

Assessment of the Capacity Development Support to the National Mine Action Authority, South Sudan

Åsa Massleberg and Lona Lowilla | Juba | November 2012

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Assessment of the capacity development of the NMAA, South Sudan, GICHD, Geneva, November 2012

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
BAC	Battle Area Clearance
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CDSTA	Capacity Development Senior technical Advisor
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FSD	Swiss Federation for Demining
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MTI	Mine Tech International
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NTSG	National Technical Standards and Guidelines
QA	Quality Assurance
QC	Quality Control
QM	Quality Management
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SSMAA	South Sudan Mine Action Authority
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This assessment was mandated by South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012 - 2016, which was endorsed by the Office of the President. The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) submitted a formal request to the GICHD to carry out the assessment shortly after the National Mine Action Strategic Plan validation workshop was held in Juba in February 2012. NPA offered to pay for the assessment, and hired GICHD as a consultant to implement it.

The purpose of the assessment was two-fold: i) inform START and NPA's decisions regarding a continuation of the project; ii) contribute to improving the programme through documenting lessons learned and providing recommendations. The objective of the assessment was to ascertain results (output and outcome) and assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the project "capacity development of South Sudan Mine Action Authority", with a specific focus on the UNMAS driven transition plan, the START contribution and NPA's involvement in the Transition Team. The specific objective of the assessment was to (i) summarise achievements, experiences and lessons on what might have affected the implementation of the project; and (ii) provide recommendations regarding possible future project strategies and approaches.

It is widely recognised that South Sudan faces tremendous development and security challenges. The country experienced a sharp increase in violence shortly after independence, and the austerity measure that were introduced in January 2012, following South Sudan's shut-down of its oil production, have had detrimental impacts on the economy. The Government reduced the operating and capital budgets across spending agencies for the remaining of the 2011/2012 financial year.

The formal process of planning the transition from a UN-managed mine action programme to national ownership started with a transition workshop in Nairobi in 2008, with another five transition workshops until June 2011. The workshops resulted in transition plans that were aimed at guiding the transition planning and capacity development process. The 2011 transition plan (T6), is structured around the nine core responsibilities of the NMAA. It presents the level of national ownership, and specifies activities that need to be carried out to reach the next level of national ownership. It is divided into elements, corresponding to the areas of mine clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance.

Following the news that UNDP would stop its capacity development support to the NMAA, UNMAS initiated the idea of creating a transition team in 2010. The principal aim was to implement the transition plan and to carry out capacity development activities with NMAA. As of October 2012, the transition team comprised representatives from NPA, UNMAS and UNICEF.

NPA has a long history in South Sudan of working closely with the Government. NPA started its capacity development project with the NMAA in mid-2010. The Canadian Stabilisation and reconstruction Task Force (START)-supported NPA Capacity Development Project started on 1 November 2011 and will run until 31

January 2013, with a no-cost extension until 1 April 2013. As stated in the 2011 – 2013 proposal, the long term objective of the project is that the “SSDA has a functional and sustainable mine action centre that coordinates all mine action activities and stakeholders in South Sudan”. NPA has worked in the NMAA compound from the beginning of the capacity development activities, and has delivered many training courses to NMAA staff, mainly in the areas of information management and QA/operations, but also in areas related to support activities.

UNMAS started its activities in Sudan in early 2002, and has been acknowledged for its contributions to peace building, particularly in the early days. Numerous evaluations, however, have highlighted that there is room for considerable improvement in how UNMAS engages in capacity development. It is clear that capacity development, despite being included in the UN Security Council Resolution that mandates the UNMISS and UNMAS in South Sudan, and in the TOR of some UNMAS personnel, is not given much importance, and is generally not viewed as being part of “getting the job done”.

As of October 2012, more than one year after the main responsibilities were supposed to transition from UNMAS to NMAA, NMAA had taken the lead in MDD accreditation and QA, VA and MRE. Other main areas of the South Sudan mine action programme, such as information management, operational planning, prioritization, accreditation, tasking or QA/QC were under the responsibility of UNMAS, with only limited, if any, involvement of relevant NMAA personnel. South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012 – 2016 stipulates that South Sudan should be fully in charge of the conduct and coordination of the mine action programme by 2016. UNMAS collocating with the NMAA is by many seen as a precondition for NMAA being more involved in the various areas of the mine action programme.

The current institutional set-up of the NMAA, where there is no separation between the functions of the Authority and the MAC, is widely believed to be resulting in politicisation of ever-day operational work. Most respondents highlighted the need to separate the functions of the political Authority and the operational MAC, underlying that this separation corresponds to best practice in mine action, and that it is a key step in promoting an effective and efficient MAC. Despite these recommendations however, the NMAA structure remains without a separation, with no indications that the NMAA senior management acknowledges these recommendations, or is actively promoting a separation.

There is an evident lack of coordination between the transition team members (NPA, UNICEF and UNMAS), and the extent to which the transition plan is implemented is very low. NPA has played an important role in facilitating training activities, and while this is commendable it is challenging to determine the long-term impacts of these training courses. Better coordinated capacity development activities, a clear capacity development work-plan, more structured on-the-job trainings, and a stronger implementation of the transition plan would make all capacity development activities more efficient and effective.

While the austerity measures have clearly had an impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the capacity development activities, with no operational budget at the NMAA, many believe that a lack of commitment, on behalf of the GoSS, the NMAA and UNMAS represent the most critical impediment. While external actors can provide guidance, recommendations and support to the NMAA, the decision to commit and to effectively implement these recommendations is ultimately in the hands of the GoSS and the NMAA.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

In 2011 and 2012, the GICHD assisted with facilitating two workshops that resulted in South Sudan's first National Mine Action Strategic Plan¹. The first specific objective of the of the Mine Action Strategic Plan relates to the review of the role, responsibility and structures of the NMAA, in order to ensure the effective and efficient management of the mine action programme. One of the indicators for this specific objective is an *“assessment report with documented conclusions and recommendations.”*

The NMAA submitted a formal request to the GICHD to carry out the assessment shortly after the National Mine Action Strategic Plan validation workshop was held in Juba in February 2012. NPA offered to pay for the assessment, and hired GICHD as a consultant to implement it.

The assessment is therefore mandated by the National Mine Action Strategic Plan, endorsed by the Office of the President.

PURPOSE & OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the assessment was two-fold:

- i) inform START and NPA's decisions regarding a continuation of the project;
- ii) contribute to improving the programme through documenting lessons learned and providing recommendations.

The objective of the assessment was to ascertain results (output and outcome) and assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the project “capacity development of South Sudan Mine Action Authority”, with a specific focus on the UNMAS driven transition plan, the START contribution and NPA's involvement in the Transition Team

Specifically, the objective of the assessment was to (i) summarise achievements, experiences and lessons on what might have affected the implementation of the project; and (ii) provide recommendations regarding possible future project strategies and approaches.

Evaluation mandate

The assessment is mandated in South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012 – 2016, endorsed by the Office of the President.

Evaluation Questions

The assessment questions, as stated in the Terms of Reference, available in Annex 1, were the following:

¹ South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012 – 2016, http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-SouthSudan-2012-2016.pdf

Relevance

The relevance of the capacity development project objectives and the logic behind them given the situation and needs of the beneficiaries.

- Has the choice of focus areas for the capacity development project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?
- To what extent has the support from the Transition team been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs of the beneficiaries?
- Does the capacity development initiative strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or hinder them?
- What is the value added for NPA / START's involvement in supporting the capacity development of NMAA?

Efficiency

The efficiency with which the capacity development project is translated into activities including financial and human resources, management, and monitoring and evaluation.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the capacity development initiative in achieving the objectives set out, including choice of strategies and approaches.

Other issues that the assessment examined included:

- The sustainability of the support provided to the capacity development activities. Is the support provided institutionally and financially sustainable?
- Coverage – which beneficiaries and NMAA personnel groups have been included/excluded from capacity development initiative?
- Coordination – Has UNMAS coordinated the NMAA capacity development activities in an efficient and transparent way?

METHODOLOGY

Assessment phases

The assessment was structured around four distinct phases:

- Phase I: Inception phase, desk review of relevant documents, mapping of broader state building activities in South Sudan. National consultant executed a mapping exercise of broader state building initiatives in South Sudan.
- Phase II: Field visit to South Sudan for meetings with relevant stakeholders, including NPA, NMAA, UNMAS South Sudan, relevant ministries, international and national NGOs, etc. Debrief to main stakeholders of preliminary findings before departure.

Phase III: Assessment report writing and dissemination.

Phase IV: Presentation of results before the Transition Workshop 7 in Juba in November.

The assessment team comprised:

Name	Position	Role/Responsibilities
Ms. Åsa Massleberg	Advisor, Strategy, Transition and Development – GICHD	Evaluation Team Leader & lead re liaising with stakeholders and reporting
Ms. Lona Lowila	Director –Rising Dawn Consultant Firm South Sudan	National consultant

The assessment team organised a debriefing meeting with key staff from UNMAS, NMAA and NPA at the NMAA office in Juba on 12 October, presenting preliminary findings.

REPORT LAYOUT

This report is structured in the following way: The next chapter provides the context (history of conflict; the scope and nature of the mine/ERW contamination; relevant political, economic and social factors). This is followed by the main findings. The report presents main conclusions in relation to the assessment questions and evaluation criteria, and then concludes with recommendations, with specific sections targeting the GoSS, NMAA, NPA, STRT and UNMAS respectively. The standard annexes complete the report.

CONTEXT

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT AND MINE ACTION IN SOUTH SUDAN

THE SUDAN CIVIL WAR

Since Sudan's independence in 1965, the country only saw peace for a total of 11 years. Autonomy for the southern Sudan region was agreed through the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, putting an end to the first civil war (1955-1972). The agreement aimed to address concerns of the southern Sudan liberation movement. Despite relative calm over the next decade, tensions between southern Sudan and the central government in Khartoum remained. In 1983, led by Dr. John Garang, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebelled against the central government in Khartoum, initiating the second civil war (1983 – 2004). The signing of the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004 paved the way for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, putting an end to Africa's longest war.²

The Government of Sudan's (GoS) military, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the SPLA/M and other non-state actors used landmines/ERW throughout the civil wars. Landmine contamination can also be traced to World War II, when landmines were laid along the northern border with Libya. The second civil war was essentially a guerrilla conflict, with the GoS holding a few garrison towns, including Juba, Malakal and Wau, and surrounding outposts, while SPLA controlled much of the countryside in the south. The guerrilla warfare continued throughout the second civil war, with SAF and SPLA controlling various towns and areas of land, resulting in roads and communities along the frontlines becoming severely contaminated with landmines/ERW.

Anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines were used by both sides in a wide range of areas, including key roads, towns, rural communities, around water sources and across arable land. AT mines were mainly used on roads by SPLA/M to restrict the movements of GoS forces and to limit access to the towns. GoS used AP mines defensively to protect its garrison towns and to prohibit movement of SPLA/M forces. Upon the signing of the CPA, Sudan emerged as a country contaminated by landmines and ERW, making an impact on transport, socio-economic development rehabilitation and reconstruction, and hindering the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees to their home communities.

As of October 2012, there was a total of 1,281 landmine/ERW victims (458 men, 108 women, 121 boys, 34 girls, and 560 where age and sex was unknown) in South Sudan, and 3,359 landmines/ERW survivors (1,481 men, 224 women, 329 boys, 71 girls, and 1,254 where age and sex was unknown) in South Sudan.³

² While the CPA was signed in January 2005, the permanent ceasefire was signed in 2004. <http://www.un.org/chinese/ha/issue/sudan/docs/cpa-3.pdf>

³ IMSMA data received from Mohammed Kabir Mahimi, IMSMA Officer, UNMAS South Sudan on 17 November 2012

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

The second civil war between the SAF and the SPLA ended with the signing of the CPA⁴ between the GoS and the SPLA/M in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 2005. The signing was the result of more than two and a half years of negotiations between the SPLA/M and the ruling National Congress Party. The CPA provided for an initial pre-interim period of six months, followed by an interim period of six years. The interim arrangement set out that the single state of Sudan should be ruled by the Government of National Unity, and the semi-autonomous government of southern Sudan (GOSS). This interim arrangement was often referred to as the “one state two system approach”.

Key milestones during the interim period included the 2009 democratic elections, and the January 2011 referendum.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY

Acting upon Article 58 (1) of the Interim Constitution of 2005, and Chapter VI of the CPA, and following Sudan’s decree ratifying *the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction* (in short, the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)), Sudan’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established through *Presidential Decree No. 299* in December 2005.⁵

Officially launched in March 2006, the NMAA comprised a national mine action committee, a general secretariat, a national mine action centre, and a southern Sudan regional mine action centre (RMAC). The decree set out the structure of the authority, and the structures, authorities and responsibilities of the NMAC located in Khartoum and the RMAC based in Juba. The RMAC changed its name to the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) through GOSS’s *Presidential Decree No. 45* in June 2006.⁶ The president of southern Sudan, General Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed the appointment of a chair person, a deputy chairperson and three executive members. The decree mandated the SSDA to formulate and implement plans for clearance activities, and urged it to cooperate and collaborate with relevant national and international institutions that had expertise in the field, while working closely with the SPLA and the SAF.

THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

The SPLM/A signed Geneva Call’s *Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action* in 2001. Building on this initial commitment, South Sudan expressed a keen interest to succeed to the APMBC shortly after its independence, and became the 158th state party to

⁴ <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf>

⁵ *Presidential Decree No. 299* (2005), <http://www.sudan-map.org/DocDownload/Program/FormationoftheNationalMineActionAuthorityNMAA.pdf>

⁶ *GoSS Presidential Decree No. 45/2006*, 27 June 2006, <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPAper cent20Monitor/Annexes/Annexper cent2044per cent20-per cent20GoSSper cent20Commissioners.pdf>

the convention on 11 November 2011, after depositing its notification of succession to the APMBC. The APMBC came into effect on 9 July 2012, the day of South Sudan's independence. Given that the Convention entered into force for South Sudan on the day of independence - 9 July 2011 - South Sudan's deadline for destroying or ensuring the destruction of all emplaced anti-personnel mines is 9 July 2021. The deadline for destroying or ensuring the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines is 9 July 2015. At the 2011 Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, South Sudan reported that, while it did not possess any stockpiled anti-personnel mines, it had discovered stocks of mines after succession in former Sudanese armed forces camps. South Sudan further reported that it would destroy these mines in 2012.⁷

THE 2011 INDEPENDENCE AND BEYOND

The independence of South Sudan

As per clause 2.5 of the CPA, an internationally monitored referendum, organised jointly by the GoS and the SPLA/M provided the women and men of southern Sudan with the opportunity to either confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the CPA or to vote for secession. The referendum took place as scheduled on 9 January 2011, and the results that were published on 7 February 2011 showed that an overwhelming majority (98.83 per cent) voted in favour of secession. The vote for secession and the subsequent independence of South Sudan, declared on 9 July 2011, effectively terminated the interim arrangements, agreed to by the NCP and the SPLA/M through the signing of the CPA.

Post-independence insecurity

South Sudan experienced a sharp increase in violence shortly after independence. Much of the post-independence violence is rooted in the CPA not comprehensively determining future relations between Sudan and South Sudan, and it not being fully agreed on, and implemented by, the two parties prior to independence. Escalating violence on both sides of the border has been fuelled by the failure to hold a referendum on the status of Abyei, the disputed conduct of popular consultations on the future status of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and the failure to agree and demarcate all of the border between South Sudan and Sudan. The dissolution of the Joint Integrated Units of the two countries' armed forces has also contributed to the rebellions in each country. Failure to agree transit fees for South Sudanese oil through Sudan has inflamed bilateral relations and prompted the suspension of South Sudanese oil production in January 2012, with potentially drastic consequences for Juba's revenues and access to credit and development aid. An intermittent blockade of cross-border trade with Sudan and the simultaneous mass return of several hundred thousand persons of South Sudanese origin have also strongly affected economic conditions, particularly in the South's northern states. Resurgence of violence in Jonglei state resulted in humanitarian emergencies, with significant displacements of civilians and many deaths.

⁷ <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/south-sudan/>

A recent report from the UK-based organisation International Alert (IA) highlights that most violence in South Sudan in 2011–2012 appears to be related to deeper problems of lack of governance, security and rule of law, as well as poor economic opportunities.⁸ Most of the recent violence has been connected to cattle, but the dynamic evolved further towards escalating cycles of inter-communal violence and the deliberate targeting of civilians. Rebel militia activity increased after independence, predominantly confined to the areas of Greater Upper Nile.

Textbox 1: Seven processes anticipated to impact on the consolidation of peace⁹

Seven Processes Anticipated to Impact on the Consolidation of Peace

- Relations with Sudan and the negotiation of outstanding CPA issues;
- Austerity and the maintenance of patronage-based governance and security structures until oil exports can be resumed, especially within a context of acute humanitarian need and food insecurity;
- Revision of the constitution to facilitate more or less inclusive governance and the nature of political decentralisation;
- National elections (date undecided) and the choice of a ruling party presidential candidate at the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) convention in 2013;
- Natural resource extraction, including the resumption and maintenance of oil production, landholding and the licensing of mineral and agricultural concessions;
- Renewed disarmament, starting in 2012, on either a consensual or coercive model;
- The degree of political stability or instability – including potential or regime change – in Sudan, which could have positive or negative consequences for long-term relations.

Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan escalated in March and April 2012 when heavy fighting broke out in Heglig, a border town in the disputed oil-producing region of Abyei, Unity state. The situation worsened on 10 April, when SPLA seized the Heglig oil hub, before withdrawing upon an order from President Salva Kiir on 20 April. The Heglig violence is the closest Sudan and South Sudan have come to an open conflict since independence.

Austerity measures

Following GoSS' accusations that Sudan was stealing oil from South Sudan, GoSS suspended all its oil production in January 2012. Oil revenues reportedly accounted for 98 per cent of South Sudan's public expenditure and 99 per cent of its foreign currency export earnings.¹⁰

⁸ International Alert, *Peace and Conflict Assessment of South Sudan, 2012*, <http://www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/peace-and-conflict-assessment-south-sudan-2012>

⁹ International Alert, *ibid.*

¹⁰ Report presented by the Minister of Finance to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, 2012

The social impacts of the oil shutdown are expected to revert to 2004 (wartime) levels by 2013 – essentially erasing peacetime improvements in the standard of living in South Sudan. Following the suspension of oil production, the Council of Minister approved an initial set of austerity measures on 17 February 2012. These recommended a reduction in the operating and capital budget by 50 per cent for most agencies and state transfer were cut by 10 per cent.¹¹ This level is where the service delivery is mostly needed and consumed by the population.

The Government also reduced the operating and capital budgets across spending agencies for the remaining of the 2011/2012 financial year. These cuts were not the same across the government agencies. For example the budget for the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation was marinated at 100 per cent in recognition of contractual commitment, while the Ministry of Defence budget was reduced by 10 per cent. The budgets for the ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture, Petroleum and Mining were cut by 20 per cent, the South Sudan Reconstruction and Development by 85 per cent while other spending agencies were reduced by 54 per cent.

In addition, the Government significantly reduced staff salaries, maintaining the portion of salaries below South Sudan Pounds (SSP) SSP 500 with no reduction, reducing the next SSP 1,000 of monthly salary by 10 per cent, the portion of salaries between SSP 1,500 and SSP 2,500 by 25 per cent and any payment over 2,500 by 50 per cent.¹²

The above issues are coupled with weak government institutions and rule of law, high levels of corruption , lack of physical infrastructure, limited access to land, and a lack of input and output markets, and of skilled workers and well-educated managers. A large-scale corruption scandal became official in June 2012, after President Salva Kiir publicly accused officials of stealing at least USD 4 billion from state resources. The President issued letters to 75 current and former senior government employees, asking for the unaccounted money to be returned. Since the President issued the letter in May, a total of USD 60 million had reportedly been returned. More than USD 2 billion went missing in a well-publicised scandal involving the staple crop sorghum - in which bogus companies were paid by government but never delivered the grain.¹³ Many fear that corruption at this level has seriously jeopardised the credibility of the GoSS among the international community.

¹¹ The Minister of Finance and planning in an interview with the press in September 2012

¹² The report of the Minister for Finance and Planning to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, Feb, 2012

¹³ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18326004>

FINDINGS

TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

THE TRANSITION PLANNING PROCESS

The process of transitioning mine action responsibilities from UNMAS to national ownership started in late 2007. This was in response to the updated 2006 *Mine Action Strategic Framework's* strategic goal no. 6, to develop and implement a transitional plan in order to facilitate the transition of mine action management from the UN to national authorities. UNMAS took the lead in organising a series of six transition workshops from late 2007 to 2011.

Transition workshops and plans

The fifth transition workshop in May 2010, resulted in the fifth transition plan¹⁴, which presented nine core management responsibilities of the NMAA:

1. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action.
2. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities.
3. Revise the NTSGs according to in-country needs and conditions to which all concerned are obliged to adhere.
4. Manage the quality of all mine action activities.
5. Accredite mine action organisations in accordance with NTSGs, prior to authorisation of mine action activities.
6. Maintain the integrity of IMSMA.
7. Mobilise necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve mine action strategic goals.
8. Ensure that Sudan honours its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty and other relevant treaties.
9. Plan, coordinate and manage all aspects of support service elements of a mine action programme.

The fifth transition plan was divided into the above mentioned nine core management responsibilities of the Sudan mine action programme. These responsibilities were referred to as “elements”, which were subdivided into components; each of the elements was divided into a common structure, outlined and described; then an end-state for that specific component was presented.

The report presented five levels of national ownership for each component, with level 0 corresponding to no national capacity to carry out responsibilities, and level 4 corresponding to the highest level of national

¹⁴ Sudan Mine Action Programme, Transition Plan for Sudan, February 2011, southern Sudan; <http://www.sudan-map.org/DocDownload/Program/TransitionPlanSOUTHFeb2011public.pdf>, northern Sudan; <http://www.sudan-map.org/DocDownload/Program/TransitionPlanNORTHFeb2011public.pdf>

ownership. The reader could also see at which level of national ownership the MAP was set in 2008, and which level it was believed the programme had reached in 2010.

The sixth transition workshop (T6) was held in Juba in June 2011. Following the independence of South Sudan, the workshop focused exclusively on the transition process in South Sudan, and brought together representatives from GoSS, the UN, NGO partners and other stakeholders.

Review discussions during the T6 revealed that SSDA's levels of national ownership, as agreed upon during the T5 workshop, far from accurately reflected the reality on the ground. One key reason for this discrepancy could be traced to the fact that the general level of capacity was considerably higher in the north compared to the south, explained in part by higher levels of education, more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly, considerably lower impacts of the war on all levels of society. The high levels of national ownership agreed on during the T5 could therefore have been a result of representatives from southern Sudan feeling intimidated in comparison with their northern counterparts.

A fundamental problem related to the transition plans is that the pre-T6 transition plans were politically driven by the "one country approach", portraying levels of national ownership that did not reflect the reality. The majority of the respondents reported that the transition plan is not a useful document. NPA is the only organisation that informed it uses the plan to guide its activities.

Key problems related to the transition plan include:

- the plan does not have any concrete, smart action points
- it does not have any "accountable" activities
- there are no indicators of the different levels of national ownership (level 0 - lowest to level 4 - highest), resulting in varying and highly subjective interpretations of the different levels.
- the lack of a realistic work plan accompanying it (apart from NPA's work-plan) has resulted in a low level of implementation of the transition plan

The seventh transition workshop was organised in Juba in November 2012. Significant improvements were identified in the areas of MRE and VA, where the level of national ownership had been strengthened in many components. Representatives from all main partners agreed these improvements were results of UNMAS national MRE and VA personnel collocating with NMAA. Their collocation had facilitated improved information sharing and on-the-job trainings.

THE TRANSITION TEAM

Following the news that UNDP would stop its capacity development support to the NMAA, UNMAS initiated the idea of creating a transition team in 2010. The principal aim was to implement the transition plan and to carry out capacity development activities with NMAA.

As from mid-2010, two staff members from the UNMAO team were directly involved in capacity development: one UNDP UN volunteer (UNV) who was permanently located at the NMAA premises, and one UNMAS technical advisor, who spent considerable time working with NMAA's senior management team. Together with the NPA capacity development team, these staff members represented the transition team. Key responsibilities and activities were agreed upon by the transition team members. It was further decided which key external partners the various transition team members were responsible for, and each transition team member was assigned a SSDA counterpart. The UNDP stopped its involvement in mine action in South Sudan in mid-2011, stating that mine action was no longer a UNDP priority in South Sudan.

As of October 2012, the transition team, in theory, comprised representatives from NPA, UNMAS and UNICEF. While the transition team met on a regular basis, and had clear roles, responsibilities and plans in 2010, the situation in October 2012 was very different. There was a gap of several months between the previous UNMAS Capacity Development Technical Advisor and the present one. The extent to which the transition team members actually form a team is questionable. It appears that UNICEF does not play an active role in the capacity development of the NMAA any-longer. UNICEF staff reportedly rarely attend the monthly coordination meetings held at the NMAA. While UNMAS and NPA personnel share information on a regular basis, there is no consolidated work plan that guides the team's capacity development activities. Also, the lack of structured meetings has resulted in poor coordination of activities, and weak implementation of the transition plan. While it is clear that all transition team members accept and understand that it is UNMAS' role to coordinate the transition team, the extent to which this happens appears to be very low.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

NPA started its operations in southern Sudan in 1986, with a focus on food security, health care, and general development of local communities. NPA established its mine action programme in Yei, South Sudan in March 2004, implementing clearance and survey activities.¹⁵

NPA is the NGO that has been the most heavily involved in capacity development activities with the NMAA, and it also has a long history of close support to the SPLM. NPA and UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding, subsequent to which two NPA staff members initiated the capacity development project in 2010. NPA set up a container in the NMAA compound, to promote a close working relationship with the NMAA. NPA initially started with one expatriate capacity development advisor, one expatriate IM staff, and three national staff. Upon the request of NMAA, UNMAS and UNDP, NPA organised a number of training courses during this first phase, including manual demining, EOD level 2 and 3, operations/QA, and mine action introduction to senior NMAA personnel. Upon a request from UNMAO and UNDP, NPA succeeded in organising the first ever EOD level 3 course in South Sudan in 2010.

¹⁵ NPA, Mine Action Portfolio 2010 – 2011

NPA has also organised mine detection dog (MDD) trainings at the training centre in Ethiopia. These courses have resulted in NMAA taking the lead in MDD accreditation and QA processes.

In late 2010 – early 2011, NPA conducted a survey in collaboration with UNMAS, looking into training needs and on-the-job training requirements at the NMAA. Since then, NPA has based its activities on the findings of this survey. Both UNMAS and NMAA highlighted the need for training courses. One lesson learnt, stressed by the NPA project manager himself, is that a more thorough needs assessment should have been carried out, prior to the identification of the three focus areas.

The Canadian Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START)-supported NPA Capacity Development Project started on 1 November 2011 and will run until 31 January 2013, with a no-cost extension until 1 April 2013.

As of October 2012, the NPA project had a total of seven staff: 1 project manager, 1 operations advisor, 1 Support officer, 1 administrator, 1 support function training officer, 1 IMSMA officer and 1 regional information management advisor. Three of the seven staff are female.

As stated in the 2011 – 2013 proposal, the long term objective of this project is that the “SSDA has a functional and sustainable mine action centre that coordinates all mine action activities and stakeholders in South Sudan”. The target group for the project is stated as:

- Administrative and support staff
- QA and operational staff
- IM staff

The proposal further states that the transition team coordinated capacity development activities aim to “correspond directly to crucial institutional functions of the national mine action authority as identified in the Transition Plan and as part of the collaborative efforts of the Transition Team”.¹⁶ During the second phase, NPA is focusing its activities in the following areas:

1. Institutional capacity building
2. QA/operations management
3. IM and IMSMA and MAC

NPA further stated that it plans to “incorporate a training session for the “students” and SSDA staff which will cover the following topics: gender in Mine Action, Sexual harassment and Anti-Corruption awareness. This training will be held in collaboration with staff from NPA, UNDP and MAG.”

NPA anticipates that the project will result in the following outcomes:

¹⁶ NPA, Information Document; NPA’s support to the capacity development of Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority, March 2011

- Enhanced skills, knowledge and capacity of the NMAA to meet the Transition Plan's targets in order to assume a mine action coordination role in South Sudan.
- The transfer of instrumental skills and knowledge, across several key functional areas, resulting in a Government institution capable of effective mine action coordination with reduced international technical assistance
- A government institution fully functional, structured with relevance to South Sudan's mine action context, and sustainable without or with very limited international assistance

NPA has succeeded in delivering an impressive number of training courses for NMAA personnel. A summary of all training courses carried out by NPA during the START project can be found in Annex 3. Apart from formal training courses, NPA has also organised multi-day field missions with NMAA personnel, to Jonglei State in 2010 and to Unity State in 2011 and 2012. NPA has further facilitated recce QA visits with NMAA staff in Wau, Juba and Yei.

In relation to sustainability, NPA underlined the following in the proposal: *"the possibility that the transition team's recommendations to the SSDA are not followed must be acknowledged. Efforts have been made in the past that have not been successful; discontinuation of the programme must be an option if progress is not being made. The fulfilment of the goals in the transition plan will be indicative of measuring performance."*

UNMAS

The UN document *Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy of June 2005*¹⁷ specifies that UNMAS - a division of the Department for Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) – is the focal point for mine action in the UN system. The policy further sets out that in specific peacekeeping, complex emergency and rapid response settings, UNMAS can establish and manage mine action coordination centres. In relation to capacity development, UNMAS is mandated to coordinate the planning for the transfer of programme management responsibilities to national authorities, and, in cooperation with other UN mine action team members, advise governments on the development of mine action institutions and legislation as well as to assist in developing capacity and institution building plans.

UNMAS started its activities in Sudan in early 2002, when it, upon requests from the GoS and the UN in Sudan established the emergency mine action programme; "Information Management and Coordination for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan."¹⁸

The UN Inter-agency Policy highlights various issues in relation to assistance to mine-affected states and national ownership in its "common positions" section.¹⁹ Paragraph 16 notes: *"To ensure the most effective*

¹⁷ Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy", June 2005, http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MAEC_8_2_6_%20final%20PDF.pdf

¹⁸ United Nations emergency mine action project in Sudan, www. http://www.mineaction.org/docs/608_.asp,

and appropriate response to the landmine threat, United Nations mine action activities promote national ownership, institution-building and capacity development, and are contingent on adherence to the core requirements of the IMAS...” Paragraph 18 highlights that “in certain exceptional circumstances, it may be appropriate for the United Nations to assume some or all of the responsibilities, normally undertaken by a national mine action authority”. Paragraph 63 further notes that in programmes managed by the UN, the UN “Coordinates development of a plan, in collaboration with national and UN partners, establishing the milestones to be reached before management of the programmes is transferred to national authorities”. Paragraph 64 is dedicated entirely to the transition process:

*“Where the United Nations has been managing a programme on behalf of a national or local authority, the United Nations encourages or assists the government to develop a plan to transfer responsibility for the programme to the national authorities, based on the attainment of agreed milestones as part of a single and integrated strategy. The transfer process will normally be implemented as a phased activity, as capacity is developed within the national and local structures. The process will culminate when appropriate capabilities exist within these structures, and the formal handover of remaining responsibilities will be completed...”*²⁰

The 2006 version of the *Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework*²¹, signed by the GoS, SPLM and the UN stated that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country approach.” This was based on CPA’s “one country, two systems approach”, essentially meaning unified national coordination, planning and implementation across the country. This approach came to influence the transition planning process to a large extent until South Sudan gained its independence in July 2011.

The signing of the CPA, and the subsequent influx of donor money, mainly through the DPKO Assessed Budget²², resulted in a substantial expansion of mine action operations in Sudan. From its inception in 2003, the Sudan mine action programme expanded to be the world’s second largest mine action programme (after Afghanistan), with an annual budget of USD 70 million in 2011.²³

The UNSCR 1996 of 8 July 2011 defines the mandate of the UN in supporting the republic of South Sudan in mine action activities, and in building the capacities of the NMAA²⁴. The resolution authorised the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to perform the following tasks: “Supporting the Government of the

¹⁹ Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy”, June 2000

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, June 2006, <http://www.sudan-map.org/DocDownload/Program/SudanNationalMineActionPolicyFrameworkJune06English.pdf>

²² The assessed budget of UN DPKO missions are determined by UN Security Council Resolutions and are to cover the costs of core peacekeeping functions, but do not cover all the costs within peacekeeping mandates. In Sudan, the UN assessed budget was used for mine action activities in support of the UNMIS peacekeeping forces and humanitarian assistance. Funding from the voluntary trust fund (VTF) has been used for demining in support of humanitarian assistance, including for mine risk education and victim assistance, http://www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=who_pays_for_it

²³ UNMAO Profile 16 June 2011, <http://sudan-map.org/OLD/DocDownload/Program/UNMAOprofileJune2011.pdf>

²⁴ UNSCR 1996 (2011), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sudan%20SRES%201996.pdf>

Republic of South Sudan in conducting demining activities within available resources and strengthening the capacity of the republic of South Sudan Demining Authority to conduct mine action in accordance with International Mine Action Standards.” This new mandate resulted in the mine action office changing its name from UNMAO to the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) on 1 September 2011. The name was changed again in July 2012 to UNMAS South Sudan.

The UNSCR 2057 of 5 July 2012 extended the UNMISS mandate until 15 July 2013.²⁵ The UN Council kept the mandate unchanged, and recalls the presidential Statement of 11 February 2011 that affirmed that national ownership and national responsibility are key to establishing sustainable peace and the primary responsibility of national authorities in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peace building. Of particular note is that article 27 of the UNSCR 2057 states the following:

“Requests the Secretary-General, in particular, to utilize to the greatest extent possible opportunities for co-location of appropriate mission components with the Republic of South Sudan counterparts in the interest of building national capacity; and to seek opportunities to deliver early peace dividends by utilizing local procurement and otherwise enhancing, to the extent possible, UNMISS’s contribution to the economy;”

UNMAS has identified the following priorities for mine action:

- Opening of primary and secondary routes suspected of having been re-mined for humanitarian assistance activities and the safe return of IDPs and refugees
- Survey, Marking and targeted clearance of landmines and ERW
- Mine Risk Education (MRE), especially for IDPs and refugees; Landmine/ERW victims need assessment and victims assistance
- Capacity building and transition to national authorities.

The UNMAS strategic goals include²⁶:

1. Continue to undertake emergency mine and ERW clearance and survey operations in high-priority areas jointly determined by the national authorities and the UN.
2. Continue to prioritise Mine Risk Education for at-risk communities.
3. Through Survey on the impacts of landmines, identify, register and prepare maps of areas suspected of landmine contamination in order to determine the full effects on communities.
4. Strengthen existing national capacities to ensure the physical, psychosocial, and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of mine and ERW victims and survivors.
5. Strengthen the existing national mine action institutional framework to be able to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor all aspects of mine action.

²⁵ UNSCR 2057 (2012), <https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10701.doc.htm>

²⁶ <http://www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=203>

6. Develop and implement a transitional plan to facilitate the transition of mine action management from the UN to the national mine action authorities.
7. Expand existing national operational capacities in the mine action surveys, mine and ERW clearance, Mine Risk Education and victim assistance.
8. Ensure that South Sudan honours its obligations under the anti-personnel mine ban treaty and other relevant treaties.

As of October 2012, UNMAS had a total of 72 staff members in South Sudan. 66 men (44 national staff and 22 expatriate) and six women (three national and three expatriate). A P4 Capacity Development Senior Technical Advisor (CDTA) started working with UNMAS in September 2011, continuing the work that was initiated by the P3 Technical Advisor who left in mid-2011. The CDTA took on the additional role as Deputy Programme Manager around mid-2012, something that has been criticised by a number of UNMAS staff, as they are concerned the added responsibilities related to this role will divert the CDTA from key responsibilities and tasks related to capacity development.

UNMAS has been praised for its impressive clearance outputs and for enabling the transportation of humanitarian assistance on verified, safe roads rather than by air, saving millions of dollars. The opening of key routes also facilitated the safe resettlement of IDP and refugee returnees. A 2008 evaluation of EC – funded mine action programmes in Africa concluded that,

“... in spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit infrastructure, and the modest level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives contamination, UN MA Service (UN and its partners) have done an excellent job in establishing mine action operations and coordinating these through UNMAO”.²⁷

A 2007 external evaluation of the Sudan mine action programme concluded that the biggest weakness in the programme was capacity development. Likewise, 2010 multi-donor evaluation²⁸ of support to conflict prevention and peace building activities in Southern Sudan underlined the following:

“Where criticism seems warranted, it is in the role of UNMAO in developing a transitional strategy to hand over mandate and responsibilities to the Southern Sudan Demining Commission and national authorities after 2011. ...overall management of the sector by UNMAO has been generally highly regarded. But efforts to coordinate with GoSS and the SSDC as well as the other commissions were less successful and have not generated the expected results”.²⁹

²⁷ Paterson, T et al.(2008) *Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in Africa*, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Commissioned by the EU

²⁸ Bennett, J. S., Pantuliano, W., Fenton, A., Vaux, C., and Brusset, E., (2010) *Aiding the Peace: A Mutli-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005 – 2010*, ITAD Ltd., UK, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/40/46895095.pdf>

²⁹ *Ibid.*

It is clear that capacity development, despite being included in the UN Inter-Agency Policy, the UNSCRs that mandate the UNMISS and UNMAS in South Sudan, and in the TOR of some UNMAS personnel, is generally not viewed as being part of “getting the job done”. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities for capacity development activities resulted in few personnel “volunteering” to involve relevant NMAA personnel in their work. One evaluation of UNDP’s capacity development project has highlighted doubts as to whether UNMAS personnel have the necessary skills and aptitudes to train and mentor national counterparts in the first place.³⁰ There is a widespread view that UNMAS as an institution does not prioritise capacity development, despite the fact that it is part of its mandate in South Sudan. The UNMAS CDTA reportedly submitted a number of capacity development proposals, using funds from the assessed budget, but none of these were approved by UNMAS senior management. While there were budget lines for specific activities such as the development of the national mine action strategy and transition workshops, the CDTA has no budget to carry out capacity development activities with the NMAA, something that was highlighted as a key challenge. There are evident confusions related to what the assessed budget can be used for.

The following issues are key issues that impede the UNMAS capacity development activities:

- lack of coordination
- lack of sense of ownership of transition/capacity development activities by UNMAS personnel
- lack of concrete capacity development work-plan (specifying who, what, when, how, why)
- capacity development frequently viewed as something “outside of the main responsibilities”
- despite talk of collocation for years, none of the UNMAS expatriate staff were fully collocated at the NMAA office as of October 2012. The CDTA has had an office at the NMAA office since September 2011, but highlighted that he is not in a position to spend more time at the NMAA due to other responsibilities. Two national UNMAS staff members from the MRE/VA departments were permanently collocated at the NMAA as of October 2012. As mentioned above, key challenges that previously represented main reasons not to collocate, such as lack of electricity and internet were resolved in September 2012, so it is unclear what the main reasons for UNMAS not collocating now are
- structured and monitored on-the-job training is lacking

THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY

The NMAA, UNMAS, NPA, UNICEF and other main mine action stakeholders have agreed that the key responsibilities that should be transferred to the NMAA include the following:³¹

³⁰ Paterson, T, et al, *ibid*.

³¹ The Republic of South Sudan, *South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012 – 2016*, http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-SouthSudan-2012-2016.pdf

- planning, coordinating, monitoring and overseeing all aspects of mine action
- prioritising, tasking and authorising all mine action activities,
- revising the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG),
- managing the quality of all mine action activities,
- accrediting mine action organisations in accordance with NTSG,
- maintaining the integrity of IMSMA,
- mobilising necessary funds from national and international sources,
- ensuring that South Sudan honours its obligations under the relevant conventions,
- planning, coordinating and managing all aspects of support service elements of a mine action programme

As of October 2012, more than one year after the main responsibilities were supposed to be taken over by the NMAA, NMAA had taken the lead in MDD accreditation and QA, VA and MRE. Other main areas of the South Sudan mine action programme, such as information management, operational planning, prioritization, accreditation, tasking or QA/QC were under the responsibility of UNMAS, with only limited, if any, involvement of relevant NMAA personnel. South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012 – 2016 stipulates that South Sudan should be fully in charge of the conduct and coordination of the mine action programme by 2016.

The fact that UNMAS is not collocated at the NMAA is widely recognised as a key impediment to effective capacity development, as there are few opportunities for practical on-the job training and mentoring related to operational planning and information management.

The current institutional set-up of the NMAA, where there is no separation between the functions of the political Authority and the operational MAC, is widely regarded as a key detriment to any support to be sustainable, as it results in politicisation of ever-day operational work. This was highlighted by NMAA personnel, operators, NPA and UNMAS.

NPA has, from the beginning of its capacity development activities in 2010, highlighted the need to separate the functions of the Authority and the MAC, underlying that this separation corresponds to best practice in mine action, and that it is a key step in promoting an effective and efficient MAC, where every-day operational work is not affected by political influences. Likewise, UNMAS has on numerous occasions highlighted the benefits of separating the Authority and the MAC. This recommendation is also reflected in a number of evaluations and reports implemented in South Sudan from 2007 to 2011 and corresponds to best practices and the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), *IMAS 02.10 Guide to the establishment of a*

mine action programme.³² Despite these recommendations however, the NMAA structure remains without a separation. There are further no indications that the NMAA senior management acknowledges these recommendations, or is actively promoting a separation.

Respondents pointed out that many of the key challenges at the NMAA relate to the senior management, the working environment and structural issues, and include the following:

- roles and responsibilities of the NMAA executive members and political appointees are not clear to other NMAA personnel and external stakeholders (NPA, UNMAS and operators)
- many believe that “wrong individuals are in wrong positions” at the NMAA
- lack of leadership and guidance
- lack of internal coordination and information sharing
- lack of financial transparency within the NMAA (regional offices and specific departments highlighted that they are usually not aware of the exact budgets)
- lack of initiative –many international operators highlighted that they would be happy to assist, but are rarely asked and consulted
- poor insight into operational activities (international operators highlighted coordination meetings as clear examples, when NMAA often accuses operators of not clearing certain regional areas, when in fact they have been operating there for many seasons)
- poor assistance provided to international actors with national staff labour issues³³
- the NMAA provides limited, if any, added value during the monthly coordination meetings that are co-chaired by UNMAS and NMAA³⁴
- lack of incentive and motivation among NMAA personnel
- challenges to retain qualified personnel

The high turnover of personnel is in part due to decisions made by GoSS related to relocation of staff. Frequently, however, it appears that issues related to the NMAA itself, such as lack of leadership and guidance result in a dispiriting working environment.

³² IMAS 02.10 *Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme*, 2nd edition, January 2003, http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MAS/documents/imas-international-standards/english/series-02/IMAS-02-10-Ed1-Am1.pdf

³³ Two international HMA operators reported that NMAA, rather than helping to solve national staff labour issues (relating to contractual issues), has “fuelled” conflicts. These two operators are now facing court cases, despite following all the correct procedures, according to the South Sudan Labour Law.

³⁴ UNMAS reported that it has made several attempts to “hand over” the responsibility of running these meetings, but that the NMAA senior management always “hands it back.” One of the key achievements in relation to monthly coordination meetings is that the NMAA is now fully in charge of sending out meeting invitations to the various mine action organisations.

As of November 2012, NMAA had a total of 91 staff members. It was not possible to obtain this data disaggregated by sex, and it was also not possible to get an updated version of the organogram. All NMAA personnel were paid by GoSS, and the operational and running costs were, until the austerity measures in early 2012, paid by GoSS. This is commendable, since it is unusual that NMAA personnel are fully funded by the Government budget. The number of staff can be scrutinised, and the efficient use of all the 91 staff can be questioned. As stated, earlier, NPA has since mid-2012 bought a generator and a V-SAT, and was paying for the fuel to run the generator.

NMAA Regional offices

The NMAA has three sub-regional offices, located in Malakal in Upper Nile State, Yei in Central Equatoria State, and in Wau in Western Bhar El- Ghazal State. Most respondents noted that the capacity in these three sub-offices is very low, and that the offices are severely under-resourced in terms of staff and equipment.

A team of five NPA personnel conducted an assessment to Wau and Malakal in February 2012. The main challenges highlighted by the Wau personnel then were essentially the same as in October 2012.³⁵

NMAA Wau regional office

One member of the assessment team visited the Wau regional office, and had the chance to meet with four staff members, including the regional coordinator.³⁶ The Wau office clearly lacks even the most basic resources, that would enable it to function as a regional office.³⁷ UNMAS provided funding to refurbish the Wau office, changing the windows, painting the walls, etc., with the plan that UNMAS will collocate once the VSAT and generator have arrived, as there presently is no electricity at the Wau office. The main challenges highlighted by the Wau personnel include no operational budget, and a lack of on-the-job training.

Malakal regional office

Unfortunately, the assessment team did not have the chance to travel to the Malakal regional office, or obtain any information from personnel.

³⁵ NPA Capacity Building Project. South Sudan Mine Action Authority. Field visit to regional office, Greater Bahr el Ghazal, February 2012. NPA proposed the following actions:

1. A computerized reporting system should be introduced in order to enable the management to plan appropriately and on time;
2. The Adm/Finance staff member should attend Administration training course;
3. The SSMAA Director of Adm/Finance should provide updated financial books to the regional offices;
4. Maintenance and a redecoration of the regional Office is needed in order to give a proper image of the institutional entity;
5. The office space should be reorganized;
6. Organize-office management on-job-training and provide new filing cabinet;
7. Communication policy should be developed.

³⁶ The plan was also to visit the Malakal and Yei regional offices, but due to cancellation of flights to Malakal, that trip was cancelled. One member from the assessment team met with two staff members from the Yei regional office in Juba.

³⁷ Photos from the Wau office are available in annex 4.

Yei regional office

Though the assessment team did not have the opportunity to travel to Yei as planned, a meeting with two staff members from the Yei regional office was organised in Juba. It is evident that the situation in Yei is in sharp contrast to those in Malakla and Wau, as NPA provides the NMAA with the office facilities inside the NPA compound. The office therefore has regular electricity and internet.

The key challenge highlighted by the Yei personnel is the lack of operational budget and fuel for their vehicles. They also lack computers. UNMAS provides them with DSA (paid out of the UNMAS ops/QA officers own pockets until now.) It is clear the provision of DSA is an incentive for the NMAA staff, and an enabling factor to get them into the field. The Yei respondents pointed out they would value NMAA/UNMAS collocation, believing it would result in more effective on-the-job training in the main areas they need strengthened capacity; tasking, IM, SOPs and operational planning.

Yei staff emphasised the value field attachments to operators like MTI, G4S and NPA have added in the past, and would like these to continue in the future. Field attachments, which entailed joining operators for a number of weeks, provided the NMAA ops/QA officers with excellent opportunities to gain concrete experience of clearance work.

CONCLUSIONS

RELEVANCE

Has the choice of focus areas for the NPA capacity development project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?

The NPA capacity development project focuses on the following three areas:

1. Institutional capacity building
2. QA/Operations management
3. Information management/IMSMA/Mine Action Centre

The assessment teams believes it was relevant for NPA to focus on these three areas for a number of reasons, including:

1. The focus areas correspond to five out of the nine elements in the sixth transition plan (T6)
2. NPA has previous expertise within the selected areas, and can therefore add value

While NPA has delivered two training courses, specifically related to the first focus area, it made a strategic decision to focus most of the support in areas two and three. The rationale behind this decision was that, due to the perceived politicization of the NMAA, and the challenges stemming from this, and the lack of budget and financial oversight, NPA believed its support in the first area would add limited value. As a result,

NPA concluded it had greater chances of positively contributing in the areas of QA/Operations and IM/IMSMA/MAC. The assessment team believes this decision was sound, and it is commendable that NPA reflected on the contextual issues and, on the basis of challenges identified, modified its focus accordingly.

To what extent has the support from the Transition team been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs of the beneficiaries?

Information shared by respondents from UNICEF, NPA and UNMAS clearly indicate that the transition team is not active. While the coordinating responsibility is recognized (by all members) to be that of UNMAS, there appears to be a complete lack of coordination, with no transition team work plan in place, and no regular transition team meetings. Also, the fact that there is no TOR for the transition team means its role and purpose are ambiguous.

Does the capacity development initiative strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or hinder them?

There is no evidence of any specific attempts to link the capacity development activities with broader national initiatives. While the NMAA and UNMAS played important roles in ensuring the inclusion of mine action in the *South Sudan Development Plan*,³⁸ it appears that there has been little mainstreaming of the NMAA capacity development within broader state building initiatives. Also, no evidence suggests that the main organisations involved in capacity development of the NMAA interact with actors involved in capacity development in other sectors of the GoSS.

EFFICIENCY³⁹

Has the operations capacity development initiative been implemented in the best / most suitable operational set up in order to be efficient?

NPA has focused its capacity development in the operational department in the following two areas:

1. On-the-job training and field attachments in accordance with IMAS and NTSGs, in close collaboration with UNMAS, commercial mine action companies and mine action NGOs
2. Provision of IMAS courses, accredited by UNMAS

Activities in the first area have been severely hampered by the austerity measures, and the fact that the NMAA has no operational budget and no means to provide staff with DSA. NMAA staff have, from time to time, joined UNMAS on daily field trips, where DSA is not necessary. For longer trips, UNMAS personnel reported some instances when they provided NMAA staff with DSA out of their own pockets. While it seems like both UNMAS and NPA have secured some funds to cover DSA expenses for NMAA staff, to enable them to go on field trips, more efforts could have been made to involve NMAA to a greater extent in office-based activities related to operational planning, tasking and accreditation.

³⁸ *South Sudan Development Plan 2011 - 2013*, <http://www.idt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/South-Sudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf>

³⁹ In the context of mine action evaluation, efficiency refers to... "a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results (outputs and outcomes)". IMAS 04.10, Ibid.

As for the second area, the initiative has been efficient from an activity and output perspective, as resources (time, money and expertise) have been converted into concrete outputs in the form of training workshops conducted, and the number of NMAA staff successfully completing courses. The outcome, however, is more challenging to assess. This is largely due to a lack of opportunities for NMAA staff to practice what was covered during formal training courses, due in at least part to the austerity measures. One area that has seen great achievements is in the accreditation and QA of MDD, where NMAA is taking a lead. Apart from this area however, while it is possible to assess what has been taught and covered, it is hard to assess what has actually been learnt.

Have the capacity development activities been successful in mainstreaming cross cutting issues, such as gender? If not, why?

It is clear that NPA has made an effort to mainstream cross-cutting issues like gender, exemplified in the following initiatives:

- NPA hired an South Sudanese female consultant with strong expertise in civil society and gender to give training modules on gender and anti-corruption during NPA-organised training sessions in 2011 - 2012.
- NPA has encouraged qualified women to apply for positions in the NPA capacity development project. As of October 2012, the team included three female and two male national staff members.

Looking at the broader capacity development activities, however, the extent to which gender has been successfully mainstreamed must be questioned. The *UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes*⁴⁰ are not actively followed.

How has the Transition team been monitored? Is UNMAS using lessons learnt and adjusting / developing where appropriate?

The transition team neither meets on a regular basis, nor has a consolidated capacity development work-plan in place. There are presently no monitoring activities of the transition team or the transition plan.

EFFECTIVENESS⁴¹

What is the value added of NPA/START's involvement in supporting the capacity development of SSMAA? NPA's capacity development support has added value, in terms of activities carried out. Recognizing that capacity development is not a priority for UNMAS, the focused and structured activities that NPA provides have benefited NMAA, including in the following ways:

- Because NPA has a good reputation, and is considered a "friend" and "partner" by the GoSS and the NMAA, NPA can allow itself to be critical, engaging in open and honest discussions with NMAA personnel

⁴⁰ *UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes*, March 2010 <http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MA%20Guidelines%20WEB.pdf>

⁴¹ In the context of mine action evaluation, "the term refers to... the extent to which the intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance". IMAS 04.10

- Despite numerous challenges, NPA has successfully managed to implement all training courses as planned
- The NPA capacity development project was based within the NMAA premises from the very start of the activities in 2010. Following necessary renovations of the office building, NPA moved into the main office in the first quarter of 2012. The collocation with the NMAA has facilitated close coordination, good information sharing and on-the-job training with NMAA personnel
- Since August 2012, NPA has provided a V-SAT, a generator and fuel to run the generator. Given that the NMAA had no budget to cover these costs, NPA's assistance in this regard has been instrumental for the NMAA office having regular and reliable electricity and internet.

What is the effectiveness of the capacity development initiative in achieving the objectives set out, including choice of strategies and approaches?

Are the capacity development activities and NPA strategy for South Sudan appropriate in the national context as well as for the objectives set in the programme?

NPA

The stated objective of the NPA capacity development project is: *"The SSDA has a functional and sustainable mine action center that coordinates all mine action activities and stakeholders in South Sudan."*⁴²

It is clear that the NPA project has not been effective in achieving this objective. This is not due to an implementation problem, since NPA has implemented all planned activities. The failure in achieving the objective rather relates a project design problem coupled with external challenges, as the absence of commitment and buy-in to institutional changes represents a key impediment. While NPA's main objective is relevant, it can be argued that it was too ambitious and unrealistic, given the two-year time frame of the project, the low levels of capacity in the GoSS and the society in general, and the fact that mine action is not considered in the top groups of priorities. One key lesson learnt, highlighted by NPA itself, relates to not having implemented a thorough assessment of the NMAA prior to the start-up of the project. Had the above mentioned challenges been better understood and analysed from the beginning, perhaps the strategy on which the project implementation is based would have been formulated differently, with more realistic outcomes and objective.

UNMAS

UNMAS does not appear to have a clear objective for its capacity development activities. Therefore, the assessment team has no basis to come to a conclusion on whether the UNMAS strategy and objective have been effective. While some meaningful activities have been carried out, these seem to have been implemented on an ad-hoc basis, rather than in a structured, strategic manner. Capacity development activities appear to stem mainly from individual initiative, rather than reflecting a work-plan, with the aim of

⁴² As stated in NPA's START proposal "Capacity development of SSDA 01.0111 to 31.01.13"

achieving specific objectives. The transition plan, which is widely criticized by UNMAS staff, is not implemented, and no single UNMAS staff member reported that the plan facilitates capacity development.

To what extent has the Transition team achieved the objectives set out?

While the individual agencies comprising the Transition team (NPA, UNMAS and UNICEF) carry out a number of activities, these activities are rarely systematically coordinated, monitored and reviewed. It is unclear what the objectives of the transition team are. The transition plan does not stipulate who is responsible for what, and is not a useful document to determine what the objectives of the transition team are. Consequently, the assessment team has no basis to come to a conclusion on this question.

Has the Transition team-lead capacity development been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the needs of the beneficiaries / stakeholders?

NPA and UNMAS have coordinated operational capacity development activities to some extent, but there is room for improvement both between NPA and UNMAS, and within UNMAS. It is clear that there is confusion among UNMAS personnel regarding who is responsible for what. The absence of a capacity development work plan has contributed to the lack of systematic, structured activities.

There are instances however, when NPA, UNMAS and operators have come together and coordinated specific initiatives. The November 2012 operations officer course in Yei is one example that illustrates excellent collaboration between NPA and UNMAS. All actors agree that on-the-job training is what NMAA personnel lack and need the most. As pointed out above however, the austerity measures have limited the possibilities for NMAA personnel to be more actively involved in many operational activities.

SUSTAINABILITY

Is the support provided institutionally and financially sustainable?

The current austerity measures means it is challenging to assess financial sustainability. The implications of not having financial means to pay for fuel to run vehicles or the generator, or to pay DSA for field trips are key impediments to NMAA personnel practicing what they have learnt. Also, the lack of separation between the Authority and the MAC represents a key challenge for any support to be sustainable.

The common perception among respondents that many NMAA personnel are not recruited based on their skills and qualifications points to another key issue that negatively impacts on the sustainability of the support, as it results in “wrong people being in the wrong positions”. Many respondents pointed out that tribalism and nepotism at the NMAA negatively impact the general atmosphere at the Authority. Linked to this is the high turnover of personnel at the NMAA, something that represents another principal impediment to the institutional and financial sustainability.

COVERAGE

Which beneficiaries and NMAA personnel groups have been included/excluded from capacity development initiative?

Most capacity development support was focused on the MRE/VA, IM and Operations/QA departments. This focus was based on an agreement among NPA and UNMAS that it is in these areas that the support would add the most value; a focus that is understandable. Some believe that more attention should have been given to the support department at the NMAA. Given the limited resources, the lack of budget oversight, and the fact that NPA and UNMAS are not in a position to cover all areas, the current focus is justified and understandable.

All key stakeholders recognise that the regional offices, especially Wau and Malakal have been marginalised and not received the support they need.

COORDINATION

Has UNMAS coordinated the NMAA capacity development activities in an efficient and transparent way?

UNMAS has not succeeded in coordinating capacity development activities. It is clear that the transition team is very weak, and that UNMAS does not take the lead in coordinating capacity development activities. There is further a lack of coordination of capacity development within UNMAS, with no capacity development work-plans in place. There is a lack of ownership in relation to capacity development, and it is clear that many staff members are uncertain of who is responsible for what. It is also notable that many UNMAS personnel see capacity development as falling outside of their responsibilities, despite it being included in most UNMAS personnel TOR, and in the UNSCRs that mandate the presence of UNMAS in South Sudan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOSS

Request a response to this report from the NMAA

The Office of the President should mandate and require the NMAA to submit its analysis of this assessment report, including which of the recommendations warrant implementation, together with a draft implementation plan, including resource requirements.

Separate the Authority and the Mine Action Centre

The operational and authority levels should be separated, with the NMAA responsible for broad strategic and policy decision related to mine action, and a MAC overseeing mine action at the operational level. Given the importance of this, the NMAA should include this recommendation in the response to the report that it submits to the GoSS.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NMAA

Advocate for mine action with other GoSS stakeholders

NMAA senior management, with support of UNMAS and NPA, should increase its efforts in raising awareness of mine action among relevant ministries. To ensure this is done in a structured manner, NMAA is advised to invite ministry representatives on a semi-annual basis, to inform them of key issues and developments in the mine action sector.

Organise regular staff meetings

The NMAA management should start regular (perhaps twice a month) staff meetings with all NMAA staff. Meeting minutes should be taken and circulated to all personnel. Regular meetings would facilitate internal information sharing and coordination, and promote transparency.

Formally request UNMISS to collocate UNMAS with the NMAA

Through the Office of the President, the NMAA is recommended to submit a formal letter to UNMISS, requesting UNMAS to collocate with the NMAA. A reference should be made to the UNSCR 1996 of July 2011, and the UNSCR 1057 of July 2012, and Article 27 on the importance of collocation. The reasons why collocation is important and why it would be beneficial to the NMAA should be presented, and it should be underlined that UNMAS has the full commitment and support of the GoSS and the NMAA in doing so.

Get the right staff for the right positions

While recruitment procedures currently take place through the Ministry of Labour's Public Service and HR Department, NMAA should play a more active role in the recruitment board committee, to ensure that individuals are recruited based on their competencies, experience and skills. It is important that NMAA has a combination of sector-specific skills and expertise as well as core functional skills such as basic public financial management.

Revise terms of reference of all NMAA staff members

Terms of reference for all personnel (including the executive members) should be revisited and reviewed. ToR need to reflect the requirements and responsibilities of the organisation. A review would help minimise confusions related to roles and responsibilities.

Utilise existing learning and training opportunities

NMAA personnel are encouraged to demonstrate a higher degree of initiative, be more proactive, and reach out to UNMAS, NPA and operators, looking into opportunities for on-the-job training. A more proactive attitude would send out encouraging signals to partners, who have indicated they would be happy to assist and support if approached.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NPA

Ensure future project outcomes and objectives are realistic

NPA should design future activities based on a thorough analysis of existing and possible challenges and risks, recognising NMAA's absorptive capacity.

Focus future capacity development support on on-the-job training

NPA should concentrate its future activities on promoting and facilitating on-the-job training for NMAA's various departments. This would increase opportunities for NMAA personnel to practice what has been covered in formal training courses. For these activities to be as strategic and structured as possible, NPA should develop an on-the-job training plan in close collaboration with UNMAS and NMAA. To be implementable, this plan needs to address obstacles such as lack of resources on the part of NMAA.

Work more hand-in-hand with relevant NMAA personnel

To promote on-the-job training, NPA technical advisors (as the IM advisor currently is) should work more closely with their NMAA counterparts, and share offices with them.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR START

Make continued funding conditional on implementation by GoSS and NMAA of key recommendations from this assessment

START should continue its funding to the NPA capacity development project on the condition that key recommendations targeting GoSS and NMAA are implemented. While the NPA support has added value, it is clear that institutional impediments have constrained NPA's ability to achieve the anticipated outcomes and the overall objective.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNMAS

Clarify UNMAS' capacity development objectives

UNMAS should clarify its general capacity development objectives to all staff. The assessment team further recommends that the role and responsibilities of the UNMAS capacity development senior technical advisor be clarified as presently these are not clear to UNMAS personnel.

Secure funding for capacity development activities

Develop a capacity development strategy and work-plan

The UNMAS capacity development senior technical advisor, with input from all UNMAS colleagues, NPA and NMAA, should take the lead in developing a capacity development strategy that clearly sets out the objectives of capacity development support (for Juba and the regional offices); and a capacity development work-plan, corresponding to all the components of the transition plan's nine elements. The assessment team recommends that the work-plan:

- specifies activities
- includes clear indicators of success
- lists how the activities correspond to the transition plan

- highlights which staff members are responsible for what activities
- includes a timeline

Define capacity development roles and responsibilities in relevant TOR and job descriptions

Based on its overall capacity development goals, UNMAS should incorporate in all TOR and job descriptions the requirement to report on capacity development activities in their annual performance reviews. This would help clarify who is responsible for what and it would avoid the risk of capacity development being marginalised and viewed as an area that is not included in “getting the job done”.

Collocate with NMAA

The transition 7 workshop in November 2012 made it clear that strengthened capacity in many NMAA departments are dependent on a closer collaboration with UNMAS. While the assessment team recognises that UNMAS has other important responsibilities apart from developing NMAA’s capacity, it recommends that the UNMAS management drafts a collocation plan, including specific timelines, for the main office in Juba and the regional offices, to which all relevant personnel should be requested to adhere. Important lessons can be learnt from UNMAS’ success in collocating with the NMAC in Khartoum.

Monitor and review the transition plan

UNMAS should take the lead, in collaboration with NMAA, NPA and UNICEF, to regularly monitor the implementation of the transition plan, and in reviewing it at least on a 6-month basis.

Take the lead in monitoring all capacity development activities

UNMAS should reengages in its coordinating role, and take the lead in (in close collaboration with NPA, NMAA and UNICEF):

- conducting regular (monthly) capacity development meetings
- monitoring the transition plan
- promoting the implementation and review of the transition plan

Give NMAA operations and QA personnel more responsibilities

NMAA personnel, with close supervision of UNMAS, should take on more responsibilities for smaller tasks, implemented by humanitarian organisations (not commercial contracts). A number of smaller tasks should be selected, in which the NMAA will be responsible for:

- accreditation
- tasking
- QA
- completion

This process should be closely monitored by UNMAS personnel, and feedback should be provided to NMAA staff in a constructive and structured manner.

Include capacity development components in statements of work

Recognising the need for NMAA operations staff to gain more exposure, UNMAS should include capacity development components in all statements of work with operators. This would enable NMAA personnel to go on field attachments, when there is a need to gain greater operational knowledge.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NPA AND UNMAS**Ensure and promote a holistic and strategic approach to capacity development**

NPA and UNMAS should ensure that the development of the NMAA's capacity is integrated with the national capacity development process and aligned with national development priorities and policies; and that the NMAA's capacity development partners work with other national and international stakeholders to ensure their efforts are informed by an on-going dialogue. Mine action capacity development partners can benefit greatly from the capacity development expertise that is available in other sectors. This would facilitate collaboration and information sharing among partners, while ensuring that capacity development efforts are driven as a national process, aligned with national priorities, processes and plans. Also, partners need to be attentive to the absorptive capacity of national institutions to apply complex capacity development programmes that represent "international best practice." Adopting a realistic approach, recognizing the many challenges on the ground, focusing on what is needed and manageable from the perspective of the NMAA is a precondition for any capacity development to be sustainable.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE ASSESSMENT

Objective

The objective of the evaluation is to ascertain results (output and outcome) and assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the project “capacity development of South Sudan Mine Action Authority.” with a specific focus on the UNMAS driven transition plan, the START contribution and NPA’s involvement in the Transition team

Specifically, the objective of the assessment is to (i) summarise achievements, experiences and lessons on what might have affected the implementation of the project; and (ii) provide recommendations regarding possible future project strategies and approaches.

Key issues/questions to address in the evaluation

Relevance

The relevance of the capacity development project objectives and the logic behind them given the situation and needs of the beneficiaries.

- Has the choice of focus areas for the capacity development project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?
- To what extent has the support from the Transition team been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs of the beneficiaries?
- Does the capacity development initiative strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or hinder them?
- What is the value added for NPA / START’s involvement in supporting the capacity development of SSMAA?

Efficiency

The efficiency with which the capacity development project is translated into activities including financial and human resources, management, and monitoring and evaluation.

- Have the strategies and approaches adopted been effective, timely and adequate in line with the needs and priorities of the capacity development initiatives?
- Has the operation capacity development initiative been implemented in the best / suitable operational set up in order to be efficient?
- How has the Transition team been monitored? Is the UNMAS using lessons learned and adjusting / developing where appropriate?

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the capacity development initiative in achieving the objectives set out, including choice of strategies and approaches.

- To what extent has the Transition team achieved the objectives set out?
- Are the capacity development activities and NPA strategy for South Sudan appropriate in the national context as well as for the objectives set in the programme?
- Has the Transition team-lead capacity development been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the needs of the beneficiaries / stakeholders?
- Has the capacity development activities been successful in mainstreaming cross cutting issues, such as gender? If not, why?

Other issues to be examined include:

The sustainability of the support provided to the capacity development activities. Is the support provided institutionally and financially sustainable?

Coverage – which beneficiaries and SSMAA personnel groups have been included/excluded from capacity development initiative?

Coordination – Has UNMAS coordinated the SSMAA capacity development activities in an efficient and transparent way?

ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET

Date	Person	Organisation/Position	
1 Oct	Åsa Massleberg (ÅM) arrives in Juba		
2 Oct	Team meeting, Åsa Massleberg and Lona Lowilla		
3 Oct	John Dingley		Capacity Development Senior Technical Advisor/Deputy Programme Manager, UNMAS
	Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch		Chairperson, NMAA
	Teddy Akello		Director of Programmes, NMAA
4 Oct	Robert Thompson	UNMAS	Chief of Operations
	Geoff Downs		Regional QA/Operations Officer
	Lance Malin		Programme Manager
5 Oct	Jonas Anuar	SIMAS	Director
	Henry Andrew Okwera	NMAA	Director of Finance and Administration
	Mike Rashid		Acting Director of Operations
6 Oct	Paul Molam	TDI	Programme Manager
	Howard Barnes		Operations Manager
	Kate Norton	DRC/DDG	Country Director
	Christina Jensen		Programme Manager
	Justin green		Operations Manager
7 Oct	Roger Gagen	MTI	Programme Manager
	Simon Lowell		Operations Manager
8 Oct	ÅM departure to Wau		
	LL meetings in Juba		
	Malek	NMAA	Director of MRE
	Bul Chol Aguer		IMSMA Operations Officer

ÅM meetings in Wau			
9 Oct	Richard Loydell	UNMAS	Operations/QA Officer
	Gideon Manyuon Abating	NMAA	Regional Coordinator
	Sebit Charles		MRE Officer
	Joseph Mangara		Radio Operator
	Michael Achol Matueny		Operations Officer
	LL meetings in Juba		
	Dr. Anei Adik Arop	Hman Rights Commission	
10 Oct	ÅM return to Juba (flight to Malakal cancelled)		
10 Oct	LL meeting in Juba		
	Nathan Wajea Pitia	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare	Director
	Margaret Mathiang	NMAA	Former Deputy Chairperson, SSSA
11 Oct	Catherine Flemming	Canadian Embassy, START Project	Head of Stabilisation, START
	Taban	NMAA	Executive Members
	Phillemon		
12 Oct	Diana Sururu	UNICEF	Child Protection Officer
	William K. Kollie		Child Protection Specialist
13 Oct	Hannah Bryce	DCA	Country Director
	Irina	MAG	Country Director
14 Oct	Chris Fielding	UNMAS	Operations/QA Officer
15 Oct	Bosko Ade Felix	NMAA Yei Regional Office	QA Officer
	Mawa Moses Lupe		Operations/QA Officer
16 Oct	John Sorbo	NPA	Project Manager
	Batali Gabriel Modi		Operations Advisor
	ÅM departure Juba		

ANNEX 3 – SUMMARY OF NPA-ORGANISED TRAININGS

NPA Training Courses : 2011 - 2012					
NPA Focus Areas	Training courses 2011 – 2012	Duration	Topics covered	NMAA female participants	NMAA male participants
Institutional Capacity Building	Computer training in Yei	1 month	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Introduction to information – Technology & Microsoft Windows – Proficiency in Microsoft Word – Proficiency in Microsoft Excel – Internet – Proficiency in Microsoft PowerPoint 		6
	Computer training in Juba	1 month	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Introduction to information – Technology & Microsoft Windows – Proficiency in Microsoft Word – Proficiency in Microsoft Excel – Internet – Proficiency in Microsoft PowerPoint 	1	6
	Support & administration training, Juba	6 days	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Finance and accounting – Logistics and procurement – Basic knowledge in HR and administration 	1	6
	Support & administration training, Juba	6 days	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – HR management and administration practice 		13

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Modern principles of management - Procurement and logistics management - Finance and accounting 		
	Support introductory training to the operational staff in Yei	6 days	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communication skills and report writing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communication & its aspects - Types and barriers in communication - Sources of information - Report writing - Types of reports - Project Planning & management - Monitoring and evaluation - Managing change in an organization - 	3	12
	English language classes and adult literacy education (targeting cleaners, drivers and guards)	ongoing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - English language - Adult literacy 	7	4
	Distance learning education	Ongoing	-	3	12
QA and Operations Management	QM and GMAA course	9 days	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IMAS and NMAS, QM - Accreditation - Desk Accreditation and operational procedures - Mine Action QM reporting procedures - Mine Action QA and mine field 		

			completion / handover procedures		
	Manual demining course	3 weeks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Course Introduction - Introduction to humanitarian demining - Land mines – types & how they work - Types of land mines and UXO's in South Sudan - Injuries from land mines and UXO's - QC - IMAS - NTSG - Marking system in mine fields - Metal Detector- Introduction., calibration, testing, use in working lane, sweeping & Pin pointing - Tripwire Detection and Vegetation Clearance - Prodding & Excavation - 100 % Excavation Drill in the working lane - Introduction to Survey, BAC & EOD operations - Action 1 & Action 2 drills - CL & MRE - The Standard Drill in a Working Lane - Gender in Mine Action 	1	4

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Basic Life Support / CasEvac / MedEvac drills - IMSMA - Organization of Clearance Site & Field Routines 		
	EOD level 2	3 weeks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduction to Land Service Ammunition (LSA), landmines and booby traps - Explosive theory & practical - Introduction to Air dropped weapons & guided missiles - Storage & transportation of explosives - Demolitions & management of demolition sites - BAC - Threat assessment & survey & planning - EOD task management, clearance techniques and reconnaissance - IMSMA& reporting for EOD tasks 	1	4
	Operations Officer Course, Yei		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Task administration - Impact assessment - General mine action assessment - EOD operations - BAC and manual demining 	1	10

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> operations – IMAS – NTSG – Mechanical assets – MDD – QA reporting procedures and IMSMA – MA QA and mine field completion/handover – MA QA and accident reporting procedures – MA QA and BOI – MA QM and operational deployment 		
IM and IMSMA and MAC	Advanced access training in Yei	1 month			3
	Advanced GIS manipulations for mine action operations	1 month			2
	IMSMAng course organized by GICHD in Juba	2 weeks			3
	GICHD-organised African regional IMSMA A1 course in Mozambique.	2 weeks			2

ANNEX 4 – PHOTOS FROM THE ASSESSMENT



NMAA personnel in Wau regional office, October 2012



FNMAA, UNMAS, NPA and the assessment team after the debriefing. Juba, 12 Oct 2012

ANNEX 5 - LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Bennett, J. S., Pantuliano, W., Fenton, A., Vaux, C., and Brusset, E., Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005 – 2010, 2010

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GICHD, Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action capacity Building and Development Project, October 2007

GICHD, Evaluation of UNDP Mine Action Senior and Middle Management Training Courses, February 2007

GoS Presidential decree No. 299 (2005)

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IMAS 02.10, Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme, First edition, 1 August, 2007

International Alert, Peace and Conflict Assessment of South Sudan, 2012

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, SouthSudan

Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy”, June 2005

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NPA, Information Document; NPA’s support to the capacity development of Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority, March 2011

Paterson, T et al., (2008) Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in Africa, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Commissioned by the EU

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The United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Sudan 2009-2012

The United Nations: Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations' Inter-Agency Policy, June 2005

DPKO, Sudan Unified Mission Plan, UNMIS, 2005

The UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action's Mine Action Guidelines for Ceasefire and Peace Agreements

UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes, March 2010

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UNMAS, Report of the UN Emergency Mine Action Programme in Sudan, September 2003

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