Investment Case for the International Front-loading Facility for Mine Action (IFFMA)

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
EU	European Union
FCDO	UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FFA	Financial Framework Agreement
FTE	Full-time equivalent
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
ICMA	International Capital Market Association
IFFEd	International Finance Facility for Education
IFFIm	International Finance Facility for Immunisation
IFFMA	International Front-loading Facility for Mine Action
IFTWG	Innovative Finance Technical Working Group
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RDNA	Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
SAF	Strategic Allocation Framework
SOFR	Secured Overnight Financing Rate
SPV	Special-purpose vehicle
UN	United Nations

Executive summary

Mine action faces a structural financing problem. The repercussions of contamination are immediate and severe, but funding is often annual, fragmented, and difficult to predict. This mismatch can delay clearance, prolong exposure to injury and loss of life, slow recovery, hinder agricultural production and infrastructure use, and increase the long-term costs of mine action programmes.

This investment case assesses whether a proposed global front-loading facility could efficiently address this mismatch. Front-loading is a financing mechanism that converts a portion of predictable, multi-year donor commitments into funding that can be disbursed sooner towards mine action programmes. The best-known precedent is the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm),[1] which uses long-term sovereign pledges to issue vaccine bonds, making funds available earlier for programmes from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.

In the mine action context, sooner access to greater liquidity has not been flagged as a consistent program need across mine-affected countries; the main quoted constraint is access to multi-year planning. Mine-affected contexts are heterogenous in terms of absorption capacity and scale of contamination, and more immediate access to liquidity is not always considered as particularly enabling. Even though front-loading facilitates multi-annual planning, this is neither exclusive to, nor does it strictly require the establishment of a front-loading facility.

The investment case focuses on front-loading in its **strict capital markets sense**: converting long-term sovereign pledges into upfront liquidity through bond issuance, as exemplified by IFFIm.

The proposed International Front-loading Facility for Mine Action (IFFMA) follows the IFFIm model and adapts it to the mine action sector. Donors would make legally binding multi-year commitments to support borrowing through an independent special-purpose vehicle (SPV, the legal entity entrusted with bond issuance).

The resulting liquidity could then be allocated to a portfolio of priority mine action programmes through a governance structure designed to keep funding decisions separate from programme selection processes, preserve humanitarian principles, and avoid conflicts of interest. These decisions should be subject to specific legal, regulatory, tax, donor, and governance reviews of the final institutional design and of any role proposed for an existing host institution. It is important to bear in mind that the financing of mine action differs from that of immunization: economies of scale, where they exist, are most likely found in mass-contamination contexts with established national systems and experienced operators; in other settings, the main benefit of a front-loading model

may be a more modest improvement in continuity, flexibility, and operational efficiency rather than lower unit costs.

A mine action front-loading facility would be most useful in contexts where the following five factors are present: (1) extensive contamination; (2) strong indications that earlier action produces materially better outcomes; (3) sufficient capacity to absorb funds and manage multi-year programming; (4) national ownership and credible criteria for setting priorities; and (5) reliable systems for budget allocation, monitoring, and financial oversight. In such settings, front-loading could improve planning certainty, reduce stop-start inefficiencies, introduce greater flexibility in the timing of disbursement, and–where this accelerates priority clearance–reduce exposure to explosive ordnance risks. Additional funds could be disbursed when eligible programmes have greater needs (see "Front-loading applied to mine action" section for further details).

For mine-affected countries and operators, the main benefit resides in predictability, continuity, and flexibility. Qualitative consultations conducted through the Innovative Finance Secretariat's technical and steering structures–together with bilateral exchanges with donor governments, mine-affected authorities, operators, and financial institutions–consistently highlighted flexibility in disbursement, predictability, and multi-year planning as important. These consultations were not intended to represent the whole sector, and views differed regarding the scale at which additional funding could be absorbed. Representatives of mine-affected countries in particular highlighted that sharp declines in funding between short grant cycles hindered continuity.

For donors, the primary benefit could be strategic. Front-loading can convert future commitments into earlier available resources, provide support for larger and more coherent programme envelopes, and lower participation barriers for contributors that do not maintain separate financing mechanisms for mine action. A common standards-based allocation and reporting framework could also improve visibility of collective results, while reducing fragmentation across separate funding arrangements.

Front-loading does not provide outcome-based funding, nor does it imply direct investment in mine action. The facility's implementation requires a concrete allocation architecture, clear eligibility criteria, conservative treasury policies, and political willingness from donors to make multi-year commitments. In such a structure, private investors act as lenders to the facility, not as risk-taking investors in mine action outcomes.

This investment case features both the financial model and the proposed governance architecture for IFFMA, as an institutional model to turn capital raised into credible, nationally anchored mine action programmes that can be monitored. Using IFFIm as a model, the facility should be designed as a lean financing structure, with programme approval and oversight adhering to a strict, rules-based process. Making use of development finance practice, it should rely on existing delivery channels where

possible rather than creating a parallel operating apparatus. Drawing on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), eligibility and monitoring should be grounded in evidence, national standards, quality management, and information management, and be free from bias and conflicts of interest.

The analysis suggests that the minimum cumulative donor pledges to IFFMA would need to be at least USD 1 billion spread over 10 or more years. This assumes a collective commitment from at least four (sovereign/supranational) donors with strong credit profiles, regarded as investment grade (BBB- or higher, determined by credit rating agencies).

The illustrative case studies later in this document show the scale of reported contamination and financing needs, the linkage between clearance and recovery, and the circumstances in which earlier and more predictable financing could be useful. They are illustrative scenarios, not proposed allocations.

The analysis considers IFFMA potentially useful only in selected contexts. Its benefits should be understood principally in terms of timing, predictability, and programme continuity, rather than as an automatic way to achieve sector-wide economies of scale or to transfer the risks of mine action outcomes to bondholders.

The potential gains of the facility have been weighed against the costs of establishing and operating the facility, the limits imposed by the **actual capacity to absorb** additional funding in a shorter time frame, and the understanding that some of the sought-after benefits (notably, multi-year allocations) are *not* exclusive to a bond-issuing facility.

The analysis finds that the institutional architecture, lead time, and recurrent costs required for a standalone bond-issuing facility are significant. It suggests that the potential benefits are not sizeable enough to justify the relative cost of establishing a full IFFIm-style bond-issuing structure, with its institutional complexity.

It recommends that, rather than creating new institutions, the next phase seek to preserve the IFFMA's core objectives–multi-year predictability, strategic allocation, flexibility, and crowding-in–**while prioritizing lower-cost approaches through existing multilateral development banks (MDBs), donor, and recovery finance channels.**

Front-loading applied to mine action

Front-loading converts predictable future donor commitments into liquidity that can be disbursed sooner. In the case of mine action, programmatic needs are immediate and have severe implications, while international funding is often annual, fragmented, and difficult to predict. The financial model described below estimates the indicative amount that a hypothetical front-loading facility could make available upfront, while later sections reflect important considerations regarding absorption capacity.

In the proven case for the immunization sector, front-loading adds concrete value to projects in which earlier access to funding affected long-term outcomes. A front-loading model includes the following steps:

- Donors enter binding multi-year commitments.
- These commitments are pooled and serve as the basis for capital market borrowing, usually through bond issuance.[2]
- Funds raised from investors are made available immediately.
- **Donors continue to pay their original pledges over time, which are used to repay investors**. This makes programme resources available earlier and enables multi-year planning, while donor contributions continue to be paid over time without necessarily increasing their annual budgetary allocations towards mine action; however, the facility's running costs must also be factored in.

IFFMA would follow the same core logic as IFFIm: legally binding sovereign pledges would support borrowing, and the proceeds would be disbursed according to the facility's agreed allocation rules. Mine action would be financed as a public-good intervention, so activities would not need to generate direct financial returns to be eligible for funding.

Importantly, any new facility would also **provide a common financing platform through which new donors could enter the mine action sector**, including those without dedicated mine action programmes or the capacity to manage standalone funding structures. **The specificity of a front-loading facility is that it relies on donor pledges.** The ability of new donors to make binding pledges would need to be evaluated separately, as would their credit rating. While pooling funds does not improve an individual contributor's credit rating, the composition and legal strength of the pooled commitments can support the facility's overall credit profile.

Front-loading does not represent direct investment in mine action projects by private investors. Investors (bond-buyers) act as lenders to the facility. The front-loading facility's main purpose is to reshape the timing of funding flows, improving planning certainty and continuity and potentially reducing the long-term costs of stop-start cycles in operations.

Multi-year pledges as long-term commitments are the cornerstone of the model. Front-loaded resources are not earmarked by each donor for a specific project but allocated according to the agreed criteria through the facility's governance structure. This means that donors must accept a degree of pooled decision-making. Pledged funds cannot be earmarked.

Due to the humanitarian nature of mine action, programme and funding design must be adaptable to the evolving needs in certain areas. While IFFMA's core benefit is that of front-loading (making funds available earlier, at scale), the facility could also rapidly

disburse funds to respond to emergencies. In this case, **a portion of the funds is not front-loaded all at once** but carefully deployed based on evolving needs. If donor funds are diligently managed by the Treasury Manager, the pool of funds can be rapidly transferred to emergency-response programmes.

The debt obligation would reside with the facility, backed by pledging contributors, rather than with beneficiary mine-affected States. A mine-affected State could also participate as a contributor by voluntarily making a legally binding pledge, which would be treated under the same financial framework as other contributor commitments. Any allocation to that State as a beneficiary would remain subject to the same eligibility and conflict-of-interest rules, including recusal from decisions specific to that country. The effect of pooled commitments on the issuer's credit profile is discussed in the next section.

Main features of a front-loading facility

The principal potential advantages of front-loading relate to the timing and predictability of funding, operational continuity, and the pooling of donor commitments. These benefits are conditional: they depend on sufficient capacity to absorb funds, credible governance, and the extent to which earlier liquidity produces better programme outcomes than conventional multi-year grants.

Operational efficiency

Potential improvements in efficiency arise primarily from continuity. Predictable multi-year financing can support better planning and use of existing teams, equipment, and technical capacity, while reducing the costs of repeatedly engaging, dismissing, and re-recruiting staff. In this paper, operational efficiency refers to how economically mine action programmes convert resources–funding, time, equipment, and expertise–into outputs and outcomes.[3] Front-loading does not in itself guarantee efficiency; gains depend on programme design, flexibility, and absorption capacity.

Evidence from multi-year mine action funding supports the argument for continuity. The 2019 evaluation of the Netherlands' Mine Action and Cluster Munitions Programme reported "widespread agreement" on efficiency gains from multi-year funding, including lower costs related to managing proposals, and less disruption from stopping then re-recruiting teams when funding fluctuates. The same evaluation also noted concerns about insufficient flexibility in volatile contexts, stressing that multi-year funding is most effective when its contractual design remains adaptable.

The facility's allocation and eligibility architecture would need to balance financing at scale with programmes' actual capacity to absorb funds. Front-loaded funding improves

efficiency only where programmes can deploy it productively; otherwise, larger allocations may result in idle assets and holding costs rather than better results.

In mine-affected contexts economies of scale are most likely to apply front-loaded multi-year funding can distribute fixed costs across a larger mine action programme. This is most plausible in mass-contamination contexts with established national systems and experienced operators. In these contexts, equipment, specialist technical capacity, procurement, and management costs can be deployed over longer periods and larger work plans.


Where economies of scale are less likely–such as in insecure, highly dispersed, or access-constrained settings–operational feasibility, rather than the level of funding, will remain the binding constraint. In those contexts, larger upfront envelopes do not necessarily reduce unit costs and may even create inefficiencies if programmes cannot absorb funds productively. The **Strategic Allocation Framework (SAF)** proposed in the governance section of this analysis distinguishes between contexts, identifying cases where economies of scale are likely to apply and produce improvements in continuity, flexibility, and operational efficiency.

Potential crowding-in effects

A pooled facility could make it easier for smaller or non-traditional contributors to participate by offering a professionally managed platform, along with common governance and reporting frameworks, rather than requiring each donor to establish a separate financing mechanism. The issuer's credit quality would depend on the composition, legal strength, and credit quality of the pooled sovereign commitments, with highly rated anchor donors supporting market access. This could help attract and "crowd in" additional donors. However, making a donor pledge would remain a policy choice; participation in the facility does not reduce a government's sovereign borrowing cost.

Figure 1 below illustrates the credit-support logic of pooled sovereign commitments (referred to in this paper as the "solidarity effect"): highly rated, "anchor" or "core" donors can strengthen the issuer's overall credit profile, while other contributors participate through the same platform. Donors C and D in the figure contribute to the facility, but do not borrow through IFFMA.

Figure 1: Facility's credit rating to encourage additional funds



Note: This figure represents an illustrative scenario only. The actual score would be set by rating agencies.

By joining the facility, additional donors could participate through a common financing and governance platform, whose market access is supported by the pooled commitments of the core donor group. The principal benefit for smaller or non-traditional donors joining the facility would be institutional and transactional, by centralizing governance, treasury execution, and reporting. Highly rated donors remain essential, with their pledges helping to increase the facility's credit profile and therefore reduce its borrowing terms.

The final credit rating of the facility would be assigned by the appointed rating agencies, calculated based on the facility's structure and donor commitments. The model assumes the use of ratings from two separate agencies to support broad institutional market access; obtaining and maintaining these ratings would be a recurrent cost of the facility. While a good credit rating is a condition for market access, it does not guarantee demand for the bond or its competitive pricing (meaning its ability to raise funds at an interest cost comparable to similarly rated bonds).

The front-loading model is also characterized by an absence of donor earmarking before bond issuance. Donor pledges are **pooled** to support the facility, without being attributed in advance to specific countries or projects. **This is important because the bond is backed by the combined strength and predictability of those donor commitments.** If

donor pledges are fragmented through earmarking, this can negatively affect the facility's credit profile and investor confidence, since not all funds would be equally available to repay investors and the facility rest on the full value of pooled pledges. Bond proceeds should be allocated under the agreed framework, based on common priorities and eligibility criteria.

For some donors, however, this can be a disadvantage as they have less control over individual country or programme allocations. The governance model therefore needs to provide contributors with strategic oversight and transparent portfolio reporting without reintroducing project-level earmarking.

Incentives for investors

Investors who buy bonds receive a normal financial return: they are **paid interest over time and get their money back when the bond matures**. What could make this type of bond attractive is that it combines a relatively secure investment profile–supported by long-term donor commitments–with a clear humanitarian purpose. This can appeal to **institutional investors**, such as pension funds, insurance companies, asset managers, banks, mutual funds, and sovereign wealth funds, which invest large sums of money and generally seek **reliable, professionally managed products.**[4]

The attractiveness towards investors (bond-buyers) will nonetheless depend on prevailing market conditions upon issuance (such as interest rate levels, investor risk appetite).

Limitations of a front-loading facility

Like any funding mechanism, a front-loading facility has specific characteristics that warrant assessing whether it is viable and sufficient to serve the stated purpose: bridging the gap between mine action needs and the shortfalls caused by annual, fragmented funding cycles.

This section examines the potential caveats and limitations of using a front-loading facility in the specific context of mine action. These include questions of "additionality" (whether the facility brings additional capital to mine action programmes), absorption capacity, and set-up considerations. The set-up considerations will be further explored in the section describing the proposed legal and governance structures for its establishment.

Timing and additionality

Front-loading accelerates the disbursement of resources that donors have already committed; **it does not generate new funds**. If multi-year pledges to IFFMA come from existing mine action budgets (instead of providing an increase to sustain the facility), the

total amount available to the sector may not increase. This risk may be greatest in the early years, when part of the funding will also be needed to cover the facility's operating costs.

Contributions towards IFFMA would have to cover both the multi-year pledges and the running costs of the facility (which have been kept to a minimum in this exercise to prioritize a lean, operational infrastructure).

Absorption capacity

The financial logic of front-loading (deploying capital earlier and at scale), and its impact on mine action depend on **the capacity to absorb and deploy that capital effectively**. In contexts where national mine action systems are underdeveloped, access is constrained by conflict, or the operator footprint is limited, the availability of larger upfront sums does not translate automatically into faster or better clearance.

The facility's proposed eligibility architecture (see page 44 onwards) includes an **absorption-capacity test**. In contexts with limited capacity, bringing funding forward may not lead to faster or better results, while still creating costs from holding unused funds.

Time to operate

Establishing a credible front-loading facility takes time. Negotiating pledges, completing legal registration processes, engaging the Treasury Manager, concluding credit rating processes, issuing programme documentation, and approving the facility's disbursement criteria are all necessary steps before the first bond can be issued.

A realistic estimate for the time required to issue bonds is **two to four years** from the start of the process. Donors and affected communities should be informed of this timeline from the outset to prevent the facility from being perceived as an immediate response.

Pre-existence of a programmatic, disbursement, and allocation body

The most consequential structural limitation of the front-loading model as applied to mine action is not financial, but institutional.

IFFIm's design rests on a critical precondition: the existence of Gavi. Before IFFIm was conceived, Gavi had its own board, strategy, application-review machinery, country-level relationships with health ministries, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) architecture.

IFFIm is a pure financing vehicle positioned above a fully operational programmatic institution. It raises money, while Gavi decides how to spend it.

The Financial Framework Agreement between IFFIm, its donors, the World Bank, and Gavi formalizes this arrangement, stating that IFFIm has no employees and that all administrative and programme-appraisal functions are performed by Gavi (with Gavi's administrative support fees being disclosed in IFFIm's Annual Trustees reports). The allocation function of the facility is performed with the support of a pre-existing, credible, globally recognized institution performing the allocation function.

Mine action has no equivalent body or single institution with a mandate comparable to Gavi's. This construction effort should be factored into any comparison with IFFIm's operating budget. This absence constitutes the facility's primary design constraint. The prospective IFFMA Secretariat should be responsible for reviewing allocations, conducting M&E, and maintaining a stable relationship with national mine action authorities, while a separate Special-Purpose-Vehicle acts as an independent, ring-fenced bond issuance entity.

Two specific risks follow from this gap:

1. **The facility may be capitalized before it is institutionally ready to allocate**, which could leave raised funds undeployed. A clear milestone should be defined and built into the foundational statutes of the secretariat, requiring it to reach a minimum operational threshold before any bonds can be issued.

   That threshold should include, at a minimum: (1) the formal establishment of the Secretariat's Board; (2) the appointment of the executive director and core staff; (3) the signing of the hosting agreement and adoption of key internal controls and operating procedures; (4) the approval of the SAF, eligibility methodology, and reporting templates; (5) the appointment of the Allocation Committee and Technical/Eligibility Panel; and (6) the identification and preliminary appraisal of an initial pipeline of eligible programmes capable of absorbing the first disbursements (for instance, those featured in the case studies in this document, without excluding other relevant contexts that meet the eligibility criteria).

2. IFFMA's Secretariat will have to build over time **the track record of institutional relationships, country-level presence, and sectoral authority** that Gavi had accumulated over approximately five years of operation before IFFIm's inaugural issuance in 2006. This means the facility's early allocation cycles carry higher operational risk than IFFIm's did. A potential hosting agreement with an existing authoritative entity in mine action is intended to serve as an additional mitigation factor, while the choice of Geneva as the establishment jurisdiction provides grant access and proximity to a broader humanitarian ecosystem.

An alternative could be for an existing entity within the mine action ecosystem to assume the role of the disbursement entity, if permitted by its mandate. This mandate does not exist by default, as it did for Gavi; in this case, it is based on the premise of describing the required structures for issuance and allocation, including the necessary safeguards to ensure legal independence and avoid conflicts of interest.

For IFFIm, a specific Eurostat ruling was negotiated at its establishment, allowing European Union (EU) Member State contributors to defer recognition until the point of payment rather than upon making the pledge. This treatment directly affects deficit and debt ratios under the EU's Stability and Growth Pact. This exception was specific to IFFIm's structure and domicile and does not automatically extend to IFFMA. A new ruling would need to be sought; until it is obtained, EU Member State donors face a significant fiscal accounting barrier to making binding multi-year pledges. This process should be initiated in parallel with the legal establishment of IFFMA, not deferred. Donors not subject to EU fiscal rules–Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland–are unaffected.

Members of the Innovative Finance Technical Working Group (IFTWG) have noted that the scale of pledges to IFFMA may not significantly affect the fiscal deficits of the pledging EU Member States. This further illustrates, however, the legal and normative architecture required to underpin pledges and bond issuance in general.

Complementarity vs. substitution effects relative to bilateral grants

The existence of a common financing platform such as IFFMA could have a centralizing effect on donor engagement. This could have a positive impact by lowering entry barriers for new contributors and giving donors access to a common standards-based allocation mechanism, but it also raises the question of whether IFFMA pledges would complement, or partially replace, direct grant support.

In the IFFIm case, the front-loading vehicle did not replace the disbursement agent's wider grant base. Instead, it became a significant channel within a broader funding mix, with several donors continuing to support Gavi directly alongside IFFIm. IFFIm's own records show that Gavi received an administrative support fee within the IFFIm structure.[5] Between 2006 and 2024, IFFIm provided approximately 16 per cent of Gavi's overall funding. This share is not a measure of success or failure, but indicates that front-loading has operated as a significant, yet partial, financing channel alongside Gavi's wider grant base.

At the same time, Gavi donor profiles show that several sovereign donors–including the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom–supported both IFFIm and Gavi directly, suggesting that, in practice, IFFIm operated more as a partial complement to, rather than a full substitute for, direct support.

For donors that do not currently provide extensive funding for mine action, the substitution question does not arise in the same way: these donors could access the sector through IFFMA's pooled structure without needing to build standalone programme infrastructure of their own. In these cases, the "solidarity effect" described under the advantages of front-loading would be most relevant.


For existing mine action donors, by contrast, the issue of substitution is real and should be managed explicitly. If donors redirect existing bilateral commitments into multi-year IFFMA pledges and correspondingly reduce direct grant flows, the net effect on the sector could be neutral or even negative in the short term once establishment and operating costs are factored in. Longer-term substitution would be justified only if the facility delivers better timing, continuity, and strategic use of funds compared to fragmented grant cycles. This assessment should also consider what may be lost through pooling donor commitments–including bilateral flexibility, donor visibility, diplomatic engagement, direct relationships between countries, and support for priorities outside the facility's allocation framework. Some of the advantages sought through IFFMA may also be captured through lighter, lower-cost mechanisms using existing channels (see "Recommendations" section).

Financial model

The objective of front-loading is to convert future commitments into present liquidity that can be disbursed sooner and more flexibly for mine action. While donors continue to disburse annually, front-loading aggregates the cumulative value of multi-year commitments to allow for greater present liquidity. A front-loading funding mechanism is particularly well-suited for projects with high upfront costs that benefit from the rapid disbursement of funds–providing there is absorption capacity.

This overview illustrates how the front-loading facility would work financially, and how much could be raised upfront and made available for mine action today. **Figure 2** below illustrates the impact of front-loading for a group of donors collectively pledging USD 100 million over a five-year period (2027–2031). By doing so, donors could immediately support mine action at scale, with immediately available funds of **USD 75 million**.

Figure 2: Front-loading capacity through collective donor commitments (USD 100m)



The upfront disbursement available in 2027 is more than 3.5 times the size of a traditional grant contribution. As a result, affected regions could accelerate their mine clearance programmes sooner, unlocking significant reconstruction and development gains for entire communities in the region.


Furthermore, the front-loading model can adapt to donors' strategic needs and allow them to tailor their commitments–for example, to different time horizons, provided they remain multi-annual. One donor could, for instance, choose to pledge more than 10 years, while another would pledge for five–the longer the pledge, the lower the annual contribution towards the facility.

The funding mechanism can therefore accommodate different commitments while still providing **scale, speed, and flexibility** for mine action funding.

Figure 3 showcases a 5- and 10-year donor commitment, based on the target to provide USD 100m in mine action funding in 2027. As mentioned above, **the longer the grant timeline, the more donors can benefit from lower annual commitments**.

A detailed description of the forecast model can be found in the technical specifications annex of this document (see Annex 2).

Figure 3: Aggregate annual contribution scenarios, based on funding target of USD 100m in 2027



Note: For illustrative purposes, we have modelled 5-year and 10-year grants paid in equal annual installments (first contribution in 2027).

Financial efficiency

Sovereign donors face competing requests for humanitarian and development resources. A front-loading facility for mine action must be a cost-effective vehicle for donors to deliver immediate impact in mine action.

Minimum viable donor commitment

For IFFMA to effectively and cost efficiently fulfil its proposed mandate, donors must make legally binding multi-year commitments at scale. The **minimum combined total of donor support** is meant to be driven by the size of programmatic needs, followed by the minimum level of bond market activity, the operational capability of the disbursement agent, and the cost-benefit analysis of setting up the facility.

Concerning the need for programmes to have **sufficient capacity to absorb funds**, the key consideration is whether donors consider IFFMA as complementary to their bilateral grant programme, or whether they intend to channel future funds to long-standing programmes through the global front-loading facility. If we anticipate the substitution effect, it is important to match any future eligibility criteria with the intended scope.

Currently, the reported mine action funding needs structurally exceed the international funds available. Mine action needs in Ukraine, for example, are forecasted in the Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5) and estimated at USD 27.6 billion over the period 2026–2035. Recognizing the complexities of such an exercise, we employ a

straightforward, though limited, methodology using historical international mine action funding as a proxy for future needs. As a conservative estimate, the facility could provide at least a 25 per cent pro-rata rate for future needs. The inflation-adjusted five-year average (2019–2024) of international funds is USD 695 million,[6] implying that IFFMA could serve a minimum annual disbursement need of at least USD 173 million annually. The disbursement need is subject to the absorption capacity of programmes, as well as the processing capability of the disbursement agent.

To define the minimum level of financial activity, we estimated the bond activity of smaller-scale public issuers with limited thematic mandates, such as IFFIm[7]. Based on the guidance from the Frontloading Technical Work Group, we developed three indicative parameters for eligible bond issuance. Following these parameters, we assume that IFFMa could expect a minimum consecutive bond issuance activity of USD 1.25–1.5 billion over a 10-year period, subject to market conditions[8].

First, a bond deal size of USD 500 million serves as a practical minimum for public benchmark transactions, while USD 750 million to USD 1 billion is a preferable range to ensure adequate investor participation. Large-sized bond programmes are more financially efficient, as cost of borrowing in USD decrease as the bond size increases. IFFMA could, of course, occasionally issue smaller-sized bonds in the range of USD 200 to 300 million, recognizing non-optimal financial costs. For illustrative purposes, IFFIm's initial donor commitment in 2005 totalled nearly USD 4 billion from six donors, followed by its first issuance of USD 1 billion in November 2006 and subsequent smaller bonds in 2008 and 2009.

Second, the programme should not be structured as a one-off transaction, since isolated issuance is unlikely to establish regular borrower status in international capital markets. Conducting at least one transaction every two years is necessary to sustain investor confidence and maintain market presence over time. Bond issuances can vary in size, maturity, and currency, subject to favourable market conditions and the final recommendations of the Treasury Manager. Hence, IFFMA's USD 500 million bond could be followed by a GBP 20 million sterling bond or EUR 500 million euro-denominated bond.

Third, the total volume of bond issuances could differ from the total amount of donor commitments and programmatic disbursements. In fact, the total bond issuance can be considerably higher than donor commitments, as new issuances can be used to repay maturing bonds. This common practice is called refinancing. For instance, as of June 2026, IFFIm issued over USD 10.3 billion in bonds, well above the USD 9.7 billion in donor commitments, and the USD 6.6 billion disbursement to Gavi.

Furthermore, for the **operational capability** of IFFMA, donor commitment need not be of a minimum scale, but also a requires a long-term pledge duration, of minimum 10 years. To fulfil the front-loading mechanism objective of accelerating the availability of capital for priority interventions, long-term future commitments need to be brought forward to the present. The shorter the grant duration, the smaller the benefit of front-loading and the more it will resemble a straightforward multi-year grant. Moreover, the IFTWG has advised that a potential Treasury Manager must be confident that IFFMA would be a long-term endeavour to internally justify lending its services to the facility. Short-term commitments, such as a ranking of up to five years, coupled with a one-off bond issuance, would therefore be unfavourable from the perspective of a Treasury Manager.

From an implementation standpoint, operational capacity would realistically only be reached by 2030. This timing reflects the lead time required to put into operation both the disbursement agent and the financing facility, including establishing governance and legal structures, negotiating binding donor commitments, securing the legal mandate of the Treasury Manager, and preparing large-scale capital market issuances.

While the benefits of "reliable funding" through IFFMA strongly align with the needs of the mine action sector, they should be weighed against the costs–namely set-up and annual running costs. These costs have been estimated as follows:

- Set-up and registration costs are estimated at approximately CHF 270,000–300,000, with the final amount depending on the legal form confirmed by legal counsel, external drafting, and fiduciary support, and the scope of transition and hosting arrangements (see "Estimated Establishment and Operational Costs" section and Annex 4).
- Annual running costs are estimated at CHF 3.7–5.5 million, with the final amount depending on the staffing configuration and the hosting arrangement and service model, the Treasury Manager mandate and fees, the level of monitoring, and the final cost of two external ratings (see "Estimated Establishment and Operational Costs" section).

Thus, **the minimum cumulative donor pledges to IFFMA would need to be at least USD 1 billion over 10 or more years**. This assumes a collective commitment of at least four (sovereign/supranational) donors that have strong credit profiles and are regarded as investment grade (BBB- or higher, determined by credit rating agencies).

Total expected contribution for an anchor donor

Based on the assumptions used in this paper for the minimum viable donor commitment–that is, cumulative donor pledges of at least USD 1 billion over 10 or more years, supported by at least four investment-grade sovereign or supranational contributors–an equal-burden scenario implies an anchor donor pledge of approximately USD 250 million over 10 years, or USD 25 million per year. If one-off establishment costs and annual operating costs are shared pro rata across the same four founding donors, that donor's indicative share would be approximately CHF 67,500–75,500 for one-off set-up costs and CHF 925,000–1,375,000 per year for recurring operating costs. On that basis, the anchor donor should expect a first-year commitment of about USD 25 million in programme pledges, plus roughly CHF 1–1.45 million in shared set-up and operating costs. This is an illustrative planning calculation based on the minimum viable donor base and the cost ranges used in this paper; the actual burden could be lower or higher depending on the final number of founding donors and the agreed cost-sharing formula.

- Minimum cumulative donor base: USD 1 billion over 10+ years
- Illustrative number of anchor contributors: 4
- Indicative anchor donor pledge: USD 250 million over 10 years
- Indicative annual pledge: USD 25 million per year
- Indicative one-off set-up share: CHF 67,500–75,500
- Indicative annual operating cost share: CHF 925,000–1,375,000
- **Indicative first-year total: USD 25 million in pledges plus CHF 1.0–1.45 million in shared costs**

Structure and governance of the facility

Legal and institutional set-up

The institutional architecture described below is illustrative and would remain subject to legal, regulatory, tax, and governance reviews prior to implementation. **To ensure legal compliance, institutional clarity, and credible access to capital markets, the front-loading facility should be established as an independent legal entity.** Its design rests on a clear separation between (1) issuance and treasury management and (2) allocation and disbursement to eligible programmes.

Throughout this paper, the proposed IFFMA entities are distinct from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The GICHD would play a technical, analytical, and convening role, unless a separate mandate and governance process authorized it to take on a broader role. Any hosting, allocation, certification, investment advisory, credit assessment, guarantee management, or commercial endorsement function involving the GICHD would require a separate legal and governance review and should not be assumed based on this investment case.

In capital markets practice, this separation supports **bankruptcy remoteness**: the legal and financial insulation of the issuer's assets, receivables, and payment flows from the insolvency, liabilities, or unrelated risks of other entities or activities. This is important because investors and rating agencies need to be sure that pledged commitments, reserve assets, and debt service cash flows remain ring-fenced and available to meet the facility's obligations, rather than being exposed to operational liabilities, governance disputes, or third-party creditor claims. The same logic also requires that no entity potentially eligible for funding should participate in the body taking allocation decisions.

IFFIm was created as a dedicated financing vehicle for Gavi. It is an independent UK company limited by guarantee, while Gavi is a separate Swiss foundation and the sole member of IFFIm. IFFIm has no employees; all administrative support is provided by Gavi under the Financial Framework Agreement (FFA) between IFFIm, the grantors, the World Bank, and Gavi. This arrangement was possible because Gavi already existed as a fully staffed, credible disbursement and allocation body before IFFIm was conceived. **Gavi's administrative support fee is reported separately in IFFIm's annual trustees' accounts and is included in governance cost assessments by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)**. As already noted, IFFMA cannot replicate this shortcut: no equivalent sector-wide disbursement and allocation hub currently exists in mine action. The facility must therefore build from scratch the administrative and programmatic infrastructure that IFFIm inherited from Gavi.

Any hosting agreement between the secretariat and a host institution should maintain legal and operational separation. The host should not own facility assets, assume facility

liabilities, act as the issuer, or control allocation decisions. The agreement should define the support services provided and include safeguards for conflicts of interest, liability, and reputational risk.

Jurisdiction and legal set-up

The institutional model examined in this investment case requires two legally distinct structures: **(i) a special-purpose vehicle (SPV)** responsible for bond issuance and the associated financial obligations; and **(ii) a programmatic Secretariat**, acting as the facility's disbursement agent and supporting allocation, grant administration, monitoring and reporting. These entities would need to remain legally and operationally separate, but they would not necessarily need to be established in the same jurisdiction.

For the **SPV**, this investment case does not prescribe a specific jurisdiction. England and Wales provides the closest direct precedent: IFFIm is incorporated there as a company limited by guarantee and registered charity. Other established European jurisdictions that merit consideration include **Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands**, given their experience with special-purpose and structured-finance vehicles and, in some cases, dedicated legal or fiscal frameworks. The relative advantages of these jurisdictions would need to be assessed specifically for an IFFMA structure, including the treatment of sovereign pledges, tax and fiscal-accounting implications, bankruptcy-remoteness requirements, regulatory obligations, capital-markets familiarity, and establishment and recurrent costs.

The **final choice of SPV domicile should remain with the donors establishing and capitalizing the facility**, informed by independent legal and tax advice and, where relevant, the appointed Treasury Manager. On the basis of the analysis undertaken, the GICHD Innovative Finance Secretariat would recommend that founding donors first compare established capital-markets jurisdictions with relevant precedent and legal or fiscal frameworks — including England and Wales, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — rather than assume that the issuer should be co-located with the programmatic Secretariat. England and Wales would merit consideration because of the direct IFFIm precedent, while the comparative merits of the other jurisdictions should be established through dedicated legal, tax and cost analysis.

For cost-modelling purposes, this case assumes a Swiss co-domiciled structure comprising a Swiss SA/AG and a Swiss Verein. Its aim is to illustrate that the establishment and continuous operations of these structures would have inherent costs.

For the **programmatic Secretariat and disbursement agent**, this investment case recommends **Switzerland as a jurisdictional option** for the following reasons:

- **Hosting arrangement alignment:** A potential hosted model could draw on the experience of the GICHD and the wider institutional infrastructure available in Geneva. If the GICHD were to be considered as a host, any hosting, administrative-service or secondment arrangement would require a separate assessment and internal approval of mandate, governance, resource and legal implications. This model is therefore illustrative and does not imply that the GICHD has agreed to or is authorized to host the Secretariat.
- **Institutional ecosystem:** Establishment in Geneva would connect the Secretariat with the broader mine action, humanitarian and development ecosystem and could facilitate relationships with national authorities, international organizations, donors and technical stakeholders relevant to programme allocation, monitoring and implementation.
- **Potential coordination efficiencies:** If the Secretariat were established in Switzerland, locating the SPV in the same jurisdiction could offer some incremental efficiencies by placing both entities within a common legal framework and reducing certain cross-border contractual, administrative and compliance interfaces. These advantages should, however, be treated as **secondary efficiency considerations rather than a structural requirement**. The IFFIm precedent demonstrates that a financing vehicle and its programmatic counterpart can operate successfully from different jurisdictions where their respective responsibilities and contractual relationships are clearly defined.
- Accordingly, the jurisdictional choices for the two entities should be assessed separately. **Switzerland presents a stronger institutional case for the programmatic Secretariat than it necessarily does for the bond-issuing SPV.** Co-domiciliation could simplify aspects of coordination, but it should not override materially stronger legal, fiscal, cost or capital-markets considerations favouring another jurisdiction for the issuer.
- The final legal architecture would in all cases remain subject to external legal and tax advice, donor decisions and the governance approvals required before establishment

The Facility's Secretariat: Disbursement Agent

IFFMA should be structured as two legally separate registered entities–each with its own governing board and distinct responsibilities. One entity is the bond-issuing SPV discussed in the previous section.

The facility's Secretariat would be entrusted with programme allocation support, grant administration, disbursement, monitoring and reporting. The two-entity model clearly separates capital market liabilities and treasury functions from programme allocation, disbursement, and monitoring risks. The final legal form remains subject to legal, regulatory, and fiscal review–which should be provided by external legal counsel.

Legal entities

Entity	Role
SPV	Financial arm: bond issuance, treasury management, investor relations. Governed by the SPV Board.
IFFMA Secretariat	Programmatic arm: allocation support, disbursement administration, monitoring. Governed by the Secretariat's Board.

The working assumption is that the disbursement agent, the IFFMA Secretariat, would be a Verein (association), subject to external legal review. The Verein acquires full legal personality as soon as its written statutes are adopted and a governing committee is appointed (art. 60 ZGB), with no minimum capital or notarial incorporation required. This enables the entity to hold property, open bank accounts, employ staff under Swiss labour law, and enter into contracts, including a hosting agreement.

Members are not personally liable for the Verein's obligations (art. 75a ZGB). Registration in the Geneva Commercial Register is anticipated as a practical requirement given the secretariat's cross-border disbursement mandate and staff employment obligations (art. 61 ZGB). A full statutory audit is triggered only if total assets exceed CHF 10 million, turnover is more than CHF 20 million, or the full-time equivalent exceeds 50, sustained over two consecutive years (art. 69b ZGB). The Verein is preferred over a foundation (Stiftung) because its statutes can be amended by its **general assembly**–the meeting of all association members. This allows the governance architecture to evolve as the facility's operational scope develops.

The founding members of the IFFMA Secretariat should remain few and strategic–specifically, the founding donor governments and, if useful, a small number of institutional founding partners admitted under the statutes. **Applicants, operators, the host institution, and the Treasury Manager should generally remain outside the**

membership to ensure the general assembly preserves a clear constitutional role without creating allocation or conflict-of-interest concerns.

Recommended membership model

- **Sovereign donor members**: The core members should be founding donors. Subsequent donor governments should join the Verein as members. Each government would designate an authorized representative, typically through its foreign affairs or development ministry. Founding members would be named at incorporation, and later members would be admitted by the general assembly under the statutes.
- **Mine-affected State contributors**: A mine-affected State that voluntarily makes a legally binding pledge could join the Verein as a sovereign contributor under the same membership rules. Contributor status would not create an entitlement to funding; any programme concerning that State would be assessed under the normal eligibility framework, with mandatory recusal from decisions specific to that country.
- **Main role of sovereign donor members**: Sovereign donor members would constitute the general assembly and exercise the association's reserved powers: amending the statutes, admitting new members, electing or removing the Secretariat's Board, approving annual accounts, and deciding other matters required by law or the statutes.
- **Optional institutional founding members**: A very small number of non-applicant institutional founding partners could be admitted at the launch stage if politically useful. This category should remain exceptional and should be limited to entities that do not create applicant, operator, or service provider conflicts.
- **Observers and advisers**: Representatives of mine-affected States that are not members, technical bodies, the host institution, the Treasury Manager, or other stakeholders may be invited to observe or advise under the statutes, board rules, or separate agreements. They should not be members of the Verein or have a vote in the general assembly.
- **Entities that should not be members**: Likely applicants, operators, implementing entities that may seek funding, consortium leads, the host acting in a service capacity, and the Treasury Manager should be excluded from membership by design. This preserves the separation between contributor control, programme eligibility, and financial execution.
- **Core duties of members:** Members should uphold the statutes, respect conflict-of-interest rules, keep membership separate from applicant interests, and fulfil any membership obligations expressly set out in the statutes.
- **Important drafting point:** Being a member of the Verein should not, in itself, replace a donor's pledge or contribution agreement. The general assembly

exercises constitutional control over the secretariat, while the financial commitment to the facility should remain governed by separate pledge and contribution instruments.

The facility's boards: Distinct mandates

Each registered entity has its own governing board. The **SPV Board** serves as the facility's financial and statutory governing body, while the **IFFMA Secretariat's Board** functions as the facility's strategic and programmatic governing body. This division mirrors the structural logic of the IFFIm–where the IFFIm Board of Directors manages the financing vehicle and Gavi's board oversees programmatic and strategic matters–but is adapted to IFFMA's institutional reality: rather than locating the strategic function within a pre-existing institution as Gavi does for IFFIm, IFFMA assigns it to the Secretariat's Board, explicitly established for that purpose in both the secretariat's statutes and the SPV's founding documents.

The two boards are parallel statutory structures that serve different legal entities with distinct mandates. **The SPV Board governs the facility's finances; the Secretariat's Board governs the facility's strategy.** Conflict-of-interest rules apply to both: any member with a direct institutional or financial interest in a matter put before their board must declare it and step back from the relevant discussion and vote.

Decision-making and mandate of each body

Body	Mandate	Decides	Recommends	Consults/informs
IFFMA Secretariat's Board	Strategic and programmatic governance: approves the SAF; appoints the Allocation Committee and Technical/Eligibility Panel; and retains final allocation authority	The SAF; the annual envelope; committee/panel appointments; and final allocations	—	SPV Board (financial compatibility) and Treasury Manager as needed
SPV Board of Directors	Financial governance: authorizes bond issuance; oversees the Treasury Manager Agreement; ensures solvency and company law compliance; and confirms that approved allocations are financially compatible	The issuance of parameters; treasury and liquidity decisions; financial compatibility confirmation	—	Rating agencies and legal counsel

Body	Mandate	Decides	Recommends	Consults/informs
	with liquidity and debt service constraints			
Allocation Committee	Applies SAF to invited submissions from certified operators, national mine action authorities and other Board-approved entities whose programmes meet the criteria to benefit from frontloaded funds; reviews programme proposals; recommends allocations to Secretariat's Board	Procedural matters within its charter, but no final allocation authority	All allocation recommendations to the Secretariat's Board	Technical/Eligibility Panel and secretariat
Technical/Eligibility Panel	Reviews documented evidence against IMAS and applicable national standards; provides internal technical eligibility findings for the facility's allocation process	Technical eligibility findings for internal use	—	National mine action authorities and secretariat
Treasury Manager	Manages bond issuance; cash management, hedging; debt service; investor relations. Non-voting observer on SPV Board	Execution within SPV Board-approved parameters	Issuance strategy, ceilings, tenor, currency	SPV Board and rating agencies
Secretariat (Disbursement Agent)	Processes submissions; supports the Allocation Committee and Technical Panel; administers disbursement and monitoring; manages any hosting agreement	Administrative and operational matters within its mandate	Allocation papers, eligibility coordination, monitoring reports	Host institution and all other bodies, as relevant

Key questions

Question	Answer
Which body controls the facility's strategy?	The Secretariat's Board controls the facility's strategy, through the multi-year SAF.
Who reviews projects and recommends allocations?	The Allocation Committee reviews projects and recommends allocations, operating under a board-approved mandate. It is chartered by and reports to the Secretariat's Board.
Who executes issuance and cash management?	The SPV and its Treasury Manager execute issuance and cash management under separate financial authority delegated by the SPV Board.
How is independence preserved?	Independence is preserved through the legal separation of the two entities; conflict-of-interest rules for both boards and the Allocation Committee; and a hosting agreement that does not transfer assets, liabilities, or decision-making power to the host.
Why is this relevant for donor confidence?	It mirrors the strongest features of earlier front-loading designs: IFFIm separates financing from programme management, while the International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd) relies on existing MDB systems rather than building a parallel operational apparatus.
How does this address the needs of the mine action sector?	Because mine action lacks an equivalent single global operator to Gavi, the facility builds a purpose-built secretariat and allocation architecture grounded in IMAS and National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).
Core recommendation	The SPV should remain a lean financing vehicle and should not act as an implementing operator. Allocation criteria should be set by the Secretariat's Board through a multi-year SAF, then applied by the Allocation Committee operating under strict conflict-of-interest rules and supported by the secretariat.

SPV Board of Directors: Composition, profiles, and appointment

Financial rigour should be ring-fenced at the SPV Board. In accordance with feedback from the IFTWG, the SPV Board should be composed exclusively of those with capital markets, treasury, and structured finance expertise. It should not be involved in programmatic or allocation decisions. The SPV Board's mandate is limited to:

- Issuance authorization and the determination of treasury, reserve and liquidity parameters
- Oversight of the Treasury Manager Agreement, management of reserve and liquidity requirements, and compliance with the company law applicable to the SPV.

The IFFIm precedent directly informs the appropriate profile for members of the SPV Board. IFFIm's trustees–who are also directors of IFFIm for the purposes of company law–are responsible for determining its strategic plans, overseeing their implementation, and monitoring functions outsourced to Gavi and the World Bank. Recent IFFIm board members have included the former global head of capital markets at the World Bank, the co-head of policy and markets at the UK Debt Management Office, the former chief sustainable finance adviser at the European Investment Bank, and senior officials from the African Development Bank. This profile–featuring senior expertise in treasury, capital markets, development finance, and public-sector debt management–should serve as the benchmark for the IFFMA SPV Board. The SPV Board should comprise three to five members.

Members of the SPV Board

Seat	Profile required	Appointment
Director or statutory function	Any director or representative required by the governing law of the SPV, whose role does not need to determine the SPV's strategy (set by the Board as a whole).	Appointed in accordance with the applicable law and the SPV's constitutional documents.
Capital markets/structured finance specialists (1–2 seats)	Senior professionals with experience in bond issuance, funding strategy, hedging investor relations, and rating agency methodology.	Nominated through a process coordinated by the founding donors and appointed in accordance with the SPV's constitutional documents. Indicatively, members could serve fixed three-year terms, renewable once, with staggered rotation. .
Development finance specialist (1 seat)	Senior professional with MDB or international financial institution treasury experience, familiar with the	Same nomination and appointment process as capital markets seats.

Seat	Profile required	Appointment
	financial architecture of donor-backed financing facilities.	
Liaison nominee from Secretariat's Board (optional, 1 seat)	One member nominated by the Secretariat's Board to maintain strategic alignment between the two entities without merging their governance functions. The nominee should not participate in programme allocation decisions in their SPV capacity. e.	Nominated by the Secretariat's Board and appointed or confirmed in accordance with the SPV's constitutional arrangements. The member would normally serve concurrently with their Secretariat Board term.
Treasury Manager (non-voting observer)	The Treasury Manager attends SPV Board meetings as a non-voting observer. They have no seat or role at the Secretariat's Board, consistent with the separation between financial management and programmatic governance.	Observer status is established through the Treasury Manager Agreement.

Meeting frequency: Meetings should be held quarterly–to receive Treasury Manager reports, review solvency and liquidity positions, and confirm the financial compatibility of any revised allocation envelope or disbursement schedule. A prospectus committee of the SPV Board should be established for time-sensitive issuance decisions, consistent with IFFIm practice.

Chair: The chair should be appointed by the SPV Board from among the board's members. They should be a capital markets or development finance specialist.

IFFMA Secretariat's Board: Composition, profiles, and appointment

The Secretariat's Board is the facility's strategic and programmatic governing body. It is established to reflect the facility's mine action mandate and the interests of the donor community. The **founding members of the Verein**–and thus the initial Secretariat's Board's constituent principals–are the pledging donor governments and/or the institutional founding partners. Subsequent board members are elected by the general assembly of the Verein in accordance with the secretariat's statutes.

The Secretariat's Board should meet at least twice per year: first, to approve or review the SAF and annual allocation envelope; and second, to review portfolio performance, receive the secretariat's M&E report, and consider any eligibility architecture amendments warranted by changes in the operating environment.

Donor representatives

Element	Description
Profile	A senior official from the pledging government's foreign affairs or development cooperation ministry, typically at director or deputy-director level, with budgetary or policy responsibility for that government's mine action or humanitarian disarmament portfolio–for example, the head of a humanitarian or stabilization division, or the desk officer with delegated authority for the mine action pledge. Seniority is required because the role carries fiduciary and strategic sign-off responsibilities at the board level.
Role	Voting members of the Secretariat's Board, representing each pledging government's interests in the allocation framework's approval, allocation envelope-setting, and oversight of allocation decisions. Donor representatives should not sit on the Allocation Committee or the Technical/Eligibility Panel: those bodies make or certify case-level recommendations that should remain insulated from the strategic and funding relationship managed by the board.
Appointment	Self-designated by each pledging government and confirmed by the general assembly of the Verein. At inception, board seats are established through founding donors' pledges and contribution agreements. A donor that increases or decreases its pledge does not automatically gain or lose a board seat; voting weight, if adopted, should be specified separately from seat entitlement in the statutes.

Independent experts

Element	Description
Profile	Two to three independent professionals with expertise in mine action, development finance, or programme management, providing technical depth without operational or self-interested alignment. Independence requires no current or pending financial relationship with entities likely to apply for IFFMA funding.
Role	Voting members, providing analytical perspective on SAF quality, eligibility architecture, and portfolio performance. They form the board's audit and conflict-of-interest oversight function.
Appointment	Nominated through a donor-sourced or open-call process and elected by a qualified majority of the Verein's general assembly. They serve fixed three-year terms, renewable once, with staggered rotation to preserve institutional memory.

Rotating mine-affected context representative

Element	Description
Profile	A director or senior official of a national mine action authority or national mine action centre, selected through a peer-rotation mechanism among eligible mine-affected States rather than appointed by a single government.
Role and conflict-of-interest treatment	A non-voting seat with a strategic-input role (the recommended default option). The representative contributes operational and field perspectives to SAF discussions without a vote on envelope-setting, issuance matters, or any allocations affecting their own country. If the board prefers a voting seat for legitimacy reasons, it should be subject to mandatory recusal from any board item concerning the representative's own country and structured as a two-year non-consecutively renewable term.
Appointment	Selected through a transparent peer-rotation process among eligible mine-affected States and appointed by the Secretariat's Board for a two-year, non-consecutively renewable term.

Chair: The chair is elected by the Secretariat's Board from among its voting members. Given the programmatic nature of this board, the chair should combine mine action or humanitarian programme management expertise with the diplomatic capacity to manage a multi-donor governance body. The chair serves a staggered term to ensure that process continuity at leadership level is maintained when a new cohort of members joins.

Strategic Allocation Framework

The SAF is the multi-year rulebook through which the Secretariat's Board sets the facility's programmatic priorities and allocation parameters. It is aligned with the pledge cycle–typically three to five years–and governs how the Allocation Committee assesses proposals. The SAF sets the rules and limits for allocations; it does not preselect projects or replace case-level reviews.

The SAF contains five substantive elements:

- **Allocation envelope:** the total funding available for the cycle, expressed as a cumulative ceiling and indicative annual disbursement schedule. The 25 per cent reserve used in the financial model is a conservative modelling assumption corresponding to a 75 per cent gearing limit, rather than a fixed governance rule; the final reserve and liquidity parameters would be set by the SPV Board with the Treasury Manager and informed by rating agency and market requirements.
- **Strategic priority windows**: pre-defined geographic, thematic, or context-based parameters for eligible submissions. The board should approve the criteria in advance, including the severity and persistence of contamination, the additionality of earlier funding, absorption capacity, national ownership, financing gaps, relevance to recovery or humanitarian priorities, and portfolio diversification considerations.
- **Eligibility architecture:** the eligible types of applicants and activities; minimum technical and fiduciary requirements; and scoring criteria and weights applied by the Allocation Committee, including the balance between primary allocation streams and any flexibility window for underserved or lower-visibility contexts.
- **Allocation methodology:** whether the cycle prioritizes a small number of large multi-year programmes or a broader portfolio, together with concentration limits preventing excessive exposure to any single location or implementing partner.
- **Performance and reporting conditions:** requirements for technical performance, financial reporting, risk management, M&E, and context-specific outcome or impact measures. IMAS 07.40 and 14.10 provide relevant operational principles, but facility reporting would also need to address fiduciary and investor-facing requirements not covered by IMAS.

Allocation Committee

The Allocation Committee would be established **within the governance structure of the IFFMA Secretariat.** It would be chartered and appointed by the Secretariat's Board, administratively supported by Secretariat staff, and financed through the Secretariat's annual operating budget. Its costs— including member honoraria, meetings, travel and any specialist expertise required for individual reviews— would form part of the overall cost of operating the disbursement agent.

The Committee would apply the Board-approved **Strategic Allocation Framework** (SAF) to programme proposals submitted following invitation by the facility within priority contexts identified by the Secretariat's Board. Under this model, the facility would not need to issue an open call to the market. Instead, once the Board has defined the relevant geographic or thematic priorities through the SAF, eligible national mine action authority or centres, recognised mine action programme, or another eligible coordinating entity approved by the Board— could be invited to submit a structured multi-year programme proposal.

The Allocation Committee would review those proposals against the Board-approved eligibility and allocation criteria and make recommendations for final Board approval prior to disbursement. **The Secretariat's Board would retain final authority over all allocations**; the Committee would provide technical review and recommendations but would not make final funding decisions.

The committee should have expertise in mine action operations and standards, programme/grant management, M&E, development or public finance, and mine-affected contexts. Current applicants, implementing partners under review, and sitting donor representatives should not ordinarily be members; context-specific experts may be invited on a non-voting basis. Appointments, declarations of interest, and recusals should be recorded in accordance with the facility's transparency policy.

To ensure investor confidence, the facility's allocation architecture must be strategic, standards-based, insulated from conflicts of interest, and monitorable over time. In mine action, IMAS and relevant National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) provide a common technical and procedural baseline for minimum eligibility and monitoring requirements. While IMAS cannot substitute for an allocation hub, they can provide the evidentiary framework through which to independently verify the Allocation Committee's findings.

Principal-agent risk

The principal-agent risk represents the threat that a committee member acts in their own self-interest rather than in the best interests of the Allocation Committee. This risk extends beyond relationships with applicants: committee members could also be

influenced by donor priorities, host institution interests, prior advisory roles, or relationships with implementing partners. The following safeguards are therefore proposed, in accordance with OECD principles on disclosure, recusal, and post-employment conflict management:

- **mandatory declarations of interest** at every meeting, not only at appointment
- **a post-tenure cooling-off period** of at least 12 months before a former member may accept paid employment or a paid consultancy with an entity whose IFFMA application or funded programme they reviewed, with longer restrictions applied when warranted by the risk of conflict
- **an annual conflict-of-interest audit** carried out by the secretariat, and reported to the Secretariat's Board
- **final approval authority retained by the Secretariat's Board** over all allocations, ensuring that recommendation and decision authority remain structurally distinct.

Role of the Treasury Manager

This paper uses Treasury Manager as the formal term for the financial institution appointed to manage the facility's treasury operations; "Treasury Agent" is a generic description of the same function, not a separate body. The Treasury Manager would support funding strategy and bond issuance, manage liquidity and reserves, conduct hedging and debt services, liaise with investors and rating agencies, and administer donor-backed cash flows. The Treasury Manager operates within parameters approved by the SPV Board and has no role in programme selection. A representative may attend SPV Board meetings as a non-voting observer under the Treasury Manager Agreement.

The World Bank represents the closest institutional precedent because it serves as treasury manager for IFFIm. Other multilateral institutions with demonstrated capital markets capability and experience managing donor-backed facilities could also be considered, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Council of Europe Development Bank, or the African Development Bank. The selection procedure should be conducted by the SPV Board through a competitive process evaluating capital markets capability, donor-backed facility experience, cost, mandate alignment, and conflicts of interest.

Treasury management should be considered a recurrent core cost. The exact fee level will depend on the final mandate, the issuance programme, the size of assets and reserves under management, and whether additional services are required (such as liquidity support or more complex hedging).

Currency considerations

The financial model currently uses USD as the base currency, consistent with the predominant currency of existing mine action funding flows, and the currency used in extension requests under Article 5.3 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) (under which a State Party that cannot complete clearance within the convention's initial 10-year deadline may request an extension of up to 10 years). In practice, these extension requests also provide a useful indication of the contamination, capacity constraints, and funding needs reported by affected States.

If the primary donor pool consists predominantly of European sovereigns (Germany, Norway, the European Union, Switzerland), using the euro as the base currency could meaningfully reduce hedging and swap costs (the cost of exchanging one currency's cash flows for another).

The optimal base currency, reflecting both the composition of donor pledges and the expected investor base, should be determined by the SPV Board together with the Treasury Manager once the founding donor group and issuance strategy become clearer. Pledges in non-base currencies would be hedged according to the relevant payment profile to manage exchange-rate risk. Under the model, hedging costs would form part of the facility's treasury and financing costs unless contribution agreements allocate them differently (see Annex 2 for technical specifications of the financial model).

Estimated establishment and operational costs

The Secretariat is the facility's disbursement agent–the body that performs, in mine action, the functions that Gavi performs for IFFIm. It is formed by the Allocation Committee and its administration support, managing the disbursement to programs.

The proposed hosted model is based on precedent but is not prescriptive. Hosted secretariats and support units exist in international organizations and can reduce the set-up burden.

Illustrative cost comparators

The IFFMA Secretariat would need to support the allocation review process, administer grant disbursements, conduct or commission monitoring, produce reporting for donors and investors, and support a multi-stakeholder governing body. The relevant cost base should therefore reflect the functions required by the proposed facility rather than the budget of any single existing institution.

Publicly available financial information from international grant-making organizations and global partnership secretariats provides useful contextual benchmarks. These organizations vary considerably in mandate, portfolio size, geographical coverage,

staffing models, and institutional arrangements. Their reported costs should therefore be considered only as indicative reference points rather than direct proxies for IFFMA.

Cost comparators

Comparator category	Indicative non-grant operating cost	Illustrative scale and functions	Basis
Geneva-based international grant-making organization	Approximately CHF 10 million annually	Fewer than 50 FTE; multi-country grant portfolio; allocation, monitoring, and civil-society reporting functions	Publicly available audited financial statements
Global partnership secretariat	Approximately USD 20–25 million annually	Large multi-country portfolio; programme oversight, partnership coordination, and reporting functions	Publicly available consolidated financial reporting and independent institutional assessments

The organizations underlying these public benchmarks have not explicitly endorsed the proposed institutional model or the cost assumptions presented and preferred for their cases to be used as abstract examples. The full list of consulted documentation is included in annexes.

Large global financing partnerships are not used as direct cost comparators. Their secretariats generally support portfolios, funding channels, and institutional arrangements considerably broader than those envisaged for IFFMA. They nevertheless illustrate the operational architecture that can support multi-country allocations, programme oversight, financial reporting, and stakeholder governance.

Conversely, small treaty-support units provide a useful lower-bound reference for governance support, meeting administration, and reporting, but do not normally undertake the full grant management, due diligence, disbursement, and field monitoring functions envisaged for IFFMA.

Gavi itself is not taken as the main cost comparator, because IFFIm currently accounts for only around 16 per cent of Gavi's overall funding, rather than financing the entirety of Gavi's portfolio; by contrast, the **IFFMA disbursement agent would need to be created ad hoc to support the full programmatic and disbursement roles required by the facility**.

Even so, Gavi can still illustrate the scale of the institutional architecture behind immunization disbursement: in 2024, Gavi-supported programmes operated across 57 countries and, according to a recent Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) assessment, the Gavi Secretariat comprises approximately 380–390

permanent and temporary core employees, rising to roughly 550–600 personnel when including consulting and COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) staff.

The estimated annual secretariat cost of CHF 2.5–4 million is therefore derived primarily from the indicative staffing and operating model shown below. Public institutional benchmarks are used only to test whether the resulting range is broadly proportionate to the proposed functions. The estimate is not calculated as a percentage of any comparator organization's operating budget.

The final cost would depend on country coverage, portfolio size, allocation frequency, monitoring intensity, the division of responsibilities between the secretariat and other service providers, the scope of shared host services, and the volume and complexity of grants.

Indicative staffing

Role	Min. FTE	Full FTE	Function
Head of secretariat/executive director	1.0	1.0	Strategic management; board and Allocation Committee liaison; accountable for secretariat performance under the hosting agreement
Deputy head/head of programmes	—	1.0	Operational leadership of allocation and M&E; deputizes for executive director
Senior programme officer (allocation)	1.0	1.0	Leads allocation review; prepares Allocation Committee papers; coordinates with framework owners and national mine action authorities
Programme officers (allocation and due diligence)	2.0	3.0	Processes invited submissions; conducts due diligence against SAF criteria; drafts eligibility assessments
Technical/standards officer	1.0	1.0	Supports IMAS and national standards review; liaises with national authorities; could be provided through host support or secondment, subject to mandate, approval and the hosting agreement
Senior M&E officer	1.0	1.0	Designs portfolio M&E system design; oversees independent monitoring visits; conducts annual impact reporting for donors and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investors
M&E officers	1.0	2.0	Field-based monitoring; data collection and analysis; beneficiary reporting against common indicators

Role	Min. FTE	Full FTE	Function
Head of finance/grants management	1.0	1.0	Financial management; disbursement tracking; financial reporting to board, donors, and ESG investors; liaison with Treasury Manager
Grants management officer	1.0	1.0	Disbursement administration; programme financial monitoring; audit support
Communications/donor relations officer	1.0	1.0	Donor reporting; ESG impact communications; International Capital Market Association (ICMA) Social Bond reporting; board meeting preparation
Legal/compliance officer	1.0	1.0	In-house compliance monitoring; contract management; interface with external legal counsel
Administrative/operations support	2.0	2.0	Human resources, payroll, procurement and IT; significant portion could be provided through shared host services under a future hosting agreement, subject to approval and cost
Total	13.0	16.0	At loaded Geneva cost of CHF 130,000–160,000 per FTE: approximately CHF 1.7m–2.6m (personnel only), before hosting fee, consultants, travel and M&E field activities

Note: The FTE cost reflects gross salary plus employer social contributions (AHV/AVS, pension and accident insurance) under Swiss law. This professional planning estimate is benchmarked against Geneva humanitarian-sector market norms and should be verified against the final host institution's human resources data and the agreed service model during hosting negotiations.

One-off establishment costs for legal drafting, entity registration, compliance, and operational set-up are estimated **at CHF 20,000–52,000 for the two registered entities** (the SPV and the secretariat). Official Swiss registry fees are modest–the federal SME portal lists basic commercial register fees of CHF 420 for a limited company and CHF 280 for an association, plus marginal per-entry and certification charges; the larger part of the estimate therefore reflects professional services–such as legal drafting, notarial or fiduciary support, compliance set-up, bank documentation, and the preparation of hosting and governance documentation–rather than registry fees alone. Issuance programme legal documentation (prospectus, rating agency engagement, listing fees) is a further significant cost budgeted separately, as it depends on the issuance size. An external legal opinion is indispensable before registration; opting for this structure is contingent upon receiving this external legal opinion, along with further guidance from future board members.

Annual running costs

Annual running cost	Amount (CHF)	Source and basis
Treasury Manager fees	CHF 1–1.2 million	Planning range derived from observed IFFIm Treasury Manager costs reported by the World Bank and adjusted downward for IFFMA's smaller initial scale and potentially leaner mandate. Not an official quoted fee rate.
Secretariat (13–16 FTE at launch: allocation, M&E, grants management, donor reporting, and administration; plus hosting and non-staff costs)	CHF 2.5–4 million	Planning range based primarily on the staffing model in this section: 13–16 FTE at loaded Geneva cost of CHF 130,000–160,000 per FTE implies approximately CHF 1.7–2.6 million personnel cost excluding hosting, travel, field M&E, IT, and consultants.
External legal support (ongoing)	CHF 100,000–200,000	Professional planning estimate covering compliance, covenant monitoring, disclosure obligations, and ad hoc structured finance support. Verification from Geneva counsel is recommended before use as a planning figure.
Credit rating agency reports and maintenance (2 agencies)	CHF 100,000	Indicative planning allowance for initial and ongoing rating surveillance. Two ratings are assumed for broad institutional market access. Not a quoted tariff.
Total indicative annual operating cost	CHF 3.7–5.5 million	Before bond transaction costs for each issuance.

Annual running cost	Amount (CHF)	Source and basis
		At the minimum annual disbursement target of approximately USD 173 million, the administration cost ratio is broadly within the 2–7% range used as a contextual benchmark for comparable global funds.

Taken together, the one-off establishment cost is therefore estimated at CHF 270,000–302,000, and the indicative first-year cost envelope (one-off establishment plus one year of operations) at CHF 3,970,000–5,802,000. These are planning figures, not quoted market rates.

Cost sensitivity: the planning range should not be read as scale independent. Secretariat staffing and field monitoring costs would rise with the number and geographic spread of funded programmes, while Treasury Manager, legal, and rating costs depend more on the mandate and issuance complexity. Underwriting, listing, and transaction costs for each issuance remain outside the annual operating cost range and would need to be assessed against the final issuance programme.

Conflict-of-interest safeguards

A credible front-loading vehicle keeps strategy setting separate from project assessment and implementation. Once the governance framework is established, the facility is designed to direct capital through a systematic and documented process, ensuring both investor confidence and allocation credibility. The governance framework is complemented by a clear set of conflict-of-interest safeguards that apply to both the Allocation Committee and the secretariat.

The Secretariat's Board, as the donor-governed strategic body, should not include voting members from entities likely to apply for funding, whether directly or through consortium arrangements. Specialist organizations, United Nations (UN) entities, or technical bodies that may later be involved in applications can contribute through observer or advisory roles rather than holding voting seats. Allocation Committee members should serve in an independent expert capacity, and any direct institutional, financial, country-specific, political, donor-priority, implementing partner, advisory, consultancy, hosting, or other material interests must be declared and managed through recusal. The framework should expressly address donor influence, the interests of the host institution, and prior advisory relationships. The secretariat should remain legally independent and must not apply for IFFMA funding; these requirements should be embedded in the statutes, board rules, conflict-of-interest policy, hosting agreement, and funding agreements, rather than assumed as a general principle of Swiss association law.

Members of IFFMA bodies

Body	Should likely applicants have a seat?	Recommended rule
Secretariat's Board	Not as voting members	Entities likely to apply for funding should not hold voting seats, and participate only as observers or advisers.
SPV Board	Not applicable	The SPV Board is composed exclusively of financial experts. No programme-implementing entity should hold a seat.
Allocation Committee	No current applicants; donor officials should not ordinarily sit	Members should serve in an independent expert capacity. Any direct institutional, financial, donor-priority, or country-specific interests or applicant relationships require disclosure and recusal; exceptions to composition rules should be justified and documented.
Technical/Eligibility Panel	No	Panel members review evidence against IMAS and applicable national standards and issue internal eligibility findings. They should have no financial or institutional relationship with entities whose submissions they review.
Secretariat	No	The secretariat remains legally independent and does not apply for IFFMA funding.

Project eligibility and allocation criteria

This framework is particularly well suited to an application-by-invitation system. IFFMA would not automatically invite the market at large to compete for contracts. The proposed invitation model for IFFMA would be programmatic rather than procurement based: instead of procuring mine action services for the facility, it would invite a framework owner to develop a programme within a board-approved priority window. As this approach can nevertheless still create fairness and reputational risks, the SAF should define when an invitation is justified, the criteria for selecting an invited entity, why a broader call would not better serve the facility's purpose, and the documentation and review requirements for each invitation. Any procurement law implications would remain subject to legal review.

Eligible framework owners could include: (1) a national mine action authority or centre with a mandate to coordinate the proposed programme; (2) a recognized UN-led mine action programme or coordination framework; or (3) with the SAF's expressed permission and only if no additional intermediary adds value, a consortium or partnership of accredited national and/or international operators acting through a designated lead entity. In all cases, the invited entity should have legal standing, fiduciary capacity, and a

formal mandate or endorsement appropriate to the programme. The selection criteria and rationale for the invitation should be predefined and documented to ensure the process does not amount to preferential access or endorsement of a particular commercial operator.

Under this model, the invited proposal should identify the implementing partners and the supporting delivery arrangements. This not only preserves the distinction between strategic programme ownership and field delivery, but also allows the facility to remain rule-based and selective without appearing to conduct a procurement process. Accredited operators would therefore still be able to access funding as named implementing partners within an invited programme or, where permitted by the board-approved strategy, as direct submitting partnerships.

The facility should avoid unnecessary intermediary layers. Where accredited national or international operators provide an effective delivery platform, disbursement should flow directly to the approved lead entity or operator partnership–rather than through passive intermediaries that add administrative steps without improving accountability or delivery quality. Localization objectives should be reflected in programme eligibility and delivery arrangements, while still using international capacities when necessary for operations.

The Allocation Committee should review, justify, and document its recommendations in line with the allocation and eligibility architecture approved by the board for the relevant multi-year cycle. Its role is to apply the board-approved framework to invited submissions, assess whether the evidence and safeguards are sufficient, and recommend allocations for final board approval.

Allocation and eligibility architecture

To ensure sector-wide credibility, eligibility criteria could be anchored in the applicable **IMAS** together with relevant NMAS.

A single facility-level theory of change should underpin this architecture, supported by common indicators and a limited number of context-specific measures. The core results chain is:

- front-loaded and predictable funding (input)
- multi-year work plans, greater operational continuity, and reduced mobilization delays (outputs)
- faster land release, reduced explosive ordnance risk, and improved access to land and infrastructure (outcomes)
- safer communities, recovery benefits, and stronger national systems (impacts).

Key assumptions–including donor continuity, absorption capacity, access, national coordination, and functioning governance–should be stated explicitly and tested during allocation and monitoring.

The architecture should also retain a measure of flexibility. While mass-contaminated settings with stronger mine action systems may be the most immediately compatible with front-loading, the SAF should reserve a limited flexibility window for underserved, lower-visibility, or so-called forgotten contexts that still meet minimum fiduciary, technical, and feasibility requirements.

While IMAS alone do not create an allocation hub**,** they provide a strong foundation for defining minimum operational and technical requirements for eligibility. The strategic priorities and the final criteria would be set by the facility's board through the multi-year SAF, and then translated into evidence requirements, metrics, and scoring rubrics by the secretariat and the Allocation Committee.

To protect the facility's credibility with both donors and investors, project eligibility should be determined through a clear and documented assessment procedure. The sequence below is designed to ensure that capital is directed only to contexts and programmes that are strategically relevant, operationally feasible, technically sound, and financially compatible with front-loading.

Reporting should distinguish between implementation reporting and longer-term follow-up. Use of funds, activities, and outputs should be reported both during implementation and upon programme completion. Measurable outcomes should be reported during the programme cycle. Where appropriate and feasible, selected longer-term impact indicators may be monitored for a period determined by the board after completion. The secretariat should consolidate portfolio-level reporting and, where relevant, align allocation and impact reporting with the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) Social Bond Principles and the Harmonised Framework for Impact Reporting for Social Bonds.

Step 1: Determine context eligibility. The first step would be to assess whether a country or context falls within the strategy approved by the board. The Allocation Committee, supported by the secretariat, would determine whether the mine-affected context is eligible for consideration. The appraisal should evaluate not only documented contamination, coordination, and operational feasibility, but also whether a significant financing gap exists relative to identified needs and available or committed resources. This prevents front-loaded capital from being directed to contexts where the need is insufficiently evidenced or where additional finance cannot realistically be absorbed.

These metrics are illustrative, and not prescriptive or exhaustive. The final metrics should be approved by the board, according to its statutes.

Context eligibility

Criterion	Illustrative metric	Possible evidence	Assessment method
Documented explosive ordnance contamination	Extent of confirmed or suspected hazardous areas; contamination affecting civilians, their return, agriculture, or infrastructure	Information. Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) records, upon expressed permission of affected country; national baseline survey; national strategy maps	Pass/fail at concept stage; updated during due diligence
National authority recognition	Existence of a national authority, centre, or equivalent coordination mechanism	Government decree, statute, or official designation	Pass/fail
Operational feasibility	Access conditions and absorption capacity for a multi-year programme	Risk note from UN or country platform; implementation feasibility memo	Pass/fail with mitigation conditions
Strategic fit	Country falls within board-approved priority windows	SAF	Pass/fail
Financing gap	Significant gap between documented programme needs and available or committed resources	National financing plan; donor mapping; extension request; programme budget and confirmed commitments	Pass/fail or prioritization criterion

Step 2: Determine programme eligibility

The second step would be to assess whether a proposal is the right type of programme for front-loaded mine action funding. Here the facility would convert board-defined strategic priorities–such as programme sustainability, funding at scale, national ownership, localization, or additionality–into measurable criteria.

The secretariat would support the board-appointed experts in the Allocation Committee in defining and documenting these metrics, with the board being responsible for final approval.

The weights below are illustrative only: different multi-year allocation frameworks could favour different strategic approaches, changing the relative scoring.

Programme eligibility

Priority	Questions asked by the facility	Illustrative metric	Possible evidence	Decision use
Programme sustainability	Will the programme result in durable national capacity or sustained benefits from land release?	Share of work plan dedicated to national systems, quality assurance and control, information management, and transition; existence of residual risk plan	Transition roadmap; NMAS development plan; training and certification plan; pathway for post-release land use	Scored (20%)
Funding at scale	Is the programme large and predictable enough to justify front-loading?	Minimum envelope and minimum duration	Multi-year budget; disbursement curve; milestone schedule	Pass/fail plus scoring
National ownership	Is the programme nationally led or at least nationally endorsed and embedded in public plans?	Formal endorsement by national authority; role of national authority in oversight; alignment with national strategy, policy, or work plan	Government letter; extracts from national strategy; oversight terms of reference	Scored

Localization	Does the programme strengthen national and local actors where feasible, and provide a realistic pathway for contexts where local capacity is weak or absent?	Share of budget implemented by national actors where feasible; national staffing in operational and supervisory roles; local procurement where suitable; capacity-development pathway in fragile settings	Consortium structure; staffing plan; subcontracting plan; training budget	Scored
Additionality	Would facility funding accelerate or extend the programme beyond what ordinary grants would support?	Incremental hectares, households reached, roads reopened, or infrastructure unlocked relative to a baseline grant scenario	Donor mapping; note on alternative scenarios; financing gap analysis	Scored
Programme risk	Are operational, security, fiduciary, safeguarding, and delivery risks understood and manageable?	Risk rating and mitigation measures; contingency arrangements; residual risk after mitigation	Programme risk register; independent due diligence; national or UN risk information	Pass/fail with mitigation conditions and scoring where appropriate

This tier could also incorporate IMAS-based operational integrity tests. For example, proposals could demonstrate information management arrangements consistent with IMAS 05.10, quality management arrangements consistent with IMAS 07.12, or a land release methodology consistent with IMAS 07.11 and related technical notes on all reasonable effort.[9]

Step 3: Determine financing eligibility

The third step would be to confirm whether the project is financially compatible with front-loading. The point here is not to duplicate technical appraisal, but to ensure that

the selected programmes are the ones that stand to benefit most from earlier funding– while still meeting the facility's fiduciary and portfolio safeguard requirements.

Financing eligibility

Criterion	Purpose	Illustrative question	Typical decision rule
Predictable disbursement profile	Allows the SPV to match commitments to expected liquidity and borrowing	Can disbursements be phased over multiple years with credible milestones?	Pass/fail
Fiduciary channel suitability	Ensures funds move through accountable channels	Is the proposed recipient able to receive and report on funds in line with the required standard?	Pass/fail
Portfolio concentration	Avoids excessive exposure to one location, conflict setting, or implementer	Would approval create concentration risk at the facility level?	Board and treasury judgment
Investor and contributor defensibility	Protects the facility's narrative to markets and donors	Can the programme be described as a strategic public goods investment with measurable outcomes?	Board judgment


Case studies: Front-loading for mine action

Case study 1: Front-loading for mine action in Ukraine

In the Ukrainian case, the scale of contamination, the linkage between clearance and recovery, and the urgency of restoring productive land and infrastructure make a case for earlier and more predictable financing. Integrating mine action into broader reconstruction programmes is identified as a critical enabler of economic recovery. Importantly, interventions and geographic targeting may require collaborative, continuous reassessment to ensure operational feasibility and risk mitigation in conflict-affected settings.

Figure 4 illustrates mine action activities in Ukraine to inform the planning of future activities and humanitarian response, consulted on July 6, 2026.

Figure 4: Implementation of humanitarian demining activities in Ukraine



The interactive map was created by the Ukraine Mine Action Centre in cooperation with the GICHD under the coordination of the secretariat of the national mine action authority.

The Ukraine National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2033 has established a long-term national policy framework addressing explosive ordnance contamination and closely aligning with IFFMA's project eligibility criteria.[10] The strategy, including the operational plan for its implementation from 2024 to 2026, aims to restore safe land use, protect the population, and strengthen national mine action governance. Three strategic priorities guide implementation:

- the release of contaminated territories through systematic surveys, land release processes, market development for mine action services, and technological innovation
- reducing risks to the population through marking hazardous areas, and coordinating ER and rehabilitation for victims
- strengthening the national mine action management system through improved institutional capacity and coordination, unified certification procedures, and effective management of international assistance.

The operational plan for the next three-year period–from 2027 onwards–is currently being developed.

The need for mine action in Ukraine is assessed using the RDNA. Based on the RDNA5, the total recovery and reconstruction needs for explosive hazards management are estimated at USD 27.6 billion over the period 2026–2035.

IFFMA is not a substitute for all international mine action funding for Ukraine. This illustrative case considers how IFFMA could support Ukrainian multi-year programmes with USD 220 million, beginning with an annual disbursement of USD 48 million, followed by a consecutive annual decrease of USD 2 million. This yearly reduction of USD 2 million is intended to showcase IFFMA's capacity to spread multi-year funding flexibly, based on programmatic needs. After review by the Allocation Committee, the programme aligns with the strategic purpose and programme eligibility criteria for front-loaded mine action finance. The programme is assumed to last five years and begin in year 1.

Case study 2: Front-loading for mine action in Cambodia

The case of Cambodia also shows the potential value of front-loaded funding for mine action. The scale of residual contamination in the country is estimated at 524 million square metres across ten provinces and directly hinders the recovery of agricultural land, housing, water resources, forests, and market access.[11] The APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation notes that, despite declining accident rates, farmers continue to enter uncleared land because of livelihood and agricultural pressures. This indicates that residual contamination continues to constrain safe agricultural use, even as casualty trends improve. Significant parts of the programme still need to be completed. According to Cambodia's own analysis, an estimated USD 146 million (over a five-year period) is needed to implement Article 5 through 31 December 2030.[12]

The country's third extension period is driven by the forthcoming National Mine Action Policy 2026–2035, which emphasizes strengthening national capacity to manage residual contamination.[13] The policy therefore reflects a deliberate strategic focus on national ownership of both implementation and long-term institutional response, in line with the project eligibility criteria. The APMBC Extension Committee has explicitly identified stable international funding as essential for Cambodia's effectiveness through 2030,[14] underscoring the importance of stable and predictable financing for implementation for the period leading up to 2030. **Figure 5** illustrates mine-free provinces up until the end of June 2025, according to the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority.[15]

Figure 5: Map of Cambodia showing mine-free provinces, as of 30 June 2025




Source: Royal Government of Cambodia

Under an illustrative front-loading scenario, IFFMA could support Cambodia's multi-year programme with financing of USD 100 million over the five-year extension period. The remaining funding required could be addressed by Cambodia's resource mobilization strategy.

Figure 6 illustrates how front-loading could be applied for Ukraine (blue) and Cambodia (red). Backed by collective 10-year donor, IFFMA could provide earlier funding totalling USD 705 million in the first five years, including for Ukraine (USD 220 million) and Cambodia (USD 100 million).

Figure 6: Frontloading case studies – Ukraine & Cambodia



Conclusion

A front-loading facility for mine action could create a pooled, more predictable, and multi-year funding channel; support earlier disbursement of funds in selected contexts; and provide a common platform for potential new donors to participate and make pledges. Anchor donors could help non-traditional donors with lower credit ratings to access the facility; however, while this crowding-in effect is technically possible, it remains to be confirmed whether new donors would decide to join.

The analysis in this investment case suggests that, at present, these advantages are not sufficient to justify the cost and institutional complexity of establishing a full IFFIm-style bond-issuing structure. Unlike immunization, where IFFIm builds on Gavi's pre-existing programme allocation and disbursement machinery, mine action has no equivalent sector-wide body. Reproducing that architecture would require new legally independent structures, dedicated governance and staffing, treasury and legal services, and ongoing operating expenditure.

The distinctive benefit of front-loading–making larger volumes of funding available earlier–also does not automatically generate the same economies of scale in mine action as it can in immunization, where standardized bulk procurement is key to driving down vaccine prices. IFFIm complements rather than replaces Gavi's wider grant base: it accounts for approximately 16 per cent of Gavi's overall funding and relies on Gavi and the World Bank for programme administration and treasury support. A conservative cost-benchmarking exercise indicates that the annual operational cost for such an institutional set-up would be **CHF 3.7 to 5.5 million,** preceded by a one-off establishment cost of **CHF 0.3 million.**

This finding does not diminish the importance of the objectives pursued: **predictability, multi-year planning, crowding-in additional sources of funding, flexibility, stronger coordination, and closer alignment with national priorities**. These objectives are not, however, exclusive to a bond-financed facility.

Investors in an IFFIm-style structure would lend funds against sovereign donor pledges; they would not assume the operational or outcome risk of mine action programmes. This avoids placing debt obligations on mine-affected countries, but does not mobilize the risk-sharing investment capital often associated with private sector participation.

The reasonable conclusion is therefore not to abandon the search for better mine action financing, but to adopt a phased approach: preserving the objectives; testing lower-cost alternatives through existing institutions; and retaining the possibility of a global vehicle as a later option if a disbursement entity (the “Gavi equivalent”) already holds the relevant mandate.

Recommendations

This investment case recommends that the next phase prioritize institutionally lighter, country-specific financing approaches that can deliver more predictable and strategically aligned resources without creating a parallel global operating apparatus.

A better comparison is the approach of the International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd), rather than that of IFFIm. This approach is designed to expand financing through existing MDBs, complement their established instruments and delivery systems, and address financing gaps without creating a separate programme implementation body.

For mine action, this would mean integrating mine action and explosive ordnance risk reduction into existing recovery, reconstruction, agriculture, infrastructure, or environmental remediation wherever contamination is a binding constraint on delivery or investment. Mine action costs could be structured as eligible enabling costs within larger programmes, assisted through donor grants, guarantees, concessional windows, technical assistance, or blended finance–depending on the public benefits, revenue model, and repayment capacity of the underlying project.

Official recovery assessments recognize explosive ordnance contamination as a major obstacle to reconstruction and development in countries such as Ukraine.[16] This creates a practical pathway for testing country-level mine action investment frameworks through existing MDB, donor, and recovery finance channels before considering a new bond issuer.

A standalone IFFMA vehicle should be reconsidered only when all three of the following conditions are met: sufficiently firm and legally credible multi-year donor pledges; a mature programme selection and disbursement architecture; and clear evidence that the benefits of early, large-scale liquidity outweigh the legal, financial, and operating costs of creating and maintaining the facility.

Recommended direction

This investment case recommends exploring how mine action could be linked to additional funding sources through already established disbursement channels (for instance, by creating country-specific investment frameworks delivered through existing MDB and recovery finance channels).

This could preserve IFFMA's core objectives–multi-year predictability, strategic allocation, flexibility, and crowding-in–without incurring the costs of establishing a standalone bond issuer and disbursement apparatus.

Potential features of the next phase:

- Use existing MDB, donor, and recovery finance structures rather than creating new institutions unless strictly necessary.
- Integrate mine action and explosive ordnance risk reduction into broader recovery operations where contamination hinders delivery or investment.
- Use multi-year and catalytic instruments (including capacity-building grants, guarantees, concessional co-financing, and technical assistance) through established institutions.
- Strengthen national ownership by linking financing to country-led recovery and mine action plans.

By March 2027, the GICHD Innovative Finance Secretariat will propose a country-specific funding model that includes the features listed above.

Annex 1: Glossary of key terms

Bond: A bond is a way for an organization to raise money from many lenders at once. Instead of borrowing from a bank, the organization raises money from investors by issuing bonds. In return, it commits to:

1. repay the original amount borrowed (the principal)
2. make regular interest payments (the coupon) over a defined period.

Bonds are commonly used by governments, development banks, and international facilities to raise large sums of money upfront for public purposes.

Example: The IFFIm issues bonds on international financial markets. Investors–such as pension funds or insurance companies–buy these bonds, providing IFFIm with immediate cash. That cash is used right away to fund vaccination programmes. Over time, donor governments pay their pledged contributions to IFFIm, and those payments are used to repay the investors. In this way, money that would have arrived gradually over many years becomes available immediately.

Coupon: The coupon is the **interest payment** made to investors for lending their money. It is usually paid annually or semi-annually and is expressed as a percentage of the principal.

The coupon compensates investors for:

- waiting to be repaid
- taking on a (usually low) level of risk.

Example: An investor who buys a bond issued by IFFIm might receive a small annual interest payment. That payment comes from donor contributions made to IFFIm, not from profits. The coupon is typically modest because the bonds are backed by long-term donor commitments and managed by a highly trusted Treasury Manager. IFFIm's first bond issuance in 2006 raised USD 1 billion to be repaid after five years at an interest rate of 5 per cent (a competitive rate at the time).[17]

Impact investing: Impact investing is an **investment approach** that aims to contribute to achieving positive, measurable social and environmental impacts. Impact requires 1) *measurability*: a change measured against a baseline; 2) *intentionality*: a clearly defined parameter; and 3) *additionality*: a change that would not have occurred in the absence of the activity.[18] Impact investors can provide either concessional or non-concessional finance.

- **Non-concessional finance** refers to deploying capital with the intent to generate positive, measurable impact alongside a **market-rate financial return**.

  Market-rate financial return means that the risk-return trade-off of an asset is *competitive* with other assets on the market. Typically, the potential return on investment rises when the risk increases. For projects that are competitive at market rates, there is a market. For-profit and commercial entities can engage directly, *without* the need for de-risking or public funding support.

- **Concessional finance** refers to deploying **below market-rate finance** provided by major financial institutions to accelerate *development* objectives. It refers to financial resources extended under terms less demanding than standard market conditions. This type of capital is often used to support high-impact projects that may not attract sufficient private sector investment.

  Actors that operate in this space are development **finance institutions**, **multilateral funds**, **regional/multilateral development banks (MDBs)**, and **philanthropies**.

Example: The vast majority of "impact investing" market includes **non-concessional** fundings. For instance, institutional and commercial investors can access "ESG funds" or "responsible investing funds". The International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank, is considered the world's largest impact investor providing *concessional* finance.
An example of concessional finance is debt with lower expected interest or extended repayment periods, for a health innovation company in a developing country.

High-risk, partly humanitarian projects that fall under the purview of international organizations, public entities, and non-commercial actors relate to *concessional* finance. This can be crucial not only to realistically determine which actors to engage, but also to maintain humanitarian principles.

Principal: The *principal* is the **original amount of money borrowed** through a bond. It does not include interest. When a bond matures, the principal must be fully repaid to investors.

Example: If a facility issues bonds worth CHF 500 million, that CHF 500 million is the *principal*. Over the life of the bond, investors receive interest payments but, at the end of the bond's term, the full CHF 500 million must be repaid. Donor contributions or other agreed funding streams are used to repay this amount.

Present value: Present value refers to the idea that **money available today is worth more than the same amount received in the future**. This is because money today can be used immediately, while money received later cannot.[19] In financing mechanisms

such as front-loading, present value is realized by turning future payments into cash available today through borrowing.

Example: If a donor commits to contributing CHF 10 million per year over 15 years, those payments would normally arrive slowly over time. Through a front-loading mechanism, the facility can borrow against those future payments and access most of that value upfront. This allows activities–such as mine clearance or vaccination–to happen years earlier, when they are most urgently needed.

Special-purpose vehicle (SPV): An SPV is a legal entity established to perform specific functions–holding assets or liabilities–that are limited in scope or time. The SPV's core business function consists of channelling funds from one entity to another entity. The SPV has only a minor role in managing and directing activities. Typically, an SPV has no or few non-financial assets and employees. The main purpose is to protect entities from financial risk and create separate layers for complex financial operations.

Example: IFFIm is an SPV: it receives annual donor commitments, issues bonds on the capital market, and consequently channels these funds to Gavi to support vaccination programmes. IFFIm has no employees and holds few non-financial assets. Gavi is therefore better protected from the financial risks of vaccine bonds, since there are different legal layers between IFFIm and Gavi.

Treasury manager (also referred to generically as treasury agent): A treasury manager is an institution appointed to manage the financial operations of a facility that raises money through bonds or other borrowing, including by:

- issuing bonds
- managing incoming and outgoing cash flows
- making interest (coupon) payments to investors
- ensuring repayments are made on time.

The treasury manager does **not decide how money is spent** on programmes. Its role is purely financial and operational.

Example: For IFFIm, the World Bank acts as treasury manager.[20] The World Bank uses its financial expertise and strong credit standing to issue bonds on behalf of IFFIm and manage all payments to investors. This arrangement reassures investors that the facility is professionally managed and reduces borrowing costs, while allowing IFFIm and its partners to focus on health outcomes rather than financial operations.

Annex 2: Technical specifications of the financial model

The financial forecast model provides an indicative estimate of the facility's capacity to disburse upfront funds for mine action. This is based on hypothetical donor pledges, financial parameters, and predefined restrictions. A **pledge** is defined as a legally binding donor commitment, specifying nominal amounts and contribution timelines. A **disbursement** refers to funds available for programmatic expenditure (such as land clearance).

The model applies structured and conservative assumptions, based on market data as of 15 April 2026. The model also uses the **Secured Overnight Financing Rate** (SOFR), a benchmark interest rate for US-dollar financial instruments, to estimate borrowing costs. Through SOFR, the model estimates the **present value of pledges**–that is, how much the pledges are worth today in real terms.

To forecast maximum upfront disbursement, the model incorporates a **"gearing ratio limit" of 75 per cent.** This means only part of donor pledges can be converted into immediately available funds through bond issuance. The remaining portion is retained as a reserve. **This reserve protects bondholders and supports the facility's creditworthiness.**

For the time being, the facility's currency is assumed to be USD–consistent with the currency currently used for the majority of funding flows to mine action programmes. If donors commit funds in currencies other than US dollars (or the facility's base currency), donor pledges would be **hedged.**

These **hedge contracts** fix exchange rates at the time of pledge signature, allowing for predictable conversion of donor contributions into US dollars. This mitigates foreign exchange risks and ensures stability between incoming funds (donor contributions and bond issuances) and outgoing payments (disbursements and bond payments).

Annex 3: Concrete examples of how eligibility metrics could be assessed

The examples below are not intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive, but rather to illustrate how a secretariat could support the definition of assessment metrics for board approval and implementation by an Allocation Committee, as well as how eligibility criteria and assessment metrics could be applied within the facility's internal governance and decision-making processes. They are not intended to create any form of public certification, accreditation, ranking, endorsement, or "investment readiness" label for a country, programme, operator, consortium, implementing partner, or other actor. The examples should not be relied upon as investment, legal, technical, fiduciary, or credit assessments, and do not replace independent due diligence by donors, investors, implementing entities, or other third parties.

1. Example: Contamination and land release readiness

An applicant country might claim that a proposed five-year programme will unlock agricultural land and generate returns. Rather than relying on that statement alone, the facility should ask for the following: mapped hazardous areas in a recognized information management system; a baseline showing suspected and confirmed areas; the prioritization logic for non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance; and the national criteria governing cancellation, reduction, and clearance. This is in line with the IMAS land release architecture, which requires national standards to define evidence-based criteria and the desired level of confidence for released land.

2. Example: National ownership

A proposal led by an international NGO should not pass the national ownership test merely because the NGO consulted the government. The stronger test is whether the national mine action authority has formally endorsed the programme; whether it appears in a national strategy or annual work plan; whether national authorities are part of the programme's oversight mechanism; and whether the proposal strengthens national policy, quality management, or information systems. IMAS 09.10 supports this approach by placing broad strategic, policy, and regulatory authority at the national level.

3. Example: Localization

Localization should not be reduced to a rhetorical preference for local partners. A credible set of metrics might include the following: the share of the total budget executed by national entities; the percentage of national staff in supervisory roles per year; the existence of a certification or accreditation pathway for national teams; and the extent to which the proposal transfers survey, quality management, and data management capabilities rather than only field labour tasks. These indicators are especially appropriate in mine action because safety, information quality, and quality assurance are

not ancillary functions; they are central to operational confidence under IMAS 05.10 and 07.12.

4. Example: Additionality

Additionality should be measured against a credible counterfactual. For example, if current grants will fund annual clearance in one province, but front-loaded funding will support a five-year compact across three provinces plus national information management upgrades and operator training, the incremental outputs and systems effects should be shown clearly. The facility can request a comparison between the baseline grant scenario and the front-loaded scenario, including time saved, area released sooner, infrastructure reopened earlier, and the degree to which fixed programme costs are spread more efficiently across a larger multi-year portfolio.

5. Example: Monitoring integrity

The investment case should also show that success will be monitored independently, while making clear that monitoring does not guarantee programme quality, safety, legal compliance, financial performance, or the achievement of outcomes. IMAS 07.40 states that those involved in monitoring should be competent and free from bias and conflicts of interest. This is highly relevant to facility design as it means that monitoring and verification should not be left solely to the implementing entity; the secretariat or an independent monitor should review records, site evidence, and performance reports. IMAS 14.10, updated in 2025, further supports the inclusion of programme-level monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning frameworks in mine action programme design.

Annex 4: Detailed calculation of establishment costs

The one-off establishment estimate of CHF 20,000–52,000 covers the legal and operational steps required to constitute the two registered entities proposed in this paper–a Swiss SA/AG for the SPV and a Swiss association (Verein) for the secretariat–before any bond issuance documentation is prepared. The estimate deliberately excludes the SPV's paid-in share capital, because that capital remains an asset of the company rather than a sunk establishment cost.

Component	**Amount (CHF)**	**Basis**
Commercial register basic fee–SA/AG	420	Official federal SME portal basic fee.
Commercial register basic fee–association	280	Official federal SME portal basic fee.
Additional register entries, signatures, certified extracts	100–400	Official portal lists modest per-entry and certification charges; range depends on final filings.
Notarial/fiduciary incorporation support for the SA/AG	2,500–6,000	Planning estimate pending quotes; covers incorporation deed, capital deposit coordination, and initial corporate formalities.
Legal drafting of statutes, board rules, basic governance documents, and hosting agreement skeleton	12,000–30,000	Planning estimate pending quotes from Swiss legal counsel.
Compliance, Know Your Client (KYC), bank documentation, Unique Identification Number (UID)/payroll /tax registration set-up	3,500–10,000	Planning estimate pending quotes; varies with banking and hosting arrangements.

Domiciliation/fiduciary/first-year corporate secretarial set-up	1,500–5,000	Planning estimate pending quotes.
Total one-off establishment cost (excluding paid-in capital)	20,000–52,000	Sum of the components above.

In addition to these legal and registration costs, this paper assumes a separate innovative finance transition and coordination phase costing CHF 250,000. That figure is an internal planning estimate, rather than an externally quoted tariff; it is intended to cover the transition work required to move from design to implementation, including donor coordination, procurement of legal and treasury support, and preparatory governance work before operational launch.

Official Swiss sources also confirm that a Swiss SA/AG requires minimum share capital of CHF 100,000, of which at least CHF 50,000 must be paid in upon establishment. Because that paid-in capital remains an asset of the SPV, it is not counted here as an establishment expense.

Reference documents

- **IFFIm, "Prospectus" (30 August 2024):** Consulted for the funding request and approval process, including Gavi's role in requesting funding and IFFIm's review of requests against constitutional and financial parameters before confirmation.
- **IFFIm, *Annual Report of the Trustees and Financial Statements* (2024):** Consulted for the governance and operating model, including the fact that IFFIm has no employees and oversees functions outsourced to Gavi and the World Bank.
- **IFFEd, "Prospectus" (2020):** Consulted for the design principle of working through existing multilateral development bank structures, supporting government-led programmes aligned with credible country plans, and avoiding the creation of a parallel delivery entity.
- **IFFEd, "Prospectus" (2020) and "Design Proposal" (2018):** Consulted for the staged allocation approach, including the identification of potential beneficiary countries, the use of agreed allocation criteria, and the link between country eligibility, credible plans, and debt sustainability.
- **IFFIm, "Resource Guide" (2025):** Consulted as a general reference on IFFIm's institutional architecture, financial model, and operating logic.
- **World Bank Treasury, "About the World Bank Treasury":** Consulted for the description of treasury functions relevant to the role of a treasury manager.

- **World Bank, *Ukraine–Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): Main Report, February 2022–December 2025* (2026):** Consulted as a recent official reference on the scale of damage, recovery, and reconstruction needs in a mine-affected context, and for the broader proposition to embed explosive ordnance contamination in recovery planning and affects infrastructure, housing, agriculture, and public service restoration.
- **GICHD, *Operational Efficiency in Mine Action* (March 2023):** Consulted for the definition of operational efficiency and for factors affecting efficient use of mine action resources.
- **Government of the Netherlands, *Evaluation of the Mine Action and Cluster Munitions Programme of the Netherlands 2016–2020: Final Report* (October 2019):** Consulted for evidence on the operational benefits and flexibility constraints associated with multi-year mine action funding.
- **IFFIm, "First IFFIm Bonds Raise US$1 Billion" (7 November 2006):** Consulted for the timing of IFFIm's inaugural issuance and the pre-existing operating track record of Gavi at the time of launch.
- **IMAS 04.10, Glossary:** Consulted for the definition of the national mine action authority as the government entity responsible for broad strategic, policy, and regulatory decisions in mine action.
- **IMAS 05.10, Information Management in Mine Action:** Consulted for requirements relating to systematic information management, along with quality control, across mine action programmes.
- **IMAS 07.11, Land Release, and Technical Note 07.11/03 on All Reasonable Effort:** Consulted for the principle that national standards should define evidence-based criteria for cancellation, reduction, and clearance, as well as the desired level of confidence in released land.
- **IMAS 07.12, Quality Management in Mine Action:** Consulted for the minimum requirements of a mine action quality management system.
- **IMAS 07.40, Monitoring of Mine Action Organisations:** Consulted for the principle that monitoring should be carried out by competent persons free from bias and conflicts of interest.
- **IMAS 14.10, Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning in Mine Action Programmes (2025 edition):** Consulted for monitoring, evaluation, and accountability principles relevant to programme oversight.

- **FCDO, Annual Review of IFFIm (2024):** Consulted for the observation that IFFIm's funding costs on outstanding bond issuance were reported at approximately 40 basis points above the weighted average spot rate of donor funding costs.
- **IFFIm credit reviews by Fitch (September 2025), Moody's (October 2025), and Standard & Poor's (S&P) (December 2025):** Consulted for the proposition that IFFIm's credit profile is supported in part by the strength and scale of outstanding donor commitments, particularly from its largest contributors.
- **World Bank, IFFIm Treasury Manager Report–First Quarter of 2025:** Consulted for current information on treasury manager costs, fund balances, debt service and liquidity management, and the operational scope of the treasury manager function within the IFFIm model.
- **Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund**, Annual Financial Statements 2024, audited by BDO Ltd, Geneva, 4 June 2025
- **Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, *Annual Report 2024* (2025)**
- **MOPAN, *MOPAN Assessment Report: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance* (2024)**
- **Swiss SME portal, Registration costs with the commercial register:** Consulted for official Swiss commercial register fee schedules for a limited company and an association, and for ancillary entry and certification charges.
- **Swiss Civil Code and Swiss Code of Obligations (Fedlex):** Consulted for the legal requirements governing Swiss associations and limited companies, including legal personality, audit thresholds, paid-in capital, and Swiss-resident representation requirements.
- **World Bank, "IFFIm Treasury Manager Report: Fourth Quarter of 2024":** Consulted, together with the "First Quarter of 2025" report, for observed treasury manager cost levels in the IFFIm precedent.
- **Gavi donor profiles (including the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, France, Norway and the United Kingdom):** Consulted for evidence that direct support to Gavi and IFFIm support coexisted in practice.
- **ICMA, "Social Bond Principles" (June 2025) and *Handbook: Harmonised Framework for Impact Reporting for Social Bonds* (June 2025):** Consulted for

ex-post allocation and impact reporting expectations relevant to ESG-oriented investors and social bond issuance.

- **OECD, *Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and Country Experiences* (2004), together with subsequent OECD integrity guidance:** Consulted for principles on disclosure, recusal, and post-employment conflict management.

Endnotes

[1] IFFIm (International Finance Facility for Immunisation). "About IFFIm." https://iffim.org/about-iffim.
[2] See Annex 1 of this document for a detailed glossary of key terms such as "bonds", "coupon", and "principal"–including practical, illustrative examples for each category.
[3] GICHD (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining), *Operational Efficiency in Mine Action* (Geneva: GICHD, 2023).
[4] IFFIm, *Resource Guide 2025* (Cheshire: IFFIm, 2025); International Capital Market Association (ICMA), *Social Bond Principles: Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Social Bonds* (Paris: ICMA, 2025). Consulted for IFFIm's investor base and the characteristics of social bond issuance.
[5] IFFIm, *Resource Guide 2025* (Cheshire: IFFIm, 2025); IFFIm, *Annual Report of the Trustees and Financial Statements, 31 December 2024* (Cheshire: IFFIm, 2024).
[6] ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Landmines). *Landmine Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL, 2025). Inflation adjustments through World Bank historical Special Drawing Rights (SDR) deflator (2024 =100).
[7] A primary distinction for bond issuances is between private placements, which are bilaterally negotiated and unlisted, and public benchmark bonds, which are syndicated to a broad institutional investor base and subject to secondary market obligations. IFFIm's vaccine bonds are typically public benchmark bonds.
[8] For instance, bond activity could be through USD equivalent 500 million inaugural bond in year 1, and a USD equivalent 250 million bond in year 3, 5, and 8.
[9] International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), IMAS 05.10: Information Management in Mine Action: mine action programmes should ensure systematic management of information, along with quality control; IMAS, IMAS 07.11: Land Release. IMAS, Technical Note 07.11/03 on All Reasonable Effort: national standards should define evidence-based criteria for cancellation, reduction, and clearance, along with the desired level of confidence in released land; IMAS, IMAS 07.12: Quality Management in Mine Action: mine action quality management systems should follow the identified minimum requirements.
[10] Ukraine, "Ukraine National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2033," 2024. Approved by Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers on 28 June 2024.
[11] Analysis of the request submitted by Cambodia for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the convention, Committee on Article 5 Implementation (Algeria, Norway, and the United Kingdom), 6 November 2025.
[12] Analysis of the request submitted by Cambodia, 6 November 2025.
[13] Analysis of the request submitted by Cambodia, 6 November 2025.
[14] Analysis of the request submitted by Cambodia, 6 November 2025
[15] On 30 September 2025, the Cambodian government requested an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas.
[16] World Bank Group, Government of Ukraine, European Commission, and United Nations, *Ukraine: Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4), February 2022–December 2024* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025), 180.
[17] IFFIm, *Resource Guide 2025* (Cheshire: IFFIm, 2025).
[18] Betti, Gianni, Costanza Consolandi, and Robert G. Eccles, "The Relationship between Investor Materiality and the Sustainable Development Goals: A Methodological Framework," *Sustainability* 10, no. 7 (2018), 2248.

[19] World Bank, Maximizing Finance for Development: Leveraging the Private Sector for Growth and Sustainable Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018). Internal lessons note.
[20] World Bank Treasury. **"**About the World Bank Treasury."
https://treasury.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/treasury.