Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action

Final Report

Kristian Berg Harpviken
Ananda S. Millard
Kjell Erling Kjellman
Arne Strand

Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management
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Authors: Kristian Berg Harpviken, Ananda S. Millard, Kjell Erling Kjellman, Arne Strand

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SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64
Telegram: sida stockholm. Postgrio: 1 56 34–9
E-mail: info@sida.se. Homepage: http://www.sida.se
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<td>ACBAR</td>
<td>Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Accelerated Demining Programme</td>
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<td>AMAA</td>
<td>Afghan Mine Awareness Agency</td>
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<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti-personnel Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td>Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>ATC</td>
<td>Afghan Technical Consultants</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Anti-tank Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battlefield Area Clearance</td>
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<td>BHMAC</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Cluster Bomb Munitions</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Center for Disease Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td>Centro de Estudios Internacionales (Managua)</td>
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<td>CIDC</td>
<td>Canadian International Demining Centre</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CMAC</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>CMAO</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>National Commission for Demining (Nicaragua)</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>see NMCC (Mozambique)</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>Danish Church Aid</td>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>DNEP</td>
<td>Dirección Nacional de Estradas e Pontes</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<td>DPPC</td>
<td>Demining Policy and Planning Committee</td>
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<td>EC/IMG</td>
<td>European Commission International Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Entity Mine Action Center</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Mozambique)</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>FUNAD</td>
<td>National Demining Fund</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization Trust</td>
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<td>HCR</td>
<td>Croatian Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<td>HMA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Mine Action</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Defense Board</td>
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<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<td>INAROECE</td>
<td>National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices</td>
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<td>IND</td>
<td>see NDI</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Internal Rate of Return</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Trust Fund</td>
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<td>K-DOM</td>
<td>Kosovo Disengagement Observer Mission</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission</td>
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<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Civil Defence</td>
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<td>LM</td>
<td>Landmine Monitor</td>
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<td>LOIS</td>
<td>Level One Impact Survey</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
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<td>MACA</td>
<td>Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MACC</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre, Pristina</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme (IDRC, Regional Office for Southern Africa)</td>
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<td>MAPA</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MASP</td>
<td>Mine Action Support Group</td>
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<td>MAT</td>
<td>Mine Action Team</td>
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<td>MBT</td>
<td>Mine Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>MCPA</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Planning Agency</td>
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<td>MCSC</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Sub-Committee</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
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MDD Mine Detection Dog
MEDDS Mechem Explosives and Drug Detection System
MGM Stiftung Menschen gegen Minen
MLSW Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
MoPH Ministry of Public Health
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem; IND)
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NMCC National Mine Clearance Commission (Comissão Nacional de Desminagem; CND)
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid
NPV Net Present Value
OAS Organization of American States
ODA Overseas Development Administration
OMAR Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PCP Principled Common Programming
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRIO International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
QA Quality assurance
R&D Research and Development
RENAMO Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)
RMAC Regional Mine Action Centre
SAC Survey Action Centre
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAF Swedish Armed Forces
SC Steering Committees
SCF Save the Children
SIPO Swedish Institute for Public Administration
SNC Supreme National Council TA Technical Advisers
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SRSA Swedish Rescue Services Agency
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SWEDINT Swedish Armed Forces International Command
TA Technical Advisor
UNBRO UN Border Relief Operation for the Thai-Cambodian Border
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola</td>
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<td>UNMACC</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNOCA/</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance UNOCHA</td>
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<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCERO</td>
<td>United Nations Special Coordinator of Emergency Relief Operations</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UXO LAO</td>
<td>Lao National UXO Programme</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<td>VJ</td>
<td>Yugoslav army</td>
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<td>VTF</td>
<td>Voluntary Trust Fund</td>
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<td>VVAF</td>
<td>Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Executive Summary

This report examines the contribution of the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) to Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA). Until the mid-to-late 1990s, HMA practices tended to define the landmine problem in terms of numbers of mines or areas suspected of containing mines. Similarly, progress was most often measured in terms of numbers of mines lifted or square metres cleared. Such an approach presumed that the mere removal of mines constituted the primary objective of mine action. However, such an approach tended to neglect other important aspects of mine action. Little attention was devoted to how priorities were established and how HMA related to a broader reconstruction agenda. In the last several years, there has been a decided shift within the field of mine action. Increasingly, there has been a realization that while mine clearance is an important goal of HMA, clearance cannot occur in the absence of attention to a variety of social factors. Landmines affect different communities in different ways, and their impact on human populations varies according to a set of contextual factors. Within this current shift in thinking, the landmine threat is viewed less as a technical issue and more as a societal issue. As a result, it is the impact landmines have on human populations that is seen as the crucial variable within mine action.

Through a review of Sida’s contributions to mine action over the past decade, this report looks at a set of central issues within mine action from an impact perspective. First, we assess the role and the implications of impact assessment in mine action. Impact assessment is a particularly important tool for designing approaches to HMA that lead to sound priority-setting and constructive interventions. A second focus of the report is on implementation channels. Here, we look at several distinct approaches to the actual implementation of mine action, examining NGOs and the government as practitioners of HMA. A third focus of the report is on the implications of how organizations operating within HMA coordinate their efforts and to what extent they coordinate with other actors involved in rehabilitation and development efforts. This is a key issue given that HMA should ideally constitute an integrated element of a broader humanitarian effort. The fourth and final focus of the report is on a set of Swedish initiatives within mine action, which we refer to as Swedish capacities. More specifically, we examine research and development projects funded by Sweden, the use of seconded Swedish technical experts and the Swedish mine detection dog project in Cambodia.

The report has two specific objectives and one broader overarching ambition. The first goal of the report is to assess Sida’s contributions to mine action and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of its approach. The second, and related, objective of the report is to assist Sida in developing and revising its current policy guidelines on HMA. The third and overarching ambition of this report is to gain a better understanding of how contextual factors impinge on mine action. In working towards this, we outline specific societal factors and their potential consequences for HMA practices.

The Sida response

Sweden has lacked a specific policy guiding its support to mine action. Consequently, Swedish support to mine action has tended come as the result of ad-hoc decisionmaking rather than as the result of a cohesive policy position. In practice, Sweden’s support to HMA has favoured mine clearance. Of its contributions over the past decade, Sida itself has categorized 85% as support for clearance activities. In its latest policy-intention document, Sida argues that support to mine clearance is important because clearance is the activity that eliminates mines and most effectively takes advantage of current Swedish capacities. More generally, Sida has emphasized the promotion of activities that help develop sustainable national capacities and to support the reorientation towards promoting impact in HMA. One of
the conclusions of this report is that there is considerable need for Sida to develop a well-founded and comprehensive policy position in order to realize these objectives.

**Impact assessment**

Impact assessment refers to the tools that can assist in ensuring that the needs of those affected by landmines are most effectively met. Impact assessment should be the foundation for establishing priorities, taking into account local particularities and a country’s position along the emergency – development continuum. Impact assessment is also an instrument for ensuring that operations maximize impact once under way. Traditionally, HMA has not distinguished between output and impact. In recent years, this has begun to change, with a resulting emphasis on impact rather than output measurements. Whereas output emphasizes landmine contamination in terms of numbers of mines lifted or square metres cleared, impact focuses on the variable effects of mines and mined areas on human populations. Impact assessment is therefore a key tool in ensuring that appropriate priorities and interventions are established in a given context.

In recent years, a variety of methodologies have been developed in order to assess impact. Amongst the most prominent of these are ‘rules of thumb’, economic analysis, composite indicators and community studies. Our review of the strengths and weaknesses of these methodologies suggests that, with the exception of rules of thumb, each offers valuable insights into the effects of mines on populations. The utility of any single approach must take into account differences in country-specific contexts, while also remaining sensitive to the overall goal of an impact-assessment mission. Given that each approach has certain strengths and weaknesses, each may be used in conjunction with the others in order to facilitate priority-setting and the implementation of HMA projects.

While Sida strongly supports the current reorientation towards placing impact at the centre of HMA, Sida has not funded the development of impact-assessment methodologies. In order for impact assessment to become institutionalized, there is a need for stronger donor support. Emphasizing impact assessment will often appear more expensive in the short term, given that expenditures on impact assessment itself will be reflected in the overall costs. However, an informed donor will take this into account and ensure that impact assessment is a precondition for support. From the perspective of Sida, there is a need to reassess its current policy of concentrating almost exclusively on mine clearance. At present, Sida possesses the knowledge and the interest needed to play an active role in promoting impact assessment in HMA. Such a step would be consistent with Sida’s broader policy initiative of ‘Developmental Humanitarian Assistance’, which focuses on solutions that have both broad and enduring effects.

**Implementation channels**

Implementation channels are the means through which mine action is put into effect on the ground. Over the past decade, a number of distinct channels have been used for the implementation of HMA. Amongst the most important of these are the UN, NGOs, governments and commercial companies. Until recently, UN-led Mine Action Centres (MACs) often assumed the roles of both coordinators and implementers of mine action. However, following pointed criticisms of this dual role, there is currently broad consensus that the role of MACs should be restricted to the coordination of mine action. The implementation of mine action should be carried out by independent agencies, such as NGOs, or by existing national institutions such as civil defence organizations. Furthermore, in most mine-affected countries, the scope of the mine problem necessitates the building of a national response capacity that can in the long term deal with the mine problem in a flexible and cost-effective manner.
Nongovernmental organizations have become the most oft-used implementation channel within mine action. An emerging, albeit less common channel, is that of national governments. A review of the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs and governments as implementation channels suggests that NGOs are particularly strong in their ability to tailor approaches to fit the needs of a given context. NGOs are also noteworthy for their abilities to develop and implement innovative responses and for the manner in which they have sought to institutionalize impact assessment. However, NGOs appear weaker in their ability to coordinate efforts with other humanitarian initiatives and have displayed little capacity to build local organizations with the potential to sustain HMA activities after their departure. In contrast, support to national governments appears to provide a solid basis for creating sustainable national capacities, as long as that government demonstrates commitment to such a goal. At the same time, governments seem less able to accommodate a broader humanitarian agenda, implement impact assessment methodologies and coordinate efforts with non-HMA actors.

The strengths and weaknesses of specific implementation channels will vary by context. In politically unstable situations, NGOs tend to be more effective than other channels in the implementation of HMA. Where governments are stable and effective, NGOs do not offer any significant advantages. Rather, national institutions, through established entities, including both military and civilian institutions, are most effective as long as the relevant organization is legitimate, reliable and technically competent. That the comparative advantage of one type of implementation channel versus another is dependent on a series of contextual factors suggests that donor support for a particular channel should come only after a careful review and assessment of the unique features inherent in a specific context. In order to ensure that the implementation of HMA is in accordance with a broader humanitarian agenda, the providing of adequate personnel, particularly those with a humanitarian and development background, should be a prerequisite for funding. Ensuring that steps are taken to facilitate the building of national organizational capacities with a long-term viability should be seen as a further premise for funding.

**Coordination**

While HMA has frequently been regarded as a highly specialized technical sector, there is also a growing realization that it should constitute part of a broader humanitarian initiative. Therefore, it is vital that coordinating mechanisms are in place within mine action as a sector and between mine action and other humanitarian efforts. The coordination of HMA is the responsibility of Mine Action Centres. The cases reviewed here suggest that MACs are relatively effective as HMA coordination bodies. However, their effectiveness is largely based on a high level of authority, and MACs tend to exercise a considerable degree of control over implementing partners. This in turn can restrict the development of innovative and flexible responses by implementing agencies and may also serve as an obstacle to the building of viable national organizations. Currently, the trend is to expand the role of MACs to include quality assurance and the accreditation of implementing bodies. Such an expansion implies an increase in the level of authority exercised by Mine Action Centres.

There is little effective coordination between HMA and other humanitarian assistance. Mine action still tends to be viewed as a technical and specialized sector, rather than as part of a broader reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. In part, this can be seen as stemming from the preponderance of military personnel and organizational culture within the sector. Perhaps more fundamentally, the high level of authority exercised by MACs is a hindrance to effective coordination between HMA and the broader humanitarian sector. The potential for the MAC to impose sanctions on those it coordinates tends to force organizations involved in mine action to focus on coordination within HMA rather than with actors outside the HMA sector.
A prime concern with Mine Action Centres is their viability. MACs are entirely dependent on international funding, which again may serve as an obstacle to the natural and logical transfer of responsibility for mine action to existing indigenous entities. Accordingly, there should be a reassessment of how MACs are structured in order to ensure their transfer to sustainable national institutions. A further implication is that responsibility for mine action should be placed with existing national capacities at the outset of an operation, to the extent this is possible.

**Swedish capacities**

While Sweden has been one of the world’s largest donors to HMA, there is no Swedish NGO operating in mine action. Instead, Swedish mine-action initiatives have come in the form of support to research and development projects, the secondment of technical experts and the Mine Detection Dog (MDD) initiative in Cambodia. Our review of these efforts suggests that in order to ensure that responses to the mine problem meet the needs of those affected by landmines, a concerted effort must be made to assess the relevance of projects. In practice, this means the identification of priorities as defined by populations in individual mine-affected regions, countries or communities. These needs should serve as the fundamental basis for initiating projects or programmes. Excluding the views and needs of those in a mine-affected region jeopardizes the sustainability of initiatives and minimizes people’s sense of ownership of programmes. In turn, the potential for creating long-term sustainable responses is greatly reduced. More generally, Sida’s broad experience from humanitarian assistance and development should be used to ensure that the necessary expertise and institutional arrangements are in place from project initiation onwards. This would include a thorough assessment of all collaborating partners, as well as ensuring that all Swedish stakeholders identify with Sida’s HMA policy.

**Concluding remarks**

Although the most acute threats from landmine contamination may be largely under control within the next few years, the problem will still be far from eradicated. At the same time, there is an emerging dilemma in mine action today. While there is a reorientation within HMA, under which new tools and approaches are being developed to deal more effectively with the problem of landmines, there is also a parallel decrease in international interest in the issue of landmines. It is therefore imperative for the international donor community to take steps to ensure that the opportunities that currently exist are taken advantage of. The central challenges for mine action today are to maintain political interest in the issue, to ensure sufficient levels of funding and to promote responses that can lead to sustainable long-term benefits for those most seriously affected by landmines.
1 Introduction

This report examines the contribution of the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) to Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA). In the past few years, HMA has undergone what has been termed a 'quiet revolution'. Traditionally, measures of landmine contamination have focused on number of mines per square metre, with scant attention paid to the impact of mines on communities and individuals; meanwhile, landmine removal has focused either on amount of land cleared or on total number of mines removed. However, governments, organizations and the international community have come to recognize that landmines are an integral part of a greater humanitarian crisis, constituting significant obstacles to the repatriation of displaced persons, the resumption of economic activity and the rebuilding of society as a whole. In response, there has been a gradual shift within HMA, with greater focus being placed on social factors and increased sensitivity to the impact of landmines on peoples’ lives. Hence, the quiet revolution.

Aims and scope of the report

This evaluation examines this shift in HMA through an assessment of Sida’s contribution to mine action. The report has two particular objectives and one broader and more general goal. The first ambition of this project is to assess Sida’s contributions to mine action. Through its support over the last decade, Sida has become one of the world’s largest contributors to mine action. By examining projects supported by Sida, this report outlines the relative merits of different approaches to HMA. The second ambition of this project is to establish guidelines for the future. By drawing on lessons learned from the past, the report is designed to assist Sida in revising and developing its policy, and to provide future guidance for decisionmakers. With this goal in mind, the evaluation focuses on learning aspects and assesses individual activities, programmes and implementing organizations. The third and overarching ambition of this report is to place mine action in a broader context, looking at how social and political factors impinge on HMA practices. As part of this, we attempt to sketch some of the key linkages between societal factors and their consequences for HMA. In this sense, the report is anchored in an approach which emphasizes the social and economic impact that landmine contamination has on communities and individuals and examines how these impacts can be placed at the centre in the planning and implementation of HMA. Further, because HMA is part of a broader humanitarian effort, we attempt to sketch the links between HMA and other humanitarian initiatives. In the report, we examine four basic aspects of mine action:

1. The role of impact assessment in HMA, with a focus on the strengths and weaknesses of four approaches: Rules of Thumb, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Composite Indicators and Community Studies. In order to illustrate the relative merits of each of these approaches, we draw on examples from the cases of Afghanistan and Mozambique.

2. The comparative advantages and disadvantages of different implementation channels, with an analysis of NGOs and governments as implementers of mine action. In addition, we look at two alternatives to these channels, namely the UN and commercial companies. In this section, we draw primarily on case studies of Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Iraqi Kurdistan, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in Angola, and the military in Nicaragua.

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3. The coordination of mine action, both within HMA and with other humanitarian and development efforts, focusing on the role of UN Mine Action Centres (MACs). Specifically, we examine MACs as coordination mechanisms for HMA in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

4. The role of Swedish capacities in humanitarian mine action. In particular, we assess Sweden’s contribution to Research and Development, the merits of seconded Swedish technical experts and the Swedish initiative with Mine Detection Dogs (MDDs) in Cambodia.

The issues and cases examined in this report draw on the negotiated Terms of Reference specified by Sida. Hence, the issues focused on here relate specifically to Sida-supported efforts. At the same time, the issues are germane to an understanding of mine action more generally and address some of the fundamental issues within HMA. Thus, the report should be seen as pertinent not only for Sida but also for other donors, HMA organizations, and governmental and humanitarian agencies.

**Defining Humanitarian Mine Action**

Humanitarian Mine Action is a relatively new concept, one that came into being in the early 1990s. In general terms, HMA includes all organized efforts aimed at mitigating the effects of, or eliminating, landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). Drawing on the UN definition, HMA may be said to include four general components:

- **Mine clearance**, including minefield survey, mapping and marking;
- **Mine-awareness and risk-reduction education**;
- **Victim assistance**, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
- **Advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines**

As is inherent in the concept, Humanitarian Mine Action refers to a spectrum of activities that extend beyond the simple clearance of mines, including surveying, marking, mapping and data management. Because it is humanitarian, HMA should ideally constitute part of a broader postwar reconstruction effort, linked to other development initiatives. At least in theory, HMA seeks the total eradication of landmines, carried out in conjunction with an overarching plan that includes recovery, reconstruction, rehabilitation and other political, social and economic initiatives. Conversely, military demining can be considered the clearance of landmines for strategic military purposes. Military demining normally seeks to create a lane through a contaminated area for military usage and does not necessarily attempt total clearance. To the extent that military demining is concerned with the complete eradication of landmines, this is primarily with the goal of ensuring the safety of military personnel. Moreover, military demining is rarely conducted as part of a broader humanitarian and development effort. Yet, although the techniques and approach employed in HMA and military demining differ, HMA efforts

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1 Two limits to the report are particularly significant. First, although support to mine action in Cambodia – most notably UNDP TF – has constituted Sida’s second largest initiative throughout the period 1990–2000, it is not covered by this report. Over the period 1993–2000, excluding in-kind contributions, Sweden is listed as the third largest donor to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre via the UNDP Trust Fund (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2000. Landmine Monitor Report 2000: Toward a Mine Free World. United States: Human Rights Watch, p. 386). However, the Cambodian programme has been one of the most studied and documented, and there are currently four ongoing evaluations of mine action in Cambodia. In this report, we only briefly address the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC). Second, because this report only addresses components of mine action funded by Sida, general arms control aspects, including issues such as stockpile destruction are not discussed.

2 The removal of UXO is an integral part of most HMA programmes, and the expertise required for dealing with UXO and landmines is closely related. In the following, we will only use the term HMA.

frequently draw on personnel and techniques adopted from the military. From a humanitarian perspective, this is often quite problematic. Since the goal of military clearance is to secure strategic areas or to create a passage primarily for military purposes, and since – in contrast with HMA – military mine clearance does not aim at total eradication of landmines or the return of areas to local communities, mine action becomes divorced from other humanitarian endeavours, falling victim to a myopic approach that focuses almost exclusively on technical issues. This is a dilemma for HMA that we will return to throughout this report.

The context for Humanitarian Mine Action

One of the fundamental considerations guiding this report is an examination of the context in which HMA takes place. As an obvious statement, different countries are characterized by unique social, political and historical circumstances. Such contextual factors can be seen as determining the range of options available in a country, serving either as facilitators or as constrictors for mine action. From the perspective of HMA, one of the most important factors is where a country falls on the ‘emergency-development continuum’. Whether a country is in a complex state of emergency, such as war, or is in the process of initiating redevelopment can be seen as a determining factor in assessing the appropriate mine-action response. The political environment, including factors such as regime stability and institutional responsiveness, can also affect HMA responses. Existing capacities in terms of knowledge, resources and organizational strength further determine the suitability of different approaches to mine action. Logistical factors such as geography, roads and climate are important in deciding on an approach. Last but not least, the scope of the mine problem is also a key aspect, not necessarily in terms of numbers, but in terms of the threat landmines pose and whether the extent of that threat can be determined. In the subsequent chapters of this report, we sketch out the relevant contextual factors as they apply to the cases in question here, with the goal of developing an understanding of how these affect HMA practices (see Appendix 1.4).

The Sida response

In addition to an examination of context, a point of reference throughout this report is that of Sida’s guiding principles and practices on HMA. While Sida’s country-specific practices will be detailed in the coming chapters, it is useful at this juncture to gain an understanding of Sida’s general mine-action guidelines (see Figure 1.1).

As a general rule, Sida’s contributions to HMA have not been guided by any coherent policy position, and there has been no formal decision mandating Sida involvement in mine action. Sida has eschewed a ‘blueprint’ policy solution, preferring to assess the merits of different funding channels. Decision-making has been on a year-by-year basis, and there is no allocation of funds specifically for HMA. Responsibility is divided into regional or thematic areas; decisions are taken based on the needs of each country or region; and these decisions dictate total expenditures. As a result, the amount of funding for mine action provided by Sida each year varies greatly. Funding to mine action is prioritized in the context of other pertinent issues in a country – e.g., natural disasters, emergencies, etc. – and, if HMA is viewed as important in relation to these issues, it will receive funding.

In spite of the lack of an overarching policy, it is possible to identify a number of principles that have guided Sida decisionmaking. The most basic tenet of Sida’s support to mine action is that of humanitari-

an needs and the needs of victims of humanitarian disasters – of which HMA is considered one important aspect. A second principle has been that of emphasizing national capacities, seeking to make local entities self-sustainable. More generally, Sida points out that the mine problem is largely expected to be under control within the next five to ten years, although it may take decades to solve. Consequently, Sida argues that HMA must have a more development-oriented approach, whereby mine action should be integrated with other humanitarian aid. Further, HMA should be geared towards supporting specific reconstruction projects with a clear development orientation and should be regarded as ‘Developmental Humanitarian Assistance’, a term coined by Sida in 1999. Specifically, Developmental Humanitarian Assistance implies that all humanitarian aid should have a developmental objective, provide assistance in acute situations and provide long-term solutions that are accepted and supported locally.

Swedish HMA guidelines have generally supported UN measures. In 1991, Sweden actively engaged in a Nordic initiative that established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and supported later efforts – both politically and financially – designed to improve coordination and to strengthen the UN’s capacity to address the mine problem. Sida supported the establishing of the United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS) in 1997 and has accepted this body’s role in policy development and as a general coordinating mechanism. As formulated in 1996, Sweden’s mine-action guidelines and principles emphasizes the following three components:

- work towards a strengthening of the international ban on anti-personnel landmines;
- work towards a rapid and effective clearance of existing landmines, through a development of effective methods in Sweden and the promotion of international cooperation towards this goal;
- aid and assist mine victims and mine-affected countries and contribute towards a reduction of the effects of landmines, through support to mine-awareness campaigns.

Following a Sida review of its mine-action policy in 2000, draft guidelines were presented. These are:

- the integration of HMA with other humanitarian initiatives, with the view of mine action as a part of a broader project or programme, as opposed to an activity on its own;
- the maintenance of ongoing engagements. Sida currently supports mine action in some of the most affected countries and regions. In the event of support to new areas, these should be prioritized on a humanitarian-aid and cooperative basis.
- the prioritizing of and support for mine clearance over mine awareness, survey and victim assistance, since:
  a) mine clearance is the activity that eliminates landmines and creates the possibility for the free movement of individuals and the capacity to put land back into use;
  b) Sida and Sweden have, primarily through personnel, been active in HMA and could thus have a number of comparative advantages;
  c) ongoing technical developments in Sweden are aimed at mine clearance and have the potential to increase the speed of clearance operations;
- the development of national structures and capacities. In the next decades, affected countries are likely to suffer even under the most favourable of conditions. It is difficult to ascertain in what way national capacities should be achieved. This must involve a natural degree of sustainability that, according to Sida, is decidedly not the case with today’s MACs. Scepticism towards the utility of MACs is one of Sida’s prime concerns. While Sida views it as necessary to support MACs, they are not viewed as a viable solution to the mine problem. Among the more central problems noted by Sida are that MACs are not linked to a central country policy and they lack sustainability.
- support for the United Nations through the strengthening of coordination and consultative functions for HMA through the UN.

Figure 1.1. Swedish Mine Action Principles and Guidelines

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(Notes:
6 Preliminär redogörelse för och analys av det samlat svenska stödet till olika former av målverksamheter samt underlag för preliminär inriktning av fortsatt stöd, Sida, 28 June 2000.
7 Svensk minpolicy (Swedish mine action policy), e-mail from Lars Johansson (Sida) to evaluation authors, 12 January 2001.
8 Preliminär redogörelse, note 6 above.)
Sida’s support to Humanitarian Mine Action

Since 1990, Sida has contributed 579 million SEK to mine action (Table 1.1). This made Sida the world’s third largest contributor to mine action until the end of the 1990s. In 2000, however, Sida was ranked seventh among the world’s donors. In its support, Sida has made mine clearance its priority, favouring mine clearance over virtually all other mine-related activities. For example, in the Sida document from 2000 which discusses its contributions to HMA, Sida states that for the period 1991 to 1999, ‘(t)he predominant portion, approximately 85%, has gone to mine clearance’. Contributions to Research and Development initiatives rank a distant second, followed by the Mine Detection Dog (MDD) project in Cambodia and Mine Awareness (Table 1.2).

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<td>64.8</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>129.5</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
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Table 1.1. Sida’s support to Humanitarian Mine Action, 1990–2000¹⁰

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<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total 1991–1999</th>
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<td>Mine clearance</td>
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<td>Mine Awareness</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<td>Cambodia, dog project</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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Table 1.2. Sida’s support to Mine Action by Activity, 1991–1999¹¹

⁹ Preliminär redogörelse, pp. 6. In reality, some of Sida’s contributions to mine clearance have gone to other activities. For instance, Sida points out that many mine awareness programmes are integrated into clearance activities, and contributions designated as having gone to mine clearance have likely gone to a broader range of activities. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Sida has made mine clearance its priority in its support to HMA.

¹⁰ Updated October 2000. All figures in million SEK. The figures do not include Sida support to other initiatives such as conferences or research and development.

¹¹ All figures in million SEK.
At the same time as Sida has been one of the world’s leading donors to HMA, there has been a gradual decrease in its funding level since 1998. Such a decrease can partly be explained as the aggregate result of decisions taken on a country-level basis and partly as a result of multi-year contributions that appear in the year that the grant is made. Nonetheless, since reaching a peak of almost 130 million SEK in 1998, Sida’s contributions to HMA have shown a downward trend through 1999 (88.5 million SEK) and for the year 2000 (76.7 million SEK). Total levels of funding, as indicated above do not tell the entire story, yet the strong downward trend in funding signals a decrease in interest for the issue of landmines within Sida.

**Assessing the Sida response**

Sida’s mine-action response can best be termed as fragmented and ad hoc. Although Sida has increasingly moved towards a more integrated approach, whereby HMA is seen as part of an overall humanitarian effort, mine action is still largely viewed as a separate sector. Consequently, one of the issues we examine in the report is whether or not the lack of a clear HMA policy has left Sida vulnerable to political pressures in its decisionmaking, and we raise the question of to what degree Sida is able to retain control over its decisions. In the past two years, Sida has commissioned a specialist on HMA. This has come as a response to an evident need for Sida to design a policy on HMA and raise the level of Sida’s knowledge on the issue. This report can be seen as one step in such a process.

A second important aspect of Sida’s response is the emphasis of mine clearance as opposed to the other aspects of HMA, such as surveying, marking, mapping and data management. As pointed out earlier, 85% of Sida’s total contribution to mine action over the past decade has gone to clearance. Although some of these contributions have in reality been used for other activities such as mine awareness and coordination, Sida’s primary emphasis is on mine clearance. The importance of viewing HMA as a total ‘package’ and not as isolated components is an issue that we will return to throughout this report. In particular, the role of impact assessment is addressed in the next chapter, including its importance in ensuring the maximization of impacts.

**Methodology and study design**

The methodology employed in the evaluation consists of the following components:

**Document and literature review**

In our document and literature review, we have attempted to include all relevant Sida, government, UN and NGO documents, along with a review of existing studies. Such a review has been vital to this study. The document and literature review was important in outlining Sida’s and the Swedish policy position. A review of UN and NGO documents was further important in establishing prevailing international policy consensus, which could be systematically compared to Sida policy.

**Field visits**

Field visits to selected areas have constituted the second major component of the study. The field visits have enabled the research team to interview personnel, review relevant documents, and observe and assess HMA practices. Due to the broad scope and the limited time-frame for the study, field visits could not be made to all cases under consideration in this evaluation. For the purposes of the report, field visits were made to the following areas: Bosnia, Nicaragua, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

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12 Preliminär redogörelse, note 6 above, pp. 5–6.
Interviews
Interviews with key actors constituted the third, and perhaps the most significant, methodological component in the study. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews have focused on three sets of key actors. Open-ended interviews with Sida officials were used to establish an understanding of Sida’s HMA policy, how that policy has been arrived at and how Sida policy corresponds to international policy on HMA. A second focus has been on interviews with UN officials and representatives in New York in order to establish the UN’s policy position on HMA. Interviews were also conducted with representatives from the Survey Action Centre (SAC) in Washington, DC. A third focus has been on open-ended interviews with HMA operators, including representatives from major NGOs, Mine Action Centres, and government officials. These interviews were crucial in gaining an understanding of which priorities and goals were established, how they were arrived at and the extent to which they were put into practice in mine action.

An emphasis has also been placed on gaining the viewpoint of beneficiaries and target groups. This has been accomplished through two basic approaches. First, and as discussed in the next section, the viewpoint of beneficiaries is a fundamental element of completed AMAC community studies. Second, interviews were conducted with individuals living in mine-affected areas. These were selected randomly, and in this sense can not be considered representative or systematic. However, we take the viewpoint of these beneficiaries as an important additional source in assessing mine action.

Community studies
The fourth and final component of the methodology is the use of outputs from completed AMAC community studies. Community studies are intensive studies of local mine-affected areas and include the gathering of survey data, interviews and the identification of key impacts. They are extremely labour-intensive, requiring at least four to six weeks from the time of inception to completion. Given the relatively restricted time-frame of this evaluation, it has been impossible to conduct new community studies for the purposes of this evaluation. However, completed AMAC community studies have generated a wealth of detailed information relevant for this report. Consequently, this analysis draws on outputs generated by these community studies, particularly in the context of socio-economic impacts and as relevant to cases included in this evaluation, namely Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Angola.

Evaluation criteria
In accordance with the desires of Sida, the report has been guided by a set of evaluation criteria:

1. Relevance
2. Impact
3. Coordination
4. Sustainability
5. Accountability.

In the report, we do not necessarily employ all the criteria in relation to all issues. In two instances, we contend that some of the evaluation criteria are not relevant. This pertains to the chapters on social impacts and coordination. In both of these cases, the issue focus of the chapter is one of the evaluation criteria. Hence, it is difficult — if not impossible — to relate these to the other criteria in a meaningful way. In the remaining chapters, we structure the discussion in accordance with these criteria.

A participatory ambition
In the process of conducting the research and analysis for this report, there has been an emphasis on ensuring that the outcome of the evaluation is relevant to Sida. In practical terms, this has meant several consultations with Sida’s resident HMA expert during the planning stages of the study. Howev-
er, throughout the data collection, analysis and writing of the report, contact with Sida has been limited. During field visits, the study team sought discussions with Sida representatives in order to brief them on preliminary findings. In practice, it often proved difficult for Sida personnel in the field to accommodate our request for such meetings. Lastly, when possible, the team has discussed findings with key personnel from organizations visited. Such discussions have proved useful for gaining feedback, for filling in gaps in the data and as a way of double-checking our preliminary conclusions.

The evaluation team

The team for the evaluation consisted of the following personnel. The data gathering, analysis and write-up of the report was carried out by members of the Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC) project at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). This team consisted of Kristian Berg Harpviken, Project Leader, AMAC; Ananda S. Millard, Senior Researcher, AMAC; Kjell Erling Kjellman, Researcher, AMAC; and Arne Strand, Research Fellow, PRDU, University of York. In addition, Barbro Rönnmo, Consultant, SIPU International AB, functioned as Administrative Coordinator and assisted the research team in Bosnia. Göran Andersson, Director, SIPU International AB, was team leader for the study.

In order to ensure that the evaluation has maintained the highest possible standards, the research team was aided by an independent quality-assurance team. The quality-assurance team comprised Ivar Evensmo, Researcher and Consultant, PRIO; Bengt Ljunggren, Consultant, SIPU; and Sayed Aqa, Field Director and Consultant, Survey Action Centre (SAC).

Structure of the report

The report is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 examines four of the main current approaches within HMA to social impact assessment, namely ‘Rules of Thumb,’ Cost-Benefit Analysis, Composite Indicators and Community Studies. In order to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of each, we draw on examples from Afghanistan and Mozambique. Chapter 3 turns to a discussion of different implementation channels. The discussion focuses on the merits of using NGOs and the military as implementers of HMA. Specifically, we look at two of the largest international NGOs at present, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Iraq and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in Angola. Further, we examine the merits of the Nicaraguan government’s use of the military as implementers of HMA in Nicaragua. In addition, we also take a brief look at the UN and commercial companies as implementation channels. Chapter 4 looks at the coordination of mine action, both within HMA and in relation to other humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this chapter, the focus is on what has become the central role of Mine Action Centres (MACs) today, that of coordination bodies. Chapter 5 examines Swedish capacities in international mine action, looking specifically at Swedish initiatives in research and development, the use of seconded technical experts and the dog project in Cambodia. In Chapter 6, our recommendations for future policy guidelines are presented. In Chapter 7, we offer our concluding remarks on the study, focusing on the role of Sida as a donor.
2 Impact Assessment

The essence of the shifts that HMA is currently undergoing lies in a reorientation from defining the mine problem in terms of numbers of mines or total suspected area contaminated by mines to defining the problem in terms of the impact of mines on human populations. This reorientation has inspired the development of different approaches to impact assessment, all drawing on insights from the wider debate on postwar reconstruction and development. Over the past several years, Sida has become increasingly interested in the issue of impact and has eagerly pursued the impact perspective with some of the agencies it has funded. At the same time, Sida’s current policy position is to prioritize mine clearance over all other aspects of HMA. Such a position serves to constrain a constructive engagement in ensuring the impact orientation of HMA programmes. Most fundamentally, a thorough impact assessment of any particular programme is rendered impossible, unless that programme has collected impact data on a systematic basis.

In this chapter, we will first look briefly at Sida’s policy. We will then provide a tentative definition of impact, before situating impact assessments in relation to stages of reconstruction, phases of projects and level of society. We then turn to a review of four different approaches to impact assessment: Rules of Thumb, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Composite Indicators and Community Studies. These approaches differ from each other in fundamental ways, both when it comes to the questions they generate and to the methodology applied for responding to these questions. Each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses. The challenge is to establish which one works best for a particular task or in a particular context and to see how the different approaches may complement each other. Finally, we will explore some of the key challenges that an agency is faced with if it wants to make impact assessment an effective tool in its project-implementation practice, challenges that apply across all approaches.

Sida’s role

Sida has not been a visible actor in the process of reformulating international HMA policy to integrate sensitivity to impact. At the same time, Sida has repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of evaluations of impact in the sector. The 1998 Afghanistan study of socio-economic impact of HMA has been closely reviewed within Sida. The 1997 impact study of the programme in Laos contributed to Sida’s disengagement from the programme. Concern over the scarcity of HMA impact documentation was a key reason for why Sida in 1999 initiated a desk study on existing initiatives.

Sida’s concern about impact has not translated into increasing support for the development and application of tools for impact assessment. The documentation of impact of any given programme is difficult in the absence of impact data, a conclusion also reached in the Sida desk study. In Sida’s most recent policy formulations, there has been an explicit emphasis on demining, at the exclusion of other components of HMA that include impact assessment or survey arrangements. Thus, there is as of now an inherent contradiction between Sida’s demand that programmes have a more solid impact orientation and its lack of funding initiatives in the area.

1 See for example: Preliminär redogörelse för och analys av det samhälle svenska stödet till olika former av minverksamheter samt underlag för preliminär inriktning av fortsatt stöd, Sida, 28 June 2000.
Donors may feel that the costs of impact-assessment exercises are not justified. The argument that all that counts is getting mines out of the ground has a certain persuasive power. Nonetheless, the costs involved are well justified. A national HMA operation is often a long-term commitment, and it is thus important to make sure the right tasks are solved first. Similarly, we need to make sure that the scarce resources allocated for HMA are utilized in the best possible manner. At the one extreme, there may be a community where access to a waterhole is denied by a handful of mines, a task that can be solved by a small team in a week. At the other extreme, there may be large minefields, but these may have little effect on a community and will take a 32-man platoon of deminers many years to clear. Most people would agree that it makes sense to open up the waterhole first; but, in practice, poorly developed impact sensitivity within HMA has meant that large tasks have often been given priority.

What is impact?

The reorientation to impact in mine action implies a shift away from placing mines and demining at centre to seeing humans and their basic livelihoods as the focus. As in other sectors of reconstruction and development assistance, there has been a tendency within HMA to focus on the most immediate and easily measured results of activities. Consequently, the number of mines and UXOs lifted or the number of square metres cleared have frequently been employed as indicators of progress. In contrast, little attention has been devoted to an examination of the effects of landmines over time, in specific contexts and on different populations. The difference between the former and the latter approach is often referred to as the distinction between impact and output. The emphasis on impact draws on a more comprehensive understanding of what it is that constitutes a sensible intervention often associated with development assistance but which in reality is just as essential for emergency-oriented projects, in order to safeguard that they are generally sound. In shifting attention from output to impact, the challenge lies in finding sound approaches to defining the problem – approaches that will be helpful for designing the most constructive interventions. Measures such as the numbers of square metres cleared or the number of people having attended mine-awareness presentations are simplistic and say little about the actual impact of a project. In practice, such output measures can easily encourage operators to maximize volume of operations, not impact on people, and in the example given above - prioritize the large minefield at the cost of the few mines around the waterhole. Broader questions such as whether demining has significantly altered people’s overall life quality or whether mine awareness has led to changes in behaviour are much more difficult to respond to. The development of approaches that address such complex issues remains the central challenge.

Impact-assessment approaches can be partly judged by the degree to which they maintain the interest of the primary stakeholders – people affected by landmines. In its most limited sense, this is nothing but the safeguarding of a sense of ownership, secured through transparent procedures and with locals having a key role as providers of information. Truly securing the interests of mine-affected people, however, also implies the ability to represent their perspective, in priority-setting as well as operational design. Since any society will have differences of interest, impact is not evenly distributed: at the extreme, a demining operation might benefit some while disadvantaging other members of the same community. One community study from Angola found that a large-scale demining operation launched to facilitate the return to the original village for one group of people would simultaneously lead to another group being forced to move away from the houses and fields they had established during the war. Ultimately, a key challenge in impact assessment is striking a balance between paying attention to local particularities while maintaining a practicable and legitimate system.

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Impact can also be understood in terms of constraints. HMA always takes place in difficult environments, where a number of contextual factors serve as constraints on the freedom of choice for an implementing body. The most important contextual factors that apply have been discussed in the introduction. Sensible priorities cannot be made without an appreciation of the constraints that apply in any given situation. Yet, it is also important to realize that constraints are not fixed entities, but are rather factors which agencies can either affect or adapt to. One example of a key constraint is the availability of funding. Some donors tie funding to particular projects or to particular geographic areas. Effectively, an implementing body is blocked from setting priorities based on its own assessments of impact. More generally, HMA actors, in the absence of assessments of impact, have tended to give prominence to constraints when establishing priorities.

**Situating impact assessment**

At an overall level, HMA is implemented at different stages of the reconstruction process. At the one extreme, there may be an emergency stage, with an emphasis on short-term priorities. At the other end, there is a development-oriented stage, where longer-term priorities are dominant. It can be argued that, at the emergency end, key priorities are more easily identified, and reducing accidents will always be important. Furthermore, it will often be the case that certain high-priority tasks, such as reopening key transport routes or clearing areas for the resettlement of returnees, will stand out as obvious priorities. As one moves from the emergency towards the development-oriented stage, establishing priorities becomes more complex and requires more sophisticated approaches. Nonetheless, it is important that the launch of emergency responses are paralleled with a systematic effort to build up the knowledge required to guide sensible priority-setting in the mid- to long-term. Too often, when a situation is defined as an emergency, it serves as an excuse for launching short-sighted operations, even though consideration of the broader and more long-term implications of an intervention is no less important in an emergency situation.5

As one moves from emergency to development stages, it will also be the case that tasks that have an impact at the regional or national level, such as the reopening of key infrastructure, have been dealt with. Hence, the focus will increasingly turn towards projects where the major impact is exclusively at the local level. In emergency-oriented tasks, it is often a problem that one is preoccupied with impact at regional or national levels only, while neglecting the impact on the community that hosts the operation. In one example from Mozambique, the local population had very little information about a major demining exercise in their neighbourhood that was aimed at restoring access to a central water pipeline.6 In the report from which the last example was taken, it is argued that micro-level impact exists in all macro-level tasks that take place in populated areas and that all agencies should take seriously the challenge of maximizing impact at multiple levels.

For impact assessment to contribute to a thorough improvement of HMA practice, it must be integrated as a tool in the planning and implementation phases of projects. In the new UN International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) which are currently in progress, four kinds of surveys will be included: general, impact, technical and the hand-over documentation.7 The three first kinds of survey are all conducted prior to operations. Whereas the international standards are modified for both general and technical surveys, it is the standardization of the impact survey that

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5 Additionally, it is often true that what is at first seen as an emergency requires a long-term response. This is indeed the case with HMA. Most cases that have a dramatic mine problem that can be solved within a short time frame will also have a more enduring mine problem of a less dramatic character that will require a long-term, sustainable response.


7 The new standards exist in draft versions; most of them are available at http://www.mineclearancestandards.org/revised.htm
is genuinely new. At an overall level, it remains the case that the attention to impact assessment in HMA is primarily aimed at developing a tool for planning and prioritization prior to implementation, with little attention given to the implementation and completion phases. As argued elsewhere, in order to ensure the maximization of impact, including the effective mitigation of any potential negative impacts, there is a need for implementation to include an ongoing monitoring of impact. Similarly, the shift from output to impact is unlikely to be successful unless there is a systematic assessment of impact upon completion of each operation. Post-operation analysis is in this sense a requirement if effective organizational learning is to take place.

**Rules of thumb**

Most operative HMA programmes have used a simple typology of tasks as the basis for setting priorities. Here, a single dimension of the tasks at hand constitutes the basis for ranking. Most often, focus is on the type of area affected, such as whether a road or a residential area is mined. What will here be referred to as ‘rules of thumb’ approaches to impact assessment still guide most actual programme implementation in HMA. These one-dimensional typologies are based on the simple assumption that knowing with sufficient certainty that a particular task is, for example, a residential area indicates the social and economic importance of that area. The typologies currently applied in Mozambique and Afghanistan, which we will examine here, are both more advanced versions. In these, certain additional criteria are added to the key factor, such as whether action has been requested by a UN agency or an NGO with other plans in that particular area.

In Afghanistan, criteria for priority-setting were first defined in 1996. Before 1996, tasks had to meet certain minimum requirements to be taken on, such as the absence of armed conflict and support from the local community (see Appendix 2.2). In 1996, a new system for priority-setting was developed. Its foundation is a sorting of tasks into type of land, such as agricultural, residential, roads, irrigation systems or grazing land. With type of land as the key element, emphasis is given to additional factors. Among these is whether or not there has been a request from a UN agency, an NGO or from locals. Other factors include the urgency of the task in terms of whether the area affected will be taken into use soon and the prevalence of mine incidents. The actual priority decisions take place at the district level, with the potential involvement of local authorities and representatives from other agencies. In contrast with Mozambique, the Afghan programme has consistently applied its priority-setting system, helped greatly by the existence of a nationwide general survey as well as by a functioning coordinating body. The use of consistent ranking, as well as a country-wide survey, has allowed the Afghan programme to report on the share of high-priority areas cleared. Nevertheless, its relevance as a representation of programme impact is limited.

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8 A draft version of the standards for the impact survey was not available as of 1 January 2001. The other survey formats refer to former standards as follows: a general survey replaces the level one survey; a technical survey replaces the level two survey and the handover documentation replaces the level three survey.

9 Millard & Harpviken, 2000, note 6 above; Roche, 1999, pp. 3-0-32, note 4 above.

10 By 1998, the existing system for prioritization was complemented by a ‘General Prioritization System’, in which the focus is placed on the actual impact of the task, through such broad categories as, for example: alleviation of human suffering, repatriation of refugees and resettlement of IDPs, and food security (see Appendix 2.2). This system, which is currently emphasized in MAPA, should be understood as a formulation of overall policy principles, and is not directly applied in operational documents decisions. The principles herein are in compliance with overall UN policy on Afghanistan, and correspond to the UN’s core themes for cross-sectoral coordination.
In Mangane, Nampula province, a large demining project was launched to restore access to a major water pipeline serving the larger city of Nacala. The task was a clear priority by NMCC standards, and the task had high importance at the provincial level. At the same time, no attention was given to the potential impact on the community in whose vicinity the operation is conducted. There was minimal communication between the operator and locals, and amongst the latter there was an emerging feeling that assistance providers totally neglected their situation. This could have been avoided if local-level impact had been identified and followed up. In this case, given that people have confidence in clearance, they may benefit in several ways, including regaining access to former areas for agricultural and coal production. In this case, on the basis of a rough approach to impact assessment, local-level impact was neglected.

Illustration 2.1: Neglecting impact at the community level

In Mozambique, the system that is currently in use is also a refined rules of thumb approach. Developed by the National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC) in 1998, it has been integrated into NMCC standard survey forms, applied by all major demining agencies. Here, priorities are ranked by type of task, but the typology also includes considerations about level of impact ranging from the national to the community. There are three main categories: high, medium and low priority, each with three subcategories, making a total of nine categories (see Appendix 2.1). This is an advanced version of the one-factor typology in that each category in this system takes into account type of area, its larger function, as well as the societal level to which it is relevant. Distinctions between categories are ambiguous, and the judgement of the enumerator is decisive for ranking. Although the NMCC standard form is widely applied, the ranking prescribed therein is not key to agencies priority-setting. Rather, this tends to be based on the so-called ‘common sense’ of high-level managers. Ultimately, the data generated by the system applied in Mozambique are insufficient as a basis for making even the most general assessment of impact.

Generally, rules of thumb approaches to impact assessment have several weaknesses. Their capacity to engage and represent the views of affected populations is limited. As exemplified above, the inability to focus simultaneously on impact at various levels is a weakness. Rules of thumb may be used for initial priority-setting, but have little value at later phases in the project cycle, including the planning, implementation and post-clearance phases. Since rules of thumb also operate with broad categories, which are not necessarily easily distinguishable, they are vulnerable to the biases of individuals. This is closely linked to the problem that with such rough data, decisionmakers more easily become focused on constraints, as opposed to impact, in decisionmaking. The disadvantages of rules of thumb approaches only intensify as one moves away from the most immediate emergency stage.

Economic analysis

The use of economic analysis for impact assessment has a long tradition in aid and development, and it can build on a well-defined analytical apparatus as well as a substantial body of knowledge. The general objective of economic analysis is to establish future returns on various types of investment, and its most common form is cost-benefit analysis. The approach is open to the inclusion of a multitude of factors, and its most common application is to establish a template that can be applied across a number of similar situations. In contrast to other impact-assessment approaches, the focus tends to be on economic values only, although one would find that some analysts place a price on a non-economic value in order to be able to build it into their calculus.

11 Based on a community study in Millard & Harpviken, 2000, Chapter 7, note 6 above.
The first attempt to apply a form of economic analysis in HMA was the Afghan socio-economic study, a first draft of which was launched in Autumn 1998. The study was based on revisiting all 5,513 minefields cleared by the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) and included separate survey forms for establishing the impact of local-level projects, such as in a village, and larger level projects, such as a road. Without applying a cost-benefit formula, the study suggests that the annual economic benefits to mine action stood at a total of US$ 65 million, with an annual expenditure in the range US$ 20–25 million. Currently, the World Bank has taken the data from the socio-economic study and built upon it in a wider analysis, a formal cost-benefit assessment. One objective of this has been to establish templates for different types of tasks in different regions, for example for irrigated agricultural land in the Western region, and to use such templates as a basis for priority discussions at the community level. A second objective has been to compare the costs of different clearance techniques. Thirdly, the World Bank is also interested in being able to compare the return on investment ratio in the HMA sector with other sectors, such as vaccination campaigns or investments in infrastructure. Although the World Bank admits that the central effects of landmines are neglected by economic analysis, this latter objective has nevertheless been of some concern to people involved in HMA.

A second initiative that has promoted cost-benefit analysis in HMA is the UNDP-initiated ‘Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action’. This study contains both a principal presentation of cost-benefit analysis and case studies of Laos, Mozambique and Kosovo. The UNDP report presents a rudimentary cost-benefit model, on the basis of cost of clearance versus future benefits, per square meter of land. In the Laos case, the key example is for UXO clearance of ‘wet-season’ rice paddy, which represents a valuable asset in the relatively homogeneous economy of Laotian agricultural communities. Benefits are calculated based on the expected net crop over the next 20 years and an assumed sales value by year 20. Future benefits are discounted at 12%. This gives an expected benefit (‘net present value’) of US$ 3,540 per hectare. Total costs are composed of clearance costs (US$ 4,000-4,400 in 1999) plus labour costs (estimated at US$ 50, the rural daily wage rate). The conclusion is that UXO clearance on ‘wet-season’ rice paddy can not be justified solely on economic grounds, given the current costs of the programme. The programme has suggested clearance costs can be brought down to US$ 3,000 for year 2000, which would shift the balance and provide a positive return on investments.

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14 The report also discusses non-economic impact, such as that relating to trauma or to peacebuilding, and it establishes casualty rates at 10–12 as opposed to 20–24 in 1993.


17 The study also introduces other approaches to impact assessment, including the Composite Indicator approach and the Community Studies approach, in addition to an emergency survey conducted by the Survey Action Centre in Kosovo, based mainly on spatial data and population statistics.
Cost-benefit analysis underlines the importance of ensuring that cleared land is taken into use immediately. To shorten the time period between clearance and productive use, building confidence amongst future users is essential. Building confidence depends on the investment in good relationships with locals, including forums for mutual exchange of information. Studies from Mozambique demonstrate that lack of confidence in clearance is a problem, and that it can take years before cleared land is taken into use. Given that land is often widely accessible in Mozambique, people tend to have developed alternative fields for cultivation by the time demining is conducted, which exacerbates the effects of a lack of confidence.

In a different example from Afghanistan, it was found that the locals in a village were unwilling to cultivate a particular area. It proved that a missed anti-tank mine had been found by a local farmer while tilling the land. A team from MACA investigated the incident, but no information regarding the results of the investigation was given to the community. The lack of post-investigation information further contributed to a low confidence level both at the village level and in surrounding areas.

Illustration 2.2: The importance of confidence in clearance

In the Mozambique case, where the economy is arguably much more varied, applying cost-benefit analysis is more complicated. Different cost-benefit templates have to be tailored to each particular production system, and the risk of misrepresenting the local particularities increases. The UNDP economic analysis from Mozambique draws on data from a household economic study in Nampula province. The same formula as in the Laotian case is applied. Clearance costs are higher, estimated at US$ 7,000 per hectare. The net present value is calculated for three different production practices: high input at US$ 2,700, improved practices at US$ 1,950, and traditional at US$ 1,247. Hence, mine clearance of agricultural land can not be justified solely on economic grounds, unless clearance costs are dramatically reduced. An alternative example finds very positive returns from clearance of access to a village water point, which frees up a scarce resource: women’s time for other activities including agriculture. In Mozambique, land in itself is rarely a scarce resource, which is one reason that agricultural production scores badly in a cost-benefit analysis.

At a general level, the value of economic analysis for securing participation appears limited, in spite the World Bank’s ambition to make it a focus for community-level discussion. The strength of economic analysis seems to be in assessing a programme or a nationwide effort, rather than as a tool for safeguarding impact at a local level. In terms of phases of projects, economic analysis seems best suited to pre- and post-project assessments. A principal strength of economic analysis is its treatment of constraints and costs. These enter directly into the calculus, and the results visualize gains stemming from a reduction of costs and from working flexibly with constraints. Economic analysis has a role to play in any stage from emergency to development. Nonetheless, given its narrow focus on economic impact, economic analysis should not be seen as the dominant approach to impact assessment in HMA, but as a useful complement to other approaches.

Composite indicator

Currently, the most influential approach to impact assessment in HMA is the global Level One Impact Survey (LOIS) run by the Survey Action Centre (SAC). The LOIS is emerging as the international

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18 Information gathered during Harpviken’s fieldwork in Afghanistan, spring 1999. The example is not meant to indicate that missed mines are more frequent in the Afghan programme than elsewhere. In fact, the Afghan programme is exemplary in reporting transparently on demining accidents as well as missed mines. See Millard & Harpviken, 2000, see note 6 above.

19 SAC is a consortium of NGOs and UN agencies, managed by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF). It is currently engaged in thirteen countries, with actual implementation of a survey being underway in five of those: Cambodia, Chad, Kosovo, Mozambique and Thailand. In Yemen, a survey was completed in late 2000. For background on SAC, see the webpages at http://www.vvaf.org/gls/index.shtml
standard for basic impact surveys. In the revision of UN International Mine Action Standards, SAC is given a central role in the definition of standards for the impact survey. Furthermore, the SAC format for survey and analysis is integrated in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), a new database for data analysis and decisionmaking support. IMSMA has the support of the UN and most major actors in mine action, and its integration of SAC’s formats for reporting and analysis is significant.

The survey uses a composite indicator, called the Mine Impact Score, which is composed of three types of variables: nature of contamination, function to which access is blocked and number of recent victims (see Appendix 2.2). The nature of contamination is covered by two variables: presence of mines and presence of UXO. The blocked-access category includes a total of ten variables, including crop land, pasture, water points, residential areas and other infrastructure. Recent victims are reflected in one variable. With the exception of the victim variable, all variables are binary. This means, for example, that the presence of mines or UXO count the same regardless of the scope of the problem. Similarly, blocked access to a resource gives either one or zero, while the importance of that resource in that particular community is not considered. In contrast, for the victim variable, each new victim adds as much to the composite indicator as does the first victim. The size of the mined area, or the number of mine areas affecting any particular community, does not affect the impact score.

The variables are weighted, and the weighting of the various components can be changed according to the goals defined by the user. In practice, the weighting system for a country survey is established through negotiations between SAC and country representatives. The maximum score is constant, whereas the weighting of individual factors is modified to safeguard relevance in a particular country. For SAC, it is important to secure that results of individual country surveys are comparable at a global level. When recent mine victims are given such a prominent position, this reflects both SAC’s principal humanitarian concern and the fact that numbers of victims have proven to be a good indicator of the extent to which a community has adapted to the mine threat or not.

The number of victims is seen as a key indicator of impact both in rules of thumb approaches and in the LOIS format. Recent accidents are often a sufficient indicator to release an operation. In three Mozambican communities studied by AMAC in 1999-2000, there had been recent accidents. In none of the communities in question could registered accidents be said to indicate the severity of the problem. People living in these communities were familiar with the minefield and its boundaries, and were dependent on entering the minefield in none of the cases. There were different reasons for each of the accidents, but in none of the cases was it justified to see them as an indication of the scope of the mine problem in that particular community.

Illustration 2.3: Accidents and impact assessment

The Yemen survey, implemented by the Afghan agency MCPA, is the only completed LOIS to date. The general approach is to first conduct an ‘expert opinion collection’, interviewing officials at various levels as well as other key informants and complementing these with existing records. In Yemen, the expert opinion collection generated a list of 1,294 suspected communities. After the survey, the list contained only 592 communities, of which 15 were not identified at the expert opinion stage. Community interviews consist of a mapping session and questionnaire, complemented by a visual inspection of mined areas. In the final analysis, the Yemen survey identified 14 high-impact communities,

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20 A draft version is not available as of 1 January 2001.
21 Millard & Harpviken, 2000
84 moderate-impact and 494 light-impact ones. Examples of general findings are that blocked access to water sources is particularly dangerous and that categories of people likely to be subject to incidents include people taking livestock for grazing and risk-taking young males. This illustrates the more general point that LOIS is designed to inform not only demining, but also a broader range of HMA activities, including mine awareness. 

In Mozambique, the Canadian International Demining Institute (CIDC) is in the process of implementing a LOIS, with completion planned for mid-2001. CIDC does not operate as a subcontractor to SAC, but has been using modified versions of SAC instruments. Since HMA in Mozambique has so far been conducted in the absence of any country-wide level one survey, and with very little impact data, it is expected that the CIDC survey will represent fundamental improvements in the HMA effort. By itself, it will be of great value in generating a clearer picture of the scope of Mozambique’s mine problem, an issue that has warranted a lot of discussion over the past few years.

Afghanistan has a level one survey. The problem is that the survey has very little impact data, and the results are in many cases outdated. Following an SAC advance mission in May 2000, SAC suggested that existing data be imported into the IMSMA database, complemented by the findings from a modified version of LOIS. However, both tasks are labour demanding, and discussions are ongoing as to whether the complementary survey should be arranged as a concentrated exercise in which all mine-affected communities are revisited or if one should conduct the impact survey step-by-step, over several years. Only the former option can satisfy the programme’s need to become more strongly impact-based in its planning. The latter will not give the programme impact data on all tasks, and, in practice, survey will follow preliminary priorities, which again would have to be based on existing data. Given the scope of the Afghan mine problem, the value of having impact data at the national level justifies the costs.

One weakness with the LOIS is that it tends to rank highly those communities that have a wide range of impacts, even if none of these are particularly dramatic. This relates directly to the fact that most of the variables are binary - the score is either zero or one. Cases in Mozambique serve to illustrate this point. In many communities where land is mined, people have taken up cultivation of fields further away from the settlement, and, in some of these cases, the new land is more fertile. In these cases, it seems unlikely that the mined area would be cultivated after demining. Nonetheless, in a system such as LOIS, the community would receive the same points for blocked access to agricultural areas as those communities in which people have no alternatives.

Illustration 2.4: Alternatives to resources to which access is blocked

In conclusion, it is significant to note that SAC’s composite indicator has become the basic reference for basic-impact surveys. In terms of including local stakeholders, the survey applies a rapid participatory appraisal technique that ensures a level of local ownership, and thus legitimacy for the survey. The survey spans all levels, with the community as its primary level of analysis, while ultimately maintaining its ambition to have comparable data at the global level. The composite indicator has been developed to fill the needs of a basic-impact survey, and is in most cases not a sufficient basis for launching an operation in a selected community. Hence, the survey is relevant primarily in the earliest phase. Many, particularly proponents of cost-benefit analysis, would argue that the survey has a weakness in not reflecting costs (or constraints) in its impact measure. The SAC format is appropriate for impact assessment at all stages of the emergency-development continuum.

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25 Information based on community study in Millard & Harpviken, 2000, Chapter 6, note 6 above.
Community studies

Community studies represent a more open approach, where the aim is to establish a more thorough understanding of the impact of landmines on communities. The approach is pursued by the Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC) at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). AMAC combines several methods of data collection: open interviews with key informants, survey, observation and documents. The analysis is based on a standard ‘plan of inquiry’, which establishes the most significant issues, and findings are mainly presented in text. The approach is labour intensive. In order to get the most out of relatively short stays in any one village, AMAC staff employ local surveyors. AMAC community studies have two principal objectives: first, to contribute to placing impact at the core of HMA debate and practice; second, to develop a focused package for community studies that can be applied by operational agencies as a complement to other approaches.

AMAC’s community studies are guided by the idea that significant impacts may be identified in several fields within the community, beyond the almost exclusive attention to accidents or to economic impact. Community studies therefore also look at issues such as the impact of landmines on migration or their role in relation to cultural or religious issues. Often, the types of issues that prove to be of major importance in one community are negligible in another. Apart from being oriented towards a broader range of issues than other approaches to impact assessment, the community-studies approach is also occupied with looking at the interaction of different factors. For instance, it may be the case that the presence of landmines is only one of several factors that prevent refugees from returning to their community of origin. Landmines may interact with a lack of transport and a poor security situation, and, unless these other factors are resolved, people will not return.

In Afghanistan, community studies by AMAC demonstrate the extent to which HMA agencies work in separation from other agencies involved in reconstruction, even in cases where the latter would be important sources of information for impact assessment. One village in West Afghanistan had hosted demining operations more or less continuously over six to seven years; yet the exchange of information with other agencies working permanently in the village was very limited.

Illustration 2.5: Impact assessment and coordination

In Mozambique, AMAC has used community studies as a basis for identifying weaknesses in existing impact-assessment procedures. These studies led AMAC to conclude, amongst other things, that impact assessment was largely understood as an event, brought to completion with the collection of level one survey data. In contrast, the community studies generated findings that led to recommendations of impact assessment being understood in terms of a process where impact remains in focus throughout the whole project cycle. In one case study from Capirizanje, on the border with Malawi, it was found that the impact of the operation was dramatically different from what was envisaged at the outset. Demining was motivated by safety for returnees moving through, but the demined area became a key resource for local agriculture and settlement. It is argued that a more detailed assessment prior to clearance, as well as a systematic monitoring of impact in the implementation phase, would have enabled the operator to identify the key impacts and ensure their earliest possible realization.

Case studies of affected communities were used as a complementary measure in the Level One Impact Survey in Yemen. Each of the six case studies were conducted by a two-person team over a mini-
mum of two days and were arranged partly to serve as a check on the findings from the structured survey and partly to supplement the survey results with personal accounts and more comprehensive community profiles. In the Yemen report, findings from the case studies are represented both in appendix form and as illustrations of impact throughout the text. The case studies are drawn on in order to warn mine-action planners of the danger of taking the categories into which communities are ranked as their only reference. Community studies are demanding in terms of both labour and competence, and some critics question their relevance as an impact-assessment tool for operators on exactly these grounds, arguing that the costs outweigh the benefits. In terms of representing local interest, community studies are strong. Their relevance is highest at the local level, but the data they generate are difficult to aggregate. Therefore, they are not the best basis for statements about a country’s overall mine problem. Community studies are workable for all phases of a project, but, as a component in a larger operation, their role would mainly be to make a more thorough impact assessment of communities identified as high impact through other approaches. Finally, community studies are adaptable to all stages in the process, from emergency to development. Ultimately, community studies constitute a complement to other approaches, such as in addressing high-priority communities identified by LOIS.

**Institutionalizing impact assessment**

The four analytical approaches discussed in this chapter are to a large extent subject to similar challenges in method, even though they vary widely in terms of analytical focus. In practice, there are undoubtedly differences between the rough minefield visit that normally informs a rule of thumb decision and the longer presence that underlies community studies, to take the extremes. Nonetheless, all approaches face the challenge of collecting data that is as solid as possible, under what are often difficult conditions. One challenge is that of building trust with people who have experienced armed conflict and who may also have been subject to political control. Without trust, it is difficult to collect solid data. Another problem, relevant to most of the countries of concern here, is the lack of secondary data. A third problem is that the landmine issue is often heavily politicized. Not only will there be actors with an interest in misrepresenting the mine problem, key actors in HMA have formulated methodological tools that can only contribute to an overestimation of the problem. The response is to work on the development of more robust methodological tools, a process that is now under way in several of the approaches discussed above.

In a community in northern Mozambique, the main settlement and the former village centre had a mine belt between them, although safe access was not seen as a problem. People had taken up cultivation in other areas nearby, and the economic importance of demining would be minimal. Nonetheless, people welcomed the demining warmly, seeing their ability to reassert ownership over the nearby village centre, which used to be a Portuguese colonial administration, as a matter of importance. Demining was seen as priority, and people ranked it above, or equal to, other welfare issues, such as a health post. However, with no direct risk of accidents, and minimal need for the resources freed up by demining, it was essential that the population developed full confidence in demining for the operation to have any impact. On that assumption, the operation was significant because it responded to a locally defined need. Unfortunately, confidence in demining has not always been safeguarded in the same manner as was the case in this operation.

**Illustration 2.6: Local priorities**

Better tools are not enough; there is also a need to develop the competence to apply them. It is important that impact-assessment initiatives are linked to local competence building, and that the persons being trained are linked to continuing responses. Impact assessment is a process where data is collected

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30 Millard & Harpviken, 2000, Chapter 6, note 6 above.
and progress monitored in all phases of a project or a programme. To take one example: the Sida desk study on the effects of mine action is concerned about the partiality of those behind the Afghan socio-economic study. Emphasizing partiality overlooks the basic fact that impact can only be secured once the operators on the ground have developed the capacity to deal with it. Although independent evaluation may be required at certain intervals, this by no means excludes the need for operators to have a basic command and knowledge of impact assessment. Capacity-building in impact assessment is a priority and must be part and parcel of any larger impact assessment initiative.

There are many opportunities for where to organizationally locate impact-assessment capacities. What is the best solution in a given context will vary according to factors such as organizational policy, access to competent personnel and the scope of the mine problem. In cases where the coordination of assistance is strong, it may be that the impact-assessment function should be located within a general coordination body rather than with specialized HMA agencies. However, when humanitarian funds are devoted to HMA, implementing agencies as well as donors are ultimately responsible that operations are conducted on the basis of sound impact assessments, even though the capacity to conduct assessments may vary a great deal. Most fundamentally, sound impact assessment in HMA requires personnel that have an understanding of both broader issues of development and more specific issues relating to landmines and their impact.

While developing a specialized expertise for HMA organizations is essential, it is not enough. The change from an output- to an impact-oriented definition of the mine problem needs to be solidly rooted amongst all stakeholders. Representatives from government administrations, cooperating organizations and affected communities need a basic introduction to the subject as a foundation for constructive dialogue. Similarly, a basic impact understanding needs to be fostered throughout HMA organizations. Unless personnel at all levels understand, and give attention to, impact issues, HMA misses a vital resource. Field personnel in many cases have a deep-seated understanding of the communities in which they work, but this is a resource that is too often lost.

**Conclusion**

Any HMA operation needs to be rooted in thorough impact-assessment mechanisms. Traditionally, HMA has not distinguished between impact and output, while progress has been measured in terms of mines lifted and square meters cleared. We are now in a reorientation process, where the focus has turned towards the impact of HMA on people and communities. Given the potential costs to human lives, it is key that priorities are established on a sound basis. Furthermore, once priorities are established, implementers need the capacity to monitor impact both throughout and after the operation. A successful institutionalization of impact assessments amongst HMA organizations requires that agencies develop analytically skilled staff, and that sensitivity to impact issues is emphasized in the training of all types of staff.

Donors are often attracted by the simple and powerful logic of output indicators: this is the cost of lifting a mine; this is the programme cost per square meter. If such measures are applied, programmes that pay attention to impact are unlikely to come out as the cheapest, both because they will give priority to small-scale tasks with large impact and because their expenditure on impact assessment will itself be reflected in the overall cost. A well-informed donor will realize this and make sound impact assessment a precondition for support. As this chapter has established, the challenges of moving HMA from being output-oriented to impact-oriented are complex. The challenges differ between stages of reconstruction, between phases of projects and between different societal levels. Thus, there is no single answer to the challenge. What works well in one context does not necessarily work well in another, and the different approaches discussed here should be understood as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
Rules of thumb approaches are largely outdated, with the possible exception of a few areas where the mine problem is truly limited. Economic analysis has an advantage that it balances impact and costs, while its weakness lies in its understanding of impact as largely restricted to the economic arena. It is also an inherent risk that the uncertain assumptions upon which any such analysis rests is veiled by the powerful and unambiguous numbers of its reports. Composite indicators are more robust and cover impacts in a variety of dimensions. However, they also provide only a rough measure since they report only the presence or absence of particular types of impact, regardless of the impact’s importance. Through SAC, composite indicators are about to emerge as the dominant impact-assessment tool in HMA. Community studies have generated interesting insights from existing operational practice but are still in their infancy as a tool for implementing agencies. Their openness to a variety of impacts, as well as to the interplay between different factors, constitutes their primary quality, but difficulty of aggregation and sheer labour intensity remain drawbacks. The implication of this for Sida is that it must assess which approach or combination of approaches is most relevant to respond to the need for impact assessment in a particular context.

Complementarity between approaches could take a variety of forms. For the more general impact survey and for the first prioritization of tasks, the SAC instruments are sound and can serve as a reference. Once key priorities are established, community studies can provide a complement to the LOIS, with the aim of identifying community-specific impact issues and potentially developing local indicators that will ensure a relevant focus throughout the implementation. The main role of economic analysis is for assessments at the programme level, but even here the exclusive economic focus warrants the complement of approaches that look carefully at non-economic dimensions. This is a warning that applies particularly to donors, who are often prone to searching for simple and unambiguous representations of impact. The inherent risk is that support to HMA is biased in ways that are not necessarily consistent with larger humanitarian objectives.

For Sida, there is a need to revise its current policy of funding demining exclusively. Although impact issues are widely discussed, there is a long way to go before the impact perspective plays the central role it ought to in HMA practices. Hence, there is also a need for constructive backing from a variety of actors, and from donors in particular. Sida has demonstrated interest and possesses the knowledge to become a constructive player for enhancing impact assessment in HMA. Without such an engagement, Sida runs the distinct risk of violating its broader policy of 'Developmental Humanitarian Assistance', which focuses precisely on ensuring that humanitarian efforts have both broad and enduring effects.
3 Implementation Channels

Over the past decade, a number of channels for the implementation of Humanitarian Mine Action have emerged. Because of its legitimacy in providing humanitarian assistance and in mobilizing funds and other resources, the UN assumed a central role as the implementation channel for mine action, most notably through establishing national Mine Action Centres (MACs). However, since the end of 1999, there has been broad consensus that MACs as both implementers and coordinating bodies have largely been a failure; in this chapter, we briefly cover the critique that has led to this consensus. Aside from the UN, there are currently at least two main forms of implementation channels in mine action. Owing in large part to their ability to employ a rapid and flexible approach to the problem of mines, international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have developed as a key implementation channel. A second channel is that of existing governmental institutions. More specifically, the militaries of national governments have increasingly taken a more active role in mine action, a move that stems in large part from their technical proficiency and capacities in the field. In addition, there are alternatives to the NGO and government channels, the most prominent of these being commercial companies.

Following a conceptual clarification of what we mean by implementation channels, we examine the relative merits of different channels. First, we briefly explore the criticisms aimed at MACs as implementers. Second, we examine country programmes of two of the largest NGOs currently in mine action, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Iraqi Kurdistan and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in Angola. Third, we look at Nicaragua, where the Nicaraguan Government – with support from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) – has assumed primary responsibility for coordinating HMA efforts and where the military has assumed responsibility for the implementation of demining. Fourth, we assess the utility and implications of alternatives to the NGO and government channels. We conclude with a comparison of the relative merits of each approach.

Conceptualizing implementation channels

In the simplest terms, an implementation channel can be conceptualized as the collective body of organizations that put a given policy into effect. Such a definition is of course broad and can include everything from donor agencies and international bodies to on-the-ground organizations. In the following, we employ a narrower conceptualization of implementation channels, restricting the definition to include only those organizations that specifically implement Humanitarian Mine Action at the field level.

Sida’s role

In terms of implementing HMA, the prime concern for Sida is the need to create sustainable national capacities, equipped to deal with the problem in the long term. Sida suggests that there should be a move away from the dominant role UN-led Mine Action Centres have had in the implementation of HMA, towards existing institutions such as rescue services, civil defence, the police or the military assuming a larger role in the implementation of HMA. This is based on arguments regarding sustain-

1 Preliminär redogörelse för och analys av det samhälle svenska stödet till olika former av minverksamhet samt underlag för preliminär inriktning av fortsatt stöd, Sida, 28 June 2000.p. 3

2 Interestingly, this has also become the profile of Sida’s cooperation with various Swedish capacities, where various branches of the military, as well as the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) are central actors. See Chapter 5.
ability; otherwise, Sida offers few suggestions as to the strengths and weaknesses associated with basing the implementation of mine action on existing capacities. With regard to NGOs, Sida sums up its experiences as largely positive, with a particular emphasis on several key factors. Chief amongst these is the issue of transparency, the building of national and local knowledge, and concern for impact issues. The bulk of Sida’s support has been channelled via UN-led MACs and through NGOs. Roughly 50% of Sida’s overall support has gone through MACs, while 31% has gone directly to NGOs. At the same time, a note of caution is necessary: the bulk of Sida’s support to MACs is channelled to a variety of implementing organizations. Because Sida does not earmark its contributions, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how the funds were used. Sida’s current position is that its policy needs to be modified, in order to ensure that support is provided to organizations that are viable in the long term.

The UN channel

Until the end of 1999, UN-established Mine Action Centres were mandated to act as both the coordinators and implementers of Humanitarian Mine Action. Following the findings and recommendations of the influential 1997 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) reports, an international policy consensus has developed over the past few years, contending that these two functions should be kept separate. According to this view, MACs are to function primarily as coordination bodies, with the authority to subcontract independent agencies to implement HMA at the field level. Nevertheless, the status of the UN in relation to the implementation of mine action is somewhat ambiguous, and the distinction between the role of MACs as implementers and coordinators remains blurred. In the recent controversies surrounding the Cambodian programme, the separation of implementation and overarching governance functions has been a key issue. The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) is formally run by the government, but with heavy input from the international community. Over the past two years, following accusations of mismanagement and corruption, the programme has undergone massive reforms, at the same time as many donors have withheld funds. In this context, it has been pointed out that not only is it a problem that the implementing agency, CMAC, is not subject to sufficient external control, but also a further problem has been that the governing organ has engaged in detail administration. With the establishment of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), this is meant to change. Apparently, the extent to which CMAA will take on coordination functions remains to be fully clarified, but recent guidelines call for CMAC to assume responsibility. As formulated in the most recent plans, CMAC will be responsible for both implementation and coordination for the foreseeable future.

A similar ambiguity characterizes the Afghan programme. In Afghanistan, the implementation of mine action is largely carried out by so-called national NGOs. Meanwhile, the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA) retains control over the programme’s coordination. However, these national NGOs were established by the UN in the early 1990s and continue to remain under the strict control of MACA. The execution of projects is regulated by detailed project agreements, and MACA retains control over funding. The end result is that national Afghan NGOs, who are proficient in both practi-
cal implementation and management, are in reality only semi-independent entities. In spite of the ambiguities witnessed in the Afghan programme, it appears that there is a distinct trend towards separating the coordination and implementation functions of MACs. This trend is perhaps best exemplified by the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) in Kosovo, where the UNMACC’s role is strictly one of coordination. The implementation of HMA in Kosovo is carried out by independent agencies.

The NGO channel

Nongovernmental organizations are amongst the most prominent actors in all facets of HMA. In recent years, NGOs have not only been at the forefront of mine action in terms of victim assistance, advocacy and mine awareness, but also with respect to more technical aspects, such as surveying, marking and demining. As a consequence, it has been argued that NGOs have a particular advantage in that they are able to offer innovative, flexible and integrated approaches. In the next sections, we examine the country-specific programmes of two of the largest implementing NGOs in mine action today – MAG in Northern Iraq and NPA in Angola. Specifically, we focus on the issues of relevance, impact, coordination, sustainability and accountability. In our assessment, we do not attempt a direct comparison of each NGO. Rather, we consider the relative merits of the approach of each organization in relation to the specific context and set of circumstances it has encountered. The assessment in the following is based on the country-specific programmes of only two NGOs, and the analysis is thus not necessarily representative for the NGO sector as a whole. Nevertheless, the assessment provided here does provide a relatively good indication of the significant strengths and weaknesses of NGOs as an implementation channel.

Sida's role

Sida's initial contribution to MAG’s programme in Iraqi Kurdistan came in 1994. By 1997 and 1998, Sida had emerged as MAG’s central donor, contributing 19.7 and 26 million SEK for each year, respectively. Since 1998, Sida has reduced its funding for the programme substantially, down to 9.7 million SEK for 2000. Much of this reduction in MAG’s funding in linked to Sida’s decision to concentrate its funding on southern Iraq, as opposed to northern Iraq where MAG operates. At the same time, the cuts in Sida’s funding of MAG were also part of a strategic move designed to reduce MAG’s dependence on Sida as a donor. Funding to MAG’s programme has not been earmarked in any way, and MAG has used this funding to support demining and mine-awareness activities, as well as efforts to develop a national capacity. A capacity study commissioned by Sida in 1998 lauded MAG for its ‘distinctive profile’ in mine action, emphasizing both its contributions to the ban on landmines and its innovative field approaches. However, the study was critical of MAG’s overall financial procedures and general management. In response, MAG now appears to have rectified most of the weaknesses identified in the study.

In comparison to MAG, Sida’s support to NPA projects in Angola has quite a different history. In the early years of the programme, Sida only supported work in Malanje province, where Sida had had a long previous engagement. Sida began its funding of NPA in 1995 with a contract to clear the Luanda-Malange-Saurimo road. While the latter half of the project was not completed owing to security problems, the first part of the road was successfully demined and was opened. Since, the road has been closed following the resumption of conflict in the area, and there have been reports of mine accidents

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in the region. Sida’s original funding to NPA took place in close cooperation with Swedrelief, which was in charge of bridge construction and the reparation of cleared roads. Sida’s support has now expanded beyond Malanje; from 2000, Sida funding will not be earmarked or restricted to a particular geographical area, but will be provided to specific clearance projects.

Assessment of NGOs as implementers

Relevance

MAG’s first field program in Northern Iraq was launched in 1992. At the time, MAG was the only internationally recognized HMA organization working in Northern Iraq. This remained the case until 1995, when NPA initiated its programme, followed by the UN in late 1997. MAG’s Northern Iraq programme is its largest, most developed and the one MAG views as most representative of its basic philosophy. At the same time, the programme is not recognized by the Baghdad government. When MAG began its involvement in Northern Iraq, the mine threat to the region was severe. Because the mine situation in the region remains serious, it is likely to warrant substantial and sustained activity for years to come. MAG’s early response was key, both in terms of initiating an on-the-ground effort and in bringing international focus to the problem.

In its initial phases, MAG’s programme in Iraq was a relatively conventional effort. However, the threat of major funding reductions, combined with operational problems due to difficulties in securing the supply of equipment, led to a search for innovative responses. A first example of this is the largest demarcation effort in recent HMA history. Such projects are important in that they have the potential to reduce the immediate threat of landmines and may in certain situations be a cost-efficient response. By the end of 1998, MAG had marked 1,130 of the 2,300 minefields registered in its database. A second, and perhaps even more important innovation, is that of Mine Action Teams (MATs). The concept of MATs developed from MAG’s experience with its Angola project. In Angola, MAG had experimented with multi-skill teams that combined Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) – inspired information gathering, locally tailored mine awareness and UXO clearance. In Northern Iraq, MATs combine demining, survey and mine awareness. The basic component of MATs is a demining unit consisting of three persons, most commonly a team leader and two deminers, although MATs can be as large as 18 persons. The team is responsible for ‘Community Liaison’, which includes information exchange with the community, impact monitoring and mine awareness. MATs do not always work as one unit. Components of each team can work separately or can be used in conjunction with other teams. Overall, the MAT concept stands out as one of the few alternative organizational approaches to HMA, owing to its flexibility and the unique way in which it integrates the various components of mine action.

In Angola, ongoing hostilities and re-mining by both parties (government and UNITA) as an active conflict strategy have led to the strong politicization of demining. The Angolan mine problem has been categorized as severe, despite the absence of a thorough impact assessment. Re-mining, political and security issues have placed severe constraints on demining work. In light of the general situation in Angola, the relevance of a particular programme becomes inextricably linked to the agency’s ability to respond to the changing needs of the population. It is evident that impact assessments are a necessity of HMA globally. The same can be said of understanding the context and being flexible in the way operations are conducted. In the case of Angola, both are fundamental issues that will be key in ensur-

9 The evaluation team could not visit Northern Iraq. The following is based on interviews during a two-day visit to MAG headquarters in Manchester and a review of documentation from MAG’s and Sida’s archives. In addition, we have had access to a recent evaluation report conducted for DFID: J. A. Craib, 2001. Report on Visit to Northern Iraq, Draft, Kent: Baric Consultants.

ing that demining has any effect at all. NPA’s presence in Angola dates to the mid-1980s, when the organization supported South African refugees in camps run by the African National Congress (ANC). After signing an agreement with the Angolan government in 1989, NPA gradually expanded its engagement. The mine action programme began in early 1995, with demining in Malanje province, traditionally a target area for Swedish assistance. NPA’s programme expanded rapidly, culminating with a partial national survey in 1996–97, the introduction of MDDs in 1996 and the testing of various mechanical approaches from 1997 onwards. Currently, NPA is the largest demining initiative in Angola. NPA’s programme in Angola has been characterized by the use of conventionally organized demining teams and a variety of mechanical means of demining. In the past, the combination of large platoons and strong technical proficiency was accorded greater prominence than concerns about impact. Given the current political situation (i.e. ongoing conflict), such an approach can be unproductive. More recently NPA has, as will be elaborated in later sections, attempted to respond to the changing needs of the population through the development of impact-assessment tools. The latter call for the combined use of different demining techniques (e.g. manual, machines and MDDs) to improve the speed of demining.

**Impact**

Like many mine-action organizations built on military knowledge, MAG has had difficulties in giving impact the same prominence as techniques. The shift that has taken place within the Northern Iraq programme since 1995 grew out of a synthesis of staff with a military background and staff with a development background. In MAG’s case, the latter were often brought in to conduct mine-awareness activities. Communities often became increasingly frustrated with repeated mine-awareness visits that did not lead to mine removal. MATs were developed as a response to this.

In Northern Iraq, MAG establishes priorities based on data drawn from mine-affected communities and collected prior to 1998. If needed, MAG collects new data, but only after a particular village or area has been categorized as a priority. MAG also uses a less systematic type of data in the form of community requests and MAG evaluation reports. HMA organizations have often dealt with impact in a rather static manner, collecting baseline data before moving on to the technical operation. MAG operates with the concept of ‘Community Liaison’. In practice, this relies on the MAT team’s ability to maintain a dialogue with the local community during operations, conduct mine awareness, and monitor and evaluate impact. MAG now systematically returns to projects for post-clearance impact assessments.

In March and April 2000, MAG in Northern Iraq hired a consultant to review its system of prioritization. As a result, MAG adopted new guidelines and survey forms. MAG’s basic approach to prioritization has three stages (see Fig. 3.1). The three-tiered selection system, in which constraints do not affect the priority ranking of a particular task, is regarded here as sound practice. However, a full assessment of the success of MAG’s procedures would require a detailed study, one that we are not able to undertake within the scope of this report.

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13 Valerie Warmington, 1999. *Final Report: Monitoring and Evaluation Mission to Northern Iraq (March 5–April 14, 1999).* MAG.
In Angola, the number of victims from mine accidents is amongst the world’s highest. The ongoing armed conflict has forced the migration of large numbers of the population. As a result, assessing impact is particularly difficult in Angola. Nevertheless, because of the extensive mine problem in the country, there is an immediate need for a mine-action programme. NPA Angola is currently in the process of attempting to operationalize a systematized impact-assessment (IA) methodology. This methodology is based on a three-tiered reporting system, which includes taking into account the needs and capacities of communities. It also takes into account the ability of non-HMA implementers to support a particular programme and NPA’s capacity to conduct an operation. Some operation and project managers have been trained in the use of these tools. This IA methodology requires that project managers report on a monthly basis on impact assessments that are under way and on possible future tasks. The assessment reports are sent to the management team, which is ultimately responsible for decisionmaking regarding task prioritization. This impact-assessment system will be used on a trial basis for three to four months, and an evaluation and follow-up training will be conducted after the initial trial period. It is expected that the current methodology will undergo some modification so that it is better able to respond to the practical constraints that may be encountered during the trial period.

The contextual difficulties in Angola have led to numerous problems that may not be considerations elsewhere. Currently, there is considerable debate within NPA as to whether a task can be suspended in order to take on another task of higher priority. Key staff in the organization feel this should be possible, but also recognize that shifting between tasks may cause problems since the situation on the ground changes so often. However, staff-members also believe there should be a level of flexibility so as to evaluate the situation as relevant to each case. In short, for NPA to be able to maximize its impact at the national level, it needs to be able to shift its operations in accordance with contextual changes on the ground. For example, the movement of large numbers of population from one province to another may lead to changed priorities. Luena, in Moxico province, has become host to thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the last 18 months. As a consequence, mines in the area also pose a greater threat due to the increase in populations, and their lack of familiarity with where they are located.

**Coordination**

When setting up MATs, a driving force for MAG Northern Iraq was the problems it had encountered in coordinating a mine action response. There were often long delays between an initial survey and the

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**Fig. 3.1. MAG Northern Iraq – three-stage priority-setting approach**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First stage</th>
<th>Second stage</th>
<th>Third stage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact assessment: this incorporates accidents, denied access or proximity of minefields to roads and/or settlements, the number of beneficiaries and a community’s own prioritization of minefields.</td>
<td>Assessment of constraints: metal contamination (natural and fragments), access, security problems or community conflicts over land. In the event that there is a high level of constraint, demining an area is deferred, but its priority ranking remains the same.</td>
<td>Assessment of feasibility: preference is given to minefields on the basis of the confirmed presence of mines (as opposed to their only being suspected), not having benefited from earlier MAG operations, or high visibility of minefields.</td>
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16 The criteria applied by MAG are relatively simple, as compared for example to the SAC system. The emphasis on community priorities is considered fundamental and serves as a check on MAG’s own observations.
actual response. In an effort to overcome this, MAG opted for a closer integration of its various teams. As mentioned earlier, at the ground level the MAT team largely takes care of coordination between the affected community and MAG. As with many NGOs, coordination with other humanitarian efforts is a fundamental part of MAG's thinking. In reality, MAG has found coordination with other reconstruction and development initiatives difficult, and in Northern Iraq such coordination has been relatively limited. MAG indicates this may be due to the fact that most organizations operate on the so-called oil-for-food funding, which must be renewed every six months, thus constricting long-term planning.

NPA often operates mine-action programmes and development programmes in the same country. In practice, this has not necessarily lead to stronger integration between the two. Currently, coordination between the mine-action and long-term development sections of NPA is restricted because the latter, already in the initial phases of a project, has chosen to work in specific geographical areas that do not necessarily coincide with the needs of mine action and is less mobile than the HMA section.

In a country like Angola, where the conflict is ongoing, the danger of re-mining is prevalent, and populations are highly reliant on aid. Consequently, the coordination of humanitarian efforts is key in ensuring impact. In contexts where conflicts have ceased and development is under way, focusing on one area at the expense of another can be detrimental. For instance, it can lead to one community receiving extensive humanitarian and development support, while others receive none. Currently, NPA-Angola tends to ensure that its demining is linked to other humanitarian or development work, by attempting to prioritize areas where other forms of assistance will take place. NPA will at times extend operations to neighbouring provinces and coordinate with other emergency and development initiatives. In some cases, coordination with other NGOs or UN agencies means demining areas that have been identified by these agencies. However, reliance on other organizations or agencies may mean the prioritization of areas of questionable importance. To this end, NPA regards some organizations as more trustworthy than others when it comes to site identification. Ultimately, NPA is nevertheless responsible and accountable for the impact of any operation it undertakes.

**Sustainability**

The MAG programme in Northern Iraq has an extensive history in building national competence. The programme began in 1992, and by 1995 employed 14 expatriates; by 2000, there were only four expatriates in the programme. Of these, only the country programme manager is in a line function. The current plan calls for a scaling back to one or two expatriate positions by mid-2001. The reduction in the expatriate-to-indigenous staff ratio is regarded as a positive move, since MAG has been able to build the necessary national capacity. More problematic is MAG’s restructuring of its salary system. In order to avoid losing staff to other organizations, MAG has recently upgraded its pay scale. As a result, MAG salaries for demining staff are currently higher than those of both NPA and organizations subcontracted by the UN.

The threats to the future of MAG’s programme have generated considerable discussion within the organization. MAG is unprepared for a change in the region’s political situation and would be vulnerable if the Baghdad government should assume control of Northern Iraq. If sanctions against Iraq are lifted, Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein is likely to terminate MAG’s operations. A further threat has been that of the generously funded UNOPS programme. As a solution, establishing one or more local organizations seems realistic, given that there is a high level of expertise with national staff in the programme. The central concern expressed by MAG is that donors would shy away from supporting national NGOs (even if supportive in principle), one reason being that such organizations would be

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more vulnerable to political pressure from the parties involved in the conflict. While this is a valid concern, there are ways of circumnavigating such a dilemma. One possibility is a type of MAG umbrella function, which could include fundraising, quality assurance and even work as a political shield. Alternately, national NGOs could find an arrangement with the UN. As of November 2000, MAG had not decided on an exit strategy, something that may stem from a reluctance to let go of one of the organization’s most successful programmes. Since, MAG has confirmed that it has established plans for withdrawal from the region.

In Angola, the issue of capacity building is a key question. To this end, one concern is whether or not NPA has been successful in building a long-term capacity. On the one hand, NPA could choose to stay in Angola on a semi-permanent basis. On the other, the possibility of building national organizations to take over from NPA could be explored. Currently, transferring the capacity to the government is not an option, primarily because Instituto Nacional de Remoção De Obstáculos E Engenhos Explosivos (INAROEE) has been highly unsuccessful both in coordinating HMA and in an operative capacity. Moreover, INAROEE’s demining capacity has not been operational since 1999. INAROEE wishes to be able to reactivate their former demining capacity, but this is unlikely to materialize. First, because it has long been realized that national coordinating bodies are unable to perform their duties appropriately when they also have an operational wing (see section on the UN). Second, because the Angolan government is currently laying mines, and hence a national demining capacity funded by donor aid may be seen as an additional war-making tool. At this time, it appears that NPA does not have a clear exit strategy, nor does it have a long-term strategy for continuing its operations. NPA has tried to nationalize its programme as much as possible. Currently, NPA hopes that regional offices will be mostly indigenous by the end of 2001. One positive step taken in this regard has been to hire an expatriate whose role is solely to build the management competence of national staff. These measures are regarded as positive steps.

Accountability

With its Mine Action Teams, MAG has developed a strong level of accountability to the mine-affected local population. This is exemplified both by the way in which information is collected on impact and by the way communities are given significant influence over the selection of tasks affecting a particular community. Of particular importance is the emphasis on the ‘community liaison’ function, which is meant to ensure regular contact with locals throughout the implementation phase, and hence is an asset also in building confidence in clearance. MAG’s level of reporting to existing authorities has been relatively low. Over the past year, stronger relationships have been developed with the two locally based administrations. This is partly a matter of necessity, since both relevant administrations have established their own mine-action offices. There is a potential conflict between MAG’s emphasis on community-level accountability and the emergence of stronger mine-action offices, at least if the latter use their new capacity to direct priority-setting for political reasons. At the moment, MAG, in cooperation with other agencies in the region, engages in low-key capacity-building with both offices. When Sida conducted its capacity study in 1998, significant delays in financial reporting was seen as one problem. It appears that MAG has since rectified this problem. A different problem with regard to accountability to donors is that access to Northern Iraq has proved difficult, and, as a result, there have been few project visits. Given Sida’s extensive engagement with the programme, and particularly given the innovative aspects of the programme, a fuller evaluation would be advisable. NPA’s consultation with target groups has, until recently, been low owing to the absence of an impact-assessment system. However, it is hoped that this will change with the use of the tools that have been

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18 Additionally, there is concern that technical standards may be lowered.
recently developed. The approaches to impact assessment developed by NPA include consultations with community and other non-HMA implementers. The government is seen as a further key to the process. NPA Angola has tried to relate constructively with local government, INAROEE and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS), both in information exchange and in providing the government with seconded personnel. Despite this, the Angolan government has pressured NPA to undertake tasks for political reasons. In the past, NPA believed that if it wanted to continue working in Angola, it had to respond to requests from regional politicians irrespective of the predicted impact of the task, whenever such requests were presented. Currently, this is changing with the development of the impact-assessment methodology. The establishment of a standard approach is fundamental in preventing this from occurring in the future, because impact assessments can be used to establish a common language between NPA and government officials. The government will have to realize that NPA is restricted, both by impact-assessment prerequisites and on the types of tasks they can undertake.

The government channel

In general, there have been few studies on the use of the government and the military as implementers of mine action, and very little, if anything, is known about their efficacy. In Nicaragua, the government has assumed responsibility for virtually all aspects of mine action in the country. This includes the setting of priorities, the general coordination of HMA and HMA implementation. In the following sections, we assess the Nicaraguan military as implementers of mine action in Nicaragua.

Sida’s role

Beginning in 1996, Sida has provided support for demining in Nicaragua through the OAS. Aside from supporting mine clearance, Sida has also channelled funds through the OAS for limited work on victim assistance. In terms of mine clearance, Sida has not been directly involved in demining efforts. However, Sida has requested that specific areas be demined in order to facilitate other Sida-funded development projects. Sida has thus far refrained from monitoring the work conducted by either the armed forces or the government. One reason for this has been that Sida is understaffed at the field level. A second reason is that Sida staff do not have the expertise required to monitor and assess. From the perspective of the OAS, this is advantageous in that it places fewer restrictions on implementing organizations. Sida did propose that Honduran and Nicaraguan demining efforts be more closely coordinated, but this was rejected by the OAS owing to the complexity and difficulty of such an arrangement, along with the different priorities inherent in each country.19

Assessment of the Government programme in Nicaragua

Relevance

The mine problem in Nicaragua – as well as the rest of Latin America – has never reached the proportions of other countries examined in this report. Damage to infrastructure in Nicaragua has been considerably less than in other cases, and the overall level of post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction in the form of roads and bridges is not as immediate. Furthermore, the number of victims from landmines is relatively low, and the issue of refugee return has not been linked to the mine problem.20

19 Perina, Dr Ruben M. (OAS) & Mr William McDonough (OAS), 1997. Correspondence to Ms Elisabeth Lewin, Latin America Department, Sida, 22 July
20 Landmines in Nicaragua claim upwards of 80 victims per year, and to date a total of 553 persons have been reported victims of landmine accidents. Centro de Estudios Internacionales CEI [International Studies Centre], 1999. Minas Antipersonales y Desminado en Nicaragua: Avances y Limitaciones [Anti-personnel Mines and Demining in Nicaragua: Advances and Limitations]. Nicaragua: CEI, p.15.
Among the most mined areas are agricultural lands in the northern portion of Nicaragua, and the areas bordering Costa Rica. Although the mine problem in Nicaragua is relatively limited, the above factors nevertheless dictate a need for mine action in Nicaragua. However, the landmine problem in Nicaragua has been largely neglected: it was not delineated in the peace process as an essential component of reconstruction, nor was it part of the political agenda of either the Chamorro regime or the Sandinistas.

Prior to the Ottawa process, there was little interest in HMA in Latin America. The initial demining effort in Nicaragua was ad hoc and piecemeal. In 1993, the Organization of American States (OAS) initiated its support to the programme, but the programme ended prematurely as a result of lack of funds. Although demining was resumed in 1995, it was not until the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch that HMA was addressed in a more comprehensive manner. The destruction left by Mitch focused the attention of the international aid community on Nicaragua. From the perspective of mine action, it allowed the Nicaraguan government to rethink its strategy for HMA. The end result was the creation of the National Commission for Demining (CND). This new approach to HMA is viewed as more holistic and integrated. The extent to which this is true is an issue we will return to in latter sections of this chapter. Current estimates indicate that the mine threat can be adequately dealt with by the year 2004. Such an estimate presumes that the programme is able to secure the funding needed to maintain its current pace.

In Nicaragua, the use of the military is widely regarded as the best approach to demining for several reasons. This is not necessarily because other options are not available. For instance, NGOs could be a viable alternative in the Nicaraguan context. However, the Nicaraguan government and military feels that the issue of landmines is a national problem that can effectively be dealt with by national institutions and organizations. Hence, there is consensus that there is no immediate need for NGO involvement. Unlike the case in many other countries, the Nicaraguan military has the necessary expertise, legitimacy and professionalism needed to address the mine problem. Last but not least, the military has assumed responsibility for HMA because they laid the majority of the mines.

The Nicaraguan programme has two innovative components of note. First, a special platoon, which is currently undergoing training, will be in charge of spot demining, marking and the destruction of stockpiles. Part of the rationale for the creation of the special platoon has been the demand for a capacity that can respond to the need for spot demining. Previously, spot demining on one of the fronts meant halting the entire operation. Second, the military has initiated the employment of a psychologist to provide counselling and support for the deminers.

**Impact**

The need for technical surveys outlining the extent and location of minefields is essential for any demining program. However, in the Nicaraguan context, this has been somewhat less important owing to the availability of existing maps. Although Hurricane Mitch caused a lot a damage, it did not do enough to render these maps completely irrelevant. According to the military, Hurricane Mitch affected areas that had to be surveyed, but the process was not too time consuming. The military identified 64 suspected mined areas in the post-Mitch phase by conducting interviews with local populations. The number of mines laid by the Contras is relatively limited. In order to establish the scope of Contra-laid mines, the military has relied primarily on the input of local populations. The original maps together with the post-Mitch data and the information gathered in the areas mined by the Contras provides ample information on the location of the mines in Nicaragua.
A different tool that will be used by the Nicaraguan military is the IMSMA database. As a result of the inter-agency visit involving UNMAS, UNICEF and OAS in the summer of 2000, it was decided to employ the IMSMA system in Nicaragua. IMSMA will be used in order to standardize data and help in priority-setting. The military will relinquish its control over existing data (i.e. maps) so that this can be entered into the IMSMA database. Nevertheless, questions can be raised as to the usefulness of IMSMA at present. This is particularly the case if the operation is able to secure sufficient funding to complete demining by 2004. Further problematic is inexperience with IMSMA generally and in particular the OAS’s lack of experience with it. Notably, neither the existing maps nor the use of IMSMA based on existing data will help the program satisfy even minimum standards for impact assessment.

Currently, there is no established system for setting impact-based priorities in Nicaragua. The National Demining Commission (NDC) is officially responsible for priority-setting at the national level, establishing which regions will be demined first and macro-level tasking. The NDC can best be described as an umbrella organization consisting of local NGOs, government ministries and the military. However, NDC has a number of drawbacks in that it has no budget or executive structure. Furthermore, the NDC staff is based in Nicaragua’s capital, Managua, and is thus not sensitive to the urgency for demining in rural areas and the impact of landmines on rural populations. More generally, local NGOs in Nicaragua tend to be overly preoccupied with urban issues and therefore also tend to not be involved in HMA.

At the regional level, the military works with local governments in order to establish priorities. At the same time, the chief objective of the military is to remove landmines as rapidly as possible. This approach at times entails that areas that are less important are cleared first, if only because they are quicker. The capacity of the military to fully rid Nicaragua of mines by the year 2004 – as is the plan – is dependent on its ability to secure long-term stable funding.

In short, the Nicaraguan demining effort has thus far not invested in attempts to establish the impact of mines on the population, nor have they developed impact-assessment tools for priority-setting. Recently, different government ministries were tasked to evaluate the impact of the HMA effort in relation to their area of expertise (i.e. Ministry of Agriculture on agricultural land freed, Ministry of Health on support to mine victims). However, it is hard to envisage that this will be successful given the lack of both data and know-how.

**Coordination**

A requirement for the OAS to become involved in HMA is for its assistance to be requested by the government of a mine-affected country. This occurred in 1990, when Chamorro, at that time president of Nicaragua, approached the OAS for support. In general, the role of the OAS in Nicaragua is to secure and channel funds, coordinate with the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) to provide Technical Advisors (TAs) and ensure through the TAs that UN quality standards are met. However, the OAS does not involve itself in priority-setting. Rather, this is the responsibility of the NDC.

In Nicaragua, the OAS is in charge of administering all funds. The military assumes responsibility for all so-called fronts as regards the technical aspects of demining. Consequently, there is little need for the external coordination of operational demining. With regard to the coordination of HMA, the

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21. Attached to each team is a Technical Advisor, usually an in-kind contribution from another Latin American country. Each Technical Advisor is recruited and commissioned through the IADB. Quality assurance is the responsibility of the Technical Advisors.

22. Briefly, a front can be defined as a contingent of demining and support personnel organized in accordance with military structures deployed to a particular geographic area.
military works with the Red Cross, UNICEF and the OAS in order to coordinate mine-awareness efforts. The joint Red Cross/UNICEF project attempts to respond to OAS/military needs, such as mine awareness where the military is or will conduct clearance. The military assists the Red Cross and UNICEF with technical support and expertise. However, there are no institutional arrangements guiding this type of coordination. Rather, coordination between UNICEF and the military is founded on personal contacts between individuals within each organization.

The NDC acts as the central coordinating body, with responsibility for mine awareness, victim assistance and demining. However, the NDC has largely been unsuccessful as a coordinating body. The lack of coordination that characterizes HMA extends to the coordination between HMA and other humanitarian efforts. There has been little coordination of activities to ensure that areas are cleared so as to facilitate other development initiatives.

**Sustainability**

Following the expected conclusion of the operation in 2004, the government will keep a small active team on hand to respond to needs in other countries. Although potentially a large number of soldiers will be laid off once demining has concluded, this will not be problematic since Nicaraguan soldiers of that rank have a one-year contract only. However, the most crucial issue in terms of sustainability is whether or not the programme is able to secure sufficient funding so as to run through the year 2004 and maintain its current pace. If funding was reduced or cut all together, demining could continue with government funds, but the speed of the process would be substantially reduced.

**Accountability**

In order to increase its level of accountability, the Nicaraguan military holds regular meetings with local populations. The focus of these meetings is to inform and update local communities as to what the military is doing. There is also a more limited relationship between the demining teams and communities throughout the demining process, but this tends to primarily be ad hoc rather than on a consistent basis. However, there is a fair amount of evidence to suggest that there is trust among the population that the military has the capacity to carry out demining. The trust the military has been able to establish is due largely to the success of the military in redefining its role in the postwar years. Nevertheless, there have been some conflicts between the military and local populations. This occurred in the RAAN region, an area that was controlled by the Contras. The conflict stemmed from a rejection of the military by the local population due to previous political inclinations. The military and the OAS claim they were able to alleviate tensions through meetings with local groups, and clearance work is currently underway without further problems.

Although the military is accountable to the government, the government is not accountable to anyone. In theory, the NDC is mandated to control decisionmaking regarding priorities. In reality, the NDC lacks the expertise to make decisions and winds up rubber-stamping government decisions. At the same time, there is no mechanism for monitoring the NDC by donors. In terms of funding, the military and government are accountable to the OAS. Accountability is one of the main reasons donors choose to channel their funds through the OAS. The OAS has invited the military to appoint someone to be based at the OAS office in order to enhance transparency between offices. Other donors have their own mechanisms in place for monitoring the flow of funds. For instance, one OAS official stated that one of the main reasons Danida chose not to channel funds through the OAS was that progress and funds could be monitored from their office in Managua and therefore did not require the services provided by the OAS.
Alternative implementation channels

While NGOs and the government have been among the most important implementers of HMA, there exist a number of alternatives to these approaches. Perhaps the most important alternative to NGOs and the government as implementers is commercial demining companies. In the following, we briefly examine the role of commercial operators as implementers of mine action.

Commercial operators

In recent years, there has been an expansion in the number of commercial operators working in mine action. Commercial companies have emerged as major actors in a number of contexts, including Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and Mozambique. The expansion of commercial companies stems in large part from the technology and expertise these companies have been able to offer. Donors have used commercial companies to perform clearance in preparation for other projects and for clearance not directly related to local communities. Commercial companies also implement projects under the direction of the UN and have taken on a greater importance in certain contexts. In BiH, a total of 21 commercial companies – nine national and 12 international – outnumbered NGOs by a ratio of two to one. By August 2000, commercials had cleared 60% of all cleared areas in BiH. Similarly, in Kosovo, there were eight NGOs and eight commercial companies operating at the close of 2000. In light of the emerging importance of commercial companies, including within Sida funded programmes, a systematic assessment of their strengths and weaknesses would have been appropriate. However, such an assessment is not part of the mandate of the current evaluation. Nonetheless, we will offer a few comments on some of the key aspects of commercial operators, partly with reference to the previous discussions on NGOs and the military. In the following, we draw in particular on material collected in BiH.

Commercial companies in BiH bid on tasks through a tender process administered by the International Trust Fund (ITF), although the MAC retains responsibility for task selection and quality assurance. Contract agreements stipulate the exact area which is to be cleared. Hence, the success of each operation tends to be based exclusively on quantifiable output measures. In most cases, impact issues remain outside the mandate of the operator, which is one likely reason for why commercial companies are used for larger and more easily defined tasks. Since commercials tend to be assigned larger tasks and progress is measured with simple output indicators such as area cleared, there is a bias in the reporting formats that favours commercials. Sida has expressed concern that commercials tend to have a limited perspective on mine clearance, in contrast to NGOs who have a wider societal perspective.

Given that tasks are based on simple output measures, there tends to be an emphasis on technical Quality Assurance (QA). Some would argue that the current emphasis on QA in demining is a direct consequence of the increasing involvement of commercials, particularly in light of the importance of contract compliance and liability. Technical QA measures may come to replace an emphasis on a more valid quality measure: whether the local population has confidence in clearance or not. Importantly, it is not the mandate of commercial operators to conduct impact assessments or to enhance impact by establishing a relationship with local populations during operations. A further problem in the BiH context was reports that the technical performance of several commercial companies was

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23 Horwood, 2000, p. 31, note 7 above.
poor. There were reports of mines missed during clearance, and some people expressed a preference for NGOs over commercials for exactly this reason.

It is also a common argument that there is an inherent tension between employing commercials and creating a sustainable capacity. The basic assumption is that commercials are more concerned about maintaining a need for their future service than other implementers. While there may be some logic to such an assumption, NGOs have also had problems in transferring their capacity to national entities. The basic challenge is to find institutional arrangements that secure that competence-building go hand in hand with a gradual transfer of responsibility. This is one of the responsibilities of donors. Donors can require that all implementers have sound and long-term plans for the building of national capacities.

Ultimately, commercial demining companies respond to a need for an expanded capacity in mine action. Even in the NGO sector, many would argue that their presence has stimulated efforts to increase cost-effectiveness in the sector more generally. The risk is that cost-effectiveness takes precedence over other criteria for success, and particularly those associated with impact. Humanitarian agencies could find themselves in a situation where their particular qualities are not credited, if standard contractual arrangements are tailored to enhance productivity through the application of narrow output measures.

Conclusions

This chapter has assessed implementation channels, with a primary focus on NGOs and the government as well as a brief discussion of the role of commercial operators. International NGOs have been central to the HMA effort of the 1990s. In recent years, other implementation channels have begun to supplant their dominant position. Based on our assessment of the programmes of two of the major NGOs in mine action today, we contend that the NGO channel possesses numerous advantages, but also has some deficiencies. The major strengths of NGOs are their ability to adapt to the needs of a particular context and their capacities for innovation. NGOs are also at the forefront in institutionalizing impact assessments. On the negative side, it seems that NGOs have not been particularly inclined to coordinate with actors outside the sector, and there has been little expressed willingness to engage in the building of local organizations that could last after their departure.

The key argument in favour of the government channel is its potential for developing sustainability. This depends on the overall commitment of the government in question, including the will to at least fund portions of government operations. If the military is used for demining, as is the case in Nicaragua, a further prerequisite is that this be considered legitimate by the mine-affected population. Conversely, it appears that specialized government agencies may have problems in accommodating a broader humanitarian agenda. This applies both to the ability to deal with issues of impact in planning and implementation as well as to coordination with other sectors involved in reconstruction and development.

Our brief discussion of commercial operators focused on the manner in which existing contract mechanisms give prominence to output measures at the cost of impact. We further linked this to the need for solid QA systems. We argued that while sustainability was a problem with commercial companies, it is important to note that this is also the case for most other types of implementers. Given the increasing application of commercials in HMA, including in Sida-supported programmes, a thorough study of their strengths and weaknesses seems appropriate.

Most fundamentally, the strengths and weaknesses of different implementing channels will vary according to context. In a stable political situation with legitimate and competent government agencies, the arguments for NGOs or commercial operators appear to be weak. NGOs, on the other hand,
appear to have been doing a good job in situations of political turmoil, while commercial companies operate best when there is a certain degree of political stability. In cases where the military of the affected country is regarded as legitimate, reliable and technically competent for the task, the military is generally the best entity to undertake demining. Care should be taken to ensure that government agencies invest in impact assessment. A finding in this chapter is that government agencies do not always possess the knowledge to undertake impact assessments. Consequently, it is suggested that if governments undertake demining, it must occur in conjunction with a capacity for impact assessment.
4 Coordination

Within the field of humanitarian aid, it has become increasingly evident that in order to effectively provide assistance, there must be a common understanding of the most important goals and the best way in which to achieve objectives. While such an argument can be sustained for humanitarian and development assistance in general, it is no less true in the case of mine action. Humanitarian Mine Action is a highly specialized field that often includes large numbers of actors. At the same time, it should be considered part of an integrated overall humanitarian effort. If HMA practices are to contribute to an overall reconstruction and development effort, HMA should also ideally form part of a larger coordination effort. It is therefore frequently argued that coordination is one of the most crucial components in ensuring the success of all humanitarian assistance, including mine action.

This chapter examines the coordination of HMA and the coordination of mine action with other humanitarian assistance. Because they have assumed the central role in the coordination of HMA, the main focus of this chapter is on UN-led Mine Action Centres (MACs), drawing on the cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. A second focus is on coordination between mine action and other humanitarian assistance. The chapter is structured accordingly. Following a brief conceptualization of the term coordination, we look at Sida’s policy response in the three cases. Next, the discussion turns to an examination of the coordination of HMA and the coordination of HMA and other humanitarian assistance. Before offering our conclusions, we address the role of donors in coordination.

Conceptualizing coordination

In the most basic sense, coordination is a means of organizing two or more actors. As distinguished from cooperation and collaboration, the concept of coordination emphasizes a process whereby two units are brought together to operate in a more harmonious manner.\(^1\) In comparison with cooperation and collaboration, coordination

further implies a greater organizational commitment to joint tasks. In the context of humanitarian assistance, coordination is an arrangement designed to bring together disparate agencies in order to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Coordination is intended to ensure that priorities are clearly defined, resources more efficiently utilized and duplication of effort minimized. Ultimately, the goal is to provide coherent, effective and timely assistance to those in need.\(^2\)

Yet, effective coordination can often prove an elusive and difficult task to achieve. In addition to the problem of having to bring multiple actors together, donors, governments or other agencies have interests that undermine even the best of coordination efforts. Rather than devoting their efforts to effectively providing assistance, organizations and agencies often compete amongst themselves in order to establish their legitimacy in relation to donors. Further complicating the task of coordinating is the different levels and types of coordination that may occur. For instance, coordination may take place at the international, national or local level. At the same time, coordination may take place within the framework of a broader programme or between organizations representing nominally different sectors of humanitarian assistance.

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\(^2\) See also United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182: *The Strengthening of the Coordination of the Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations.*
Coordination may at times even be counter-productive. Coordination can lead to greater control by NGOs and UN agencies and inhibit the development of local capacities. If agencies are involved in a coordination effort that promotes dependency, greater coordination of such an effort will only make matters worse. At times, coordination may also imply hierarchical management and authority. An authority – such as a government or an agency – can be vested with the power to make decisions and enforce its preferences through the use of sanctions. Thus, in its negative manifestation, coordination is something that can be abused, functioning as a form of coercion against those who are being coordinated. In spite of the potential problems associated with it, coordination becomes a necessity in complex situations with numerous actors and where providing effective assistance is the imperative. As a result, actors may willingly submit to an authority in the interest of implementing a policy or programme, with the realization that goals can only be achieved by doing so.

Drawing on the previous discussion, it is possible to distinguish between two basic types of coordination: consensus and imposed coordination.

• **Consensus Coordination.** Consensus coordination refers to a situation where actors reach a voluntary consensus through a common understanding of a situation. Actors might develop agreed-upon guidelines and standards to achieve similar goals, and there is no authority to enforce compliance.

• **Imposed Coordination.** Imposed coordination describes a situation where actors are obligated to submit to an authority. In such a situation, a central authority has the power to define the agenda, instigate preferences and enforce sanctions. Power can come in the form of control of information or resources, but also the institutionalized legal means through which to implement preferences.

While consensus and imposed coordination may at first appear as dichotomous categories, they are in reality discrete. That is, coordination is rarely purely imposed or always agreed-upon by all actors. In practice, organizations and agencies working in different sectors of humanitarian assistance exhibit different levels or degrees of coordination, depending on the activities within that sector and overall goals. Nevertheless, the objective under any type of coordination arrangement is to ensure that assistance is provided in a manner whereby impacts are maximized.

**Levels of coordination**

A second distinction can be made in relation to different levels of coordination, the actors generally involved and the tasks typically performed:

• **The international level.** At the international level, the formulation of policy, general guiding principles and strategies are of concern.

• **The national level.** At the national level, coordination typically revolves around programme development and policy articulation. At the national level, local groups are typically less involved, while UN agencies, government departments and NGO representatives assume a central role.

• **The local level.** Coordination at the local level usually takes place between representatives from NGOs, UN agencies and local communities. It is at the local level where humanitarian priorities can be most readily identified and articulated.

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Coordination, Governments and Mine Action Centres

In principle, national governments should assume responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Each state has the primary responsibility for initiating, organizing, coordinating and implementing humanitarian assistance within its own borders. Not only does this ensure that assistance takes place in accordance with national interests and planning, but it also conforms to recognized principles of international relations. However, when states are unable or unwilling to assume such responsibilities, the international community — primarily in the form of the UN — is mandated to step in. The same basic principle holds true with regard to mine action. Under ideal circumstances, national governments should function as coordinators of mine action. Since the end of World War I, governments have been responsible for addressing the issue of landmines and UXOs within their borders. It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the UN began to assume its current role in mine action, first through the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and, since 1997, through the UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS), within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Much as in the case of other forms of humanitarian assistance, the UN is mandated to initiate mine action through UNMAS in the event that a state is weak, ineffective or specifically makes such request. In the case of the latter, it is up to UNMAS to develop a plan in consultation with all stakeholders.

When UNMAS initiates mine action in a country, it typically does so by establishing Mine Action Centres (MACs). The underlying premise of MACs is that an effective approach to HMA is contingent on the presence of a central coordinating mechanism. While the role of MACs vary, their most central functions are:

- Surveys and assessments;
- The development of a national strategy plan for dealing with the mine threat;
- The setting of standards;
- Monitoring, quality assurance and, at times, financial control;
- The accreditation of implementing agencies, such as NGOs and commercial companies.

Perhaps the most central underlying premise of MACs is that they are to be sustainable, integrated into national institutions and capacities at the earliest stage possible. Although such a transfer is decided on a case-by-case basis, it should occur when a national authority is in a position to assume responsibility for management and coordination of mine action within its territory. It is on this latter point that the UN and MACs have received a great deal of criticism — not least of all from Sida. At times, MACs have the potential to create enduring structures and arrangements outside of national institutions. At other times, problems inherent in existing national capacities have made such a transition quite difficult. However, contexts vary a great deal from case to case, and it is difficult to generalize or to apply criticisms made of a MAC in one country to a MAC in another. Rather, each case must be assessed and evaluated on its own, paying particular attention to the political and social realities in which it is embedded.

Mine Action and humanitarian assistance

Before turning to a more substantive discussion of coordination in relation to mine action, we make one further important distinction. The coordination of mine action may be said to take place at two levels. At one level, coordination occurs between policy, programmes and the actors operating within the relatively narrow field of HMA. At another level, mine action constitutes part of a broader human-
itarian and development effort. Implicit in this distinction is that while mine action is a sector of humanitarian assistance in its own right, it is also an inherent component of an overall approach to development and reconstruction. Thus, it is crucial to examine coordination within mine action as a sector while recognizing that coordination with other humanitarian policy, programmes and actors is equally vital. This distinction forms the starting point for our line of inquiry.

Sida’s role

For Sida, strengthening coordination within HMA has been a pillar of its support to the sector. An estimated 50% of Sida’s total funding to mine action over the years 1990 to 1999 was allocated to Mine Action Centres. Although a major portion of this has been spent on operational activities, Sida’s emphasis on channelling funds through MACs is a significant indicator of its desire to support HMA coordination. In this regard, Sida has endorsed the conclusions of the 1997 DHA reports that recommended that the coordination and implementation of HMA should be handled by separate bodies. While there are numerous arguments for maintaining a separation of these functions, of particular importance is the wish to separate project implementation and quality assurance, to separate prioritisation, tasking and implementation, and to ensure the strongest possible procedures for maintaining financial control.

More recently, Sida has come to question its commitment to MACs. In the most recent available documents reflecting Sida policy, concerns have been expressed about the viability of MACs. A cornerstone of Sida’s policy objective is to build sustainable national capacities. According to Sida, sustainability is precisely what the present MAC structure lacks. Such a critique is primarily aimed at the financial aspects of MACs, in that the MAC structure creates incentives for delaying the completion of tasks in order to maintain access to international funding. Accordingly, Sida suggests that responsibility for the coordination and implementation of HMA be kept separate. The implementation capacity should be integrated into existing national institutions such as civil defence, police or the military. Responsibility for the coordination of HMA should be separate, preferably under the control of elected representatives such as an interagency board where relevant government ministers are represented. At the same time as Sida is critical of the present MAC structure, it does not propose alternative solutions in cases where functioning national capacities are lacking or where they lack the legitimacy required to engage in HMA.

Sida’s Support to HMA coordination

Sida’s wish to strengthen the coordination aspect of HMA is evident in its support to the three cases discussed in this chapter: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Kosovo. For Afghanistan, Sida has channelled all of its support for HMA through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Furthermore, it has provided support to UNOCHA’s general coordination capacity with 3 million SEK in both 1999 and 2000. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida’s support has primarily been aimed at the strengthening of coordination within HMA, with an emphasis on maintaining and developing the MAC structure. For instance, in 2000, half of Sida’s

8 Robert Eaton, Chris Horwood, & Norah Niland, 1997. Study Report: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities, New York: DHA., plus separate reports on Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. Sida was a cofounder of the DHA report series, which has probably been the single most influential source on the organization of HMA in the last few years.

9 Preliminär redogörelse för och analys av det samlade svenska stödet till olika former av minverksamheter samt underlag för preliminär inriktning av fortsatt stöd, Sida, 28 June 2000.

10 In the Afghan case, most funding to HMA has gone through UNOCHA. However, the international NGOs are often directly funded, in spite of coordinating under MACA, and some donors have also funded the Afghan NGOs directly, with massive protests from UNOCHA.
funds for mine action in BiH were earmarked for capacity-building of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC). This pattern of supporting the MAC structure also holds true in the case of Kosovo. Realizing that a large number of actors would be engaged in Kosovo following the cessation of hostilities in 1999, Sida identified coordination as a likely bottleneck. As a result, the target of Sida’s funding has been aimed almost exclusively the UN Mine Action Centre (UNMACC) in Pristina, relying largely on seconded Swedish personnel recruited from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA). Moreover, in Kosovo, there are definitive plans for transferring responsibility for mine action to the Kosovo Civil Defence (KPC) at the end of 2001. Such a move is consistent with Sida’s policy of not creating new long-term structures for the purposes of HMA. In general, Sida’s involvement in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo demonstrates Sida’s commitment to the MAC structure and reinforces its emphasis on the importance of a central coordinating body in mine action.

Coordination and humanitarian mine action in practice

This section turns to an examination and discussion of the different types of coordination mechanisms and arrangements introduced in the opening sections of this chapter. We first look at coordination at the international level, focusing on programme and policy development. Next, we examine the coordination role of MACs, with a focus on Mine Action Centres in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The discussion in the latter part of the chapter turns to an examination of the coordination between HMA and other humanitarian assistance, followed by a discussion of the role of donors in coordination. In the final section of the chapter, we present our conclusions.

Policy and programme coordination

At the international level, policy, programme and strategy are the most prevalent forms of coordination. Coordination at the international level typically involves major agencies, such as those operating under the aegis of the UN, international NGOs, foreign ministries and donors. In principle, it is the UN that should assume the role of the central coordinator of mine action. Accordingly, the UN has adopted a guiding set of programme principles designed to facilitate the coordination process. According to the UN, the problem of landmines should be viewed as a humanitarian concern first and foremost. The UN makes no official distinction between various types of mine action – i.e. humanitarian mine action, mine action in support of operations mandated by the UN Security Council or mine action in support of reconstruction and development. Rather, the UN holds that these should be interrelated with other issues of peacebuilding and reconstruction, such as reintegration of refugees and IDPs, revival of communities, and reconstruction and development.

Such an approach is reflected in the structure of the UN’s coordinating bodies. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is to be the focal point of all mine-action coordination within the United Nations, in conjunction with the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators in the field. In cases where the situation deems it necessary for the UN to initiate mine action under its auspices, UNMAS is to seek the development of a programme in conjunction with relevant local partners, NGOs, donors and UN bodies. Such a plan should spell out objectives and priorities. When programmes are initiated in the field, coordination mechanisms are to be established to ensure that countrywide mine-action activities are integrated, monitored and reviewed. One of these mechanisms includes a database, consisting initially of a general survey (Level One) and – ideally – followed by a technical survey (Level

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11 See SEKA Besluts dokument, (Decision Document 575/99).
Two. In terms of coordinating mine action with broader humanitarian and development efforts, UNMAS is to work closely with other UN agencies. For instance, OCHA is given responsibility for the sharing of information with UNMAS regarding the humanitarian implications of landmines, UNDP for the addressing the socio-economic consequences of landmines and UNOPS for implementing mine action programmes in collaboration with UN agencies such as UNMAS and UNDP. UNHCR is responsible for refugee return and is to work with UNICEF to develop appropriate mine-awareness programmes.

While the UN has elaborated an overarching policy and organizational structure for dealing with landmines, it has nevertheless suffered from several key problems. In spite of the holistic and integrated approach described by the UN, there has been a tendency towards compartmentalization of tasks. In part, this stems not from a lack of meetings or coordination mechanisms, but from a general ideological position within the UN whereby mine action is primarily viewed as a technical task. As one official within the UN argued, mine action is considered to be very technical and specialized, rather than an integral element of humanitarian assistance in general. A second issue is that of the role of UNMAS. In the case of UNMAS, a limitation is that, with a few exceptions, it can only engage in operations where UNDPKO has a mandate. In cases where UNDPKO does not have a mandate, UNMAS can engage in a more limited mission, such as the instigation of surveys. However, being part of UNDPKO, the humanitarian aid experience of UNMAS is limited, constricting the degree to which it coordinates with other aid and development initiatives. One solution to this problem would involve making UNMAS part of another UN agency, such as UNOCHA. A second, and perhaps more feasible, solution would involve drawing upon personnel within UNMAS with a broader humanitarian and development background.

As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, donors also play an important role in coordination efforts. At the international level, there have been attempts to establish bodies that have the potential to facilitate coordination. The Mine Action Support Group (MASG) in New York is an attempt to bring together donors through regular meetings. The main aim of MASG is to function as a forum for information sharing and discussion among donors and with UNMAS. While MASG has largely filled this role, it is limited in that it lacks the necessary structures and direction needed to establish joint goals and policies amongst donors. As a result, the potential of MASG or similar bodies must be said to be untapped. Ideally, MASG could function as a coordination body where donors could develop mutual strategies, policy and planning. In order for bodies such as MASG to become influential, they must be accorded a more significant role within mine action, while ensuring that they do not develop into bodies that attempt to impose coordination in an authoritative fashion.

The role of MACs in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo

As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, MACs are currently the central coordination bodies within HMA today. In this section, we examine the coordination function of Mine Action Centres in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA)

MACA in Afghanistan has been described by many, including Sida, as the success story among MACs. In spite of the growing critique of MACs in general, there is general consensus that MACA has been amongst the most effective MACs. The Afghan programme has proven to be relatively

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13 See: Preliminära sedgörsel, note 9 above. A comprehensive evaluation of the Afghan programme has been initiated by CIDA, DFID and the Japanese government. Fieldwork was conducted in late 2000. The evaluation was not available at the time of finalizing the current report.
innovative. The programme has been a pioneer in the use of surveys, executing a national general survey (Level One) in 1993, a systematic post-clearance impact assessment in 1998 and the regular application of technical surveys (Level Two) prior to clearance. It has also been an innovator with regard to technology. For instance, the use of the protected backhoe has contributed to speeding up clearance and strengthening security, particularly in the clearance of residential areas. Importantly, MACA has been able to ensure a reduction in the number of accidents from 100 in 1993, to 12 through the first 11 months of 2000.14

Two sets of factors are most often used to explain the success of MACA: first, the absence of a government; and, second, the existence of national NGOs as implementing bodies. In the case of the former, attempts in countries such as Angola and Cambodia to establish MACs closely linked to a government structure have been hampered by corruption and incompetence. In the case of the latter, the result has been that international implementing agencies have effectively carved out their own niches within these countries, and the transfer of responsibility for mine action to national capacities has become increasingly difficult. The presence of national implementing bodies has been a second key in the success of MACA. When MACA established these in 1989, the UN had envisioned a stable government in Afghanistan and the transfer of the agencies to the government. Yet, even when that political scenario failed to materialize, the national NGO solution still proved viable. Today, several of the Afghan NGOs possess extensive technical and managerial expertise and run highly competent HMA operations.

At the same time, a number of criticisms can be levelled at MACA. Whereas MACA has been instrumental in building the capacity of national NGOs, it has proven unwilling to acknowledge their increased capacities and allow them more freedom to manoeuvre. Rather, MACA has assumed a greater degree of control. Through its micro-management, it effectively places the autonomy of national NGOs in peril. This is exacerbated by the fact that the MACA leadership, in order to circumnavigate inflexible UN regulations, uses national NGOs to fulfil its own personnel needs. Problematically, the organizational independence of national NGOs is undermined, an arrangement that requires a high degree of authority on the part of MACA. Although granting more independence to the NGOs does imply the risk that they will not all be equally well equipped to stand on their own feet, the current arrangement of restraining the development of all national implementers is counter-productive. A second, and related problem, has been MACA's overly rigid standardization at the programme level. When the Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA) placed its 'community-based demining programme' under the auspices of MACA from 1998, it was forced to increase the size of its teams from 10 to 22 deminers. This, so that the output of their teams would be directly comparable with that of the teams from other organizations.15 However, such an increase in team-size undermines the philosophy of AREA's alternative approach. Currently, national NGOs are in the process of developing their individual SOPs, a step that may represent significant progress in this regard.

Although high-priority areas in Afghanistan can be cleared within seven to ten years, the country will have a mine problem for decades after that. To tackle the long-term problem, there will be a need for a different kind of response capacity than the one currently possessed by MAPA. A successful approach in Afghanistan must be at once flexible, locally based and low cost. There has been some discussion within the programme about how to address this problem.16 One type of response is the community-

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14 The transparency of MAPA in reporting upon demining accidents, as well as missed mine incidents, also deserves credit.
16 See for example: Bill van Ree, 1995 A Concept for Demining of Low Priority Areas in Afghanistan, Report to UNOCHA, OCHA, September.
based demining of AREA. Another type of response would entail smaller and more mobile units, able to offer the flexible response needed to deal with smaller-scale tasks. In the long-term, such a capacity would most logically be located within a government structure. In the shorter term, it would most ably form a part of MAPA.17

The relative effectiveness of MACA has been a key success factor in the overall Afghan programme. MACA has managed to systematically work to improve standards. Donor engagement has been dependent on the perceived role of MACA as a guarantor of political independence, sound prioritization and tasking procedures, and financial transparency. In this sense, the performance of MACA has been essential to the success of the program. At the same time, the increasing degree of control by MACA over national NGOs is problematic, particularly at a time when their hard-won expertise would merit just the opposite.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)

While MACA in Afghanistan can be described as one of the more successful MACs, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) has had difficulties in achieving the same degree of success. Mine action in BiH has undergone significant changes in terms of government, donors and implementers since its inception. The government of BiH requested the assistance of the UN in January 1996, leading to the establishing of The United Nations Mine Action Centre (UNMAC) in Sarajevo. The MAC structure was - in the view of some observers - prematurely handed over to the government on 1 July 1998, with UNDP to serve in an advisory capacity. As a result of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s socio-cultural and political divisions, the MAC structure was further divided into two separate entities: FEDMAC, representing the Federation of BiH, and RSMAC, representing the Republika Srpska. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) serves as a link between these, functioning as the central coordination mechanism for mine action in BiH. At the same time, the external Board of Donors was established to provide guidance to the MAC structure, co-chaired by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

Many of the main problems in BiH came at the outset. First, BHMAC was established independent of existing government institutions and national capacities. Second, BHMAC was initially set up to both implement and coordinate mine action. As pointed out in the previous chapter, MACs as both implementers and coordinators of HMA have proven problematic. Since late 1999, BHMAC has limited its role to survey activities, coordination, planning, tasking and quality assurance. Third, BHMAC failed to initiate a comprehensive assessment of the scope of the mine problem in BiH - particularly in its early phases. BHMAC only undertook a limited general (Level One) survey in 1998 and expanded efforts during 1999 by utilizing the staff of regional offices and personnel from three MAC demining teams. BHMAC has relied heavily on existing army maps, while failing to fully utilize the input of the local populations who are often the best sources of information on the mine situation. This has limited the extent to which BHMAC can effectively assume its role as a central coordinating mechanism, since it cannot allocate tasks on the basis either of general survey data or impact data.

BHMAC has also encountered a number of other problems. As part of the overall mine-action structure in BiH, the three-member Demining Commission was to assume responsibility for the accreditation of the 34 organizations and agencies currently involved in mine action in BiH. However, on 13 September 2000, the High Representative dismissed all three members of the Demining Commission, 17 Undoubtedly, there are problems in designing such an approach, particularly in ensuring appropriate medical and other back-up and in ensuring appropriate monitoring. Nonetheless, it is important to initiate the development of a type of capacity to tackle central aspects of the mine problem. This issue is not exclusive to Afghanistan.
following an initial investigation for fraud. Further, HMA activities have only been planned on a short-term basis, despite a recognition that it will take between five to ten years to address the mine problem. At present, it is envisaged that the Ministry of Civil Defence and Communication will assume responsibility for HMA in BiH. It has also been suggested that the Entity division within the MAC structure be abolished in order to reduce bureaucracy. BHMAC has also had difficulties in maintaining quality-assurance standards. There have been reports of mines found in areas that have been controlled by QA teams from BHMAC. Ensuring a high level of QA is particularly important in BiH, given that there are 34 different implementers and relatively high numbers of commercial companies. There are indications that the latter have proven somewhat less than satisfactory in their clearance operations. A final problem has been that the Entity militaries have not been fully utilized, and these remain an untapped source as a demining capacity.

In spite of the difficulties witnessed in BHMAC, a number of steps have recently been taken to address the most problematic issues. The MAC structure is presently being streamlined in order to make it less bureaucratic. Further, there are currently plans under way to initiate a more comprehensive survey in order to ascertain the scope of the mine problem in BiH. Such a step should also help inform the programme’s long-term planning. Improvements should also come from the planned transfer of authority to the Ministry of Civil Protection and Communication. According to sources in BiH, had this latter step been taken much earlier, many of the problems with BHMAC might have been avoided. Thus, while there have been considerable problems related to the overall mine-action programme in BiH, steps are currently being taken to address some of the most pressing issues.

The UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC)

Not unlike MACA in Afghanistan, UNMACC is generally described as one of the most successful MACs. However, UNMACC in Kosovo has faced a very different set of circumstances. Following the end of the NATO air campaign in 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the governing body in the province. One of the most imminent issues facing Kosovo was the problem of returning refugees. Landmines were used by both sides in the conflict, many of which were located around homes and vital infrastructure. In response, Resolution 1244 mandated UNMIK to establish a Mine Action Centre to address the problem of returning refugees. Accordingly, UNMAS mobilized donor support to fund the UNMIK Mine Action Programme (MAP). Other initiatives were the bilateral funding of organizations and agencies. There was broad agreement that these should act under the auspices of the UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC), established by UNMAS through the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

UNMACC is mandated to act as ultimate authority in the coordination of mine action in Kosovo. In establishing UNMACC in Kosovo, a deliberate effort was made to draw upon past experiences with MACs and learn from these. Importantly, it was recognized that Mine Action Centres had largely failed in the dual role as coordinating and implementing bodies. Thus, when UNMACC was established, it was mandated to act solely as a coordinator. UNMACC coordinates the organizations and agencies implementing mine action specifically, as well as humanitarian agencies operating in sectors where landmine contamination could pose a threat. UNMACC is also responsible for all quality assurance. A further emphasis has been on having a clear exit strategy and on creating a MAC structure that is easily dismantled when responsibility for mine action is transferred to the Kosovo Civil Defence (KPC) at the end of 2001. However, few specific steps have been taken to ensure the success of this transfer. The implementation of mine action in Kosovo is done through bilaterally funded NGOs and commercial operators, all of which must be accredited by UNMACC. UNMACC delegates each organization a task based on UNMACC’s priority list. At the close of 2000, there were eight international NGOs and eight commercial companies operating in Kosovo.
The Kosovo UNMACC took a number of steps early on in order to ensure its capacity as an effective coordination mechanism. A central focus of UNMACC in Kosovo was to establish the scope and extent of the mine threat during the early phases of the operation through the utilization of the latest information management systems. UNMACC has employed the IMSMA database, which incorporates information gathered by the HALO Trust Dangerous Area Survey, Vojka Jugoslovenska (VJ) minefield records, NATO information, along with information on mines, casualties and statistics on mine awareness. IMSMA is continually updated and adjusted in order to be as relevant and current as possible.

UNMACC also commissioned the Survey Action Centre (SAC) in the winter of 1999/2000 to conduct a survey specifically tailored to the needs of Kosovo. Used in conjunction with IMSMA, the SAC survey further identified and prioritized danger areas established by IMSMA. These have provided UNMACC with valuable tools in prioritizing and tasking.

As a coordinating body, UNMACC relies on maintaining a high level of control over implementing agencies. UNMACC assumes responsibility for all prioritization, tasking, accreditation and quality assurance. Operators are allocated an area, and are required to report back every week to one of five regional UNMACC representatives as well as to UNMACC in Pristina. These reporting procedures are mandatory for all accredited organizations and also include representatives from KFOR. Implementing agencies are also pressed to maintain a high rate of clearance and can only work in areas where there are known mines. The QA procedures used by UNMACC also appear to be effective. In addition to all organizations using a system of internal checks, implementers are subject to QA checks during various phases of their operations. The basic philosophy is that mistakes should be identified before they happen. The QA teams also rely on computer links, whereby the progress of implementers can be monitored from start to finish. At the same time, UNMACC allows implementers to adopt flexible approaches. For instance, if there are known mines just outside a tasked area, operators are authorized to clear the mines and report their clearance back to UNMACC. In spite of the high level of authority involved, there is considerable evidence to suggest that UNMACC has been quite successful. As an indication, the level of accidents from mines has dropped considerably since mid-1999. By the close of 2000 there were several months with no reported accidents.

To the extent that UNMACC has succeeded in its role as a coordinating body, a large part of this should be attributed to the unique circumstances inherent in the Kosovo case. The response of the international community was swift, with Kosovo viewed as a high-priority case. As a result, there was a rapid mobilization of resources to the province. The scale of the mine threat - at least in terms of sheer numbers - has been more manageable compared with other contexts. Given that the UN is the functioning government in the province, UNMACC has not been tied to any existing government structure. Consequently, it has also managed to avoid some of the problems of government ineffectiveness that have plagued MACs in places such as Cambodia. The small size of Kosovo has facilitated the logistics of regular face-to-face meetings and other forms of action. Thus, it has also been easier for UNMACC to instigate feedback procedures, which in turn facilitates the coordination process.

The coordination of mine action and other humanitarian assistance

Ideally, Humanitarian Mine Action should coordinate closely with other humanitarian initiatives. Among the more pressing problems are the repatriation of refugees and the reconstruction of homes, schools and infrastructure. The threat of landmines poses obvious barriers not only to returning refugees but also to the agencies undertaking these tasks. However, the extent to which HMA is inte-

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grated with overall recovery and development efforts in the cases reviewed here has been limited. Mine
action is frequently viewed as a technical issue to be completed before other activities can be undertaken,
not as an integrated part of either a rehabilitation, a repatriation or a more development-oriented effort. An indication of this is that UNHCR in Bosnia and Herzegovina – which was in this case
assigned a lead humanitarian role – developed its own demining capacity in order to speed up its
repatriation programme. More generally, there is little evidence of formalized contact or interaction
between HMA and other humanitarian agencies. The International Consortium of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), representing NGOs in BiH, confirmed this impression, arguing that they had not engaged
in any concerted coordination effort, owing to confidence in the work of the MAC.

The extent to which Humanitarian Mine Action is coordinated with other humanitarian/development
initiatives in Kosovo has been moderately more successful. There are regular meetings between UN-
MACC and humanitarian agencies such as ICRC and UNHCR, although these have primarily been
intended as exchanges of information, as opposed to planning and policy design meetings. In Kosovo,
the initial humanitarian effort focused on the repatriation of refugees to their homes. One of the major
obstacles preventing the return of refugees was the threat of landmines. In this regard, UNHCR had
initiated the Return Plan, which UNMACC took a significant part in developing. However, the rate
of refugee return was far more rapid than initially anticipated and essentially nullified the plan. As
a result, UNMACC was forced to react to these developments by quickly establishing priorities that
could accommodate this influx of refugees. A second major reconstruction and humanitarian emphasis
in Kosovo focused on the rebuilding of homes and the repairing of vital infrastructure. Again, a
potential barrier to the success of such an effort was the landmine threat. At the project implementa-
tion level, there has been a tendency for agencies to work more closely with UNMACC district repre-
sentatives.

Perhaps predictably, the results appear somewhat mixed. In certain instances, returning refugees were
willing to resettle in their homes, but unwilling to resume work in fields and gardens. This is particu-
larly important in the case of Kosovo, where the primary economic activity is agriculture. In Kosovo,
few accurate statistics on the rate of return are available. What is clear is that many have not been able
or have not chosen to return to their previous livelihoods. Many have migrated to Kosovo’s centres.
For instance, the city of Pejë grew from approximately 65,000 inhabitants prior to the war to around
100,000 after the war. However, how much of this is attributable to landmine contamination is highly
debatable. Many small villages and farms were completely destroyed during the war. Thus, even when
land has been returned to a usable state, other factors prevent its use in economic activity. Further-
more, reconstruction following conflict is a long-term process. In the case of Kosovo, the broader effort
aimed at initiating redevelopment is currently in progress, and its effects can not be fairly judged for
some time to come.

What are some of the factors that have hindered the coordination of mine action and humanitarian/
development efforts in Kosovo? One problem is the sheer number of organizations and NGOs operating
in a given context. For instance, at the beginning of 2000, there were over 500 NGOs in Kosovo working
on various humanitarian projects. In addition to these are UN and other agencies. This is also a problem
within mine action. As one UNMACC representative stated, given that the mine problem in Kosovo is
relatively limited, the coordination of HMA would be enhanced by the presence of fewer organizations.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle preventing effective coordination in Kosovo has been the inability of UNH-
CR to coordinate actors undertaking the reconstruction of Kosovo. According to one source, UNHCR
would be well served to adopt a model similar to that employed by UNMACC. All NGOs and agencies

would be accredited and tasked by UNHCR. However, such an approach also presumes a willingness on
the part of both organizations and donors to accord UNHCR this role, as well as an increased level of
preparedness within UNHCR. Moreover, this presumes that the same model of forced coordination
employed by UNMACC is desirable for all aspects of humanitarian assistance.

In Afghanistan, coordination between HMA and other humanitarian assistance takes place among the
different bodies of the UN-led Principled Common Programming (PCP) process. As a result, coordi-
ination primarily takes place at a relatively high level, at either the national or the regional one. This also
means that coordination between UN agencies tends to be stronger than coordination with NGOs and
other relevant entities, including the government.

At the local level, coordination is relatively weak for several reasons. First, the hierarchical MACA
structure, where priority-setting and other functions are high up in the system, does not encourage
great initiative at the local level. Furthermore, HMA personnel do not perceive themselves as a part
of the larger assistance community. When asked about coordination in general, most HMA staff, even
at relatively high levels, talk exclusively about coordination within their own sector. Individual HMA
agencies involved in implementing the Afghan programme do not participate actively in other coordinat-
ing bodies, such as the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). In the case of
national implementing partners, this is understandable, since their influence on priority-setting is
minimal. Nonetheless, it closes off another forum for the potential reconciliation of agendas and
reinforces the impression that HMA represents an exclusive sector. There are substantial disadvantages
to the absence of local-level coordination. One problem is that access to data gathered by other agen-
cies working in the same locality is often lost. Another problem is that the relationship between agen-
cies and local communities becomes skewed, as witnessed in Afghanistan where one aid agency works
with one particular village council, while an agency involved in community-based mine awareness in
the same village works with another.

In general, there is little coordination between HMA and other humanitarian assistance across the
three cases reviewed here. Mine action is viewed primarily as a separate technical issue, not as an
integral part of broader reconstruction and development initiatives. There is an obvious need for
strengthening coordination at the international policy level, the national level and the local level. Such
steps should be seen as instrumental to an integration of HMA with other humanitarian assistance.

The role of donors

Donors exercise a key function in coordination. By controlling the allocation of funding to organiza-
tions and agencies, donors determine the relative strength of coordinating bodies. It has been often
pointed out that coordination is more likely to be effective when agencies can impose decisions and
instigate strategies. However, when donors adopt a short-term or ad hoc approach, much of the
effectiveness of coordinating agencies’ effectiveness is undermined. When each donor has its own
agenda and set of priorities, the real problems at hand often fall by the wayside.

The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates this issue. Coordination efforts have not been
maximized, partly as a result of competing interests among donors. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, HMA
has been funded by a large number of donors, and many of these have channelled their support
outside of the MAC structure. Perhaps first and foremost, this has occurred when donors have chan-
nelled funds through the International Trust Fund (ITF), which has expanded the market for commer-
cial demining operators. Other donors, such as USAID, not only bypassed the MAC structure, but
engaged US commercial companies to undertake selected demining projects. The World Bank also
favoured commercial demining companies, although it employed an open bidding process and at-
tempted to work closely with the government of BiH until terminating its assistance in 1998. UNHCR has also attempted to build its own mine-action capacity, designed to support its refugee repatriation plans. However, many refugees did not return as anticipated, and the plan was judged a failure and terminated.

In contrast, donors do not appear to have undermined the coordination process in Kosovo to the same extent. Mine-action funding in Kosovo has been far less complex than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Donors have either contributed directly to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which provides funding to UNMACC, or have provided direct bilateral funding to NGOs and commercial companies. However, there has been little concerted effort to fund outside the established MAC structure. Currently, the ITF funding structure does not play an important role. As a result, UNMACC has also been able to assume greater control as a coordination mechanism.

A second problem is that of long-term donor commitment. A key aspect of effective humanitarian assistance is the ability to plan and envision the long-term success of programmes and projects. However, the planning process can be stymied significantly when the main coordinating bodies lack basic resources. In response, assistance often becomes ad hoc. This has been a particular problem in all three cases reviewed here. Although the Afghanistan programme has had relatively stable donor relations, the programme experienced major reductions in funding for 2000. As a result, a significant portion of staff was forced on leave for one to two months. There are plans for further reduction in the range of 15–20% in 2001. Given the scope of the mine problem in Afghanistan, any funding cut that leads to a reduction in capacity can be severely detrimental. A more active and multi-faceted fundraising engagement from MACA and UNOCHA could minimize the need for such reductions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, BHMAC has not received all of its pledged support and has consequently had to cut down on its expenses and human resources. Thus, a major problem for BHMAC has been that mine action can only be planned on a short-term basis. Similarly, UNMACC in Kosovo regularly operates on a 2-3 month verbal-commitment basis with donors, limiting the degree to which it can develop longer-term objectives and plans.

The issue of long-term donor commitment is a problem for NGOs as well. For instance, representatives from NGOs in Kosovo report that it is not uncommon for donors to only offer verbal commitments. This in turn affects the degree to which NGOs can develop goals, plan strategies and recruit the appropriate staff. Most problematically – and as the Bosnia and Herzegovina experience suggests – when donors have pursued their own agendas they have effectively undermined the possibility for the overall planning of HMA strategies. Initiatives have not complemented each other as they should, but have instead competed with each other. In many instances, this has led to the duplication of activities and the demining of non-priority areas.

One proposed solution to the issue of donor coordination has been that of donor boards. In BiH, a Board of Donors with responsibility for HMA was established in 1998, by invitation of the Office of the High Representative and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. The Board of Donors is an attempt to involve all donors concerned with UXO and landmine clearance in BiH in programme planning, but it is also mandated to exercise a great deal of control. The board has given itself decisive powers on certain issues, such as the recruitment of staff at the director level. The board has a mandate to address issues in considerable detail, including the approval of internal regulations by the constituent MAGs. This, combined with the fact that the board has decisionmaking powers, implies that donors are able to systematically bypass the government of BiH. For the Afghan program, UNOCHA suggested a donor board in 2000, largely in response to the funding problems faced by the

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Statutes of the Board of Donors, Sarajevo: Bosnia and Herzegovina Commission for Demining, 14 February 1998.
programme. The proposal was backed by the BiH statutes, in spite of the fact that UNOCHA wanted a more limited engagement. In this case, donors were more hesitant. Some argued that this was too high a level of engagement, both in relation to their capacity and in relation to what influence donors should justifiably have. More generally, this illustrates the issue that if donors assume authority for the execution of a programme, it will often be at the cost of people affected by landmines and will also contribute to making the transfer of HMA to existing national institutions even more difficult.

When donors define their own agendas and initiate their own strategies, the premise on which effective coordination is founded is undermined. It restricts the ability of central coordination bodies such as MACs to develop objectives and design relevant programmes and strategies. The result is that the impact of coordination is greatly limited. For donors to contribute to effective coordination, be it within HMA or between mine action and other forms of humanitarian assistance, there must be a greater emphasis on consistent long-term funding strategies. Further, there must be a greater emphasis on viewing HMA as an integral part of humanitarian assistance, with a focus on placing the needs of individuals and communities threatened by landmines at the centre.

Conclusions

The international norm for coordination within HMA has become Mine Action Centres. As coordinating bodies, MACs generally operate with a high degree of authority, which we in the opening sections of this chapter described as imposed coordination. Arguments in favour of imposed coordination in HMA often focus on the level of risks involved or the high levels of funding involved. Currently, the trend is the expansion of the authority of MACs by further formalizing their role in quality assurance, as well as in the accreditation of implementing organizations. In certain cases, this can thwart innovation and create rigid hierarchical structures.

In the cases reviewed here, coordination between HMA and other sectors of reconstruction and development has been less than satisfactory. This may in part be a result of the character of HMA, particularly the predominance of military expertise, personnel and organizational culture within the sector. More fundamentally, the type of imposed coordination common within HMA may be a hindrance to coordination with non-HMA actors. The potentials for sanctions tend to make actors in the field focus on coordination within HMA, not coordination with those who can not sanction them. Since MACs tend to be structures with a strong central authority, the implication is that coordination beyond HMA can most easily take place at the central level, where there is room for manoeuvre. At the local level, coordination will be mainly in-line, between operator and MAC. Hence, coordination beyond HMA is far stronger when it comes to policy and strategic planning, as opposed to day-to-day operations in the field.

There is every reason to be concerned about the viability of MACs. Not only are they entirely dependent on international funding, but they also constitute a difficult starting-point for the transfer of responsibility to national institutions. Difficulties in transferring responsibility are closely linked to the nature of MACs as imposed coordination organs, where a single key actor has full control over a programme. In most cases, this actor is the UN. The rigidity of this arrangement serves as an obstacle to the gradual transfer to national institutions and the development of indigenous capacities. One key implication of this is that, wherever possible, responsibility for mine action should be placed with a national entity from day one. This would not only help build indigenous capacities but would also be very much in accordance with Sida’s current policy guidelines. The second implication is that there is a need to thoroughly reassess how MACs could be structured so as to facilitate the building of national responsibility and capacity.
5 Swedish capacities

In this chapter, we turn to a discussion of three Sida-supported mine-action initiatives. While Sweden is one of the world’s leading donors to HMA, there is no Swedish NGO operating in international mine action. Instead, Swedish presence in mine action has been based around a number of efforts designed to support existing programmes. This chapter examines what have been the three main Swedish initiatives in mine action in the last decade. First, we look at Research and Development (R&D) projects instigated by the Swedes. Second, we assess the role of seconded Swedish technical experts. Third, we evaluate the Swedish dog project initiative in Cambodia. In the chapter, we provide a brief description of each, including the role of Sida, followed by a brief assessment of each.

Sida’s role

Within mine action, Sida is generally viewed as a donor that is dedicated to humanitarian principles. In contrast with many other donors who have made mine action into a political issue, Sida has retained its commitment to funding with a distinct humanitarian focus. At the same time, Sweden does not have a strong organizational presence in international mine action. Rather, in addition to the bilateral funding of international organizations and existing projects, Sida has supported a variety of Swedish mine-action initiatives. The absence of a significant Swedish organization in mine action is most likely the result of a lack of entrepreneurial initiative within the sector, rather than a reluctance to build such a capacity within Sida or the government. For its part, Sida recognizes that the involvement of new Swedish actors in mine action is unlikely unless Sida and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs take a more active role. As a result, Sida’s most recent policy formulation emphasizes the need to more effectively utilize existing Swedish resources, both in the public and private sectors.¹

Swedish organizations in HMA

In spite of being one of the world’s major donors to HMA for over a decade, there is no Swedish organization that has specialized in the implementation of HMA projects. However, there have been numerous attempts at this. In response to the 1994 government decree that formed the basis for the Swedish engagement in the development of mine clearance machines, Sida suggested the commissioning of Swedrelief as a way of exploring opportunities to build a package of expertise and machines.² This initiative rested on the assumption that the machines would work. However, this was not the case, and the machine was deemed a failure. In 1998, officials from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) suggested that a capacity be developed in Malanje province in Angola, where Sida had provided support to NPA over several years.³ Again, Sida expressed a positive interest in the initiative, but representatives at the embassy halted it, arguing that the number of operators was sufficient and that the money could be more efficiently invested in existing capacities. Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time as there has been continuous political support for the funding of a Swedish organization in mine action, there have apparently been no viable initiatives.

1 Preliminär redogörelse för och analys av det samlade svenska stödet till olika former av minverksamheter samt underlag för preliminär inriktning av fortsatt stöd, Sida, 28 June 2000, p. 15.
2 Stöd til minrensning (Support for Mine Clearance), letter from Sida to the government represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 September 1994.
The present landscape of Swedish actors involved in R&D, as well as operations, is large and complex. At present, SWEDEC and SRSA are involved with supplying personnel. SRSA can best be described as the Swedish civil defence, while SWEDEC is part of the Swedish Armed Forces. SWEDEC conducts technical training courses for military personnel, as well as training personnel from SRSA in the technical aspects of mine action. At the same time, SRSA conducts its own obligatory training courses. SRSA courses focus not only on technical aspects, but also give more attention to broader humanitarian concerns. The Defence Materiel Administration and the National Defence Research Establishment, both state-run institutions, along with several private companies, are involved in R&D. Many of these organizations work in cooperation with Sida. There are however some exceptions, such as the SKAN-JACK clearance machine used by the Croatian Mine Action Centre (HCR), but without Swedish funding. Sida suggests that the multitude of actors, the absence of political interest and the lack of a focal point to a large extent explain why not more of Sida’s support has gone to fund Swedish capacities.

Research and development

In recent years, a great deal of effort has been devoted to finding new mechanical and technologically adept ways of responding to the mine problem. Among the most employed of all technological devices is the metal detector, used in conjunction with other techniques. The basic underlying premise of technological and mechanical advances is that they increase the speed, quality and cost-effectiveness of mine clearance, thus contributing to the greater manageability of the mine threat. Thus, a ‘silver bullet’ solution that would have the potential to dramatically increase the efficiency of demining has been a constant pursuit since landmines were first defined as a humanitarian concern in the early 1990s. However, through experience, HMA practitioners, donors and decisionmakers within industry and research have come to realize that the silver bullet is unlikely to exist. Such a realization has brought a change in attitudes over the past decade, with a shift away from emphasizing the role of machines in mine clearance. This does not mean that the role of technology has been disregarded. Various agencies have quite successfully applied mechanical means in clearance. Many of these are surprisingly simple, such as the armoured backhoe used in Afghanistan. However, the means that have been used are limited to certain task and cannot be used at all times. In order for mechanical demining to be effective, it must be able to respond to a number of key issues. Perhaps first and foremost, R&D initiatives must be adaptable to suit the specific characteristics of different contexts and they must be sustainable. Among the most important issues are:

- The size of the machine should be such as to allow for easy transport. Further, machines must be transportable in the host country, where roads may at times be small and impassable.
- Machines must have the ability to work in difficult terrain, such as wet conditions, forested areas and mountain sides.
- They must be simple to operate and repair, and inexpensive to run.
- Machines must not cause severe environmental damage.

Sida began its engagement in the development of demining machines in 1994. Sida’s involvement followed intense media and political pressure that eventually led to a government decree that 10 million SEK be allocated for the purpose – in spite of Sida’s reluctance to involve itself. Most of the money was allocated to the Defence Materiel Administration, which subcontracted the company Uhreg M to develop the machine. Following numerous setbacks, the project was eventually shelved in January 1999. Sida also provided a smaller chunk of money to Bofors. As a recognized producer of

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4 Preliminär redogörelse, note 1 above
landmines, Bofors was eager to find a way to improve its public image. Bofors produced a machine in six months and launched its new invention by demonstrating it to a massive international audience, signing an agreement with NPA for the use of one machine. Nicknamed the ‘Glufs-Glufs’, the list of specifications for the machine was inspired by the belief in a silver bullet: amongst other things, it was supposed to disarm the largest anti-tank and the smallest anti-personnel mine, to work in most terrain and to be effective down to 50 centimetres. There was a great deal of optimism regarding the machine’s promise. One official at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that, in good terrain, the machine would have a cost-effectiveness '45 to 60 times lower [sic]' than manual clearance. However, none of the machines ever came close to operational efficiency. As a recent report on demining technologies rather bluntly puts it: "The Bofors Demining vehicle is still sitting in the corner of the NPA compound just outside of Sarajevo." Nor did the machine ever make it to Cambodia, as intended. Sida’s perception at the time was that the sheer weight of the machine would disqualify it from passing most bridges in the country.

In late 1995, Sida was presented with yet another technological R&D initiative. Again, this project met with considerable scepticism from Sida. The project was designed to improve mine detection through a combination of multiple detection principles: the use of radar, ground penetrating radar, metal detector and biosensor. Following Sida’s negative experience with the clearance machines, the agreement with the National Defence Research Establishment was based on much more thorough groundwork. It included numerous safeguards, such as specified benchmarks linked to funding, and a board of experts to monitor progress. The assumptions behind the multisensor project nevertheless proved overly optimistic, and the machine failed to fully meet expectations. However, unlike the clearance machines, there has been considerable interest from the commercial sector in the multisensor. In early 1999, the project was merged into a larger research effort under the auspices of the European Union, and by 2000, Sida was no longer involved in the project.

Sida’s role
Perhaps first and foremost, the R&D projects reviewed here demonstrate the limits of Sida’s influence on aspects of the decisionmaking process and the results of those decisions. Even though Sida has displayed an interest in R&D, Sida was nevertheless reluctant to engage in the specific projects it eventually became involved with. However, in spite of its scepticism towards these R&D initiatives, political and media-driven pressure effectively forced Sida’s involvement. That Sida’s involvement in R&D projects resulted from outside pressures is all the more important given that it spent large amounts of money on these projects: for the fiscal year 1994–95, 10.9 million SEK were allocated to demining machines, which at the time constituted 25% of Sida’s total expenditure on HMA; in the period 1995–99, 24.1 million SEK were spent on the multisensor project; in total, 6% of Sida’s contributions to HMA between 1990 and 1999 was spent on these two projects alone.

Assessment and evaluation

Relevance
Assuming that the objective of funding HMA is to assist persons living in mine-affected communities, there are some significant problems with the way Swedish R&D projects have been defined. A recurrent theme with the initiatives reviewed here is that the impetus for projects comes from entrepreneurial individuals, individuals who by circumstance have access to technologies that may be convertible for

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demining purposes. Buoyed by a wave of political and public interest in landmines, the entrepreneur is able to trigger the interest of authorities and the media. Meanwhile, the involvement of more relevant stakeholders, such as people affected by landmines or those who work with practical demining, is neglected. For R&D projects to contribute to the needs of those living in mine-affected areas, greater attention must be devoted to ensuring that research initiatives are relevant. Perhaps the best way to ensure relevance is to be responsive to issues and priorities generated from field-based research and to draw on the practical experience of HMA field staff.

The two projects in question share a second relevance problem. Rather than making an assessment of what is realistic, given existing technology and the type of problem at hand, designs are created that are inadequate for most situations. The mechanical demining machines discussed in the previous sections were both heavy and cumbersome and thus not able to work in most areas where mines are found; they also attempted to meet the unrealistic goal of being able to disarm the largest anti-tank mines and the smallest anti-personnel mines. Again, if these projects had been inspired by practical experiences from the field, it would have been obvious that relatively simple solutions would have been much more viable. Rather than attempting to implement one single machine that could rid the world of all landmines – the classic silver bullet approach – a set of more limited initiatives would have yielded far greater benefits for those threatened by landmines.

A third aspect is the question of whether organizational arrangements were relevant for the process. One issue is that Sida does not appear to have the capacity to deal with private business contracts within the relatively complex world of R&D projects. To Sida’s credit, it was able to draw lessons from the experience with the clearance machines from 1994 and apply those to secure a different institutional set up for the multisensor engagement beginning in 1996. Among the important changes were the inclusion of benchmarks and monitoring, as well as a greater degree of transparency. A second issue is linked to the points about relevance raised above. For a Swedish R&D project to meet the challenge of developing applicable field instruments, it must support the institutionalization of contact with stakeholders in mine-affected countries.

**Sustainability**

The classic critique of any new technology within mine action is the issue of sustainability. There is good reason to question investment in equipment that is not reliable during operation and that cannot easily be maintained under simple field conditions. In general, technological advancements are rarely better than the expertise of those using them. This is as also the case within mine action. Machines and equipment must be easy to operate for demining personnel, including all types of survey staff. Further, equipment should be sufficiently simple so that the knowledge required for its operation and maintenance is locally available. To this end, an important component of any R&D initiative is to provide adequate training for local staff. This has proven to be a problem with most of the more advanced technical responses to the mine problem; the Swedish examples examined here are by no means exceptions to this pattern.

**Seconded technical advisors**

Given that Sweden has not developed a larger organizational capacity within HMA, Sida has in the past few years sought to employ Swedish technical experts (TAs) as in-kind contributions to various programmes. This is not unique in the world of mine action. Increasingly, the seconding of personnel may be becoming the international norm for the transference of HMA expertise. Mines Advisory Group, for instance, envisions a move away from running its own large-scale field operations. Instead, it will emphasize its ability to supply a pool of experts who can act in advisory capacities and perform
technical duties. Amongst the countries which Sida has provided seconded personnel are Afghanistan and Kosovo; the assessment provided here is based on these cases.

The Afghanistan programme received its first TA in early 1997, an arrangement that continues to the present. Currently, the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA) is staffed with its third consecutive TA. The MACA TAs have been recruited via SWEDEC, which operates a pool of mine-action personnel that can be recruited for international operations. In Kosovo, Sida has seconded four TAs to the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) in Pristina. In the case of Kosovo, Sida notes the need for a central coordinating mechanism due to the influx of resources and actors following the war. As a result, there has been an emphasis on building and maintaining the MAC structure, as opposed to emphasizing an operational capacity. In Kosovo, personnel were provided through the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), which also maintains responsibility for implementation. This arrangement is distinct from the one with SWEDEC for Afghanistan, where Sida acts as the employer of seconded individuals. In general, the emphasis has been on strengthening the MAC structure in each case.

Sida’s role
A prime motive for the continued secondment of personnel has been the positive response this initiative has received: Sida views the secondment of personnel as very successful, noting that Swedish TAs have a good reputation internationally. Further, given the lack of a Swedish HMA operator, secondment is an alternative approach to giving Sweden visibility, influence and experience in HMA. It also appears that Sida considers the secondment of personnel as increasingly relevant. Given that both SWEDEC and SRSA are currently capable of providing suitable candidates, expectations are that Sida will maintain or expand its current level of secondment.

In terms of funding, a TA in Afghanistan costs Sida 0.7 million SEK per year. In the Afghan case, this amounts to 4% of Sida’s total contribution to the programme. In Kosovo, Sida has committed a total of 8.8 million SEK for the establishing of UNMACC in 1999, approximately half of which is allocated for seconded Swedish personnel. Sida’s total contribution to the Kosovo UNMACC is expected to run to roughly 8 million SEK for 2000 and 4 million SEK in 2001.8

Assessment and evaluation

Relevance
A key question when it comes to seconded TAs is relevance: do the secondments respond to an identified need in the host programme, and are suitable candidates identified by the seconding body? The overall impression is that the personnel seconded by Sida have performed well. Sida’s routines for recruitment appear to be sound. A relevant personnel pool is asked to forward several candidates in response to a job description, while Sida’s recruitment unit uses multiple methods of assessment in selecting an appropriate candidate.9 It appears that the identification of needs comes from the programme itself, rather than through pressure from Sida to include specific types of candidates. However, the identification of specific requirements is not always based on solid assessments by programme managers. Rather, job descriptions are at times tailored to suit to a perception of what Sida is willing and able to provide.

A second aspect is the issue of what sort of expertise Sida is able to provide. In previous years, there has been a great deal of dependency on the military SWEDEC organization for the recruitment of personnel. With Sida’s newly established affiliation with SRSA, this bias has been somewhat reduced,

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8 Svensk minibersägare (Swedish mine action policy), e-mail from Lars Johansson (Sida) to evaluation authors, 12 January 2001.
9 Beslut om insatsstöd (Decision Document), SEKA-Hum, 660/98.
given that SRSA also recruits personnel from non-military backgrounds and provides training in some facets of humanitarian assistance. Given the ongoing reorientation within HMA to place greater emphasize on impact, there is a need to recruit from a broader spectrum of expertise than just the military. As an illustration: a weakness with some of the personnel seconded by Sida is that they are largely unfamiliar with broader issues of development, including the most basic understanding of HMA impact. It is thus important for Sida to build relationships with other organizations in Sweden, organizations that can provide personnel with a broader basis in humanitarian assistance. With the capacity to draw on a wider pool of secondments, Sida will increase its potential to respond to the growing impact trend in HMA.10

In spite of the general success of TA secondments, the arrangement has one inherent flaw. The host organization bears no costs for the secondment; it is not in a position to redirect the funding to other objectives and the offer of seconded personnel is on what amounts to a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Thus, even if an organization makes a formal request for seconded personnel, there is still an incentive for the host organization to accept the offer, regardless of whether there is an explicit need for that person. Such an arrangement undermines normal assurances of relevance. If the host organization bears all costs for an employee, there is also a stronger incentive to ensure that there is a need to fill a specific position. In the case of seconded personnel, this is not the case. Rather, it is likely that the host organization will accept what the donor wishes to contribute, even if such a contribution is not always relevant to the needs of that organization.

Sustainability
To the extent that the management of HMA programmes is reliant on international expertise, sustainability is threatened. The secondment of TAs only adds to that problem. The best way to alleviate this problem is to ensure that TAs are committed to capacity-building, either by general training or by working closely with local counterparts who could eventually fill the position of the TA. Given this, it is striking that job descriptions examined for this report for TAs to Afghanistan and Kosovo do not make any reference to capacity-building. Considering the costs of a TA, the secondment of personnel where capacity-building is not explicitly a central element must be said to be inadvisable.

A related problem is the duration of contracts for TAs. Typically, contracts are short term. A normal-length contract is 12 months, with opportunities for six-month extensions, while the maximum duration of a secondment is two years. However, any expatriate adviser will need time to understand the programme and the context before being able to work efficiently. In most cases, this requires three to six months. Thus, one-year contracts must be considered too short to justify what amounts to a training period. Short-term contracts are ideal only if the primary objective of the seconding agency is to build its own base of knowledge. It should be pointed out that Sida is constrained by the short-term funding perspectives that typify HMA, and the issue of short-term contracts for personnel is a reflection of the larger dilemma inherent to HMA.

The dog project in Cambodia
The Swedish dog project in Cambodia was initiated in early 1996, and stems from a mission including military personnel sent to Cambodia to assess the viability of the ‘Glufs-Glufs’ mine clearance machine. Dog experts within the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) had long argued that their knowledge on the issue was held in high regard and that it should be applied for HMA purposes.11 In the initial plan,

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10 One socio-economic adviser was seconded to CMAC for one year from November 1996.
11 Cederblad C. O., 1994. Svenska Minhunder [Swedish Minedogs], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January, refers to meetings initiated by key personnel within SAF.
the main objective was to train five Mine Detection Dog (MDD) teams that could later be handed over to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC). Project start was 1 August 1996, with the transfer to the CMAC slated for 30 June 1999. When the project was evaluated in early 1999, it was clear that the project had systematically failed, both from a technical perspective and in terms of institutional arrangements. Sida and SAF were both made responsible for what was largely seen as a failure. Following prolonged discussions, it was decided to extend the project until June 2002 and to make major alterations to the project’s overall design. In our assessment, we focus primarily on the institutional factors surrounding the project, not the technical issues; the latter are covered in other reports which specifically address the technical aspects of using MDDs.

Sida’s role
The dog project in Cambodia represents a sizeable financial investment for Sida. Current costs are at an estimated 22.2 million SEK for the period ending March 2000; an additional 18.6 million SEK have been allocated for the period up to project completion and hand-over to CMAC in June 2002. In the first period, Sida’s engagement was limited. The project was formally implemented by the SAF International Command (SWEDINT), whose primary mandate is in peacekeeping operations and who at the time had no other experience in running humanitarian operations. Within the military, some saw the project as an opportunity to gain experience in international humanitarian assistance. Sida, who had no prior experience in cooperation with the armed forces, invested very little in monitoring the progress of the project. In the first years of the project, institutional contact between Sida and SAF was very limited, although there was monitoring of the project at the individual level. SAF’s reporting did not reveal the difficulties inherent in the project, and transparency was low. In the project period beginning in 2000, an external advisory board will monitor progress on a regular basis.

Assessment and evaluation

Relevance
Knowledge of why dogs work and how to work with dogs was limited in 1996, and still is today. Nevertheless, there are strong arguments for developing or refining mine-detection techniques, and dogs have for several years been seen as a promising alternative. This, linked to the fact that Cambodia has a massive mine problem, indicates that developing an MDD capacity in the country was potentially very valuable and could in the longer term also have had a significant effect internationally. In spite of this, an investment in developing MDDs is high risk, as are R&D investments more generally.

In terms of its technical competence on MDDs, there is little doubt that SAF was appropriate for the task. On the other hand, SAF was organizationally ill-equipped for running an operation with a humanitarian orientation in a culturally and socially distinct country such as Cambodia. Organizational problems included low levels of transparency, no delegation of authority from Sweden to the personnel in Cambodia and poor coordination with external actors of critical importance to the success of the project both at home and in the host country. Sida should have identified these shortcomings at a much earlier stage and should have addressed these through alternative organizational solutions.

Sustainability
The original project design had several problems in relation to sustainability. One was its relatively narrow focus in terms of content, where the main output was defined as setting up five operative MDD

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13 See Curtis & Matulewicz, 1999, note 12 above.
teams. The need for a breeding capacity was not thoroughly discussed until after the 1999 evaluation. Given the excessive costs of purchasing or training dogs internationally, a breeding capacity seems an essential component of any sustainable MDD program. In the most recent project proposal, it is still argued that purchasing dogs internationally is preferable to local breeding. In contrast, the Afghan Mine Dog Centre started a breeding program in 1994 and is now self-sufficient in terms of new dogs.

Another key element is the development of knowledge. Here, the organizational arrangements of SAF were problematic. One issue was that staff members from SAF in Cambodia had short-term contracts of six to twelve months. Hence, they could not establish the trust or the understanding of organization and culture which building a base of knowledge would require. The frequent shifts of personnel, and the fact that knowledge of MDDs in SAF was limited to only a handful of individuals posed further problems. This was compounded by an organizational structure where authority was vested in only a few individuals and where there was little organizational backing. More generally, it appears that the challenges associated with developing knowledge of Cambodian society and culture were given little attention in comparison with the more technical issues involved.

The low attention to the building of expertise is paralleled by a failure to ensure the integration of the MDD exercise with CMAC. Financially, there has been a continuous commitment to CMAC, with Sida funding constituting about two-thirds of the overall project costs, mainly in the form of salaries for national staff and various operational costs. More broadly, however, the project was somewhat peripheral, with CMAC feeling a limited sense of ownership in it. Again, this relates to the low level of authority vested in Cambodian-based SAF personnel, which prevented them from having substantial discussions with CMAC regarding the project. In the new project period from 2000 onwards, CMAC involvement is given high priority.

**Conclusion**

Issues relating to Swedish capacities have one common and recurrent problem: there is a potential relevance deficit that stems from a failure to base needs definitions on the real stakeholders, such as operators in the field and populations affected by landmines. In the case of R&D, research projects tend to be defined by representatives of the industry, and in the case of the dog project, need was identified by those who had expertise with dogs. This problem also has a sustainability aspect: unless people have been included in the definition phase of a project, they do not develop a sense of ownership of the effort.

A second persistent problem is the limited influence Sida is able to exert on projects in which they are involved. When political and media pressures are high, an organization such as Sida is often forced to comply with the demands of outside interests, such as the Swedish government or the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practice, this can mean involvement in projects that are at odds with Sida’s own policies. The validity of policy is restricted, and at times effectively made void. At the same time, Sida may have considerable autonomy in defining institutional arrangements at a given project’s inception. This is precisely what happened when Sida, on the basis of its negative experiences with demining machines, was able to ensure appropriate institutional arrangements for securing progress in the multisensor project.

Perhaps the most persistent issue associated with the three Swedish initiatives reviewed here is their lack of sustainability. In general, the Swedish capacities supported by Sida have thus far not been

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particularly effective in transferring expertise and knowledge to local communities or individuals. Instead, they have had

the effect of strengthening capacities in the donor’s own country, benefiting those who provide the assistance rather than those to whom it should be provided. Prior to engaging in the research of new technologies, seconding staff or initiating specialized projects, it is imperative for Sida to assess to what extent these can be of benefit to local populations and whether they can be integrated into existing institutions.
6 Recommendations

In the preceding chapters, we have analysed various aspects of Sida’s support to HMA over the past ten years, with a focus on the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. Furthermore, we have discussed the most recent initiatives in HMA policy and practice more generally, even when these do not necessarily relate directly to Sida. On the basis of the analysis presented in the previous chapters, we will in this chapter provide our recommendations for Sida to draw upon in its planned revision of HMA policy. The recommendations follow the same structure as the report. We begin with recommendations on impact assessment, before moving on to implementation channels, coordination and Swedish capacities. In the final portion of this chapter, we outline several general recommendations for Sida.

Impact assessment

• HMA programmes need to be based on solid systems for impact assessment and on routines for converting results of assessments into sound plans and priorities.

• There are four basic approaches to impact assessment in HMA:

• Rules of thumb have multiple weaknesses in assessing impact, and are not appropriate unless dealing with a very restricted mine problem.

• Economic analysis has its strength in balancing costs against benefits, which allows for the ranking of communities that experience similar types of effects. However, economic analysis is problematic because of its one-sided focus on economic resources. Economic analysis should primarily be seen as a complementary tool for evaluation of programmes at the macro level.

• The composite indicator, as represented by the Level One Impact Survey (LOIS), is emerging as the global reference for basic impact assessments. It has certain flaws, including insensitivity to the gravity of particular impacts. However, it is a robust tool that works relatively well for the purposes of establishing a general overview of the mine problem in a given country.

• Community studies are in the process of being streamlined so that they can serve as a systematically applied impact-assessment tool in the field. The approach is sensitive to local variation, but is also demanding in terms of time. For follow-up assessments of high-priority communities identified by the LOIS, community studies are promising.

• HMA organizations must develop the analytical capacity required to conduct impact assessments, and must ensure through organizational set-ups that impact is at the centre when establishing priorities.

• HMA organizations should make sure that all staff have a basic understanding of impact and its relationship to HMA. One way this can be accomplished is by integrating impact sessions in the basic training of staff.

• HMA organizations need to have the capacity to monitor impact during project implementation in order to modify the operation if needed. Regular contact with local populations, along with confidence-building, is integral to monitoring.

• Sida must require from any HMA programme it supports that a comprehensive and locally adapted system for impact assessment is either in place or is being developed.

• Sida must reorient its policy to see support to impact assessments as essential to its larger engagement in HMA. Sida must reorient its funding policies so that the funding of impact assessments, as well as surveys, is a priority.
• Sida should, in internal appraisals as well as evaluations of HMA, take care not to apply simple output measures, such as cost per square metre, as a proxy for programme quality. A similar caveat can be applied to relying solely on one type of impact assessment, which may favour certain factors at the exclusion of others.

Implementation channels

• HMA programmes should be organized so that implementation functions are separate from coordination and control functions.

• Different implementation channels have their own strengths and weaknesses. Which channel is most appropriate will vary with context. At times, different channels may play complementary roles within the same programme:

  - Government channels are preferable in situations where their involvement is permitted for political and military reasons. The implementation of HMA by governments is also the most sustainable option. However, specialized government agencies are often insensitive to a broader humanitarian agenda. Consequently, the building of expertise, particularly in key areas such as impact assessment, is necessary.

  - NGOs have their strengths in adaptability to politically difficult environments, in giving attention to issues of impact and in technical and organizational innovations. NGOs do not stand out as better than other implementers in coordinating with non-HMA actors or in building locally sustainable organizations. Nevertheless, NGOs will continue to constitute a central implementation channel when political and military circumstances preclude implementation through governments.

  - Commercial companies are emerging as a central implementation channel in certain countries and within larger UN-led HMA programmes. Commercial companies may possess scarce technical expertise, but their engagement should be linked to strong and independent quality assurance measures.

  - Sida should consider a systematic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of commercial operators, in light of their increasing importance as implementers in HMA.

  - Sida must emphasize the building of national capacities, both at the individual and the organizational level, and safeguard capacity-building during all stages of an operation, including the initial planning stage.

  - Sida’s expectations about the financial and organizational sustainability of national or governmental HMA organizations must be realistic, reflecting the extent to which many mine-affected countries are still at war or just recovering from a conflict. This implies a long-term planning horizon in which external funding and national capacity-building are inexorably linked.

Coordination

• The coordination of HMA should be the responsibility of a national entity as long as political circumstances allow for it.

• Establishment of Mine Action Centres (MACs) should be located within existing national institutions where possible. MACs do not necessarily have to be UN-led and can be established as a natural extension of existing national capacities. When establishing MACs, it is essential to develop plans for a transfer of the authority to a national capacity at an early stage and to be willing to invest money and expertise to ensure the success of such a transfer.
• MACs should operate with agreements and control mechanisms that are sufficiently flexible to allow for the development of independent national entities.

• MACs need to have the flexibility to accommodate variegated approaches to HMA. They need to be able to encourage the development of new and innovative approaches to HMA, in terms of technology, organizational arrangements and impact sensitivity.

• The coordination between HMA and other sectors of reconstruction and development needs to improve. The view that HMA is a technical sector apart from other parts of humanitarian assistance remains prevalent. In order to improve coordination between HMA and other humanitarian assistance, they must be integrated at the early planning stages and steps must be taken to ensure that plans are updated to accommodate new demands.

• Donor boards, when established, should not be vested with any formal authority over HMA programmes. They should refrain from engaging in issues below the strategic level and avoid exerting influence at the expense of governments.

• Sida should ensure the presence of functioning coordination mechanisms for programmes in which it is engaged. The presence of functioning coordination mechanisms is a critical factor in HMA programmes and deserves the continued attention of Sida.

• Sida should continue to support coordination mechanisms in HMA. Effective coordination is not realistic unless financial and human resources are provided for such a purpose.

Swedish capacities
• In general terms, there is a need to ensure that in-kind contributions to HMA constitute a relevant response to the particular needs of the recipient country. In-kind contributions that are motivated by the donor country’s needs to build competence or to support its own national organizations should be avoided.

• Sida should refrain from involving itself in technology-oriented HMA R&D projects. Such projects are high-risk and capital intensive, and fail to respond to any of Sida’s criteria for humanitarian assistance. An exception might be the development of low-tech sustainable equipment designed to improve the effectiveness or safety of currently applied techniques. This should take place in the host country, whenever possible.

• Sida should continue its secondment of technical advisors, as long as it is able to ensure full relevance of skills through dialogue with hosts and to uphold good recruitment procedures. No TA should be seconded unless competence-building is a central aspect of the mandate. Sida should expand its recruitment base in order to respond to requirements in all areas of HMA, such as impact assessment.

• Sida needs to closely monitor the progress of the dog project in Cambodia. Historically, the project, implemented by the Swedish Armed Forces, has been a failure, with major flaws in the organizational set-up as a key problem. Sida needs to ensure its ability to withdraw from the project unless significant improvements take place.

• Sida must ensure that the use of Swedish capacities in HMA is primarily in response to needs identified by key stakeholders in the mine-affected country.
• Sida should not assume that personnel involved possess a basic understanding of humanitarian assistance when they employ Swedish capacities in HMA. Sida needs to take greater responsibility in terms of building the necessary expertise and establishing relevant institutional arrangements, drawing on its broad experience in Swedish capacity-building for development cooperation.

General
• Sida needs to apply longer funding horizons. Given Sida's investments in knowledge and the challenges of building national capacities, a funding horizon of three to five years is a minimum. In countries with poor institutional capacity as a result of war, longer funding horizons may be necessary.

• Sida should invest in high-quality evaluations. These have proven vital for strengthening individual projects, as well as in stimulating Sida policy formulation. Steps should be made to ensure that such evaluations are participatory in their approach and that they are rooted in the perspectives of those affected by landmines.

• Sida needs to develop a consistent policy. It is vital for Sida’s ability to administer a consistent policy that it is developed in close dialogue with other key Swedish stakeholders, particularly the Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency.

• Sida needs to maintain personnel with HMA competence that can advise and build competence amongst other decisionmakers within the organization. Sida should establish a dialogue with implementation bodies in order to ensure their compliance with Sida policy and their building of the competence required to live up to the standards that this policy represents.

• Sida should reconsider its policy of prioritizing clearance at the expense of other aspects of HMA, such as survey.
7 Conclusion

In this report, we have examined a set of key issues within the field of Humanitarian Mine Action. In so doing, we have focused on areas where Sida has been involved as a donor. This report has not attempted to conduct a systematic assessment of the effect of Sida’s contributions. Rather, the report has focused on providing a qualitative assessment of its role as a donor. Throughout the report, we have related the findings and conclusions to Sida’s guidelines and practices on mine action. In this concluding chapter, we reflect briefly on the role of Sida as an international donor in mine action.

As a sector of humanitarian assistance, HMA is relatively new, coming into being only in the early 1990s. Considerable progress has been achieved over the past few years, not least of all in developing new approaches to impact assessment. Yet the reorganization of programmes so that they can reap the full benefits of new assessment tools remains in its infancy. Success in this regard depends not only on having developed the right tools, but also on building sustainable capacities equipped to handle these tools at all levels within HMA.

Since the Landmine Ban Treaty was established in 1997, political interest for the problem of landmines has gradually declined. With Sida, this decline in political interest is paralleled by a decline in the level of funding to HMA. This trend is quite unfortunate, particularly since it comes at a time when HMA is characterized by significant developments that have led to major improvements in resource allocation and organizational design. There must be a realization amongst the international donor community, including Sida, that the problem of landmines will not be solved in the near future, even if no new mines are planted. It may very well be that, in certain countries, the impact of landmines in ten years from now will be too limited to justify current levels of spending. Nevertheless, the same countries will continue to be affected by landmines for decades to come. Therefore, the challenge is to maintain acceptable levels of international funding, while promoting the development of less resource-intensive responses. These should ideally be flexible, nationally based mechanisms, suited to addressing the long-term problem of mines and UXO.

Sida was one of the first governmental donors to support Humanitarian Mine Action. Beginning with its initial contributions in 1991, Sida remained a major donor to HMA throughout the 1990s, and, in the period stretching from 1991 until 1998, Sida was the world’s third largest donor to HMA. However, since 1998, Sida has cut its total funding to mine action by 40%, and, by 1999, it had slipped to seventh place. While this reduction can in part be seen as the aggregate result of decisions within various country programmes, it is nevertheless ironic that the reductions in funding have occurred in conjunction with an emerging concern within Sida for consistent handling of HMA. This concern is reflected in Sida’s recruitment of a policy specialist on mine action and in its commission of this report, both part of a process intended to culminate in a new policy document on HMA by the middle of 2001. Clearly, Sida maintains an interest in mine action. However, it is significant that Sida has opted to reduce its total contributions to HMA while striving to become a more competent donor. This decline in funding may signal a decreasing interest in mine action within Sida and, perhaps even more so, within Swedish political circles more broadly.

In the international arena, Sida can best be characterized as a reactive, rather than a proactive, donor. As opposed to engaging HMA organizations in discussions that could lead to alterations of approaches,
Sida has generally supported the approach it viewed as constructive at the time. In practice, this has meant that Sida has not followed a consistent policy on HMA, but has instead implemented policy in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion. At the same time, though perhaps coincidentally, Sweden has abstained from building up its own organizational capacity for mine action. As a result of these factors, Sida has been a relatively flexible donor, allowing agencies with which it collaborates considerable freedom to manoeuvre in terms of designing approaches deemed appropriate at a particular time. At an overall level, the reactive position taken by Sida has been constructive in the early stages of HMA, when innovation in terms of trying out new approaches was vital. However, this report has suggested a set of principles that should be seen as minimum standards for Sida's continued engagement in mine action. It is therefore important that Sida, on the basis of such standards, continues to fund initiatives that explore innovative and constructive ways of conducting HMA.

When Sida began its involvement in HMA during the first half of the 1990s, HMA was a new field, and Sida’s reactive donor role could be seen as constructive. However, although some of the problems with the conventional approach to mine action started to become evident in the mid-1990s, Sida nevertheless maintained its relatively passive approach. In the latter half of the 1990s, a reorientation to a more proactive stance, whereby Sida could have drawn on its broad expertise within humanitarian assistance, would have permitted Sida to play a more central role in influencing HMA policies globally. Today, HMA remains a young sector in humanitarian assistance. And Sida, particularly given its investment in building expertise over the past several years, is now well positioned to play a more active, constructive and leading role within it. Sida could thus become part of what was termed the ‘quiet revolution’ in HMA in the opening sections of this report. It is therefore hoped that this report will serve as a resource for such a change and as an inspiration for a reorientation within Sida.
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR

THE EVALUATION OF SIDA’S CONTRIBUTION TO HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION

1 BACKGROUND

Towards the end of the 1980s the problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance (OXA) and its consequences for people in wartorn societies led to a growing international movement. The objective was to stop the use of landmines. 1997 it led to The Mine Ban Treaty (The Ottawa Convention). It also led to a very comprehensive effort on how to relieve people of landmines and to facilitate the regeneration of social and economic development in wartorn societies.

The perception of mines as being one of the largest problems for wartorn societies forced aid organisations as well as politicians to commit themselves to the elimination of mines. Today a process that will lead to a new way of conceptualising or categorising the severity of the mine problem is ongoing. Many donors are in a process of redefining their support to mine action. There is a common interest to find criteria for future commitments.

Large financial resources have been spent in the field of mine action activities (survey, mine awareness, mine clearing and victim assistance) and related activities such as stockpile destruction but the effects of work done are poorly evaluated. Evaluations concerning relevance, cost-efficiency and socio-economic impact are very few. To some extent this is understandable, since mine action is a fairly new field in humanitarian and development aid. The conditions for gathering information are complicated and the lack of reliable data in many mine-affected countries for planning, implementation and follow-up is limited. The variety of activities, methods (mechanical, manual, dogs etc), channels and donor support also complicates the picture. It is also a field with a considerable amount of vested interests among many involved. On the other hand an extensive number of studies and evaluations concerning technical aspects, management, structure, projects and programmes is available.
A number of presumptions have been taken for granted in the world of mine action. Years have passed and some of the presumptions might have to be reconsidered and adjusted. Among these basic ideas is the perception of the mine threat as being one of the largest problems for developing countries affected by mines, that it will be an enormous humanitarian and development problem for decades, that it takes western technology and standards to solve the problem, that building national “mine action centres” is a good, sustainable way to solve the problem etc.

Sida has found the time appropriate to evaluate and analyse its contribution to mine-action. A number of studies and evaluations have been carried out on mine action programmes and projects to which Sida has contributed, but no comprehensive evaluation of its support to mine action has been undertaken.

Sida has spent 502 mil SEK on mine action 1990-1999 (Enclosure 1). Up until 1999 Sida was the third largest donor in the world to mine action. The bulk of the contribution has been on mine clearing operation in 10 different countries on a directed multilateral basis channelled through the UN system for the establishment of national mine action capabilities, so called mine action centers (MAC) and different NGO organisations. A smaller contribution has been channelled through the Organisation for American States (OAS) for mine clearing in Nicaragua and Honduras by the national military. Sida has also provided the UN system with in-kind technical advisors to UNDP and OCHA programmes. A minedog capacity programme in Cambodia is being implemented by the Swedish Armed Forces.

In addition Sida has been tasked by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contribute to Research and Development (R&D) concerning mechanical demining and a multisensor concept for mine clearing.

As a preparation for the evaluation a desk study on “The State of knowledge on the Effect of Mine Action” has been carried out by Sida to determine the focus, scope and design of the evaluation.

2 PURPOSE, USE AND GENERAL COVERAGE OF THE EVALUATION

Given the above background, the overall purpose of the evaluation is to provide Sida with an independent, comprehensive review and analysis of its past and current support to mine action. Focus should be on learning aspects and to provide guidance for decision-makers. Based on the observations, findings and assessments made regarding individual activities, programmes and implementing organisations, the main idea is to draw general and guiding conclusions regarding Sidas support to mine action.
The result of the evaluation shall assist Sida in revising or developing policies and guidelines in the area of mine action and thus facilitate improved decision making by Sida. Sida will also use the evaluation as input in enhancing the subject knowledge of all actors involved in mine action funded by Sida.

As specified further under Scope, the evaluation shall cover supported programmes and projects, different activities (mine awareness, mine clearing), technical advisors, implementing channels (UN system, NGOs, Swedish armed forces) and the establishment of national mine action capacities (MAC) and include an identification of lessons learned from these areas and channels and their respective and relative strengths and weaknesses.

3 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The scope of the work includes a review and analysis of Sida supported, completed and ongoing mine action projects as stated in Sidas inventory of mine action 1990-2000 (Enclosure 1) in, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Nicaragua, Honduras, Angola and Mozambique.

A central issue of the evaluation is to assess the socio – economical effects of mine action, for example, land put in use, refugee return and economic regeneration, reduction of accidents as well as possible negative effects on people and communities of mine action.

It is also important to study to what extent and how the use of different kinds of implementing channels (NGO, the UN system and others) have influenced the effects achieved.

Since mine action is a relatively new field of humanitarian assistance it is essential to study to what extent it has been co-ordinated with other humanitarian and development activities in affected countries.

Additionally the evaluation should cover the results of Sidas contributions to research and development (R&D) and in–kind contributions. The benefits and shortcomings of the dog project in Cambodia as implemented by The Swedish Armed Forces shall also be covered.

The evaluation report to Sida shall include

- The effects of mine action in general and as far as possible related to specific country conditions and implementing channels.

- The main advantages and disadvantages in using different implementing channels, NGOs, UN system and others
• Lessons learnt from Sida supported mine action

• A discussion concerning the conditions for future mine action. Principal problems and possible ways ahead related to humanitarian and development aid.

• Recommendations to Sida for future support to mine action, the recommendations should as far as possible be co-ordinated with Sidas policy programmes, i.e., Gender equality, Peace Democracy and Human Rights, Poverty and Sustainable Development, and well as prioritised strategic issues such as Children’s Right and Conflict Management and Peace Building.

4 METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

Methodology

The evaluation shall be based on a) a review of existing documentation relevant to the purpose and scope of the study, b) field visits to selected countries, c) interviews with selected organisations and stakeholders.

The Consultant shall prepare and present an inception report at Sida elaborating on the proposal for basic design and plan for the study indicated in para 5. After discussions with and approved by Sida, the Consultant shall carry out the evaluation as soon as possible.

The evaluation should consider standard evaluation criteria, as commented on below.

Relevance

Has Sidas support to programmes and projects during the period been relevant in relation to the context and the perception of humanitarian and other needs?

Achievements of objectives

• to what extent the objectives of projects and programmes were clear at the time of the start and to what extent they can be said to have been achieved?

Effects on target groups / beneficiaries

• The major qualitative and quantitative effects on local population and communities, for example use of cleared land, land property issues, agriculture, communications, social and psychological effects of programmes and projects to which Sida has contributed. What are the intended and unintended effects?
Co-ordination

- An assessment of the co-ordination and co-operation between mine action and other aid and development activities. Both between national / local authorities and international organisations. Is there an acceptable prioritisation process in demining operations related to humanitarian and development needs.

- To what extent have various categories of end-user / beneficiaries been involved in the planning and prioritisation process in mine action?

Cost-Effectiveness

It is very difficult to evaluate cost-effectiveness in the area of mine action. Up until now international studies have failed to find acceptable criteria. An ongoing work at the Geneva International Center For Humanitarian Demining (GIHCD) has the purpose to find criteria for this in the field of mine action.

- Have the costs for mine action been in reasonable proportion to effects achieved?

- To what extent can a cause and effect relationship be clearly established between the projects/programmes and the result?

Efficiency

- Have programmes and projects been efficiently planned, implemented, managed and evaluated?

Sustainability

- Does indigenous mine action capacity building through mine action centres (MAC) lead to a long-term national capacity?

- The accordance between donors and/or operators and recipient countries concerning the problem with mines and UXO and how to solve the problem?

- To what extent will “mine action” survive after external funding have ended?

- To what extent have the beneficiaries (people/governments) supported the programmes?

- What are the key factors to succeed in mine action?

Cross-cutting issues
To what extent and how have cross-cutting issues been addressed in mine action and what is the effects?

5 REPORTING

The structure and sequence of reporting shall be a) inception report, b) first draft of final report together with a presentation at Sida, c) final report, d) presentation seminar at Sida.

The Consultant shall prepare and present an inception report at Sida elaborating on the proposal for basic design and plan for the study indicated in para 4. After discussions with and approved by Sida, the Consultant shall carry out the evaluation as soon as possible.

The evaluation report shall be written in English and should not exceed 80 pages, excluding annexes. Format and outline of the report shall follow the guidelines in Sida Evaluation Report - a Standardised Format (Enclosure 2).

- Three copies of the draft report shall be submitted to Sida no later than 2001-01-15. The consultant is asked to make a presentation of the first draft report at Sida.

- Within two weeks after receiving Sida's comments on the first draft report, a final draft report in two copies and on diskette shall be submitted to Sida.

- Two weeks after Sida's comments on the final draft report a final report should be submitted to Sida in three copies and on a diskette shall be submitted to Sida.

Subject to decision by Sida, the report will be published and distributed as a publication within the Sida Evaluations series.

The evaluation report shall be written in Word 97 for Windows and should be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

The evaluation assignment includes the production of a Newsletter summary following the guidelines in Sida Evaluations Newsletter - Guidelines for Evaluation Managers and Consultants (Enclosure 3) and also the completion of Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet. The separate summary and a completed Data Work Sheet shall be submitted to Sida along with the (final) draft report.
6 SPECIFICATION OF QUALIFICATION

6.1 Compulsory Qualifications

The following qualifications shall be met by the tenderer:

- The tenderer shall account for his/her understanding of the mission in his/her own words.
- The tenderer shall as concretely and clearly as possible specify and motivate the approach and methods to be applied in performing the assignment, including those employed in the various tasks of the assignment.
- The tenderer shall comment on the ToR and may suggest alternative solutions of the assignment.
- The team assigned to carry out the study shall have knowledge and experience appropriate to the purpose and scope of the study.
- The team leader shall be independent of the mine action world.
- The team assigned shall be experienced in evaluations of effects on people and communities of aid and development programmes.
- Be experienced in evaluations of humanitarian aid and development activities through the UN system and the NGO world, the implementing capacity, procedures and dynamics of these organisations.
- Submit curricula vitae for all personnel you propose for carrying out the Services. The curricula vitae should include the following information: name, address, education, and professional experience, experience of working abroad and in developing countries/transition countries. Each concerned member shall with signature certify that his/her CV is correct.
- The study team shall have very good knowledge in spoken and written English and Swedish.
- Present earlier experience from similar evaluation or studies. Present two references with name and telephone number.
- A draft report shall be submitted to Sida not later than 2000-01-15.
- The tenderer shall clearly state when the team will be able to perform the assignment.
The tenderer shall present a budget, which differentiates between and proposes ceilings for fees and reimbursable costs, specified for the different elements of the assignment. Total estimated costs shall be stated. All fees shall be stated hourly. All costs shall be stated in SEK, exclusive of Swedish VAT, but including all other taxes and levies. Individuals, however, shall state their fee exclusive of Swedish social security charges.

6.2 Preferred Qualifications

- Tenders should be based on a need for the Consultant of maximum 30 person weeks including the time needed to prepare the inception report, including time for completing the report and for preparation and presentation at Sida.
- Contract with Sida should be entered by 8 September 2000.
- The tenderer should be ready to commence the mission/assignment in September 2000.
- The Tenderer should state and specify any minor reservations against the draft contract, Sidas General conditions for the procurement of goods and services and Standard conditions and purpose alternative wording. The proposed changes shall not imply significant changes in existing draft contract or commercial/standard conditions.

Enclosures:

1. Sidas inventory of mine action 1990-2000
### Appendix 2

**List of Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westberg, Joakim</td>
<td>Technical Adviser (Sida-seconded)</td>
<td>MACA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharif, K. M.</td>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
<td>MACA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pålsson, Fredrik</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group, Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(former Sida-seconded TA to MACA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donini, Antonio</td>
<td>Deputy Coordinator/Director</td>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ershad, Mohammad</td>
<td>Data analyst</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muller, Dr Nicolas</td>
<td>Mine Delegate</td>
<td>ICRC, Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naqvi, Zareen F.</td>
<td>Senior Economist</td>
<td>World Bank, Islamabad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Byrd, William</td>
<td>Lead Economist</td>
<td>World Bank, Islamabad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fouzi, Habibullah</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Embassy of Afghanistan, Islamabad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Østby, Knut</td>
<td>Deputy Residential Representative</td>
<td>UNDP Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynolds, Samantha</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>UNCHS-Habitat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leader, Nick</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Van Ree, Bill</td>
<td>Team leader</td>
<td>Evaluation of MAPA for CIDA, DFID, Japanese govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterson, Ted</td>
<td>Team member (UNMAS economist for UNDP impact analysis report)</td>
<td>Evaluation of MAPA for CIDA, DFID, Japanese govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg, Nils E.</td>
<td>Chairman (former Swedish ambassador in Islamabad)</td>
<td>Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Younos, Mohammad</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation and Planning Agency (META)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahman, Ghulam</td>
<td>Doctrine Officer</td>
<td>META</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hameed, Eng.</td>
<td>Site Officer, Eastern Region</td>
<td>MCPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amin, Abdul Samad</td>
<td>Site Officer, Eastern Region</td>
<td>Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bismilllah</td>
<td>Site Officer, Eastern Region</td>
<td>Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akbar, Mohammad</td>
<td>Acting Site Officer, Eastern Region</td>
<td>Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brudgam, Achim</td>
<td>Field Coordinator, Eastern and Central Regions</td>
<td>MACA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hashemi, Said Jaffar</td>
<td>Acting Regional Manager, Eastern Region</td>
<td>MACA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ziauddin</td>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
<td>META</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dupree, Nancy Hatch</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>ACBAR Resource and Information Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hakimi, Shoaib</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>MDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fazel, Fazel Karim</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>OMAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aseem, Dr Habib</td>
<td>Manager, Mine Action Management Information System (MIS)</td>
<td>MCPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iqbal, Mohammad</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>MACA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eblagh, Kefyatullah</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>ATC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attiquallah, Eng.</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>MCPA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>David Rowe</td>
<td>Program Manager and Advisor</td>
<td>BHMAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memisevic Faruk</td>
<td>Opcina Zavidovic Municipality</td>
<td>Civil Protection Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Velic Mehmed</td>
<td>Sarajevo Canton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustafa Kavac</td>
<td>Sarajevo Canton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ejub Sefic</td>
<td>Sarajevo Canton, Hadzici M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enes Kavolic</td>
<td>Sarajevo Canton, Municipality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roman Tujic</td>
<td>Representative Sarajevo</td>
<td>International Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marc Young</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>ICVA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahdin Orahovac</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>FEDMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Clark</td>
<td>Senior Technical Advisor</td>
<td>FEDMAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nedzad Kukuruzovic</td>
<td>Operation Officer</td>
<td>FEDMAC, Tuzla</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chris Bird</td>
<td>Information officer</td>
<td>OHR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Swartling</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>NPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kjell Bjork</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Stop Mines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO Field Manager/staff</td>
<td>Provita</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NGO Field Manager/staff</td>
<td>BHMINES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaj Genneback</td>
<td>Area Manager Tuzla</td>
<td>Räddningsverket</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yuri Afanasiev</td>
<td>Deputy Resident Representative,</td>
<td>UNDP, Sarajevo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Task Manager for Demining</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mirga Saltmiras</td>
<td>National Officer for MAP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jusuf Tanovic</td>
<td>Villagers, Hadzici Municipality</td>
<td>Repatriated refugees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Villagers, Sarajevo suburb</td>
<td>Repatriated refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KOSOVO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collinson, Paul</td>
<td>Programme Manager, Demining</td>
<td>NPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clark, Chris</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>UNMAMCC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flanagan, John</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>UNMAMCC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Borgos, Rolf</td>
<td>Resident Representative</td>
<td>NPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oloffson, Britta</td>
<td>First Secretary, Development Cooperation</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Uddbaeck, Ulf
Development Programme Coordinator
Sida

Connelly, Mark
Demining Supervisor
NPA

Lawrence, Trevor
Medical QA Officer
DCA

Horlen, Katerina
IMSMA Officer
UNMACC

Venegren, Mats
Supervisor, Demining
NPA

Alm, Peter
QA Officer EDD
UNMACC

NICARAGUA

Sergio, Caramagna
Director, Nicaragua
OAS

Ghahramani, Manya
Assistant to Programming Officer
UNICEF

Boda, Oliver
Editor/Researcher
Confidencial

Munjia, Juan
In charge of Mine Awareness Program
Red Cross, Nicaragua

Lanzas, Norman (Dr)
Chief of National Rehabilitation Program and Coordinator of NCD
Ministry of Health

Castro, Jorge (Major)
Chief of Section
Nicaraguan Military, Engineers

Melendes, Javier
Project Coordinator
Centro de Estudios Estrategicos de Nicaragua (CEEN)

Bassi, Spiro (Col.)
Lieutenant-Colonel
Nicaraguan Military, Engineer Corp

Matamoro, Eduardo
General Secretary
Ministry of Defence

Mejia, Errol
Works with Mine Awareness
Red Cross, Nicaragua

Orosco, Carlos
In charge of operations
OAS

Bendana, Alejandro
President
Centro de Estudios Internacionales

Ernberg, Harald
Advisor in Politics and Economics
Swedish Embassy, Nicaragua

Martinez Bergström, Sara
Second Secretary
Swedish Embassy, Nicaragua

NORWAY

Gildestad, Bjørn
Economist/Consultant to MACA on WB supported Socio-Economic Survey
Nordic Consulting Group (NDC)

Sekkenes, Sara
Advisor, Angola (until Dec. 2000)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

Essén, Steinar
Program Manager, Angola
NPA

Bjorsvik, Geir
Technical Advisor
NPA

SWEDEN

Asplund, Eva
Director, Department for Cooperation with NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance (SEKA)
Sida
Bennedich, Claes
Department for evaluation and internal audit
Sida

Carelius, Olof
Lieutenant Colonel
Swedish Armed Forces

Johansson, Lars
Sida

Dahlgren, Stefan
Senior Advisor/Coordinator, Project Appraisal Committee
Sida

Lindell, Magnus
Sida

Wiberg, Barbro
Sida

Gustavsson, Christian
Project Manager Mines
Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS)

von Vietinghoff, Karin
Senior Programme Manager, Division for Humanitarian Assistance – SEKA
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Larsson, Kjell
Head of International Department
Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)

Wetterholm, Lenart
Retired officer
Swedish Armed Forces

Jarnehed, Thomas
International Pool Coordinator
SWEDEC

Fahlén, Marika
Ambassador
Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Börjesson, Barbro
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Lundberg, Peter
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UNITED KINGDOM

Moyes, Richard
Programme Manager
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

Rowan, Holly
Programme Coordinator
MAG

Kilkenny, John
Programme Manager, Northern Iraq
MAG

Priestley, Stephen
Operations Manager
MAG

Wheatley, Andy
Community Liaison Manager
MAG

McGrath, Lou
Director
MAG

USA

Downs, Charles
Division Chief, Mine Action Unit
UNOPS

Eaton, Bob
Director of Humanitarian Affairs
VVAF

Edberg, Kent (Col.)
Counsellor /Military Advisor
Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Garyson, Judy
Mine Action Specialist
UNDP

Kidd, Richard
Program Manager
Survey Action Centre

Levine, Iain
Chief, Humanitarian Policy Development Office of Emergency Programmes
UNICEF

Liljeströmm, Julius
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Mansfield, Ian
Mine Action Team Leader
UNDP
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Appendix 3

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<td>12.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>12.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International coordination</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R &amp; D, other studies</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sida's CONTRIBUTION TO HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION – Sida EVALUATION 01/06 91
## Appendix 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH:</strong></td>
<td><strong>POPULATION SETTLEMENT AREAS AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURES</strong> to provide services at provincial, district and/or community levels such as rural shops, education centres, hospitals and workshops.</td>
<td><strong>LARGE INFRASTRUCTURES AND FACILITIES</strong> for water supply, electric power/gas/oil export and distribution at national level and areas required for constructing new power lines and water-supply systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- LARGE INFRRASTRUCTURES AND FACILITIES for electric power and water supply at provincial, district and/or community level and area required for construction of such systems.</td>
<td>- LARGE INDUSTRIAL UNITS and areas with high potential for these activities at the national level.</td>
<td>- LARGE EXISTING TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURES (roads, railways…) and areas required or very important for local movements, in particular for provision of services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2- LARGE INFRASTRUCTURES AND FACILITIES for agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery, and areas with high potential for these activities at national level.</td>
<td>Level 2- INDUSTRIAL, AGRO-INDUSTRIAL AND PRODUCTION UNITS (agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery…) located at provincial, district, and/or community level and small-scale local industries, including areas with high potential for these activities.</td>
<td>Level 3- ROUTES (paths, tracks, roads and bridges) used by people involved in selling means of production, marketing local production and providing services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3- ROUTES (paths, tracks, roads and bridges) used by people involved in selling means of production, marketing local production and providing services.</td>
<td>Level 1- LARGE COMMERCIAL AND TOURISM FACILITIES and areas with high potential for these activities at national level.</td>
<td>Level 2- IMPORTANT AREAS in terms of conservation and ecological use of wildlife and natural environment at the national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3- AREAS devoted to cultural, religious, RECREATIONAL and other activities where mine clearance may contribute to create or consolidate a climate of stability.</td>
<td>Level 2- IMPORTANT AREAS in terms of conservation and ecological use of wildlife and natural environment at the national level.</td>
<td>Level 3- AREAS devoted to cultural, religious, RECREATIONAL and other activities where mine clearance may contribute to create or consolidate a climate of stability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 6

- The area must be secure and free of fighting.
- The population will derive immediate economic or social benefits after the operations.
- The local authorities have jointly requested assistance.
- The local people are ready to provide security and material help where possible.
- Refugees are returning to the area.
- The area should be free of poppy cultivation or complying with UNDCP policies.

Criteria considered by the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) prior to undertaking survey or clearance operations (UNOCHA, 1998, p. 17).

| Priority One: | Agricultural land, roads, village, canals and other irrigation systems requested by UN agencies or other NGOs. The requesting agency must provide proof that funds are available for rehabilitation tasks to begin immediately, once the demining has been completed. The request has been received from the local council; the council must provide evidence that refugees or internal displaced residents will return to the area not more than one month after demining is completed. Areas where residents are frequently affected by mine incidents. |
| Priority Two: | Agricultural land, roads, village, canals and other irrigation systems requested by UN agencies or other NGOs where planned for operations have been completed but funds are not presently available. The request has been sent by the local council, where the return of refugees or displaced residents is unlikely to occur within 12 months. Grazing land in areas affected by frequent mine incidents and the main source of income (more than 40%) is from grazing. |
| Priority Three: | Areas requested by local council which will assist rehabilitation and repatriation in the medium term (1-2 years). Area where temporary alternatives have been found (e.g. roads, housing, irrigation, etc.) which will prove unsuitable in medium-to-long term. Grazing lands in areas where some income (10-40%) is gained from grazing. |
| Priority Four: | Areas requested by villagers or individuals where proof is given that other families (11 or more) will also benefit from clearance. Areas where permanent alternatives exist but clearance will strengthen the economic structure of the area. All grazing lands not covered under priorities two or three. |
| Priority Five: | All hillsides and mountains where the presence of mines does not affect the normal life of villagers. Areas where a low number of families (10 or less) will benefit from clearance. |

1. **Alleviation of human suffering** by clearing areas and providing mine awareness instruction in localities where mine incidents are taking place.

2. **Repatriation of refugees and resettlement of IDPs** through mine awareness instruction and the clearance of homes and settlement areas, and associated areas such as fields and irrigation systems required to support persons returning to their homes.

3. **Food Security**, through the clearance of agricultural and grazing land, with land type being selected based on social-economic returns.

4. **Rehabilitation and development programmes** as set forth in Common Programming and/or the UN P.E.A.C.E. initiative through clearance of land, buildings, roadways etc. as required to facilitate approved and funded projects.

5. **Poppy eradication**, through liaison with UNDCP in support of their strategies to provide alternative opportunities for income generation.

6. **Other activities** requiring mine action supported as articulated to RMACs and MACA.

General Prioritisation System, MAPA (UNOCHA, 2000, pp. 41–42).
### Appendix 7

Locality identifier: District: Community:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Weights</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The community reported that</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>there were mines.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>there was unexploded ordnance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>access to some irrigated crop land was blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some rainfed crop land was blocked.</td>
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<tr>
<td>access to some fixed pasture was blocked.</td>
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<tr>
<td>access to some migratory pasture was blocked.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some drinking water points was blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some water points for other uses was blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some non-cultivated area was blocked.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some housing area was blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some roads were blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some other infrastructure was blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some roads was blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to some other infrastructure was blocked.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subtotal for explosives realm: ____

Subtotal for socio-economic realm ____

there were ____ mine victims in the last 24 months. Multiply with 2 ____

Points for victims ____

Total mine impact score: ____

---

If the impact score is 0, rank the community as having 'no known mine problem’

If the score is between 1 and 5, the impact is considered to be 'Low’.

If the score is between 5 and 10, the impact is considered to be ‘Medium’

If the score is higher than 10, the impact is considered 'High’.

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**Example of LOIS score summation sheet**

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1 Aldo Benini, *The Global Landmine Level-1 Impact Survey and Socio-Economic Indicators*, Protocol Document no. 6 (Washington, Survey Action Center, 2000)
### Methodology (see chapter appendices)

#### Field visit period
- Case selection
- Access/Door-opener
- Staff (surveyors/translator)
- Constraints/practical difficulties

#### Data
- No. of survey respondents
- No. of primary respondents
- Qualifier questions

### Community background

- Village geographical composition (with maps)
- Population
- War history
- Mine problem history
- Minefield: size and location
- Mine-action operation

### Economic field

- Agriculture
  - Land
  - Land rights/ownership
  - Type of crops grown
  - Fruit trees
  - Irrigation
- Fishing
- Hunting
- Wood resources
- Animals
- Household water
- Diet
- Markets
- Transport
- Employment: formal
- Employment: day labour

### Human field

- Perceptions of security
- Injuries directly caused by mines
- Victim profiles
- Evacuation facilities

#### Surgical facilities

- Access to medical professionals
  - Access to health education
  - Most common diseases
  - Access to clean drinking water
  - Sanitation

#### Health

- Education
  - Educational infrastructure and materials
  - Teachers
  - Access to school during war
  - Access to higher education
  - Mine awareness in education
  - Attitudes to education
  - Literacy rates

### Social field

- Local institutions
  - Local leadership
  - Conflict resolution mechanisms
- Religion
  - Traditional practices
  - World religions
  - Link religion and health
  - Link religion and landmines
- Tradition of collective mobilization
  - Common resources
  - For private benefit
  - Generational mobilization
- Local solidarity
  - Social support
  - Economic support
- Information
  - Vital for household economy
  - Vital info on local economy
  - Vital info on current security
- Displacement
  - History of displacement
  - Repatriation
  - Current migration dynamics
  - Shift in community composition

### The HMA operation

- HMA operation
  - Description of operation
  - Resources
  - Project plans/objectives
  - Monitoring & Evaluation
  - Visions for follow up in HMA

#### Information and Analysis

- Data collection
- Prioritization process
- Attention to ‘unintended consequences’

### HMA Organization

- Organizational resources in operation
- Flexibility
- Staff background and origin
- Perceptions of community

### Community perception of operation

- Knowledge about operation
  - Confidence in operation
  - Economic importance
  - Value not related to mines

### HMA Components

- Demining
- Mine awareness
- Victim assistance
- Advocacy
- Coordination within HMA

### HMA in Context

- Emergency assistance
- Development assistance
- Coordination with other assistance
- Coordination with authorities

AMAC Community Studies: Plan of Inquiry

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Recent Sida Evaluations

00/37:1 Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peace Building. State of the Art/Annotated Bibliography. Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Finn Stepputat, Nicholas Van Hear. Department for Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations and Humanitarian Assistance


00/38 Fortalecimiento Institucional al Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos en Honduras. Defensa y Protección de los Derechos de la Mujer. Sonia Marlina Dubón. Department for Latin America

00/39 Programa de Capacitación en Economía para Funcionarios de la República de Cuba. José Antonio Cuba. Department for Latin America


00/41 Water and Environment Project in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Bastiaan de Laat, Erik Arnold, Philip Sowden. Department for Eastern and Central Europe

01/01 Rural Development and Democratisation in Russia and Estonia. An Evaluation of Sida's Support to the Three Projects in Russia and Estonia. Paul Dixelius, Camilla Grammer, Dan Hjalmarsson. Department for Eastern and Central Europe


01/05 Resource Centre for Panchayat Training and Democratic Processes. Nirmala Buch, Rukmini Rao. Asia Department

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Infocenter, Sida
S-105 25 Stockholm
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Fax: +46 (0) 8 690 92 66
info@sida.se

Sida, UTV, S-105 25 Stockholm
Phone: +46 (0) 8 698 51 63
Fax: +46 (0) 8 698 56 10
Homepage: http://www.sida.se