust is necessarily built-up over time, support to at-risk countries is a long-term endeavour. Conversely, regular changes of personnel working for implementing partners and governmental institutions can jeopardise that trust and the likelihood of at-risk countries to engage actively.

**National capacities and structures**

The establishment of effective and well-coordinated national structures is a concrete signal that ammunition management is nationally owned. Reality on the ground, however, is that the ammunition portfolio often remains an ‘orphan’. 
Should such structures exist, for instance national SALW commissions, they often lack sufficient authority and resources. As a result, when planning and conducting their projects, external implementing partners tend to deal with various national counterparts.\(^57\)

Functioning structures and staff competencies are two sides of the same coin. At-risk countries often lack capacity to recognise and address the issue. In practice, the temptation for international stakeholders to seek immediate improvements might result in a vicious cycle: a lack of national institutional capacity leading to external material assistance and equipment that does, in turn, not address those national gaps in the long term. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates how to plan the development of skills and competencies from the beginning, in such a manner that it leads to national uptake and capacities at all levels.

**National plans with desired end-state**

National action plans or strategies, developed by national authorities, are deemed essential to set needs-based and context-specific national priorities and define an end-state for international cooperation and assistance. Similarly, these plans help identify synergies across ammunition-related areas as well as obstacles potentially undermining sustainability.\(^58\)

**Applying the IATG at the national level**

The development of a national normative and technical framework that is based on the IATG is essential for sustainable national ownership and implementation, taking into consideration the local context, needs and priorities. Certain national norms are often already in place, but generally spread over several disciplines associated with the management and storage of hazardous materials, and do not, at times, reflect latest normative developments, or lack enforcement mechanisms.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS**

The risks from poorly managed and unsecured ammunition, especially in volatile security environments have been addressed in the mandates of UN missions. Change, marking a watershed in the role of peacekeeping missions to address these risks can, for instance, be attributed to UN Security Council resolution 2100 in 2013, explicitly calling on the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to assist the transitional authorities, through training and other support, in weapons and ammunition management.\(^59\) The role of UN missions in supporting weapons and ammunition management practices, especially at the
national level, has been further reiterated since several peacekeeping and special political missions were mandated with ammunition management-relevant tasks (see Figure 3).60

Assistance by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as part of the implementation of peacekeeping/special political mission mandates primarily supports national capacity development, including the safe and secure management of arms and ammunition stockpiles. UNMAS also provides relevant technical advice to national authorities to support compliance with sanctions regimes, when applicable.

Ammunition storage facilities of peacekeeping forces themselves represent a risk in certain circumstances. The Small Arms Survey noted that ‘the loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations is neither infrequent nor inconsequential.’62 Although the UN system for the management and control of the movement of contingent-owned equipment provides for a rigorous stockpile security and transport control regime, risk perception and stockpile security practices differ from one mission to another, including among contingents of the same mission.63
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

In the last decade, PSSM has become a highly requested form of intervention to curb illicit flows of SALW and ammunition. Significant international cooperation and assistance of a technical and financial nature has been provided to at-risk countries through a multiplicity of channels and by an array of actors.64

No global assistance mechanism or trust fund dedicated to ammunition management currently exists, increasing the risk of duplicity and lack of cooperation. In the absence of such, mine action, SALW control, stabilisation or security sector reform portfolios have served as funding streams for ammunition work. Furthermore, projects have been funded through thematic channels on regional security and counter-terrorism or in the context of specific international and regional instruments such as the ATT, UN PoA, CCW Protocol V or the ECOWAS Convention, which all comprise a mechanism for international cooperation and assistance. Some projects are also funded through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation and potentially the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund.

Certain regional organisations also provide platforms for at-risk countries to request support. As mentioned above, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition entails an assistance mechanism through which participating States can seek expert advice as well as financial and material assistance for the improvement of their stockpile management. Similarly, through its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, NATO supports projects in allied and partner countries in the realm of mine action, SALW control and PSSM. It seems, however, that most support is provided bilaterally including in the context of military-to-military cooperation.
As the wider humanitarian, stability and peacebuilding ramifications of ammunition management have begun to complement the previously dominant security perception, long-standing bilateral and multilateral military-to-military support has been complemented by assistance from a civilian ‘community of practice’, including donors, the United Nations, international, regional and non-governmental organisations and commercial actors from different backgrounds.

While ammunition management requires specific technical skills and competence, expertise from various other sectors, such as mine action and SALW control, can be drawn upon extensively. The former tends to perform mostly technical and operational tasks, while the latter often conveys an understanding of the SALW control context and wider policy frameworks. The involvement of organisations with different expertise and background allows the overall response to be better targeted and to achieve greater impact. This notwithstanding, this multi-stakeholder modus operandi brings challenges in ensuring that actors and projects complement each other in a coordinated and coherent manner.
GAPS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
Analysing the interplay between instruments, processes and implementation efforts highlights several avenues that deserve further attention:

**Ensuring coherence across legal, political and operational responses**

The previous chapter underlined the fact that the framework currently addressing ammunition consists of a patchwork of instruments. As reflected at the 2017 OSCE Ministerial Council, there is scope to bring regional regimes closer to international developments to ensure more coherence.69

Furthermore, the various political initiatives, which culminated in the adoption of the 2017 UNGA resolution on ammunition stockpiles in surplus, testify to a heightened political momentum. However, it requires deliberate efforts to ensure that they feed into one another in a truly coordinated and coherent manner. The UN General Assembly ‘track’ coordinated by Germany may lead on political work at the global level, clarifying further the state of play and current gaps, recommending actions and potentially developing further the political framework on the topic. It might address to a lesser extent ‘operational’ aspects, including building national capacities, fostering research, exchanging good practices on workable solutions, awareness-raising on the IATG, and matching needs with resources. The latter, coupled with a regional perspective, has thus far been the focus of the Swiss initiative and the more recent initiative by the AU.
Strengthening capacities, institutions and standards

Incomplete understanding of ammunition management by national counterparts often hampers the effectiveness and achievability of institutional, legislative and operational changes from the outset. A mix of tailored ‘incentives’ must be offered more convincingly to increase appreciation of the risks involved when managing ammunition ineffectively and to foster awareness of the breadth of measures an appropriate response entails. Greater awareness is required on the accountability of national authorities for ammunition management. The risks of unplanned explosions for civilians, including socio-economic impact, the threat of regional insecurity or costs related to the maintenance of obsolete/unserviceable stockpiles, are all dimensions that should be called to mind when engaging on this topic at a political level, across State institutions (as opposed to only within the Ministry of Defence and relevant departments of the armed forces).

Support is most effective when approached as a broader governance issue. National institutions should be established, equipped and, crucially, empowered. A certain lack of in-country know-how and related guidance regarding resources and capacities required for an institution to sustainably manage ammunition appears to be a major impediment in this regard. Comprehensive and long-term support, linked to organisational structure, as well as ensuring strong capacities and the appropriate decision-making power of such entities, must remain a priority, which includes the development of skills and knowledge specific to stakeholder groups at all levels. Importantly, sensitising and involving oversight bodies such as parliaments should be encouraged.

Particular questions as to the set-up of such entities have arisen. Expanding the mandate of an existing body, for example a national SALW commission or a mine action authority, is an option that might allow ammunition management-related tasks to be efficiently integrated into existing structures. Yet, these bodies must imperatively be equipped with relevant ammunition expertise and enjoy institutional backing from all national stakeholders, including the armed forces, in order to be recognised and effective.

With a view to planning and guiding national ammunition management in a strategic and sustainable manner, national action plans can play a cardinal role in ownership and, by focusing on the national policy level, are key to overcoming the slim divide between the normative processes (e.g. UN resolutions, guidelines) and technical implementation. National action plans should also be understood as a tool to prioritise efforts, coordinate and define objectives and ‘exit points’ to which international partners can commit over the medium term. As important as these plans are, further guidance is deemed useful and capacity development is
needed for their establishment in the future. The 2017 UNGA resolution related to problems arising from the accumulation of ammunition stockpiles in surplus encourages States to develop them.\(^7^1\)

Finally, where legislation for ammunition exists, it rarely addresses the whole scope of the issue. Familiarity with the IATG must be increased, including through further translations, and capacities developed so that sound national regulations are put in place. Some efforts are under way in this regard: the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the GICHD are developing a guide on establishing national standards for ammunition management, and a second one to serve as a ‘basic guide’ to assist countries in best utilising the IATG in their national contexts.

**Structuring international cooperation and assistance**

Ammunition management is a relatively new issue in international cooperation and assistance with an array of new actors becoming active. It requires further consolidation and structuring to bring the different stakeholders together, harvest thematic and institutional synergies across sectors, and nurture a common understanding of the breadth of measures required and the different concepts used. Better structuring of international cooperation and assistance, i.e. matching needs with resources, and increasing coordination among donors is ever more important. Not only because it could enhance the performance of international cooperation, but also because it could set the basis for far clearer and better conditions to build trust and confidence with national counterparts.

At the national level, it is undisputed that ammunition management is a State’s own responsibility. In practical terms, a lack of national focal points in charge of coordination seriously hampers coherent planning and implementation.\(^7^2\) However, cases such as Niger document that, in certain contexts, even an existing national commission was not effectively involved in national planning; support was instead coordinated bilaterally between donors and implementing partners.\(^7^3\) Examples such as Niger and Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrate, on the one hand, the continuing need to promote more structured in-country coordination to help
overcome the often fragmented responses. On the other hand, they also suggest that partnership agreements need to be sought to ensure national financial and political commitment for uptake and sustainability of international assistance.

Approaching ammunition management at the regional level has gained much attention, mindful that the diversion and illicit proliferation of weapons and ammunition is typically a regional challenge accentuated by porous borders. Yet, regional approaches are not effective by and of themselves, but require a strong regional arrangement. Certain regional organisations have traditionally been engaged, while others have done so more recently (see Box 4). The AU, for instance, has recognised the value of equipping itself with a roster of PSSM experts from the Greater Sahel States to better respond to requests and broker local training capacities across the region. Once operational and qualified, such regional experts could complement the UN SaferGuard’s Roster of Experts.

**BOX 4** AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT SUPPORT BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

From 2010 to 2016, the OAS established and conducted a programme to support Central American countries in different areas of SALW control and ammunition management. Following international standards, the programme resulted in the destruction of surplus/obsolete ammunition, accounting of stockpiles, refurbishment of facilities and training in Costa Rica, Dominica or El Salvador, among others. The programme has testified to the importance of long-standing support and the role that a regional organisation can play among countries in similar situations, including as a mechanism for accountability. Serving as the Technical Secretariat of CIFTA gives the OAS a privileged position in this regard.

Regional organisations can play a major role in channeling assistance and galvanising national buy-in and capacities, particularly in Africa and Europe. Partnerships in Africa, primarily with the AU and ECOWAS, have been strengthened in the course of the last few years. CARICOM and Central America have made good progress as well. The active involvement of regional bodies on ammunition management seems more challenging in Asia and the Middle East; a focus on national approaches in selected countries from these regions might be more realistic. Work on issues such as national action plans or result-focused monitoring mechanisms are typically areas that could benefit from stronger regional collaboration in the future.
A recurring challenge in international assistance is the development of sufficiently detailed and ‘SMART’-ly formulated requests for support so as to make them attractive to donors. This is an issue that the Small Arms Survey’s PSSM Priorities Matrix attempts to address by offering a structured framework to requesting countries to identify and rank priorities, and improve submissions.\textsuperscript{74}

Finally, although coordination sensibly multiplies the impact of individual efforts, mechanisms allowing for effective donor coordination have not kept up with the speed at which support has grown, leading to inefficiencies and duplications. This should be addressed at the international and/or regional level (see Box 5). For its part, the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) was originally conceived as an informal and apolitical platform for coordination of assistance on PSSM (among other tasks),\textsuperscript{75} with a focus on information sharing. It does not, however, fully respond to the need for an effective global forum for donor coordination. Similarly, NATO’s SALW and mine action information-sharing platform has value in listing SALW control, mine action and certain PSSM projects, but is limited to those from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries willing to share information on this tool.\textsuperscript{76}

**BOX 5**

**AFRICAN UNION-GERMANY COORDINATION PLATFORM FOR THE GREATER SAHEL**

In 2015, recognising the challenge of coordination, the AU together with the German Federal Foreign Office, decided to set up a formal, structured coordination platform in which the AU, donor representatives, relevant regional economic commissions, States, the UN and implementing partners meet bi-annually to share information about ongoing and future activities on SALW control and PSSM in the Greater Sahel region. Technical working groups have been active since, aiming to improve joint planning among donors to enhance coordination, reduce duplication and ensure a balanced distribution of assistance. An online database has also been requested to capture SALW control and PSSM activities planned and undertaken in the region.\textsuperscript{77} A roadmap for the implementation of the AU’s initiative ‘Silencing the guns’ with a matching donor coordination structure is under development.
Better anchoring of ammunition management in the ‘bigger picture’

Discussions in past years have revealed that ammunition management has somewhat remained removed from disarmament, prevention, sustainable development or humanitarian action and that these broader frameworks have not been used sufficiently to change the still-prevailing perception that ammunition management is a technical, independent activity. However, ammunition management may yet unfold its true dividends, in particular when contributing deliberately and coherently to broader peace and security efforts such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Similarly, since it can reduce the risk of proliferation, violence and crises, the UN Secretary-General’s prevention agenda should be increasingly considered in this regard. A gap also persists between ammunition management and wider urban planning; settlements around existing ammunition depots or populations migrating to the vicinity of relocated depots are key issues that can undermine the very objective of PSSM measures.

Finally, there is scope to approach ammunition management more consistently in the context of normative frameworks. Related conferences such as the upcoming Third Review Conference of the UN PoA or the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the ATT, offer opportunities to anchor ammunition management more firmly in these discussions.

More results-focused ammunition management

From years of experience, the result is that by failing to understand the interconnection between the various ingredients for sustainable ammunition management, assistance has not reached its full possible impact. Symptomatically, the Small Arms Survey noted in 2015 that the impact of stockpile management courses on capacities and competencies was hard to evaluate.

Many donors now increasingly consider their political and financial support as an ‘investment’ which requires stakeholders to demonstrate their success and impact. Doing so (or not) may determine future funding trends. To date, ammunition management has remained, to a large extent, reliant on assumptions on its impact that output-based, currently (and commonly) used measurements (e.g. number of munitions destroyed or storage areas refurbished) are unable to demonstrate. To address this gap, interventions should be better addressed as part of a wider framework (see Box 6).
Similarly, the development of indicators to measure the impact and effectiveness of assistance would allow for better capturing of sustainable change in systems and approach, for instance regarding national normative frameworks, organisational structures and procedures, training and doctrine development, equipment and maintenance, personnel management, finances and infrastructure (i.e. the seven conditions for comprehensive ammunition management).

A workshop in 2016 undertaken by the Mines Advisory Group concluded that implementation of SDG 16, specifically its target 16.4 to reduce illicit arms flows, ‘provides a clear framework to consider the impact of PSSM assistance’. Measuring progress towards this target can also be directly relevant to the implementation of instruments such as the ATT and the UN Firearms Protocol. Unsurprisingly, the UNGA encourages States to develop ammunition management-specific indicators to complement their national SDG frameworks.
Systematic ammunition management in UN missions

Ammunition management-related activities are enshrined in certain mandates of UN peacekeeping and special political missions. Research for this report suggests that they can be more systematically anchored in mandates, operationalised and geared towards sustainable solutions. This may apply in particular to the development of capacities of national stakeholders in PSSM and efforts towards more structural and institutional efforts.87 Also, ammunition management could warrant stronger focus (as opposed to weapons management). Ultimately, further awareness and knowledge need to be raised among troop-contributing countries (TCC), possibly, for instance, as part of pre-deployment training guidelines. Changing risk perception, harmonising SOPs, regulating inspections, storage requirements and inventory of TCC’s own weapons and ammunition, or better standardising TCC’s mandates for the disposal of captured items could reduce the loss of material, while strengthening the mission’s protection mandate (see Box 7).

UNAMID is a case in point to illustrate improved weapon and ammunition management of a peacekeeping mission. UNMAS Darfur has assisted UNAMID military and police contingents in upgrading or refurbishing storage sites in accordance with the IATG and ISACS. It also helped establish an ammunition and weapons working group to review the mission’s relevant activities and draft a joint SOP for safe storage and management of weapons and ammunition at UNAMID sites. The SOP is currently pending approval.88
CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, the issues arising from unsafe and unsecure management of ammunition has been better documented and eventually understood as an area of humanitarian and security concern. As a consequence, ammunition management has been more firmly placed on the international agenda, at political and normative level, and a ‘community of practice’ has emerged. International support has stepped up to strengthen national efforts.

Major bottlenecks persist for sound and sustainable ammunition management. International cooperation and assistance is to be coordinated more effectively, national capacities promoted and global awareness sustained. Beyond its immediate human and national/regional security benefits, ammunition management should also be better understood as a contribution to broader efforts of prevention, peace, sustainable development and security sector governance. Recent initiatives and processes such as the Germany-led UN General Assembly track and the Swiss SSMA initiative are important contributions in this endeavour.
### ANNEX I: SELECTED AMMUNITION-RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAMEWORK</th>
<th>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>AMMUNITION ASPECT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015)</td>
<td>• To end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all.</td>
<td>• Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Other relevant targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty (2013)</td>
<td>• To regulate the international trade in conventional arms and seek to prevent and eradicate illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms by establishing international standards governing arms transfers.</td>
<td>• Art. 3: Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 (Prohibitions) and Article 7 (Export and Export Assessment) prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Art. 16.1: In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance including legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and technical, material or financial assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices for implementation. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide such assistance, upon request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2003)</td>
<td>• To address post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to minimize the occurrence, effects and the risk of explosive remnants of war.</td>
<td>• Art. 8: Bearing in mind the different situations and capacities, each High Contracting Party is encouraged to take generic preventive measures aimed at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war, including, but not limited to, those referred to in Part 3 of the Technical Annex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical Annex, Part 3, Generic Preventive Measures: In order to ensure the best possible long-term reliability of explosive ordnance, States are encouraged to apply best practice norms and operating procedures with respect to its storage, transport, field storage, and handling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001)</td>
<td>• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.</td>
<td>• The lack of definition of SALW in the UN PoA creates uncertainty as to whether provisions that are not clearly limited to the weapons themselves, including those in stockpile management, also apply to small arms ammunition, parts and components. This has led to political controversy, with some States arguing that the Programme of Action applies to ammunition and others rejecting this view.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>AMMUNITION ASPECT</td>
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<tr>
<td>International (cont.)</td>
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<td>* Art. 4: This Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the prevention of illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition and to the investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol where those offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing</td>
<td>• To promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Ammunition (2001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (2013)</td>
<td>• To improve citizen security by creating a safe, just and free Community, while simultaneously improving the economic viability of the Region.</td>
<td>* Strategy that fully takes ammunition into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Declaration on the Control of Small</td>
<td>• To strengthen cooperation and coordination efforts in order to control the spread, flow, misuse and illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons.</td>
<td>* Commitment to strengthen national capacities and institutions to develop and implement comprehensive SALW control strategies, national action plans and interventions, including Physical Stockpile Security Management of State-held SALW and ammunition, in accordance with international standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms and Light Weapons across the Neighboring</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries of Western Sudan (2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM Declaration on Small Arms and Light</td>
<td>• To implement all necessary actions at the national and regional level to fully combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition […].</td>
<td>* Declaration that fully takes ammunition into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons (2011)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Central African Convention for the Control of</td>
<td>• To prevent, combat and eradicate, in Central Africa, the illicit trade and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and all parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, repair and assembly.</td>
<td>* Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Council Common Position 2008/944</td>
<td>• To define common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.</td>
<td>* Common Position that fully takes ammunition into account (as defined by the Common Military List of the European Union).</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>AMMUNITION ASPECT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>• To prevent and combat the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS.</td>
<td>• Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006)</td>
<td>• To continue the efforts for the control of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS […].</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of</td>
<td>• To combat the accumulation of and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.</td>
<td>• Strategy that fully takes ammunition into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their ammunition (2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms</td>
<td>• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region.</td>
<td>• Commitment to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and</td>
<td>• To prevent the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region.</td>
<td>excessive and destabilising accumulation of, trafficking in, illicit possession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordering States (2004)</td>
<td>• To promote and facilitate information sharing and cooperation between the governments in the sub-region, as well as between governments, inter-governmental organisations and civil society, in all matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons […].</td>
<td>and use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and other related materials, owing to the harmful effects of these activities on the security of each state and the sub-region and the danger they pose to the well-being of the population in the sub-region, their social and economic development and their right to live in peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
<td>• To provide participating States, upon their request, with a procedure that is designed to facilitate the assessment of situations created by conventional ammunition, explosive material and/or detonating devices presenting risks on their territory and to establish a framework for international assistance (technical, personnel and/or financial) to address these risks.</td>
<td>• Document that fully takes ammunition into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (2003)</td>
<td>• To assist host and assisting/donor States’ efforts to deal with stockpile management, stockpile security, and risk assessment of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction […].</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK</td>
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<td>Regional (cont.)</td>
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</table>
| Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other related materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region (2001) | • To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related material, and their excessive and destabilising accumulation, trafficking, possession and use.  
• To promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experience in the Region to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, excessive and destabilising use and accumulation of, trafficking in, possession and use of firearms, ammunition and other related materials.  
• To cooperate closely at the regional level as well as at international fora to effectively prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, excessive and destabilising use and accumulation of, trafficking in, possession and use of firearms, ammunition and other related materials in collaboration with international partners. | • Protocol that fully takes ammunition into account. |
| Nadi Framework (2000) | • To require each person who possesses or uses a firearm, ammunition, other related materials and prohibited weapons under the authority of a permit to have a genuine reason for the possession/use of the weapon.  
• To provide strict requirements that must be satisfied in relation to the possession and use of firearms, ammunition, other related materials and prohibited weapons. | • Framework that fully takes ammunition into account. |
| Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (1997) | • To prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.  
• To promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experience among States Parties to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials. | • Convention that fully takes ammunition into account. |
## ANNEX II: SELECTED AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELEVANT NORMS, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORM/STANDARD/GUIDELINE</th>
<th>RELEVANT FOCUS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
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</table>
| International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 10.50 – Storage, transportation and handling of explosives (2013) | • To provide national mine action authorities and demining organisations with guidance on the safe storage, transportation and handling of explosives and explosive materials both in the operators’ main base and also in the field or temporary base.  
• Specifications for the storage of explosives and safety distances when storing bulk explosives are those provided by the IATG. |
| International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.20 – Principles and procedures for open burning and open detonation operations (2013) | • To explain the principles and procedures for the conduct of large-scale open burning and open detonation destruction of stockpiles of explosive ordnance including anti-personnel mines. This IMAS includes recommendations for the layout of disposal sites and the contents of SOPs in order to ensure a safe system of work. |
| International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.30 – National planning guidelines for stockpile destruction (2013) | • To establish principles and provide guidance for the effective national planning and management of stockpile destruction operations of explosive ordnance including anti-personnel mines. |
| International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (2011) | • To achieve and demonstrate effective levels of safety and security of ammunition stockpiles.  
• To provide a comprehensive set of guidelines for the safe and secure storage of conventional ammunition.  
• To assist States to establish national standards and national SOPs by establishing a frame of reference, which can be used, or adapted for use, as a national standard. |
| **Regional**             |                |
| United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) generic standard operating procedures for stockpile management and destruction of small arms and light weapons (2013) | • To assist States in their compliance with international agreements and norms, while providing them with specific guidance that can be easily adapted to their own administrative and operational systems. |
| Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2008) | • To serve as a guide for national policymaking by the OSCE participating States and encourage higher common standards.  
• Compilation of the currently available “best practice” guides of techniques and procedures for the destruction of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonation devices and the management and control of stockpiles of ammunition. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORM/STANDARD/GUIDELINE</th>
<th>RELEVANT FOCUS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light</td>
<td>To provide specifications and guidelines for the safe storage, transportation and handling of ammunition and explosives that are either: 1) recovered during SALW collection operations; 2) awaiting destruction; or 3) are surplus in storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons (SEESAC), Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) 05.40 –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and Explosives Storage and Safety (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light</td>
<td>To provide specifications and guidelines for the stockpile management of ammunition and explosives that are either: 1) recovered during SALW collection operations; 2) awaiting destruction; 3) national stockpiles; or 4) are surplus in storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons (SEESAC), Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) 05.50 –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and Explosives Stockpile Management (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the</td>
<td>To establish safety principles to be used as a guide between host countries and NATO forces in the development of mutually agreeable regulations for the layout of ammunition storage depots and for the storage of conventional ammunition and explosives therein. These principles are intended also to form the basis of national regulations as far as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AASTP-1) (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the</td>
<td>To establish safety principles and procedures to be used by NATO forces in host countries during the transport of conventional military ammunition and explosives by all modes of transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AASTP-2) (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the</td>
<td>To elaborate a framework for the development of policy, review of national legislation, general operational guidelines and procedures on all aspects of SALW, required for implementation by the Nairobi Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2005)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The guide covers the SALW stockpile, in legal non-State possession, as well as that in State possession during peacetime.</td>
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### ANNEX III: MAJOR CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING AND SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS COMPRISING AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN MISSION</th>
<th>AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>Deeply concerned by the proliferation of arms, in particular SALW and the use of such arms against civilians, the UN Security Council calls for the implementation of the arms embargo. UNMAS carries out weapon and ammunition safety management initiatives with national security actors to help reduce the potential theft of small arms and ammunition and mitigate the risk of unplanned explosions at storage facilities. The Ordnance Disposal Office also provides technical support to UNAMID Military and Formed Police Units to support compliance with International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)</td>
<td>As a component of UNSOM, UNMAS supports the government in weapons and ammunition management in line with sanctions obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)</td>
<td>UN Security Council resolution 2386 (2017) affirms that ‘UNISFA may undertake weapons confiscation and destruction in the Abyei’. UNMAS manages disposal of confiscated weapons and ammunition. UNMAS also trains UNISFA troops in the use of the equipment, to meet international standards in weapons and ammunition destruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>UNMAS has been supporting UNMISS since the beginning of 2017 by ensuring the high quality required of ammunition and explosive storage facilities of the Troop and Police Contributing Contingents (TCC/PCC) throughout the mission. This has included site surveys at TCC/PCC storage facilities and, where necessary, supporting these TCC/PCC to upgrade the security of their facilities. These tasks derive from the UN Security Council’s mandate to UNMISS on the protection of civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</td>
<td>UN Security Council resolution 2364 (2017) calls on the UN to ‘assist the Malian authorities with (…) weapons and ammunition management’, prioritising the enhancement of national capacities. While 22 weapons and ammunition facilities have been constructed or rehabilitated in northern Mali up to 2017, efforts were made for the Malian counterparts responsible for the newly rehabilitated storage sites to receive tailored induction trainings on weapons and ammunition management. Other qualifying training has also been conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN MISSION</td>
<td>AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization</td>
<td>The UN Security Council calls on MINUSCA to ‘actively seize, confiscate and destroy, as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of armed elements (…), to destroy, as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of disarmed combatants’ and to collect and/or destroy surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)</td>
<td>Beyond implementing a weapons and ammunition management framework, UNMAS builds stockpile management capacity and supports disposal of unsafe weapons and ammunition collected during DDR. UNMAS also facilitates the delivery of technical assistance to the National Commission on SALW.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>UN Security Council resolution 2348 (2017) ‘calls for continued national efforts to address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through ensuring the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO (…)’.91 UNMAS establishes weapons and ammunition depots, provides training on their management and also supports the government in developing a national action plan on SALW aiming to reduce the risks related to the proliferation of weapons and ammunition.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)</td>
<td>The UN Security Council mandated UNSMIL to provide ‘support for securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their proliferation’, while underscoring the importance of fully implementing existing sanctions measures.100 In this context, UNMAS has recently developed a technical framework for arms and ammunition management to help national institutions manage vast stockpiles of controlled and uncontrolled arms.101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3 Berman Eric and Reina Pilar (2014), *op. cit.*, p. 28.


8 For this research, the term ‘ammunition’ is understood as defined by the IATG: ‘a complete device, (e.g. missile, shell, mine, demolition store etc.) charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition or nuclear, biological or chemical material for use in connection with offence, or defence, or training, or non-operational purposes, including those parts of weapons systems containing explosives.’ See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (2015a), International Technical Ammunition Guideline 01.40: Glossary of terms and abbreviations (2nd edition), art. 3.8.


12 UNGA (2008a), *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus*, UN Doc. A/63/182.


17 The following major ammunition management stakeholders have contributed to this research through interviews and/or questionnaire responses: Austria (Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence); France (Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Armed Forces); Germany (Federal Foreign Office, Federal Ministry of Defence); South Africa (Department of Defence); Switzerland (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport); African Union; Organization of American States (OAS); Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining; Mines Advisory Group; Small Arms Survey; United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; United Nations Mine Action Service; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.


20 The lack of definition of SALW in the UN PoA creates uncertainty as to whether provisions that are not clearly limited to the weapons themselves, including those in stockpile management, also apply to small arms ammunition, parts, and components. In addition, the inclusion of ‘in all its aspects’ in the title of the UN PoA could arguably also apply to ammunition. This has led to political controversy, with some States arguing that the UN PoA applies to ammunition and others rejecting this view. In 2005, the Open-ended Working Group on the International Tracing Instrument called for a separate process on ammunition in the framework of the UN which could be seen as a compromise in this controversy. See also Parker Sarah (2015), Practical Disarmament Initiative. Stockpile Management and Diversion Provisions in Selected International and Regional Instruments (Geneva: SAS), p. 1; UNGA (2005a), Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, UN Doc. A/60/88, para 27.

22 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol V), 2399 UNTS 100, art. 9 and Technical Annex, Part 3.


28 The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) was established in 2005 to build the capacity of member states and ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.

29 Economic Community of West African States (2006), *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials*, art. 16 and 17.

30 Bourne Mike et al. (2006), *TRESA: Global and Regional Agreements on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control* (Bonn: BICC), p. 33.


32 For instance, the UN Firearms Protocol considers complete round, and components (including cartridge cases, primers or propellant powder) as being part of ammunition. Others however, including the ECOWAS Convention on SALW, their Ammunition and Other Related Material, do not include parts and components, but cover munitions that are not fired or expelled from a small arm or light weapon. See Safeworld (n.d.), *Ammunition and the ATT: Options for and implications of its inclusion* (Geneva: UNIDIR), p. 3.

33 Parker Sarah (2015), *op. cit.*., p. 11.
Within the IATG, the tasks and activities necessary for safe, efficient and effective stockpile management equate to one of three risk-reduction process levels, dependent on the degree of complexity of each task or activity.


In its decision 10/17, the OSCE Ministerial Council called for exploring ways to review, and where appropriate, supplement the OSCE Handbook of best practices on stockpiles of conventional ammunition and for exploring the possibility of a voluntary use of the IATG in OSCE ammunition assistance projects. See OSCE Ministerial Council (2017), *Decision No. 10/17: Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition*, OSCE Doc. MC.DEC/10/17, p. 3.


44 UNGA (2017b), op. cit.
49 UNGA (2016c), Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, UN Doc. A/RES/71/72; UNGA (2017a), op. cit.
53 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (2015), op. cit., p. 3.
56 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (2015), op. cit., p. 3.
57 Isikozlu Elvan et al. (2017), art. cit., p. 18.
58 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (2016), op. cit., p. 4.


Ibid., p. 57; Berman Eric and King Benjamin (2017), art. cit., p. 17.

Isikozlu Elvan et al. (2017), art. cit., p. 18.

For a comprehensive overview of relevant stakeholders with their areas of expertise, see for instance Berman Eric and Reina Pilar (eds) (2014), op. cit.


OSCE Ministerial Council (2017), op. cit.


Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (2015), op. cit., p. 4.


Ibid.


80 This conclusion related to PSSM in South-East Europe. See Gobinet Pierre (2015), *art. cit.*, p. 145.


82 These indicators remain valuable to justify short-term investments.


87 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (2016), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.


99  UNSC resolution 2327 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2327 (2016); E-Mail from Maria Vardis, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service, 16 February 2018; E-Mail from Tim Lardner, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS South Sudan, 27 February 2018.


